Explain it to me: Falkland Islands

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Explain it to me: Falkland IslandsWhere are the Falkland Islands, why are countries fighting over them and why is Prince William there? The video above explains.
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It was Britain holding on to their last bit of colonialism. It's still British I think, but they have a base there. They basically put him where nothing will pop off.
 
Argentina and England had a short war over them in 1982.

That Argentina would have won, but for the . . . ahem . . . undercover help of the U.S. The French manufactured Exocet missles employed by the Argentines were decimating the British fleet.
 
That Argentina would have won, but for the . . . ahem . . . undercover help of the U.S. The French manufactured Exocet missles employed by the Argentines were decimating the British fleet.


Ah QueEx, showing your age! LOL! You remember the media hype at the time. It was all over the news. This was Margaret Thatcher's Grenada. The Reagan administration was beginning to flex their military empire muscles and the Thatcher administration was Reagan's surrogate in Europe. Thatcher thought she could overwhelm the Argentinians with their perceived superiority of the Royal Navy. Well, after what you stated, Argentina blasted the British destroyers with those Exocet missiles, the Limeys had to re-evaluate their cockiness.

I thought the Exocet missiles were significant because the right wing, just as they always do tried to label the French and French culture as weak and inferior to the macho American culture, especially in military matters got humbled by French military technology. Britain was and is still using a lot of American military systems.

You remember that France had pulled out of NATO in the late 1950s and was pursuing their own independent politics, which pissed off the so called right wing conservatives in the US. France didn't rejoin NATO until 2008 (Thanks to President Obama).

I always thought that conflict was just another European aggressor and former European colony doing what they do best, dominate land that wasn't theirs in the first place.

I remember Eddie Murphy doing a joke on the then SNL news skit; " Margaret Thatcher, are you out of your Falkland mind!!" :lol:
 
It's not colonialism if the heir to a colonial legacy (Argentina) wants to extend an irredentalist claim to an island where a settler colony was established without opposition.

The Spanish never settled The Falklands. The Argentinians never settled the islands. The British did. And before you ask, there were no indians there. It was terra incognito when the British first settled it. The Argentinian claim to the islands is based on the 500 year old Treaty of Torresedillias in which the Spanish and Portuguese divided the world to avoid conflict. The Portuguese claim to part of South America came because the Spanish miscalculated the size of the continent and the Portuguese exercised their right.

The 1,500 Falklanders want to remain a British Overseas Territory. The Argentinian dictators over the past two centuries used The Falklands as a Jedi Mind Trick on the people and when they actually stopped saber rattling and put boots on the ground, they had a rude awakening. Kirchner is doing the exact same thing now.

And as far as the idea that the Argentinians would have won, the historical record shows that while the Argentinian fighter pilots were brave and skillful (The air attacks at San Carlos Bay and the attack on a troopship which killed a bunch of Guardsmen showed that) and their special forces were a handfull, the conscripts were poorly led, poorly equipped and simply did not have the determination and audacity of the British Army.

The 1982 war was a major miscalculation because they ignored the resolution of the British to protect British land. The invasion could not be tolerated.
 
I not so certain about all that T.O., said nor am I comfortable in saying that the wobble wobble above is accurate either. Neither really matters to me; but I do stand by my claim that the British nearly bit the dust in the Falklands. Okay, perhaps a bit overstated -- but without question, the British fleet was in well over its head and the British psyche was definitely psyched the fuck out.

We all know that the sun did set on the British Empire and the folly in the South Atlantic over a remnant outpost of the Empire nearly gave the Brits a case of the international shits.

The British fleet was thousands away from its comfort zone in the North Atlantic, Mediterrean and that bit of the I/O and the Pacific it dared tread. More importantly, however, the British were without reliable command and control, the sine qua non for extended military operations. I'm near certain the Brits satcom program was then in its infancy (surely, its then extant architecture was not built-out for ops in that part of the world) and the fleet was in near total reliance upon HF comms and it had little, if any, reliable capability beyond the Azores.

In other words, the British fleet off Argentina was damn near in the dark -- and it sorely lacked a carrier with the kind of self-contained intel, surveillance and suppression capability standard with U.S. Navy CTF's (carrier task forces) that could have provided light, i.e., real-time acquisition, targeting, etc.) and the kind of tactical air that would have made the Argentines think twice every time they thought about launching a Super Étendard. Hence, the British fleet was one big-ass sitting duck for the Argentiines' exocets which were being fired from Étendards well over the line-of-sight.

