Deadly Legacy:
U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War
by William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix of the Arms Trade Resource Center
"We hope to build a new and lasting partnership between Africa and the world, based on common interests, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to peace, prosperity, and freedom."- U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Statement to the UN Security Council Ministerial on Africa, Sept. 24, 1998
"When the United States assumes the Presidency of the Security Council next month, in January 2000 – the first month of the first year of the new millennium – I wish to announce today that we intend to make Africa the priority of the month."- U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke Pretoria, South Africa, Dec. 6, 1999
"The problem of all the ethnic and tribal wars must be either resolved or at least largely reduced through a big effort by the countries that deal in arms to prevent the over-militarisation of Africa."- Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Michel Camdessus Comments to French radio, Jan. 2, 2000
Executive Summary
I. Introduction
II. U.S.-Congo Relations: Stabilizing the Region or Handicapping Peace?
III. The U.S. Role in Militarizaing Africa
IV. Changing Rhetoric, Changing Policy
Key Policy Recommendations
Other Resources for Information and Action
Endnotes
Tables:
Table 1: Post-Cold War U.S. Arms Transfers to Governments Involved in the Congo War, 1989-1998
Table 2: Post-Cold War U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Countries Involved in the Congo War, 1989-1998
African Militaries Trained by the U.S., 1997-1998
Executive Summary
As the Clinton administration moves into the presidency of the United Nations Security Council, it is declaring January 2000, "the month of Africa." Hoping to counter criticisms that it has been engaged in a rhetorical promotion of U.S.-Africa relations over the past two years without substantive follow-up, the administration has announced its intent to prioritize finding solutions to the ongoing conflicts in the region, including a 30-year civil war that trudges on in Angola and the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It has not, however, accepted its own responsibility in helping to create the conditions that have led to these seemingly intractable conflicts.
Over the past few years, the administration has made considerable effort to put a new and improved face on its relations with African countries. High-level visits to the region – first by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, then President Clinton himself in the spring of 1998, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke this past December – have reinforced the idea of a new partnership with the continent based on promoting "African solutions to African problems." The reality, however, is that the problems facing Africa and her people – violent conflict, political instability, and the lowest regional rate of economic growth worldwide – have been fueled in part by a legacy of U.S. involvement in the region. Moreover, the solutions being proposed by the Clinton administration remain grounded in the counter-productive Cold-War policies that have defined U.S.-Africa relations for far too long.
Unfortunately, the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a vivid example of how U.S. policies – past and present – have failed the people of Africa. After more than two years of devastating war, African leaders are struggling, with little success, to implement the Lusaka peace accord. Signatories to the treaty continue to call for UN peacekeeping support even as they prepare for continued fighting. Despite its demonstrable role in planting the seeds of this conflict, the U.S. has done little to either acknowledge its complicity or help create a viable resolution. Official tours of the region and impressive rhetoric will not be enough to contribute to lasting peace, democratic stability, and economic development in Africa.
Major Findings
In 1998, Africa suffered 11 major armed conflicts, more than any other continent. For the first time since 1989, Africa is the world’s most war-torn region.[1] In this decade alone, 32 African countries have experienced violent conflict, and many of those face continuing civil war or the looming threat of renewed fighting.[2] Notably, most of the African countries engaged in serious conflict over the past fifty years have also been the recipients of U.S. weapons and training. Throughout the Cold War (1950-1989), the U.S. delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa.[3] Military aid and training, covert weapons shipments, and political and financial backing poured in, as the war against communism was played out on African soil. In the process, the U.S. propped up corrupt dictators, armed some of the world’s worst human rights abusers, and fueled violent conflict. In fact, many of the top U.S. arms clients of the Cold War – Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire (now the DRC) – have turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s in terms of violence, instability, and economic collapse.
Often, the U.S. offered weapons and military assistance to a repressive government with one hand while raising the other in the name of securing democracy and promoting stability. Inevitably, somewhere down the line the regime collapses, and U.S. policy-makers are left struggling to re-write their lines. Once a new government takes power, the cycle reemerges with the same old offers of U.S. military training to help "secure democracy." Despite the astounding regularity with which the policy of arming African governments has failed, U.S. policy-makers have been unable (or unwilling) to develop effective non-military forms of engagement.
