The Southern Strategy

Darrkman

Hollis, Queens = Center of the Universe
BGOL Investor
I don;t always come nto the poltical forums but I saw some of the discussions of Blacks and why they vote for Democrats and I had to discuss the Southern Strategy. It seems there are people in here that were unaware of the Suouthen Strategy. What I plan to do is add a few posts to this thread that educate and discuss the GOP, the Southern Strategy and its possible return.
 
Southern strategy
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In American politics, the Southern strategy refers to a Republican Party (GOP) method of winning Southern states in the latter decades of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century by exploiting opposition among the segregationist South to desegregation and Civil Rights, and the cultural upheaval of New Left, Vietnam protests, and the Hippie culture.


Although the phrase "Southern strategy" is often attributed to former Richard Nixon strategist turned liberal political commentator Kevin Phillips, he did not originate it,[1] but merely popularized it.[2] In an interview included in a 1970 New York Times article, he touched on its essence:
From now on, the Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the Negro vote and they don't need any more than that... but Republicans would be shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. The more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans. That's where the votes are. Without that prodding from the blacks, the whites will backslide into their old comfortable arrangement with the local Democrats.[3]
While Phillips sought to polarize ethnic voting in general, and not just to win the white South, the South was by far the biggest prize yielded by his approach. Its success began at the presidential level, gradually trickling down to statewide offices, the Senate and House, as legacy segregationist Democrats retired or switched to the GOP. In addition, the Republican Party worked for years to develop grassroots political organizations across the South, supporting candidates for local school boards and offices, for instance. Following the Watergate scandal, there was broad support for the Southern Democrat Jimmy Carter in the 1976 election.
From 1948 to 1984 the Southern states, traditionally a stronghold for the Democrats, became key swing states, providing the popular vote margins in the 1960, 1968 and 1976 elections. During this era, several Republican candidates expressed support for states' rights, which some critics claim was a signal of opposition to federal enforcement of civil rights for blacks and intervention on their behalf, including passage of legislation to protect the franchise.[4]
Analysts such as Richard Johnston and Byron Shafer have argued that this phenomenon had more to do with the economics than it had to do with race. In The End of Southern Exceptionalism, political scientists Johnston of the University of Pennsylvania and Shafer of the University of Wisconsin wrote that the Republicans' gains in the South corresponded to the growth of the upper middle class in that region. They suggested that such individuals believed their economic interests were better served by the Republicans than the Democrats. According to Johnston and Shafer, working-class white voters in the South continued to vote for Democrats for national office until the 1990s. In summary, Shafer told The New York Times, "[whites] voted by their economic preferences, not racial preferences".[5]
In 1980 Republican candidate Ronald Reagan's proclaiming support for "states' rights" at his first Southern campaign stop was cited as evidence that the Republican Party was building upon the Southern Strategy again. The location was significant - Reagan spoke at the Neshoba County Fair near Philadelphia, Mississippi, the county where the three civil rights workers were murdered during 1964's Freedom Summer,[6][7][8] even though political speeches from local, state, and national politicians at the fair had been a long-standing tradition at the Fair dating back to 1896.[9]
In 1968, Nixon lost a majority of southern electoral votes; his 1972 victory, both Reagan victories, and the victory of George H. W. Bush in 1988 could have been won without their carrying any Southern state. Bill Clinton, a Southern Democrat was twice elected President, winning a handful of Southern states in 1992. In 1996, he won more votes outside the South and could have won without carrying any Southern state.[10]
In recent years, the term "Southern strategy" has been used in a more general sense, referring to the way in which political parties use cultural themes in election campaigns — primarily but not exclusively in the American South. In the past, politicians' highlighting of issues such as busing or states' rights appealed to white angst about integration. More recently, Republican politicians made appeals to "conservative values", and used cultural issues such as gay marriage, abortion, and religion to mobilize their base. This has also been viewed as the Southernization of American politics.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_strategy
 
GOP admits to the Southern Strategy

RNC Chief to Say It Was 'Wrong' to Exploit Racial Conflict for Votes

By Mike Allen
Thursday, July 14, 2005
It was called "the southern strategy," started under Richard M. Nixon in 1968, and described Republican efforts to use race as a wedge issue -- on matters such as desegregation and busing -- to appeal to white southern voters.

Ken Mehlman, the Republican National Committee chairman, this morning will tell the NAACP national convention in Milwaukee that it was "wrong."

"By the '70s and into the '80s and '90s, the Democratic Party solidified its gains in the African American community, and we Republicans did not effectively reach out," Mehlman says in his prepared text. "Some Republicans gave up on winning the African American vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit politically from racial polarization. I am here today as the Republican chairman to tell you we were wrong."

Mehlman, a Baltimore native who managed President Bush's reelection campaign, goes on to discuss current overtures to minorities, calling it "not healthy for the country for our political parties to be so racially polarized." The party lists century-old outreach efforts in a new feature on its Web site, GOP.com, which was relaunched yesterday with new interactive features and a history section called "Lincoln's Legacy."

Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean spoke to the NAACP yesterday and said through an aide: "It's no coincidence that 43 out of 43 members of the Congressional Black Caucus are Democrats. The Democratic Party is the real party of opportunity for African Americans."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071302342.html
 
For The Modern GOP, It's A Return To The "White Voter Strategy"

First Posted: 08- 3-09 09:56 PM | Updated: 08- 4-09 11:34 AM


With Republican party leaders so constrained by ideological blinders that none of their positions is likely to produce gains among non-white minorities, especially Hispanics, the GOP is finding it has no real alternative but to revert to a "white voter" strategy.

To some extent, it's working. The party's opposition to President Obama's agenda -- particularly his cap-and-trade energy proposal and health care reform plan -- is resonating strongly with disaffected white Democratic voters. Republican grievances about Obama, combined with race-baiting commentary from the far-right ideologues who have become some of the most dominant voices of the modern GOP, have led to a precipitous drop in the president's approval ratings among whites.

It's all very reminiscent of the party's notorious Southern Strategy, which carried the GOP for decades. But that strategy backfired spectacularly in the 2006 and 2008 elections, and there's no reason to think it will work any better in 2010 -- especially given the ever-growing importance of the minority electorate.

In this respect, even if the GOP picks up a few House and Senate seats in 2010, many of the party's top analysts believe that it will remain mired in minority status through 2012 and beyond. Other analysts say it may even decline to the level of a minor regional party, with its only real strength in the South.

The Appeal to White Voters

The appeal of the anti-Obama agenda has proven to be particularly strong among whites of low and moderate incomes. The Pew Center, tracking evaluations of Obama's job performance, found in a July 30 report that there "has been essentially no shift in opinion among affluent whites [but] among whites with annual family incomes of less than $75,000, Obama's approval ratings have declined substantially (from 57% in June to 47% today). Assessments of Obama's performance remain high among African Americans (85%)."