With all those handicaps, in my humble opinion, there was only one way the Brits mission could succeed. It got help, the kind that no one would openly admit, from an old ally.
 
Just read the posts above and would like to add something to this as well. As you may or may not be aware, before the conflict in 1982, most people in Britain hadn't even heard of the falkland lslands.

There is a political twist to the events there as well. In 1982 there was a general election here in Britain. Margaret Thatcher who was prime minister at that time imo through political manouvering used the retaking of the Falklands to her advantage.

There are those who questioned whether Britain received help. The simple answer is yes they did. The US under Ronald Reagen provided satellite imagery to help the task force. If they didn't, they were sitting ducks for the Argentine air force.

Also senior generals in Chile was also complicit in the involvement as well. It has been documented that the SAS (Special Air Service) were deployed in Argentina to attack and destroy Argentine jets and runways.

Hope this clears things up.
 
I not so certain about all that T.O., said nor am I comfortable in saying that the wobble wobble above is accurate either. Neither really matters to me; but I do stand by my claim that the British nearly bit the dust in the Falklands. Okay, perhaps a bit overstated -- but without question, the British fleet was in well over its head and the British psyche was definitely psyched the fuck out.

We all know that the sun did set on the British Empire and the folly in the South Atlantic over a remnant outpost of the Empire nearly gave the Brits a case of the international shits.

The British fleet was thousands away from its comfort zone in the North Atlantic, Mediterrean and that bit of the I/O and the Pacific it dared tread. More importantly, however, the British were without reliable command and control, the sine qua non for extended military operations. I'm near certain the Brits satcom program was then in its infancy (surely, its then extant architecture was not built-out for ops in that part of the world) and the fleet was in near total reliance upon HF comms and it had little, if any, reliable capability beyond the Azores.

In other words, the British fleet off Argentina was damn near in the dark -- and it sorely lacked a carrier with the kind of self-contained intel, surveillance and suppression capability standard with U.S. Navy CTF's (carrier task forces) that could have provided light, i.e., real-time acquisition, targeting, etc.) and the kind of tactical air that would have made the Argentines think twice every time they thought about launching a Super Étendard. Hence, the British fleet was one big-ass sitting duck for the Argentiines' exocets which were being fired from Étendards well over the line-of-sight.

With all those handicaps, in my humble opinion, there was only one way the Brits mission could succeed. It got help, the kind that no one would openly admit, from an old ally.


Check with British people who were adults a the time, and you'll find a certain amount of consternation - not necessarily anger, but disappointmnet - at the USofA for the shuttle diplomacy of Gen Al Haig and the lack of open support from the Regan administration. MCP is right, Thatcher used it to her advantage, but he needs to explain that the UK has a system that does not have fixed election dates. She fucked Labour in a landslide.

What Brits in the military and diplomatic circles admit is that there was covert support for them, like satellite photos from the US. There's also the sudden appearance of Stinger missiles on the battlefield - apparently, Thatcher played hardball with Reagan and made it clear, the Special Relationship was at risk if he did not allow some SAS boys to fly to Ft Bragg, get a crash course in its operation and hand over a container of US Army stamped Stingers. A RAF VC10 cargo plane flew from Pope air base directly to St Helena (a British Overseas Territory in the middle of the South Atlantic and just 3,000 miles from The Falklands). The Stingers were transferred to a RAF C130, the SAS boys put on parachutes and the package was delivered just in time - USA stilled stamped on the missiles. Into the first week of the war the UK relied on the Blowpipe anti aircraft missile which was found wanting.

Bruh, you're wrong on the ability of the UK's ability to "power project" - a common term in US military circles in the 70s and 80s. It's the other way around. The UK knew it could coordinate the effort 8,000 miles away while Argentina learned it could not project it's power 800 miles away. That's precisely why the Argentinian people revolted against the dictators - the promises and boasting was found to be empty. It was the Argentines who could not feed their men. It was the argentines who could not get more than a half dozen planes in the air over the islands. And it was the Brits that found their underpowered, subsonic Harriers, flying from two aircraft carriers could handle Argentina's A4 Skyhawks.