Moreover, the U.S. has failed to acknowledge its own role in fueling conflict and undermining democratic development in Africa. A July 1999 Report by the U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research states clearly that "Arms transfers and trafficking and the conflicts they feed are having a devastating impact on Sub-Saharan Africa." Yet, the authors fail to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for either its past or current military weapons and training exports to Africa, explicitly leaving the U.S. out of the picture: "Arms suppliers in Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North America, Latin America, and Asia have sold arms to African clients."[4] In fact, nowhere does the report mention U.S. arms transfers to the region, although more than $20 million worth of U.S. weapons and training were delivered to Africa in 1998 alone.[5] Nor is there any recognition that the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of U.S. equipment transferred to the Mobutu regime in Zaire and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola since the 1970’s are still being utilized in current African conflicts.
Defenders of the Clinton administration’s policy toward the provision of arms and training to African military forces point out that the United States is not the primary supplier of weaponry to the region, and that in any case U.S. military programs in Africa are designed to promote peacekeeping and professionalism, not proliferation and war. As we discuss below, whatever their intention may be, skills and equipment provided by the U.S. have strengthened the military capabilities of combatants involved in some of Africa’s most violent and intractable conflicts. As to the relative importance of U.S. arms transfers to Africa, data from the most recent edition of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s publication, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, ranks the U.S. as the second leading arms supplier to both Central Africa (behind China and ahead of France) and Southern Africa (behind Russia and tied for second with France). In contrast, the most recent data from the Congressional Research Service suggests that at best the United States ranks sixth in arms transfers to Africa for the period from 1995-1998, after China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.[6]
Any assessment of the arms flow to Africa must take account of the substantial transfers of light weaponry that are carried out beyond normal government-to-government channels. For example, as Brian Wood and Johan Peleman point out in their recent report The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, the weapons suppliers to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda included brokers and shippers in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and France, working with collaborators in Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt, Italy, Israel, the Seychelles, and the former Zaire.[7] While the United States was not a major player in this traffic, many of its closest allies were. And the U.S. history of overt and covert weapons trafficking to the region helped nourish the informal networks which are now often the main source of supply for the world’s most vicious ethnic conflicts. So the real question for U.S. policy towards African conflicts has more to do with responsibility than it does with statistics on who may hold the dubious distinction of being the leading arms supplier to the continent. If the United States is to play a credible role in resolving and preventing wars in Africa, it should be reducing its military role in the region, not expanding it. Only then will it have the diplomatic leverage needed to get other suppliers to follow suit.
As Clinton administration officials talk more and more of promoting peace and stability, consolidating democracy, and encouraging sustainable growth in Africa, they should also take a closer look at the long-term impacts of past and current policy toward the region. The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is only the latest example of how the U.S.’s Cold War legacy continues to wreak havoc in the developing world.
I I: U.S.-Congo Relations: Stabilizing the Region or Handicapping Peace?
"Zaire has been a stabilizing force and a staunch supporter of U.S. and Western policies for over two decades." - U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation, 1991
On August 2, 1998, violent conflict erupted in the recently formed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or Congo). Within months, the civil war had unfolded into a complex international crisis engulfing Central Africa in what some have called Africa’s First World War. In the early months of the war, the U.S. led intense diplomatic efforts to help contain the conflict, shuttling Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice from one end of the continent to the other to urge a withdrawal of foreign troops and an immediate cease-fire. Rice’s efforts were commendable, and the U.S. should continue to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Unfortunately, such last minute band-aid diplomacy is not enough to reverse the effects of decades of destabilizing U.S. involvement in the region.
Despite the signing of an African-brokered peace agreement in Lusaka in July 1999, peace and stability remain distant dreams for the people of Central Africa. Fighting continues in the Congo, and at least nine neighboring countries have become directly involved over the course of the conflict. The historical and political complexity of the war leaves little room for placing clear blame or prescribing simple solutions; however, the U.S. role in fueling the country’s political instability and violent conflict has been swept under the rug for far too long.
Mobutu, Friend and Ally:
Bordering nine other countries and rich in natural resources, Zaire has been the economic and strategic heart of Africa since it gained its independence nearly 40 years ago. In 1965, after five years of political and military scuffling, Mobutu Sese Soko pushed his way into the presidency with the help of external backing from the CIA. Determined to maintain a foothold on the continent, the U.S. provided political and military support to its "friend and ally" for the next 30 years. In that time, Mobutu came to be known as one of Africa’s most brutal dictators.
