Everyone is entitled to their opinions but opinion in this debate is only as strong as the evidence of law and justice and throughout this thread it's been deducted that politics or governing out weigh justice. So it's reasonable to conclude that the evidence presented here is what people in power want to make public.
Here is a review of two recent books about Bush 2's presidency. In it you'll find what some people think "what people in power want to make public" and some might call facts:
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/the-accountable-presidency?page=0,0
The Accountable Presidency
By Jack Goldsmith
The New Republic
February 1, 2010 |
"Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush" By John Yoo
"Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State" By Garry Wills
In December 2008, Chris Wallace asked Vice President Cheney, “If the president, during war, decides to do something to protect the country, is it legal?” Cheney’s answer included a reference to a military authority that President Bush did not exercise. “The President of the United States,” he said, “now for fifty years is followed at all times, twenty-four hours a day, by a military aide carrying a football that contains the nuclear codes that he would use and be authorized to use in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States.” The vice president added that the president “could launch the kind of devastating attack the world has never seen” without checking with Congress or the courts, and noted also that “he has that authority because of the nature of the world we live in.” And then he shifted to the war on terrorism: “It’s unfortunate, but I think we’re perfectly appropriate to take the steps we have.”
Garry Wills and John Yoo have written books that, in very different ways, analyze the conception of presidential power inherent in Cheney’s statement. Wills does not like what Cheney and his boss did with the presidency after September 11. But perhaps in reaction to Cheney’s statement, which he reproduces in his introduction, Wills has looked back and determined that the problem lies less with the Bush administration, which he blames plenty, than with the institution of the presidency, which became too powerful when it was given control of the bomb in the 1940s. Yoo, a legal architect of many of the Bush administration counterterrorism policies that Wills detests (and some of which I had a hand in revising), also looks to history to explain the Bush presidency, but he takes a longer arc. He analyzes the origins and subsequent growth of presidential power, with emphasis on how presidents have used their powers aggressively in crisis, and concludes that the Bush administration actions “fell within the precedents set by earlier Presidents.”