Trust me, militaries around the world watched that war intensly because it was a textbook example of planning, coordination and power projection. Sure, there were losses and surprises from the Argentines, but Britain showed that while it's military was not as big as the US's, it could reclaim it's soverinty anywhere in the world. They knew when the A4s and Super Entendards were taking off, plotted their path, knew when the arrived and braced themselves for attacks and fought back. Their umbrella over the islands was not impenetrable, but it worked.

Here's a story from last month about a Royal Navy sailor who shot down an A4. He thought the pilot died, but the pilot was able to eject and walked across the island to Argentine lines.

http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/falklands-veteran-meets-argentine-pilot-158630


Just read the posts above and would like to add something to this as well. As you may or may not be aware, before the conflict in 1982, most people in Britain hadn't even heard of the falkland lslands.

There is a political twist to the events there as well. In 1982 there was a general election here in Britain. Margaret Thatcher who was prime minister at that time imo through political manouvering used the retaking of the Falklands to her advantage.

There are those who questioned whether Britain received help. The simple answer is yes they did. The US under Ronald Reagen provided satellite imagery to help the task force. If they didn't, they were sitting ducks for the Argentine air force.

Also senior generals in Chile was also complicit in the involvement as well. It has been documented that the SAS (Special Air Service) were deployed in Argentina to attack and destroy Argentine jets and runways.

Hope this clears things up.

The RAF lost a helicopter in the mountains that divide Argentina and Chile. It was apparently putting down an SAS surveillance team which was tasked with watching the one air base that the Argentines were using to attack the fleet. Bad weather and a mechanical failure combined forced the pilot to head for Chile, rather than be captured. The mission was at the very limits of the helicopter's capabilities. He and the SAS boys were back in the fight in less than a week, by the way.

Talking about helicopters, at least one of the RAF's Chinook helicopters is a painted over Argentinian one bought from the USA in the 70s. It's still in service and has been used in the Gulf Wars and Afghanistan. :lol:
 
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Check with British people who were adults a the time, and you'll find a certain amount of consternation - not necessarily anger, but disappointmnet - at the USofA for the shuttle diplomacy of Gen Al Haig and the lack of open support from the Regan administration. MCP is right, Thatcher used it to her advantage, but he needs to explain that the UK has a system that does not have fixed election dates. She fucked Labour in a landslide.

Thanks. I understand why Thatcher would have had some consternation; and I can also appreciate the American uneasiness. Here the British are up in arms about a couple of sheep/herders and creating a tizzy in the U.S.'s backyard where it least needed a stupid fight that might boil-over into or at least fan the flames of anti-Americanism -- over what? -- LOL -- a wasteland with a few hundred (okay, several thousand) sheep :eek:

Recall, sentiments of politico-socio inequities between the U.S., and Latin America were then as they are now roiling just below the surface. And, you're asking me to help you kick my neighbors, my so-called friends, ass ? ? ? I know this is not exactly analogous, but the English didn't exactly take kindly to American D/L help to Nothern Irelanders.

That aside, my earlier comments were really directed at the military aspect, as opposed to political aspect of the situation.


What Brits in the military and diplomatic circles admit is that there was covert support for them, like satellite photos from the US. There's also the sudden appearance of Stinger missiles on the battlefield - apparently, Thatcher played hardball with Reagan and made it clear, the Special Relationship was at risk if he did not allow some SAS boys to fly to Ft Bragg, get a crash course in its operation and hand over a container of US Army stamped Stingers. A RAF VC10 cargo plane flew from Pope air base directly to St Helena (a British Overseas Territory in the middle of the South Atlantic and just 3,000 miles from The Falklands). The Stingers were transferred to a RAF C130, the SAS boys put on parachutes and the package was delivered just in time - USA stilled stamped on the missiles. Into the first week of the war the UK relied on the Blowpipe anti aircraft missile which was found wanting.
Exactly. That was my point above.

Bruh, you're wrong on the ability of the UK's ability to "power project" - a common term in US military circles in the 70s and 80s. It's the other way around. The UK knew it could coordinate the effort 8,000 miles away while Argentina learned it could not project it's power 800 miles away. That's precisely why the Argentinian people revolted against the dictators - the promises and boasting was found to be empty. It was the Argentines who could not feed their men. It was the argentines who could not get more than a half dozen planes in the air over the islands. And it was the Brits that found their underpowered, subsonic Harriers, flying from two aircraft carriers could handle Argentina's A4 Skyhawks.

No, I don't think what I said was wrong at all -- though I admit that I'm just not at liberty to say a whole lot more. But there is no doubt in my military mind that the British fleet was in over its head considering the Argentines were what, a 5th or 6th rate power? - and the Royal Navy was essentially pinned down? The Argentines had no real navy to speak of: one big-ass post WWII Heavy Cruiser that they were afraid to put to sea and when it did it had to keep it far afield of Her Majesty's combatants, or else. Other than that, the Argentines didn't have much else to speak of that it could put to sea to affect the Royal Navy. Still, until help arrived, the Royal Navy, as deployed and configured, looked and acted in disarray.

But, I will give them lots of credit: they demonstrated that once the missile threat was neutralized they could put boots on the ground move quickly to secure the lightly defended island(s).

Not to be outdone, the U.S. Navy proved it failed to adequately learn or tactically prepare for the exocets and its genre as well. U.S., forces painfully learned that you cannot play wait and see with platforms capable of launching exocets and similar anti-ship weapons inside strike range, i.e., U.S.S. Stark.

The British naval experience in the Falklands and the U.S. exprience with the Stark tie in with the present day just-off-the-radar conflict building in and around the Strait of Hormuz - where the U.S. and Iran operate in extremely close proximity. With stand-off weaponry, you cannot allow the other side to play games within striking distance and, since you can't, the likelihood that someone is going to fire-and-debate-the-consequences-later is real.​


Trust me, militaries around the world watched that war intensly because it was a textbook example of planning, coordination and power projection. Sure, there were losses and surprises from the Argentines, but Britain showed that while it's military was not as big as the US's, it could reclaim it's soverinty anywhere in the world. They knew when the A4s and Super Entendards were taking off, plotted their path, knew when the arrived and braced themselves for attacks and fought back. Their umbrella over the islands was not impenetrable, but it worked.

Without question, EVERY naval battle is studied for both the successes and failures. My comments above were not to put the British down and raise American bravado, but I'll just say that I doubt seriously the Falkland deployment was textbook. I'll give it to you, the British organized a fleet, got it in position against a low-rate force. But I don't think that you can characterize the exocet problem as a mere "surprise". That was either an intellgence gaffe (i.e., the Royal Navy didn't know the Argentines had the Etendards and Exocets -- which I don't believe was the case), or, even worse, a case of poor planning (the RN knew of the E & E's and failed to deploy adequate defensive systems and/or tactics) that cost British lives and expensive equipment.

Surprise? I would have the s.o.b. that claimed surprise - - walk the plank.
 
Thanks. I understand why Thatcher would have had some consternation; and I can also appreciate the American uneasiness. Here the British are up in arms about a couple of sheep/herders and creating a tizzy in the U.S.'s backyard where it least needed a stupid fight that might boil-over into or at least fan the flames of anti-Americanism -- over what? -- LOL -- a wasteland with a few hundred (okay, several thousand) sheep :eek:

Recall, sentiments of politico-socio inequities between the U.S., and Latin America were then as they are now roiling just below the surface. And, you're asking me to help you kick my neighbors, my so-called friends, ass ? ? ? I know this is not exactly analogous, but the English didn't exactly take kindly to American D/L help to Nothern Irelanders.

That aside, my earlier comments were really directed at the military aspect, as opposed to political aspect of the situation.



Exactly. That was my point above.



No, I don't think what I said was wrong at all -- though I admit that I'm just not at liberty to say a whole lot more. But there is no doubt in my military mind that the British fleet was in over its head considering the Argentines were what, a 5th or 6th rate power? - and the Royal Navy was essentially pinned down? The Argentines had no real navy to speak of: one big-ass post WWII Heavy Cruiser that they were afraid to put to sea and when it did it had to keep it far afield of Her Majesty's combatants, or else. Other than that, the Argentines didn't have much else to speak of that it could put to sea to affect the Royal Navy. Still, until help arrived, the Royal Navy, as deployed and configured, looked and acted in disarray.

But, I will give them lots of credit: they demonstrated that once the missile threat was neutralized they could put boots on the ground move quickly to secure the lightly defended island(s).

Not to be outdone, the U.S. Navy proved it failed to adequately learn or tactically prepare for the exocets and its genre as well. U.S., forces painfully learned that you cannot play wait and see with platforms capable of launching exocets and similar anti-ship weapons inside strike range, i.e., U.S.S. Stark.

The British naval experience in the Falklands and the U.S. exprience with the Stark tie in with the present day just-off-the-radar conflict building in and around the Strait of Hormuz - where the U.S. and Iran operate in extremely close proximity. With stand-off weaponry, you cannot allow the other side to play games within striking distance and, since you can't, the likelihood that someone is going to fire-and-debate-the-consequences-later is real.​

Without question, EVERY naval battle is studied for both the successes and failures. My comments above were not to put the British down and raise American bravado, but I'll just say that I doubt seriously the Falkland deployment was textbook. I'll give it to you, the British organized a fleet, got it in position against a low-rate force. But I don't think that you can characterize the exocet problem as a mere "surprise". That was either an intellgence gaffe (i.e., the Royal Navy didn't know the Argentines had the Etendards and Exocets -- which I don't believe was the case), or, even worse, a case of poor planning (the RN knew of the E & E's and failed to deploy adequate defensive systems and/or tactics) that cost British lives and expensive equipment.

Surprise? I would have the s.o.b. that claimed surprise - - walk the plank.

London's point is that it was not just some wasteland and 1,500 people and some sheep - it was soverign land, with 150+ years of untroubled settlement taken over by a dictatorship which denied the people the right to self-determination. It HAD to be done, as sure as the US would fight for American Samoa or Argentina would fight for some mountain pass between it and Chile or some river bend between it and Brazil (which has happened by the way).

Argentina's professional military branches were quite good not "fourth or fifth rate" and they proved it during the war. The problem is, for every Ft Benning trained officer or graduate of the Air Force Academy, there were ten conscripts who just wanted to go home or leftists who wanted the right wing dictatorship to crumble. The British forces had nothing but respect for the professionals in the Argentine military and nothing but pity on the conscripts.

To me, the question remains - how did the Junta work itself into a frenzy, knowing it's own capabilities and London's? How could it have made the strategic and operational error. Once one understands that, then the how of how London got it back becomes easy.

This has been a good exchange.
 
Well, LOL, if London felt it important, so be it. But, I wouldn't assert that "London's 150+ years of untroubled settlement" (what at common-law would be in the nature of a claim by adverse possession or prescription) is any worthier title than Buenos Aires' title either.

But, I don't think that any amount of inflation could pump-up the Argentinian Navy to be of serious blue-water quality. I just think the facts belie that. So, if we are rating the Argentines' quality based on the level of difficulty the British encountered in taking it down, perhaps, we might want to question the exam before we brag on having received an "A".

As to:

. . . the question . . . how did the Junta work itself into a frenzy, knowing it's own capabilities and London's? How could it have made the strategic and operational error. Once one understands that, then the how of how London got it back becomes easy.
If I understand your question correctly, the answer is simple. The Argentines simply didn't believe that London would dispatch the Royal Navy several thousand miles, to hold onto a patch of ground that I don't believe that even the Argentines truly wanted. Once the Argentines made their miscalculated occupation and London moved to counter their gamble, the Argentines couldn't just pull out and save face. Hence, a war that lost more lives than the number of actual inhabitants of the disputed Isles.

I too enjoyed the exchange. And, none of my comments were personal or derogatory of the British.
 
Well, LOL, if London felt it important, so be it. But, I wouldn't assert that "London's 150+ years of untroubled settlement" (what at common-law would be in the nature of a claim by adverse possession or prescription) is any worthier title than Buenos Aires' title either.

But, I don't think that any amount of inflation could pump-up the Argentinian Navy to be of serious blue-water quality. I just think the facts belie that. So, if we are rating the Argentines' quality based on the level of difficulty the British encountered in taking it down, perhaps, we might want to question the exam before we brag on having received an "A".

As to:


If I understand your question correctly, the answer is simple. The Argentines simply didn't believe that London would dispatch the Royal Navy several thousand miles, to hold onto a patch of ground that I don't believe that even the Argentines truly wanted. Once the Argentines made their miscalculated occupation and London moved to counter their gamble, the Argentines couldn't just pull out and save face. Hence, a war that lost more lives than the number of actual inhabitants of the disputed Isles.

I too enjoyed the exchange. And, none of my comments were personal or derogatory of the British.

I got you. For the record, I was born at Harlem General to two people who had US and British citizenship. It's complicated LOL. I see the situation from both US and British and a western hemisphere/colonial perspective. As such, to say "(what at common-law would be in the nature of a claim by adverse possession or prescription) is any worthier title than Buenos Aires' title either" misses the point.