Despite continued reports of widespread corruption and human rights abuses in Zaire, the U.S. helped build Mobutu’s arsenal with a fleet of C-130 transport aircraft and a steady supply of rifles, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, patrol boats, and communications equipment. By the time the dictator was ousted in 1997, the U.S. had delivered more than $300 million (measured in constant 1998 dollars) in military hardware to Mobutu’s regime. Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the U.S. also trained 1,350 of Mobutu’s soldiers at a cost of more than $100 million.[8] Although Zairian forces gained a reputation for violence and repression against civilians, the State Department continued to claim IMET training served to "safeguard Zaire’s internal stability and territorial integrity without threatening the security of neighboring countries."[9]
U.S. policy toward Mobutu was rationalized on the grounds of fighting "communism" and Soviet influence in Africa, but the U.S. was clearly more concerned with securing its own interests in the region than helping foster a stable, secure, and peaceful future for the people of Central Africa. Lying at the center of the continent, Zaire could provide the U.S. with access to important resources, transportation routes, and political favors. Over the years, U.S. rhetoric changed slightly, placing greater emphasis on democratic reform of the regime and increased attention to human rights, but in reality policy continued to focus on promoting narrowly defined U.S. economic and strategic interests.
"The U.S. has an interest in having a stable and responsible government in Kinshasa," the 1986 State Department Congressional Presentation reads, "which influences the stability, as well as the foreign and domestic policies, of its nine bordering states."[10] How Mobutu’s human rights abuses, political oppression, siphoning of government money, and use of a lawless military elite to subdue the people could have been justified as part of a "stable and responsible" government remains a disturbing question.
Moreover, even after the Cold War ended, the U.S. continued to provide military support to the Mobutu dictatorship. In 1991, the U.S. delivered more than $4.5 million in military hardware to Mobutu’s government.[11] That same year, Congress suspended its economic assistance to Congo – not on human rights grounds, but because it had defaulted on loans provided by the U.S. government to cover its weapons purchases.[12] By that time, a hearty arsenal of deadly weaponry had already poured into the country, while Mobutu’s fiscal corruption and brutal rule had incited political unrest and devastated the economy. According to the World Bank, 64.7% of the country’s budget was reserved for Mobutu’s discretionary spending in 1992; official Zaire figures put the estimate at 95%.[13]
Either the U.S. policy for promoting peace and democracy through a steady supply of military hardware and training to an undemocratic regime had failed miserably, or stated rationales masked other agendas. In either case, after three decades of oppressive rule Zaire hung ripe for violent upheaval, and U.S. policy reform was badly needed.
Enter Kabila
In 1996-97, Laurent Desiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo swept through the country and ousted President Mobutu, calling for democratic freedom under a new government. Uncertain whether democratic reforms would actually be implemented under Kabila’s self-installed government, but still hoping for a quiet end to the civil strife of the past few years, the U.S. chose to officially back the new government. At the time, the fact that the U.S. had supported the prior regime under similar rationale raised few eyebrows in Washington.
Before long, however, Kabila began his own anti-democratic crusade. Within a few short months of taking power, the new president banned political parties, suspended civil rights, and was reported to be fueling ethnic hatred. As reports of growing unrest and abuse trickled in, the U.S. held to a policy of engagement with Kabila, largely disregarding the voices of the democratic opposition and civil society groups struggling for reform within the country.
In its Congressional Presentation for FY99 Foreign Operations in Africa (written in 1997, as Kabila was coming to power), the State Department identified its "overriding objective" as "support [for] a successful post-Mobutu transition that results in a stable, prosperous, and democratic Congo." Despite the shaky future of the Kabila regime, U.S. State Department officials have continued to call for resumption of the IMET program (at a U.S. cost of $70,000) to support the new government in "developing an apolitical military cadre that respects human rights, the rule of law, and the concept of civilian control of the military." [14]
In FY2000, the DRC will also be eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. According to State, "EDA will support a rebuilding and professionalizing of the military following years of internal strife, and assist with maintaining internal security."[15] Why providing military training and equipment to a corrupt and abusive regime would promote democracy under Kabila, after the same policy had failed miserably for decades with Mobutu, was a question U.S. policy-makers should have been asking themselves. Unfortunately, before a debate on renewed military assistance to the Congo could begin, war had broken out.