ABC News polling similarly found in late June that the possible costs to consumers of cap-and-trade legislation "are particularly important to less well-off Americans. Among those making less than $50,000 a year, support for regulating greenhouse gas emissions drops by 17 points (from 75 percent to a still-majority 58 percent) if it raises prices; support if it costs $10 a month is 49 percent; and at $25, just 35 percent."

The trend lines reported by Gallup are perhaps the most striking: At the start of this year, during late January, Gallup found that Obama's job approval ratings stood at 63 percent among whites, 86 percent among African Americans, and 74 percent among Hispanics. In the Gallup survey taken in late July, Obama had gained 9 points among blacks, reaching 95 percent job approval, and was holding his own among Hispanics, dropping a statistically insignificant 2 points to 72 percent.

Story continues below
Among white respondents, however, he had dropped 16 points to 47 percent.

These findings are reinforced by recent trend lines emerging in the Wall Street Journal/NBC polling series.

In that series, the decline has been sharpest among white men, whose approval-disapproval ratio fell by 27 points, from 50-36 to 40-53.

The Demographic Trends

Republican pollster Bill McInturff notes that his party must make substantial gains among Hispanic voters or be relegated to minority status. But that just isn't likely.

With a solid majority of Republican senators opposed to the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor, the first Latina nominee to the Supreme Court, and a solid phalanx of adamant Republican opposition to any immigration reform which provides a path to permanent residency of illegal immigrants, the GOP has no real chance of increasing its share of the Hispanic vote.

In the short term, McInturff and others point out that virtually all the Democrats' vulnerabilities are among Anglo voters, especially white men. These trends are likely to produce some victories for Republican candidates in 2010, but the party continues to have long-term problems in building a sustainable election-day majority.

President George W. Bush and his top advisers were acutely aware of the long-range limitations of a "white" Republican Party. Bush, in his appointments and some of his policies, sought to reach out to the crucially important Hispanic electorate, most significantly pushing for immigration reform that would have provided a path to permanent legal residency and possibly citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants in the country.

The effort paid off for Bush in 2004, when he received 44 percent of the Hispanic vote, a Republican record.

In 2005, however, Bush's use of the immigration issue as a vehicle to win over Hispanics imploded. Republican members of Congress overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, often using language suggesting Hispanics did not share American values and other comments that angered and offended the Hispanic electorate. In the 2006 elections, only 30 percent of Latinos voted Republican, and in the 2008 presidential election, the Republican candidate, Sen. John McCain, got just 31 percent.

The Republican Party thrived between 1968 and 2000 primarily because of the gains it made among white voters, especially among formerly Democratic working-class whites, a disproportionate share of whom were men. By 2000, however, the GOP's white strategy began to run out of gas, as the white percentage of the electorate dropped to 80 percent and below.

The trend is striking. In 1976, 89 percent of the electorate was white. That number fell every four years, to 88 percent in 1980, 86 percent in 1984, 85 percent in 1988, 83 percent in 1996, 81 percent in 2000, 77 percent in 2004, and 74 percent last year. The only exception was 1992, when the presence of independent candidate Ross Perot drove the white percentage of the electorate up to 87 percent.

Nate Silver, a sports statistician and political analyst, looks at this from a different vantage point:

Consider this remarkable statistic. In 1980, 32 percent of the electorate consisted of white Democrats (or at least white Carter voters) -- likewise, in 2008, 32 percent of the electorate consisted of white Obama voters. But whereas, in 1980, just 9 percent of the electorate were nonwhite Carter voters, 21 percent of the electorate were nonwhite Obama voters last year. Thus, Carter went down to a landslide defeat, whereas Obama defeated John McCain by a healthy margin.
Silver points out that Republicans are getting slightly less dependent on white voters, but Democrats

are becoming less white at a much faster rate than the Republicans. Whereas 85 percent of their votes were from white voters in 1976, the number was just 60 percent last November. This is, of course, a helpful characteristic, since the nonwhite share of the electorate, just 11 percent in 1976 and 1980, represented more than a quarter of the turnout in November.
Silver produced this chart:

original.jpg



Emory University political scientist Alan Abramowitz has, in turn, tracked the growth of minority votes cast in presidential elections since 1992 and finds:

original.jpg



For the Republican Party, these trends not only illustrate the danger of attempting to win without improving margins among minority voters, but also the danger that a modest collection of Congressional wins next year - say 10-15 House seats --will only reinforce the dominant forces in the House and Senate wings of the GOP that adamantly support a conservative agenda that precludes concessions to minority groups. That, in turn, would increase the likelihood that the Democratic Party will be able to maintain majority status in 2012 and beyond.
 
Re: Y'all Azz "Brainwashed"

Its not about you. It's about the Rep party was the Black party for 100 yrs. Cain does have a point about us being sold on Dems who haven't done a damn thing for us. Check the numbers they don't lie.

Black folk are not loyal to the Democrats per se. Black folk vote for their interests. Your self hate assumes that Black folk's decisions are not based on self interests. Black folk voted in overwhelming numbers for republican presidential candidates until FDR. What was the reasons? Accord to my parents, FDR gave them a better deal. Black folk voted for Truman in large numbers. Why? Because he desegregated the military. The last republican president to get major Black folk vote was Eisenhower. Why, because of his support for Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. Even Nixon's first run totaled 1/3 of the Black vote. But since then, the republican's national presidential support for states rights which began predominately during Goldwater's presidential run in 1964 have general turned Black folk away from the GOP nationally. And from that point on, republicans figured they didn't need the Black demographic to win the presidency. Hell, Nixon's second presidential run which featured his Southern Strategy was designed to energize the segregationists and his pact with Strom Thurman in 1967 for Thurman's endorsement to win the South Carolina primary assured that the integration of schools that started under Eisenhower would be slowed down during Nixon's administration. And Regan's demonetization of poor Black folk did nothing to bring Black folk to voting for Republicans.

If Cain wants Black folk to be more open to republicans, he should speak on the de facto racism in private sector employment, the more equitable distribution of educational quality, particularity in the south were he grew up under segregation and the enforcement of equality under the law such as drug disparity sentencing to name a few.

As John Stewart said, I'm paraphrasing, "may be it's not the republican candidates, maybe it's their message".
 
Re: The Official Willard Mitt Romney Thread


About the post above

Gallup poll oversamples republiklan and older voters in their statistical model of their "typical voter". This is because outside of presidential election cycles, a much smaller percentage of younger and non-white voters participate in elections. The over 60 white people almost always vote in all elections, mid-term, local & presidential. If President Obama's 2008 voter demographic template is equaled in the 2012 race — then Obama wins re-election in a landslide. This is why voter suppression is such a critical part of the republiklan national election strategy.