Firstly, we're not talking Common Law - we're talking Maritime and Sovereignty Law. If The Falklands were truly Argentine, why not invade in 1832? Why did it take them 150 years to do something about it? Why open an embassy in London for decade upon decade and allow generation upon generation of Falklander to be born and grow up and then die and never raise the issue? Was it because you'd become an intensly unpopular dictatorship who has created a corrupt social class that would do anything to protect privilege and power over the vast majority of Argentines?

Why 1982? Was it because thousands of mothers were camped out in the main square in Buenos Aires and they were demanding answers as to where their sons were being held or where their bodies were buried? Was it because the reform movement was so entrenched that you had lost the middle class? The Falklands had never been a factor in Argentine politics for nearly two centuries but all of a sudden it was. Why would Argentine revolutionaries accept British help in the fight against Spain for independence and then their descendents turn on the Brits 150 years later?

The answer is political expedeincy. It isn't principle, otherwise Argentina might owe Chile a portion of Tierra Del Fuego, it might owe Brazil a bit of swampland, it might owe Paraguay a bit of swamp, it might owe Uruguay a sliver of land with 3,000 people and a bunch of cows. It wasn't anti-colonialism because they were right wing dictators (of whom the democratically elected current leader Kirshcner is a product of their oligarchy) who were friendly to various fachististic governments around the world including South Africa and Israel and most importantly Nazi Germany. Matter of facts half the A4 Skyhawks the Argentines flew to San Carlos Bay to attack the British fleet were bought directly from the US and the other half were used ex-Israeli Air Force and had been used in the 67 and 73 wars against the Arabs. All of them were maintained by Israeli technicians. Argentina is not "anticolonial" and deserves no sympathy in that regard.

Again, let's be clear - the Argentine military was two tiered. There were a minority of professional soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Very competent, very motivated and very, very dangerous. But the vast number of people in uniform were conscripts just wanting to do their two or three years and get the fuck out. London understood that they needed to go after the professionals after getting a modicome of air superiority and the tide would turn.
 
Well, LOL, if London felt it important, so be it. But, I wouldn't assert that "London's 150+ years of untroubled settlement" (what at common-law would be in the nature of a claim by adverse possession or prescription) is any worthier title than Buenos Aires' title either.

But, I don't think that any amount of inflation could pump-up the Argentinian Navy to be of serious blue-water quality. I just think the facts belie that. So, if we are rating the Argentines' quality based on the level of difficulty the British encountered in taking it down, perhaps, we might want to question the exam before we brag on having received an "A".

As to:


If I understand your question correctly, the answer is simple. The Argentines simply didn't believe that London would dispatch the Royal Navy several thousand miles, to hold onto a patch of ground that I don't believe that even the Argentines truly wanted. Once the Argentines made their miscalculated occupation and London moved to counter their gamble, the Argentines couldn't just pull out and save face. Hence, a war that lost more lives than the number of actual inhabitants of the disputed Isles.

I too enjoyed the exchange. And, none of my comments were personal or derogatory of the British.

I got you. For the record, I was born at Harlem General to two people who had US and British citizenship. It's complicated LOL. I see the situation from both US and British and a western hemisphere/colonial perspective. As such, to say "(what at common-law would be in the nature of a claim by adverse possession or prescription) is any worthier title than Buenos Aires' title either" misses the point.

Firstly, we're not talking Common Law - we're talking Maritime and Sovereignty Law. If The Falklands were truly Argentine, why not invade in 1832? Why did it take them 150 years to do something about it? Why open an embassy in London for decade upon decade and allow generation upon generation of Falklander to be born and grow up and then die and never raise the issue? Was it because you'd become an intensly unpopular dictatorship who has created a corrupt social class that would do anything to protect privilege and power over the vast majority of Argentines?

Why 1982? Was it because thousands of mothers were camped out in the main square in Buenos Aires and they were demanding answers as to where their sons were being held or where their bodies were buried? Was it because the reform movement was so entrenched that you had lost the middle class? The Falklands had never been a factor in Argentine politics for nearly two centuries but all of a sudden it was. Why would Argentine revolutionaries accept British help in the fight against Spain for independence and then their descendents turn on the Brits 150 years later?