Although the fighting that erupted in August 1998 between the new government’s forces and a coalition of Mobutu-backers and former Kabila-supporters has remained largely contained within Congolese borders, at least eight other national armies have been pulled into the conflict. Foreign troops from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, Chad, and Zimbabwe have been reported in the region during the conflict, along with as many as twelve irregular, or non-governmental, armed groups, including the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, and the Interhamwe militia forces that were behind the Rwandan genocide. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, as well as UNITA and other rebel forces, have backed the main rebel group known as the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), while Namibia, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Angola contributed troops and hardware in support of Kabila’s government forces. [16]
Other countries have also provided indirect support on both sides of the conflict. Libya is reported to have arranged the transport of troops from Chad to support Kabila. Sudan has financed three Ugandan guerrilla movements and also agreed to back Kabila. The South African government provided weapons to Rwanda in recent years and maintains good relations with President Museveni of Uganda, while private mercenaries from South Africa’s Security Lining Pretoria Company have been commissioned by Kabila.[17] The complex web of alliances has continued to evolve, with factions splitting and leaders being displaced sporadically. Signatories to the Lusaka peace accord this July included six of the governments involved, plus 50 leaders of the various rebel factions fighting in the Congo.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. has provided weapons and training to most of the players in the Congo conflict.
U.S. Military Assistance in Africa’s First World War
In 1998 alone, U.S. weapons to Africa totaled $12.5 million, including substantial deliveries to Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – all now backing Kabila. On the rebel side, Uganda received nearly $1.5 million in weaponry over the past two years, and Rwanda was importing U.S. weapons as late as 1993 (one year before the brutal genocide erupted). U.S. military transfers in the form of direct government-to-government weapons deliveries, commercial sales, and IMET training to the states directly involved has totaled more than $125 million since the end of the Cold War (see Tables 1 and 2.) [18]
All told, the U.S. has helped build the arsenals of eight of the nine governments directly involved in the Congo War. In addition, some of the Rwandan forces which played a key role in toppling the regime of long-time arms client Mobutu Sese Soko in Zaire had received training from U.S. special forces under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. The U.S. also provided an estimated $250 million in covert military assistance to UNITA’s forces between 1986-1991, [19] and is alleged to be backing the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army.
africafund@igc.org Web:apic@igc.apc.org Web: hartung@newschool.edu Web:pdd@clark.net Web: tamarg@fas.org Web: contact@iansa.org Web:mail@jubilee2000uk.org Web: woa@igc.apc.org Web: www.woaafrica.org
NOTES:
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
2 Demilitarization for Democracy, "Fighting Retreat: Military Political Power and Other Barriers to Africa’s Democratic Transition," July 1997.
3 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Fact as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
4 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "Arms and Conflict in Africa," July 1999.
5 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998.
6 Data cited are from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1997 (Washington, DC: ACDA, 1999), Table III; and Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1991-1998 (Washington, DC: CRS, August 4, 1999), p. 58.
7 Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, a joint report by the British Security Information Council, the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers, and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, (Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 1999), p. 29.
8 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts,1981, 1990, and 1997 editions.
9 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY1986, p 333.
10 Ibid.
11 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998.
12 Human Rights Watch, "Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa," March 1998.
13 David Schearer, "Africa’s Great War," in Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, p 92.
14 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1999, p 79.
15 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000, p 96.
16 See the International Crisis Group’s "Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict," November 1998, for further detail on international involvement in the war.
17 See David Schearer, "Africa’s Great War," in Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999.
18 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999
19 Human Rights Watch, "Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of Wars Since the 1992 Elections," November 1994.
20 Donald McNeil, "A War Turned Free-for-All Tears at Africa’s Center," New York Times, December 6, Week in Review, p. 5.
21 Al Venter, "Arms Pour Into Africa," New African, January 19, p 10-15.
22 Ibid.
23 Kathi Austin, "Hearts of Darkness," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 1999.
24 Reuters and CNN reports, March 8-10, 1999.
25 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
26 Department of Defense, ACSS Program Outline, July 1999.
27 Department of Defense, Report on Training of Special Operations Forces, April 1, 1998, and Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, FY1998 and FY1999, April 23, 1999.
28 Research estimate by Demilitarization for Democracy.
29 See Lynne Duke, "Africans Use Training in Unexpected Ways," and Priest, Dana, "Special Forces Training Review Sought," