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The July 4 Al-Zawahiri Video:
Protesting Too Much</font size></center>
Strategic Forecasting
Terrorism Intelligence Report
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
July 11, 2007
On July 4, As-Sahab productions released a video to jihadist Web sites that featured al Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The 90-minute production differs from other videos featuring al-Zawahiri in that it uses a number of short audio and video cameos of other people to underscore the points al-Zawahiri is attempting to make. In some ways, the video is almost like a jihadist version of "The Daily Show," with al-Zawahiri as the host using audio and video footage to emphasize his points.
The cameo appearances in the video include jihadist hero Abdullah Azzam, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Editor-in-Chief Abdul Bari Atwan, 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas Kean, Saudi National Security Council Secretary-General Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Kuwaiti academic and Islamist writer Abdullah al-Nafisi and Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia leader Saad al-Faqih, among others.
The tone with which al-Zawahiri addresses Hamas and the larger Palestinian situation seems to indicate the video was recorded prior to Hamas' mid-June offensive that consolidated the group's control over Gaza. That would mean the video was recorded before al-Zawahiri's audio message released June 25, which noted the Hamas victory in Gaza and called on Hamas to establish a government in Gaza based on Islamic law.
The video was followed by the July 10 release of another recording from al-Zawahiri in which he threatens the United Kingdom for knighting author Salman Rushdie. Like his June 25 recording, it is a video comprising an audio recording and a still picture of al-Zawahiri. The flurry of recent recordings has been similar to the media blitz of last summer, except that Osama bin Laden was in the mix last time.
The July 4 video is clearly defensive in nature, though al-Zawahiri attempts to adopt a positive tone. It is an attempt to shore up the crumbling jihadist facade in Iraq, counter the fatwas and other statements from clerics condemning al Qaeda and jihadist ideology and, in a larger sense, assert al Qaeda's power. However, a careful review of the video reveals the places in which al Qaeda is feeling pressured and is attempting to push back. Furthermore, al-Zawahiri's need to have others proclaim al Qaeda's accomplishments -- a need a truly powerful entity would not have -- leaves viewers with the feeling that, to paraphrase The Bard, the jihadist doth protest too much.
Pressure Points: Unity in Iraq
The first obvious pressure point for al-Zawahiri and al Qaeda's core leadership is Iraq. Momentum has shifted in Iraq, and things are not going well for al Qaeda there. Tactically, al Qaeda's Iraqi node can still kill people -- but strategically, the group's hopes of establishing a caliphate there under the mantle of the Islamic State of Iraq are rapidly fading. These dashed hopes have caused the group to lash out against former allies, which has worsened al Qaeda's position.
One of the reasons for this state of affairs is, according to al-Zawahiri, lack of unity. The controversy over the legitimacy of the Islamic State of Iraq is one source of that disunity. Some Islamic scholars and Iraqi tribal leaders say the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq was proclaimed prematurely, and that such a political entity can only be legitimately formed after the jihadists have been empowered. Al-Zawahiri says that many of the people who call the Islamic State of Iraq premature supported the formation of a similar government in Peshawar while the Soviets still controlled Afghanistan. Of course, al-Zawahiri fails to mention that, unlike Iraq, all the groups involved in Afghanistan were united in their opposition to the Marxist government in Kabul and its Red Army backers.
Al-Zawahiri also says the Islamic State of Iraq is more empowered and independent than the Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories and has a larger army, but that the Palestinian government is considered legitimate while the Islamic State of Iraq is not.
During the video, al-Zawahiri not only calls for unity among the jihadists and nationalists in Iraq, he also tries to reach out to the Palestinians, Shia, Arab nationalists and Kurdish nationalists. This outreach to the Shia and failure to criticize Iran when discussing the situation in Iraq is a marked contrast to the July 8 statement from Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, emir of the Islamic State of Iraq, in which he threatened the Shia and the Iranian government. Al-Baghdadi's group has also attacked scores of Shiite targets -- a strategy the group began under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's leadership, and one that al-Zawahiri counseled against.
Al-Zawahiri calls on the jihadists to "strengthen one another, and guide one another, and advise and instruct our brothers, even if we differ with them, and that we must study how to close gaps between us, in order to make use of and benefit from every achievement achieved by our mujahideen brothers." He also says this must be done "even where there are shortcomings or something less than perfection" -- a reference to the Islamic State of Iraq.
Al-Zawahiri posits that al Qaeda's efforts at fostering unity have set an example for others to follow. He says that because of al Qaeda's promotion of unity, Allah blessed its attacks against the U.S. embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole, along with the 9/11 attacks, and has protected al Qaeda's leaders from their enemies. He seems to forget the way his own ideological shift from the near to the far enemy, and his alignment with bin Laden, inflamed divisions in the already fractious Egyptian militant community.
Al-Zawahiri says al Qaeda is constantly striving to "unite the ranks of the mujahideen" and indicates that other independent jihadist groups have recently agreed to join the al Qaeda umbrella group. He says al Qaeda will soon announce the addition of some groups to its coalition, but that other groups prefer their union with al Qaeda be kept quiet right now. Al-Zawahiri did not provide any clues as to which groups have joined, but it is not illogical to conclude that, based on recent events, he could have been referring to Palestinian, Lebanese and Kashmiri groups.
However, even this assertion that more groups are in al Qaeda's ideological orbit is telling. If al Qaeda's ideology had momentum, if the Ummah were rising up in response to al Qaeda's call, there would be no reason to hide the affiliation. If, on the other hand, the United States and its allies have begun systematically dismantling al Qaeda's local nodes, then it makes sense that some of the weaker groups would want to avoid bringing that kind of pressure on themselves. Thus, a statement that al-Zawahiri intended to be an expression of strength is, in effect, a concession of weakness.
Ideological Assaults
Al-Zawahiri notes that the battles of the "crusaders and their slaves" (referring to the Muslims who cooperate with the United States and its Western allies) have expanded to the "doctrinal and moral fronts." He also says the "Ummah is currently facing a deceptive propaganda war from the Americans and their agents." These are references to the ideological war Stratfor has discussed as the only way jihadism can ultimately be defeated.
Clearly, al Qaeda also sees the attacks against its ideology as a significant threat. In fact, al-Zawahiri says, "I would like to remind everyone that the most dangerous weapons in the Saudi-American system are not buying of loyalties, spying on behalf of the Americans or providing facilities to them. No, the most dangerous weapons of that system are those who outwardly profess advice, guidance and instruction …" In other words, al Qaeda fears fatwas more than 500-pound bombs or cruise missiles. Bombs can kill people; fatwas can kill the ideology that lies at the root of the problem.
Al-Zawahiri also laments specific fatwas issued by clerics declaring that the jihad in Iraq is not obligatory and who forbid young Muslim men from going to Iraq. To counter these fatwas, al-Zawahiri plays an audiotape of Azzam (while a photo of Azzam is shown), in which Azzam comments on how jihad is the individual duty of every Muslim. Al-Zawahiri then urges Muslims to ignore such fatwas and scholars: "O youth of Islam, don't listen to them, and I convey to you the mujahideen's commanders' mobilization of you, so hurry to Afghanistan, hurry to Iraq, hurry to Somalia, hurry to Palestine and hurry to the towering Atlas Mountains." He also rails against the "religion traders in Iraq and Afghanistan to deem as haram (forbidden) the jihad against the invaders."
One reason the al Qaeda leadership is so threatened by these ideological attacks is that neither bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri has any Islamic scholarly credentials. Many Muslims do not believe they possess the training and authority to issue a fatwa.
Attacks Against the House of Saud
A significant amount of this video is devoted to an attempt to undermine the Saudi government as personified by the Saudi royal family. Though the tape also briefly mentions the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the Saudi regime receives a prolonged treatment, and the video clips of al-Faqih, Prince Bandar, al-Nafisi and others are used to vilify the House of Saud. Of course, verbal attacks against the Saudi regime are nothing new for al Qaeda. In bin Laden's August 1996 fatwa, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," he spends more ink condemning the Saudis than he does condemning the Americans the fatwa was reputedly authored against.
These attacks against the Saudis are meant to not only undermine the Saudi clerics' authority to issue fatwas, they also attempt to thwart Saudi efforts to halt the violence in Iraq. Such a settlement would effectively put al Qaeda's Iraq node out of business and hasten the demise of the Islamic State of Iraq. To this end, al-Zawahiri warns the divided jihadist and nationalist militant groups in Iraq that, "If the agents of the Saudi state were to take control of government in Iraq, or the regions of the people of the Sunnah, the Iraqis would then suffer the same repression and humiliation which the people suffer under Saudi rule." Elsewhere he says, "If Saudi influence were to spread in Iraq, it would impose on the people of Iraq a ruling clique which would own what is above the ground and beneath it, and would sell Iraq in its entirety to the Americans." He clearly wants to keep Iraq's tribal leaders off the Saudi bandwagon.
Egyptian Statements
Over the past several months, former Egyptian militants have issued a string of statements renouncing violence and al Qaeda. These statements, some of which have come from al-Zawahiri's friends and family members, appear to be another pressure point for him. He denounces the statements as the "blackmailing of the tortured and mutilated captives … who have been stripped of their thoughts and beliefs, and had their convictions removed for them to declare their remorse, regret and retractions ..."
Elsewhere he says, "I read a ridiculous bit of humor in Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, which claimed that it received a communique from one of the backtrackers, who faxed it from prison. I laughed inside and asked myself, 'Do the prison cells of Egypt now have fax machines? And I wonder, are these fax machines connected to the same line as the electric shock machines, or do they have a separate line?'
"Thus, I caution my Muslim brothers everywhere against the statements and retractions of the graduates and guests of the prisons, on the peninsula and in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Indonesia and all lands of Islam. They are either those who have been coerced and before whose eyes the memories of the torture, lashing, suspension and shocks play like a film, or are those who are disheartened and fallen and looking for a way out of prison and a little comfort. Neither type is to be listened to or relied upon in his statements and opinions …"
Despite his joke about the fax machine and the advice not to listen to these statements, al-Zawahiri is clearly bothered and issues a challenge: "Thus, I tell these enemies: This is not a noble fight, to be alone with an isolated prisoner and squeeze him physically and psychologically until he agrees with you for you, then to applaud that. If you are real men, then compete with us by yourselves, in the arenas of ideology, invitation and information, which are the arenas in which you yourselves have admitted your defeat."
Now, if the enemies of al Qaeda have admitted defeat in the area of ideology, how can al-Zawahiri call ideological attacks the most dangerous weapon facing al Qaeda? These ideological attacks clearly concern him greatly.
The End Strategy
Al-Zawahiri ends the video by mapping out a two-part strategy. The short-term plan involves targeting "Crusader-Jewish interests … in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Somalia and everywhere we are able to strike their interests." The long-term plan is to change the "corrupt and corrupting" regimes in the Muslim world once the crusaders and Jews have been defeated and can no longer support these regimes.
The video contains some clips of Atwan and al-Nafisi talking about how al Qaeda has masterfully played its strategic hand, and trumpeting the organization's strength, but when taken in light of the only criterion that really matters -- successful attacks -- these proclamations ring hollow. Had al Qaeda recently conducted spectacular attacks, there would have been no need for the inclusion of video and audio footage of people informing the public of the jihadists' power. Their actions would have spoken for themselves.
Upon reflection, perhaps their actions have.
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