The answer is political expedeincy. It isn't principle, otherwise Argentina might owe Chile a portion of Tierra Del Fuego, it might owe Brazil a bit of swampland, it might owe Paraguay a bit of swamp, it might owe Uruguay a sliver of land with 3,000 people and a bunch of cows. It wasn't anti-colonialism because they were right wing dictators (of whom the democratically elected current leader Kirshcner is a product of their oligarchy) who were friendly to various fachististic governments around the world including South Africa and Israel and most importantly Nazi Germany. Matter of facts half the A4 Skyhawks the Argentines flew to San Carlos Bay to attack the British fleet were bought directly from the US and the other half were used ex-Israeli Air Force and had been used in the 67 and 73 wars against the Arabs. All of them were maintained by Israeli technicians. Argentina is not "anticolonial" and deserves no sympathy in that regard.

Again, let's be clear - the Argentine military was two tiered. There were a minority of professional soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. Very competent, very motivated and very, very dangerous. But the vast number of people in uniform were conscripts just wanting to do their two or three years and get the fuck out. London understood that they needed to go after the professionals after getting a modicome of air superiority and the tide would turn.
 
David Cameron Condemns Argentina Over The Falklands

People living in the Falklands wish to remain British, therefore nothing to talk about.

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Thought ya'll might be interested in this:


Sean Penn’s Falklands War
Posted by Lauren Collins
February 15, 2012
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/lauren-collins/2012/02/sean-penns-falkland-war.html



As of today, Sean Penn is the new Karl Lagerfeld—the man upon whom, having disrespected something dear to the United Kingdom, the British papers most gleefully pile contempt. Lagerfeld’s sin was to insult Adele. Penn’s, far graver, was to suggest that the Falkland Islands, the long-contested archipelago off the coast of Argentina, do not rightfully belong to Britain, which has controlled them since 1833. This month, after the British announced that the Duke of Cambridge—né Prince William—would be deployed to the Falklands with the R.A.F., relations between the U.K. and Argentina, which degenerated into a war in 1982, have been increasingly hostile. The U.K.’s position is that the Islands will remain British unless their three thousand or so inhabitants express a wish that it be otherwise; the Argentineans, along with Penn, see this as a flimsy attempt at perpetuating a historic theft. “The world today is not going to tolerate any ludicrous and archaic commitment to colonialist ideology,” Penn said during a meeting on Monday with Cristina Kirchner, the president of Argentina. (Penn is prone to this sort of thing: see John Lahr’s Profile for more.)

Yesterday, in Uruguay, Penn struck again, calling Britain’s decision to send the prince to the Falklands “unthinkable.” He called the Falklands “the Malvinas of Argentina,” which, to British ears, is significantly worse than calling football “soccer.” The headline of a story in the Daily Mail read:

He’s not British or Argentine. Not that this stops the achingly trendy ex-Mr. Madonna shooting his mouth off about the Falklands.

This was accompanied by a quote from Patrick Mercer, a former Army officer and a Tory M.P., who said that Penn “seems to know nothing about the situation judging by this moronic comment. A good number of his movies have been turkeys, so I supposed we shouldn’t expect much better coming out of his mouth.” Another column, in the Mail Online, suggested, “Get out of the Falklands yourself, Mr. Penn.” (There is a long tabloid tradition of rabble-rousing with regard to the Falklands. The Sun’s notorious headline, after a British submarine, on Margaret Thatcher’s orders, sank the General Belgrano on May 4, 1982, killing more than three hundred Argentineans, was “GOTCHA.”)

Over at the Telegraph, Tim Stanley, a professor of United States history at Oxford (he is working on a biography of Pat Buchanan), had come up with a novel riposte: Sean Penn, he said, should give up the keys to his Malibu estate, which, he argued, actually belongs to Mexico. “America’s claim over Malibu is tenuous and rooted in patriarchy,” he wrote, mimicking Penn’s tone. “Sean Penn’s house is a mocking reminder of that brute chauvinism, with its high white walls and spacious interiors. Its swimming pool is an insult to the honor of the Mexican people.”

Photograph of Penn and Kirchner. AP Photo/Argentina’s Presidency.
 
falkland_islands_map.gif


falkland_islands.gif

:cool:
 
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Argentina's provocative Falklands advertisement



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May 4 - Argentina risks British anger by airing an advert of an Argentine Olympic athlete training on the Falkland islands. Sunita Rappai reports.

 

"Moreover, if faced with Argentine occupation on arrival
there would be no certainty that such a force would
be able to retake the dependency."




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