Military Donations To Obama’s Campaign
Dwarf Romney’s Numbers
<blockquote>
"Although much has been made of the tendency of veterans to vote Republican, Obama actually won in 2008 among veterans under the age of 60."
</blockquote>
13187.png.jpeg


May 29, 2012

http://www.addictinginfo.org/2012/05/29/military-donations-to-obamas-campaign-dwarf-romneys-numbers/

 
Re: The Official Willard Mitt Romney Thread

Thanks for the clarification, however as I have stated earlier, republicans will automatically get 35% of the vote just by having an "R" in front of a candidate.

They have been voting against their own interests since the late 1960s and yet can't figure out why they are in the predicament they are in.

They Southern Strategy has been in full effect since Tricky Dick.
 
Re: Could Texas become a battleground state ?

Carter won Texas because of the Dixiecrats.

The Bill Clinton type are the centrist type.

This is still a center right country.

Carter won Texas because of the Dixiecrats.

Dixiecrats in 1976? Virtually all racist Democrats switched to the republican party by 1968. That's one reason Nixon won with his "Southern Strategy."

The Bill Clinton type are the centrist type.

Clinton is center left. President Obama is center left. Gerald Ford and Dwight Eisenhower were center right.

This is still a center right country.

Eliminate Social Security and we'll see hoe center right this country is.
 
Re: Could Texas become a battleground state ?


We Are All Welfare Queens Now

[The Evolution of the Southern Strategy]



By: Ta-Nehisi Coates
a senior editor for The Atlantic



Mitt Romney's high-handed claim that one in two Americans will vote for Obama simply to better ensure their own sloth, reminded me of Lee Atwater's famous explanation of the Southern Strategy:
You start out in 1954 by saying, "N*****, N*****, N*****."
By 1968 you can't say "N*****" -- that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like:
- forced busing,
- states' rights
and all that stuff.​
You're getting so abstract now [that] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me -- because obviously sitting around saying, "We want to cut this," is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "N*****, N*****."​

The process Atwater is describing really stretches back to 1790 (sorry if I am on repeat here) when Congress restricted citizenship to white people. Progress has meant a series of fights first over direct and indirect components of citizenship (voting, serving in public office, serving in the Army, serving on juries etc.) and less explicit tactics to curtail access to them.

I think what's often missed in analyzing these tactics is how they, themselves, are evidence of progress and the liberal dream of equal citizenship before the law. It's true that for a century after the Civil War, the South effectively erased the black vote. But there was an actual black vote that had to be militated against, and in the North that vote held some sway. It's worth critiquing how the machine manipulated the black vote in Chicago, but it's also worth noting there was a black vote present, people exercising their own wills and prerogatives.

More to the point, as tactics aimed at suppressing black citizenship become more abstract, they also have the side-effect of enveloping non-blacks. Atwater's point that the policies of the Southern Strategy hurt blacks more than whites is well taken. But some whites were hurt too. This is different than the explicit racism of slavery and segregation. During slavery white Southerners never worried about disenfranchising blacks. After slavery they needed poll taxes and the force of white terrorism. After white terrorism was routed and the poll tax outlawed, they targeted the voting process itself. But at each level what you see is more non-black people being swept into the pool of victims and the pool expanding.

You can paint a similar history of the welfare state, which was first secured by assuring racist white Democrats that the pariah of black America would be cut out of it. When such machinations became untenable, the strategy became to claim the welfare state mainly benefited blacks. And as that has become untenable, the strategy has become to target the welfare state itself, with no obvious mention of color. At each interval the ostensible pariah grows, until one in two Americans are members of the pariah class.

In all this you can see the insidious and lovely foresight of integration which, at its root, posits an end to whiteness as any kind of organizing political force. I would not say we are there. But when the party of white populism finds itself writing off half the country, [i.e.,

Those People" . . . “who are dependent upon government, who believe they are victims, who believe the government has a
responsibility to take care of them, who believe they are entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you name itwe are really close."]​

we are really close.

 
Re: Racism & Fear



......<SPAN style="background-color:yellow">RepubliKlans only play was to double-down on racism ; constantly try to delegitimize his presidency. </span>

The RepubliKlans have reasserted their ‘southern strategy’ with an intensity not seen since the hate from the southern slave states projected against Abraham Lincoln during the 1860 election cycle.

The United States is now (2011) in a ‘civil-cold-war’. The outcome will determine what type of country the US is in the near future.............




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Southern Whites' Shift to the GOP Predates the '60s

Southern Whites' Shift to the GOP Predates the '60s
By Sean Trende
April 30, 2013

I by-and-large agree with the thrust of Jamelle Bouie’s recent American Prospect article, which argues that Republicans badly misapprehend the reason(s) African-Americans generally vote for Democratic candidates. Too many conservatives assert that African-Americans have developed a “false consciousness” and simply need to be shown the error of their ways before they’ll start supporting Republicans. Asking “What’s the matter with black people?” simply isn’t going to get the GOP very far in its minority outreach efforts.

But in the course of this argument, Bouie makes the following statement: “White Southerners jumped ship from Democratic presidential candidates in the 1960s, and this was followed by a similar shift on the congressional level, and eventually, the state legislative level. That the [last] two took time doesn’t discount the first.”

If you polled pundits, you’d probably get 90 percent agreement with this statement. And if you polled political scientists, you’d likely get a majority to sign off on it. That’s maddening, because it’s incorrect.

I’ve written at length on this, both in my book and here, but it is worth revisiting. In truth, the white South began breaking away from the Democrats in the 1920s, as population centers began to develop in what was being called the “New South” (remember, at the beginning of the 20th century, New Orleans was the only thing approximating what we currently think of as a city in the South).

In the 1930s and 1940s, FDR performed worse in the South in every election following his 1932 election. By the mid-1940s, the GOP was winning about a quarter of the Southern vote in presidential elections.

But the big breakthrough, to the extent that there was one, came in 1952. Dwight Eisenhower won 48 percent of the vote there, compared to Adlai Stevenson’s 52 percent. He carried most of the “peripheral South” -- Virginia, Tennessee, Texas and Florida -- and made inroads in the “Deep South,” almost carrying South Carolina and losing North Carolina and Louisiana by single digits.

Even in what we might call the “Deepest South” -- Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi -- Eisenhower kept Stevenson under 70 percent, which might not seem like much until you realize that Tom Dewey got 18 percent in Georgia against FDR in 1944, and that this had been an improvement over Herbert Hoover’s 8 percent in 1932.

In 1956, Eisenhower became the first Republican since Reconstruction to win a plurality of the vote in the South, 49.8 percent to 48.9 percent. He once again carried the peripheral South, but also took Louisiana with 53 percent of the vote. He won nearly 40 percent of the vote in Alabama. This is all the more jarring when you realize that the Brown v. Board decision was handed down in the interim, that the administration had appointed the chief justice who wrote the decision, and that the administration had opposed the school board.

Nor can we simply write this off to Eisenhower’s celebrity. The GOP was slowly improving its showings at the congressional level as well. It won a special election to a House seat in west Texas in 1950, and began winning urban congressional districts in Texas, North Carolina, Florida and Virginia with regularity beginning in 1952.

Perhaps the biggest piece of evidence that something significant was afoot is Richard Nixon’s showing in 1960. He won 46.1 percent of the vote to John F. Kennedy’s 50.5 percent. One can write this off to JFK’s Catholicism, but writing off three elections in a row becomes problematic, especially given the other developments bubbling up at the local level. It’s even more problematic when you consider that JFK had the nation’s most prominent Southerner on the ticket with him.

But the biggest problem with the thesis comes when you consider what had been going on in the interim: Two civil rights bills pushed by the Eisenhower administration had cleared Congress, and the administration was pushing forward with the Brown decision, most famously by sending the 101st Airborne Division to Arkansas to assist with the integration of Little Rock Central High School.

It’s impossible to separate race and economics completely anywhere in the country, perhaps least of all in the South. But the inescapable truth is that the GOP was making its greatest gains in the South while it was also pushing a pro-civil rights agenda nationally. What was really driving the GOP at this time was economic development. As Southern cities continued to develop and sprout suburbs, Southern exceptionalism was eroded; Southern whites simply became wealthy enough to start voting Republican.

In 1964, Barry Goldwater won 49 percent of the vote in the South to Lyndon Johnson’s 52 percent. This doesn’t represent a massive breakthrough; in fact, Goldwater ran somewhat behind Eisenhower’s 1956 showing. He lost Texas, Virginia, Florida, and Tennessee, all four of which were won twice by Eisenhower and the last three of which were won by Nixon. He also lost North Carolina and Arkansas.

Goldwater did win Louisiana and South Carolina, although as we saw above, those states became “swing states” in the 1950s, not the 1960s. The only real breakthroughs for Republicans came in Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi (Goldwater won 87 percent of the vote in the latter). But the argument that white Southerners in those states began voting Republican in 1964 is quite a different animal than the much broader claim that white Southerners began voting Republican that year; even then, the groundwork in these largely rural states had been laid in the 1950s.

And of course, there were steps forward in addition to the steps back for Democrats afterward. Jimmy Carter won the South by 10 points in 1976; if you narrowed down to white Southerners, Gerald Ford’s showing probably looked a lot like the Eisenhower/Nixon showings in the South. Even as late as 1992, Bill Clinton ran only a point behind George H.W. Bush in the South, although his showing among white Southerners was clearly much weaker. (Every Southern state besides Arkansas was decided by single digits that year.)

Even at the congressional level, the 1964 elections don’t represent some sort of watershed. The GOP’s development in the South lags its development at the presidential level, as quality candidates continued to favor the Democratic Party well into the 1990s, and as the national Democrats continued to tolerate Southern Democrats operating as a de facto third party through the mid-1970s. But as shown above, it doesn’t start in the 1960s either.

But if you're looking for an analogue to Ike's 1952 showing in the South, but at the congressional level, it would probably be 1962, not 1964. The GOP went from winning 21 percent of the Southern vote for Congress in 1960 to winning 33 percent in 1962. It nearly unseated Alabama Sen. Lister Hill that year, leading political scientist Walter Dean Burnham to declare that two-party competition had finally arrived there. Of course, it also won LBJ’s Senate seat in a special election in 1961.

Republicans actually stepped backward in the House popular vote in 1964, to 32 percent, before winning 34 percent in 1966. Incidentally, all of these improved showings owe a lot to Eisenhower, who directed the NRCC to launch “Operation Dixie” in the late 1950s, developing local “farm teams” in states where no Republican organization existed and working to make sure more House races were contested.

Goldwater’s nomination may well have represented a watershed in the GOP’s ideological development (though I think there are some nuances there that are frequently missed as well), and there’s no doubt, at least in my mind, that GOP candidates used racialized appeals to try to win over Southern whites. None of those debates are impacted by the observations above.

But the assertion that white Southerners began voting Republican in 1964 is simply incorrect, whether for president, Congress, or statehouses. The development of the Southern GOP was a slow-moving, gradual process that lasted over a century, and is just being completed today.

Sean Trende is Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics. He is a co-author of the 2014 Almanac of American Politics and author of The Lost Majority.

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ar...shift_to_the_gop_predates_the_60s_118172.html
 
Re: Southern Whites' Shift to the GOP Predates the '60s

Southern Whites' Shift to the GOP Predates the '60s
By Sean Trende
April 30, 2013


Strangest article. Definitely in line with a Greed response to a direct question. No one from what I've read in this post suggested that southerns only began voting republican post 1960s.

In fact how could anyone suggest that southerns only started voting republican post 1960s when between Lincoln and FDR (1861 - 1933) out of the 17 presidents, only 4 were democrats.

What the Southern Strategy was/is is the appeal to southern racism and states rights. A tactic popularized by Nixon's 1967 political strategist Kevin Phillips.

And if the contention that there was even a racist strategy , why did in 1981, republican campaign Guru Lee Atwater apologize for it?


<IFRAME height=315 src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/X_8E3ENrKrQ" frameBorder=0 width=560 allowfullscreen></IFRAME>
 
Re: Southern Whites' Shift to the GOP Predates the '60s

Strangest article. Definitely in line with a Greed response to a direct question. No one from what I've read in this post suggested that southerns only began voting republican post 1960s.
You mean like accusing people of linking Hitler and guns. When confronted about why you made the thread, you provide a quote of Atlanta Braves pitcher John Rocker from 2007.

In fact how could anyone suggest that southerns only started voting republican post 1960s when between Lincoln and FDR (1861 - 1933) out of the 17 presidents, only 4 were democrats.
I didn't know the split was actually 50/50 by the time of the Civil Rights Act. And just like the article, I would also bet that the average person doesn't know that either.


What the Southern Strategy was/is is the appeal to southern racism and states rights. A tactic popularized by Nixon's 1967 political strategist Kevin Phillips.

And if the contention that there was even a racist strategy , why did in 1981, republican campaign Guru Lee Atwater apologize door it?
You put so much effort into responding without even caring what the article said. "... and there’s no doubt, at least in my mind, that GOP candidates used racialized appeals to try to win over Southern whites. None of those debates are impacted by the observations above."

I didn't say the article was meant to contradict the existence of the Southern Strategy and the article made it a point to counter the reactive stupidity of people like you, yet you still bumped 5 threads like you're on a DNC crusade.

I posted this article for the same reason I post anything, because I found it interesting and I posted it in this thread specifially because it provides context that people may have been unaware of like I was unaware of it.

Now go ahead and tell us why you feel so threatened.
 
Re: Southern Whites' Shift to the GOP Predates the '60s

You mean like accusing people of linking Hitler and guns. When confronted about why you made the thread, you provide a quote of Atlanta Braves pitcher John Rocker from 2007.


That Hitler post got to you!:lol::dance:
 
source: Daily Kos

Little_Rock_integration_protest.jpg


It all started with a Constitution that allowed slavery to continue unmolested in the Southern states, only limiting the importation of additional slaves after 1808. In addition to requiring the return of escaped slaves to the slave labor camps, it required them to be included in the census as three-fifths of a free person for taxation and representation.

Because seats in the House of Representatives are based on population, not on the number of registered voters or even on the number people eligible to vote, but of total population—including people held in slavery, even if each was only considered three-fifths of a man—the South received more that their fair share. And it was not just extra House seats that their slave population provided, but also additional muscle in the Electoral College that selects the president. According to Edward E. Baptist in The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism:
One result was the South’s dominance of the presidency over the next seventy years. Four of the first five presidents would be Virginia slaveholders. Eight of the first dozen owned people.​
Oh, but you say, we fought a Civil War and ended all of that nonsense when we freed the slaves. Slavery ended 150 years ago, it is time to move on. To get past it. Get over it.

I wish that we could, but if you follow me below the fold I will trace for you the reasons it never ended and continues today.

Reconstruction 1865-1877

After the end of the Civil War, U.S. Army troops were sent into the rebellious states to ensure the civil rights of the newly freed people. This period only lasted for a dozen years, but during that time, African Americans were granted suffrage. The rebels of the Southern states, who never truly surrendered, joined together under the banner of the terrorist organization, the Ku Klux Klan, to intimidate black and white voters who attempted to participate in civic life and supported Reconstruction. This resulted in federal intervention under the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871.

Keppler-Conkling-Mephistopheles.jpg
A political cartoon by Joseph Keppler
depicts Roscoe Conkling as a character
Mephistopheles (the devil) while
Rutherford B. Hayes strolls off with the prize
of the "Solid South" depicted as a woman.



Compromise of 1877

By 1877, through means of voter suppression, intimidation, and fraud, the Democrats had managed to achieve a majority in the House of Representatives. In 1877, the Southern racists, nominally Democrats, agreed to stop the Senate filibuster and support Republican presidential candidate Rutherford B. Hayes in exchange for the removal of U.S. Army troops from South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, and a return to self-rule for the states.

The South vowed to protect the rights of African Americans.

This is a simplified, bare-bones version of a quite complicated negotiation, but the nuance it deserves would require an entire volume on the Compromise of 1877. Fortunately, C. Vann Woodward has already written one. From his work, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction, comes this example of Southern legislative tactics that should sound familiar to those who follow current events:
At a Democratic caucus on February 19,1877, a majority of the members voted for a resolution to write into the army appropriations bill, then still pending, a clause forbidding the use of troops to support the claims of any state government in the South until it should be recognized by Congress. A bill containing such a clause was passed by the House and a penalty of hard labor and imprisonment provided for anyone found guilty of violating the act. When the Republican Senate refused to accept the clause the House stood its ground and adjourned without making any appropriations for the army whatever.
Leaving President Hayes with an angry, unpaid army. Note that government shutdown by Southern racists, unable to get what they want through the legislative process, is not a new tactic.

Jim Crow

JimCrowInDurhamNC.jpg
attribution: Jack Delano for Farm Security Administration, Library of Congress, Licensed under Public Domain

Right after promising to protect the rights of all citizens, Georgia passed a poll tax in 1877 that effectively shut out freed slaves. Other Southern states followed, adding complicated registration requirements, literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses that allowed poor whites to vote because they were, or were descended from those, who were able to vote prior to 1860.

The impact: In Louisiana, in 1896 there were 130,334 registered black voters. Two years later, after restrictions had been introduced, there were 5,320 registered black voters. By 1910, there were only 730 in the entire state. This in a state where half the population was African American.

Voter turnout dropped drastically throughout the South as a result of such measures.

It is important to remember that although African Americans are a national minority, they were the majority in the Southern states after the Civil War. In Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, Richard H. Pildes, New York University School of Law, writes that they were entitled to:
... equal access to whatever schools happened to be available. They were also entitled to decide that educational spending would be 5x instead of x. African Americans were entitled to nondiscriminatory law enforcement and also to the power to decide that, for example, breaking an agricultural contract-a crime invented to keep the freed slaves under the control of the white minority-would not be a crime at all. They could even determine that civil rights violations or fraud against agricultural employees would be punished severely. Under the electoral system contemplated by the Constitution, the African American majority would have shaped educational policy, economic and criminal justice policy, and other aspects of state government in the South. ...

While in control in the 1860s and 1870s, they implemented policies designed to lead to economic and social advancement: education and protection against discrimination from private actors. If the Constitution had been obeyed and those policies left in place and strengthened, the social advancement that occurred in the twentieth century might well have occurred in the nineteenth, and African Americans might now enjoy the same economic and social status enjoyed by other ethnic groups taking their place in the American community.

Not only were they deprived of their right to vote, their numbers guaranteed that the Southern representation in the House would grow, since they now were counted as whole free persons for purposes of representation and taxation. And that is what "adding insult to injury" means.

The Jim Crow laws were more than laws restricting the franchise, they codified a way of life that kept African Americans in virtual slavery, subject to punishments as brutal as what were endured before 600,000 Americans lost their lives deciding the issue of slavery in the South.

the_warmth_of_other_suns.jpg

attribution: Random House

The Great Migration

Beginning in 1915, Southern blacks began moving north and west in search of greater opportunities and a life free from Jim Crow. Some 6 million people migrated out of the South over six decades in spite of the barriers placed in their path by the Southern states.

However, the North was no panacea for those leaving the codified racism of the South. From The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration:
Most colored migrants were funneled into the lowest-paying, least wanted jobs in the harshest industries— iron and steel foundries and slaughtering and meatpacking. They “only did the dirty work,” a colored steelworker said of his early days in Milwaukee , “jobs that even Poles didn’t want.”​
They faced the same hardships that all other immigrant people had faced, even though they were American citizens. Although they were American citizens, they were not allowed to assimilate into the mainstream culture as other groups had, but were restricted instead to low-paying jobs and housed in neighborhoods circumscribed by covenants, banks, and insurance companies.

In spite of the racism, the discrimination, the segregation, and the outright antipathy they faced, the Southern blacks who moved north and west did not live under Jim Crow laws and were allowed the vote. It was not good, but it was better. While the non-Southern states did little to stop the racism or protect the blacks, they did not codify white supremacy into law.

The New Deal

NewDeal.jpg

Top left: The Tennessee Valley Authority, part of the New Deal, being signed into law in 1933.
Top right: President Roosevelt was responsible for initiatives and programs of the New Deal.
Bottom: A public mural from one of the artists employed by the New Deal.


Franklin Roosevelt is often held responsible for denying African Americans the benefits of New Deal legisltaion. And he was the president, and the buck did stop on his desk, but some of the credit must go to the Southern racists who fought tooth and nail for the doctrine of white supremacy, placing it above country or party.

As late as 1938, only 4 percent of the African Americans in the South could vote. There was only one party in the South, so most Southern politicians ran unopposed and were re-elected repeatedly, gaining them seniority in the majority party and the committee chairmanships that that entailed. They were still benefiting from the black population that they did not allow to vote.

Fear_Itself.jpg


According to Ira Katznelson, author of Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time, there were not enough liberal or northern Democrats to achieve a majority without gaining the votes of the racist Southerners. And the price of their cooperation was the inviolability of the Jim Crow laws.

It meant that the only way that most New Deal legislation, from the NRA to the Social Security Act, could pass the Congress was if the legislation excluded from coverage agricultural and domestic workers. Which were, of course, the only occupations that blacks were allowed to hold in the South. ("In South Carolina, colored people had to apply for a permit to do any work other than agriculture after Reconstruction," wrote Isabel Wilkerson in Warmth of Other Suns.)

It was the racist Southern Democrats who voted with the Republicans to override President Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Act, which made it much more difficult for Southern blacks to organize. Katznelson maintains that John Rankin of Mississippi, the most unabashed racist in the House, wrote the House version of the GI Bill that "sharply disadvantaged southern black veterans."


The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965

The passage of the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act cost the Democratic Party the South for far more than the generation predicted by President Johnson when he signed the former.


But the Jim Crow era was finally over. The signs came down from over drinking fountains and restrooms. The right of African Americans to vote would be enforced by the Justice Department.

However, it only took three years for the South to rise again.

Nixon's Southern Strategy of 1968

Although Barry Goldwater appears to be the first Republican to appeal to the Southern voter since Reconstruction, it was Richard Nixon who developed the Southern strategy of going after the Democratic vote in the South under the dog-whistle banner of "law-and-order" and "states' rights." From an excerpt of his book, Dog Whistle Politics, published at Salon.com, Ian Haney Lopez wrote about George McGovern's summary of the Southern strategy:
Defeated by the Southern strategy, McGovern neatly summed it up: “What is the Southern Strategy? It is this. It says to the South: Let the poor stay poor, let your economy trail the nation, forget about decent homes and medical care for all your people, choose officials who will oppose every effort to benefit the many at the expense of the few—and in return, we will try to overlook the rights of the black man, appoint a few southerners to high office, and lift your spirits by attacking the ‘eastern establishment’ whose bank accounts we are filling with your labor and your industry.”
And it is still working today.

Part of the Southern strategy was to use dog whistles to appeal to the racists in the North as well as the South. It was cloaked in an appeal to the blue collar worker of the northern cities, but the dog whistles worked as well there as anywhere else where racism and fear flourished. In 1980, Ronald Reagan reaped the benefits of the Southern strategy. His advisor Lee Atwater, in a 1981 interview:
You start out in 1954 by saying, "******, ******, ******." By 1968 you can't say "******" — that hurts you. Backfires. So you say stuff like forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff. You're getting so abstract now [that] you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is [that] blacks get hurt worse than whites. And subconsciously maybe that is part of it. I'm not saying that. But I'm saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me — because obviously sitting around saying, "We want to cut this," is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "******, ******."
The Southern racist has voted as a Republican ever since.

The War on Drugs 1980 to present

The_New_Jim_Crow.jpg



The law-and-order campaigns of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan led directly to the War on Drugs, which began in 1982, at a time when illegal drug usage was in a decline. In 1985, the Reagan administration hired PR staff to publicize the "scourge" of crack cocaine. They were very effective. The War on Drugs has seen our prison population explode over the past 30 years, from 300,000 to over 2 million, the majority being due to drug-related offenses.

Michelle Alexander calls this The New Jim Crow in her book of the same name. The War on Drugs, which was started under Ronald Reagan, enhanced under Bill Clinton and continued under every president since, has resulted in "an enormous population of predominately black and brown people who, because of the drug war, are denied basic rights and privileges of American citizenship and are permanently relegated to an inferior status."
Today a criminal freed from prison has scarcely more rights, and arguably less respect, than a freed slave or a black person living “free” in Mississippi at the height of Jim Crow. Those released from prison on parole can be stopped and searched by the police for any reason— or no reason at all— and returned to prison for the most minor of infractions, such as failing to attend a meeting with a parole officer. Even when released from the system’s formal control, the stigma of criminality lingers. Police supervision, monitoring, and harassment are facts of life not only for all those labeled criminals, but for all those who “look like” criminals. Lynch mobs may be long gone, but the threat of police violence is ever present. A wrong move or sudden gesture could mean massive retaliation by the police. A wallet could be mistaken for a gun. The “whites only” signs may be gone, but new signs have gone up—notices placed in job applications, rental agreements, loan applications, forms for welfare benefits, school applications, and petitions for licenses, informing the general public that “felons” are not wanted here. A criminal record today authorizes precisely the forms of discrimination we supposedly left behind—discrimination in employment, housing, education, public benefits, and jury service. Those labeled criminals can even be denied the right to vote.​
The Election of Barack Obama

Taxpayer_March_on_Washington.jpg


This was the final straw for the Southern racist. A black man in the White House. Well, he may have been voted into office, but they were there to make sure that he could do absolutely nothing and so they conspired to vote against every policy he proposed.

The most recent example was Ted Cruz's bizarre tweet about Net Neutrality, an issue with true bipartisan support. That didn't matter, if Obama was for it, the Southern racists were against it. And he is one of them. He is also an idiot.


The current crop of Southern racists have shared their knowledge and experience with like-minded politicians in other areas of the nation. No longer is their behavior a function only of the South, as they have joined with conservatives from gerrymandered states like Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin to use the tools of white supremacy to also advance the causes of the wealthy 1 percent that pay for their elections.

Among the tools that have worked in the past and are working today:

  • Filibusters of President Obama's legislative agenda and nominations.
  • Intimidation of voters: Today they use organizations like True the Vote instead of the Klan, perhaps because bedsheets draw too much attention in an era of cellphone cameras.
  • Complicated voter registration requirements and voter ID laws that impose a new poll tax to fight a crime that doesn't exist while creating crimes out of poverty and drug use to disenfranchise people of color.
  • In the past it was lynching that intimidated blacks. Today the parallels between police brutality and lynching have been illustrated by Shaun King.
  • If they can't achieve their legislative goals they simply shut down the government.
  • But mostly, they retain their hold on power by using the same strategy that worked against George McGovern:
    Let the poor stay poor, let your economy trail the nation, forget about decent homes and medical care for all your people, choose officials who will oppose every effort to benefit the many at the expense of the few—and in return, we will try to overlook the rights of the black man, appoint a few southerners to high office, and lift your spirits by attacking the ‘eastern establishment’ whose bank accounts we are filling with your labor and your industry.​
It doesn't matter whether they call themselves Democrats or Republicans or tea partiers, they are the same people who have been putting white supremacy ahead of country or party for over 200 years. And today they are using their power to fill those bank accounts of the "eastern establishment" with the wealth earned by the American workers of all races.
 
Study: The KKK helped Republicans win the South

Study: The KKK helped Republicans win the South
Vox.com
By Dylan Matthews
17 hours ago

In 1960, the American South mostly voted for Democratic candidates and was solidly Democratic at the congressional level. By 2000, it was solidly Republican in presidential politics and mostly Republican at the congressional level. The transformation, clearly, had something to do with race and the Civil Rights Movement. But a provocative new paper suggests that Ku Klux Klan activity — as opposed to the broader phenomenon of racism — played a small but meaningful role in the process. Counties with more Klan activity saw a more dramatic shift toward the GOP, a shift that stands up to a range of reasonable statistical controls and suggests that the Klan was really a difference maker.

The evidence for the Klan's causal role

Notre Dame's Rory McVeigh, Brandeis's David Cunningham, and Yale's Justin Farrell looked at county-level presidential voting data from 1960 to 2000 in ten southern states, and coded each county based on whether a Klan chapter was established there between 1964 and 1966, when the organization was growing in response to the Johnson administration and Warren Court's increased vigilance on civil rights. Here are the counties identified:

The researchers wanted to capture the role that the Klan organizations themselves played, which is a tricky methodological problem to solve. There are a lot of other reasons why some counties might have seen more growth in support for Republicans, some of which could also explain the presence of a Klan chapter. For example, maybe a county that's just particularly racist both was fertile ground for the Klan and was less likely to vote for Democrats when they started backing civil rights — both had the same cause, but the Klan chapter didn't cause the increase in Republican support.

To take into account underlying racial animus, McVeigh et al controlled for the counties' levels of support for George Wallace, who made an explicitly segregationist third-party presidential bid in 1968. They also controlled for the level of support for Goldwater; his run galvanized Southern support for Republicans before the 1964-66 growth in Klan chapters and so is another factor that needs to be taken into account. Finally, the study controlled for changes in counties' racial makeup (counties whose black populations grew presumably saw less growth in Republican support), their level of economic prosperity and education (since Republican support is positively correlated with income and education), and whether the county had an NAACP chapter (which could have provoked the KKK to launch a branch in response).

They conclude that having a Klan chapter present was associated with a 2 percent bigger increase in Republican support from 1960 to 1972, a 3.7 percent bigger increase from 1960 to 1980, a 4.9 percent bigger increase from 1960 to 1992, and a 3.4 percent bigger increase from 1960 to 2000.How could this have worked?

The Klan used to ally with Democrats

Theodore Bilbo, perhaps the single most noxiously racist public official of the post-Civil War era. (Library of Congress)

In the midcentury South, the organized political expression of white supremacist politics was the Democratic Party. Indeed, number of prominent Democratic politicians — including Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, Supreme Court justice and Senator Hugo Black, and Mississippi governor and Senator Theodore Bilbo — were members of the Klan. But in the course of the 1960s, the northern wing of the Democrats joined with Republican elected officials (almost all of them northern) to pass the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.

After that, southern presidential politics rapidly re-aligned with newly enfranchised black voters supporting Democrats and most whites voting for GOP candidates. If the Klan was successful in suppressing African-American turnout or in pulling white people into the electoral process, that would boost the fortunes of Republican candidates.

And at least in some cases, the Klan actively supported Republican candidates. "Certainly, generating support for specific Republican presidential candidates or the Republican Party in general was not a primary goal of the Klan," the authors write, but "while the Klan was perhaps best known for its violent tactics in the 1960s, the movement did invest significant energy in attempting to influence voting outcomes … Klan members advocated for Goldwater’s Republican candidacy in 1964 while incessantly criticizing Democratic incumbents’ intensifying support for civil rights."

Are we sure?

Even the best statistical methodology in the world can't control for all relevant factors, and it's totally possible that McVeigh and his coauthors missed something that explains why Republican performance would be higher in county states without the Klan itself having an effect. This is just one study, and shouldn't be treated as settled fact. But the fact that the effects hold up against a litany of controls ,and are actually stronger in 1992 and 2000 than they were in 1972, is nonetheless striking.

https://news.yahoo.com/study-kkk-helped-republicans-win-201002152.html
 
source: The Daily Beast

Dems, It’s Time to Dump Dixie


With Mary Landrieu’s ignominious exit, the Democrats will have lost their last senator in the Deep South. And that’s a good thing. They should write it off—because they don’t need it.


<section class="content-body article-body-content">I don’t remember a much sadder sight in domestic politics in my lifetime than that of Mary Landrieu schlumpfing around these last few weeks trying to save a Senate seat that was obviously lost. It was like witnessing the last two weeks of the life of a blind and toothless dog you knew the vet was just itching to destroy. I know that sounds mean about her, but I don’t intend it that way. She did what she could and had, as far as I know, an honorable career. I do, however, intend it to sound mean about the reactionary, prejudice-infested place she comes from. A toothless dog is a figure of sympathy. A vet who takes pleasure in gassing it is not.

And that is what Louisiana, and almost the entire South, has become. The victims of the particular form of euthanasia it enforces with such glee are tolerance, compassion, civic decency, trans-racial community, the crucial secular values on which this country was founded… I could keep this list going. But I think you get the idea. Practically the whole region has rejected nearly everything that’s good about this country and has become just one big nuclear waste site of choleric, and extremely racialized, resentment. A fact made even sadder because on the whole they’re such nice people! (I truly mean that.)

With Landrieu’s departure, the Democrats will have no more senators from the Deep South, and I say good. Forget about it. Forget about the whole fetid place. Write it off. Let the GOP have it and run it and turn it into Free-Market Jesus Paradise. The Democrats don’t need it anyway.

Actually, that’s not quite true. They need Florida, arguably, at least in Electoral College terms. Although they don’t even really quite need it—what happened in 2012 was representative: Barack Obama didn’t need Florida, but its 29 electoral votes provided a nice layer of icing on the cake, bumping him up to a gaudy 332 EVs, and besides, it’s nice to be able to say you won such a big state. But Florida is kind of an outlier, because culturally, only the northern half of Florida is Dixie. Ditto Virginia, but in reverse; culturally, northern Virginia is Yankee land (but with gun shops).

So Democrats still need to care about those two states, at least in presidential terms. And maybe you can throw in North Carolina under the right circumstances. And at some point in the near future, you’ll be able to talk about Georgia as a state a Democrat can capture. And eventually, Texas, too.

But that’s presidential politics. At the congressional level, and from there on down, the Democrats should just forget about the place. They should make no effort, except under extraordinary circumstances, to field competitive candidates. The national committees shouldn’t spend a red cent down there. This means every Senate seat will be Republican, and 80 percent of the House seats will be, too. The Democrats will retain their hold on the majority-black districts, and they’ll occasionally be competitive in a small number of other districts in cities and college towns. But they’re not going win Southern seats (I include here with some sadness my native West Virginia, which was not a Southern state when I was growing up but culturally is one now). And they shouldn’t try.

My friend the political scientist Tom Schaller said all this back in 2008, in his book Whistling Past Dixie. I didn’t want to agree with Schaller then, but now I throw in the towel. He was a man ahead of his time. Look west, Schaller advised the Democrats. And he was right. Now it’s true that many states in the nation’s heartland aren’t winnable for Democrats, either. Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho, and Utah will never come anywhere close to being purple. But Colorado already is. Arizona can be. Missouri, it’s not crazy to think so. And Montana and South Dakota are basically red, of course, but are both elect Democrats sometimes. (Did you know that both of Montana’s senators right now are Democrats?!) In sum, between the solid-blue states in the North and on the West Coast, and the pockets of opportunity that exist in the states just mentioned (and tossing in the black Southern seats), the Democrats can cobble together congressional majorities in both houses, under the right circumstances.




The main point is this: Trying to win Southern seats is not worth the ideological cost for Democrats.





But it’s not just a question of numbers. The main point is this: Trying to win Southern seats is not worth the ideological cost for Democrats. As Memphis Rep. Steve Cohen recently told my colleague Ben Jacobs, the Democratic Party cannot (and I’d say should not) try to calibrate its positions to placate Southern mores: “It’s come to pass, and really a lot of white Southerners vote on gays and guns and God, and we’re not going to ever be too good on gays and guns and God.”

Cohen thinks maybe some economic populism could work, and that could be true in limited circumstances. But I think even that is out the window now. In the old days, drenched in racism as the South was, it was economically populist. Glass and Steagall, those eponymous bank regulators, were both Southern members of Congress. But today, as we learned in Sunday’s Times, state attorneys general, many in the South, are colluding with energy companies to fight federal regulation of energy plants.

It’s lost. It’s gone. A different country. And maybe someday it really should be. I’ll save that for another column. Until that day comes, the Democratic Party shouldn’t bother trying. If they get no votes from the region, they will in turn owe it nothing, and in time the South, which is the biggest welfare moocher in the world in terms of the largesse it gets from the more advanced and innovative states, will be on its own, which is what Southerners always say they want anyway.
</section>
 
Democrats and the South: There are only 50 states, a party can't abandon 9 of them

Democrats and the South: There are only 50 states, a party can't abandon 9 of them
Vox.com
By Matthew Yglesias
December 10, 2014 12:30 PM

Around the turn of the millennium, a certain segment of the punditocracy developed an unhealthy obsession with the idea that Democrats desperately needed to take action to radically enhance the party's appeal in the South. Under the circumstances, a dose of skeptical punditry (recall Thomas Schaller's 2008 book Whistling Past Dixie, for example) were a breath of fresh air.

But now the pendulum risks swinging too far in the other direction. Michael Tomasky argues that with the GOP now holding every Senate seat and every governor's mansion and every state legislature in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, Democrats should simply write the region off.

Not temper their expectations. Not refuse to make drastic ideological shifts to try to win there. Just give up. "At the congressional level," Tomasky writes, "and from there on down, the Democrats should just forget about the place."

The North Carolina problem

Tomasky's argument begins to fall apart almost as soon as he states it. He acknowledges that the former Confederate states of Virginia and Florida are important to the party's presidential prospects. Then he says "maybe you can throw in North Carolina under the right circumstances." And also that "at some point in the near future, you'll be able to talk about Georgia as a state a Democrat can capture." But then he waves it away with the thought that "that's presidential politics."

But presidential politics doesn't exist in some hermetically sealed box. Not only did Obama carry North Carolina in 2008, Kay Hagan won an open Senate seat there. And while Hagan lost in 2014, she ran well ahead of Obama's approval rating. If North Carolina and maybe-someday-soon-Georgia are going to be competitive in presidential races, then there's no reason they shouldn't have competitive Senate and gubernatorial races. Indeed, quite the opposite, since a statewide candidate in those states could easily be less liberal than Obama and still far more liberal than a southern Republican.

The Massachusetts problem

In 2014, Republicans didn't just win elections in the south. They didn't just win in Ohio and Wisconsin either. They won a governor's race in Illinois. And another in Maryland. And another in Massachusetts. In part, all three of those races reflected idiosyncratic factors. In part, all three reflected Obama's unpopularity. But whatever they reflected, they reflected the basic reality that no state is "unwinnable" if the circumstances are right. And no set of circumstances is so unlikely that it's not worth being ready for.

It's worth recalling that this massive GOP sweep came just six short years after a massive Democratic sweep. A lot of politics is driven by events and events are unpredictable. Meanwhile, weird stuff happens. A prudent political party doesn't write anything off. It always tries to recruit solid candidates and contest races, knowing that sometimes opportunity knocks.

There's a median voter everywhere

Last but by no means least, the basic logic of two-party politics says there's always some candidate who could win some race. After all, conservative southern states don't just vote for Republicans. They tend to feature super-duper conservative parties who vote for incredibly conservative Republicans. Under the circumstances, a Democrat can compete for the local ideological center.

There's no good reason for "the Democrats" to try to shift far enough to the right to win a race in Alabama, but even Alabama has a median voter and it makes sense for Alabama Democrats to try to nominate candidates conservative enough to compete for his allegiances.

Or consider Texas, where Democrats got their hopes way too high in the Wendy Davis race. This very conservative and also quite gerrymandered state happens to be home to 12 members of the House Democratic caucus. The large cities of Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio all have Democratic mayors as do the smaller cities of Austin and El Paso. That's just too many Democrats representing too many people to simply be indifferent to statewide politics.

The brutal reality for the past few cycles worth of statewide Democrats in Texas is that the state is not just conservative, it's really thrived during the Rick Perry years. But that won't last forever. Scandals, missteps, or simply bad luck are bound to happen. And then suddenly unwinnable statewide races will be within reach. If Texas Democrats win, then their task will be to try to do a good job and impress people.

That's how politics works. But it only works if you show up. There's no reason for the national party to bend over backward to cater to the most conservative region, and there's nothing wrong with writing off individual races, but there are only 50 states — you can't just forget about nine of them.

http://news.yahoo.com/democrats-south-only-50-states-173002957.html
 
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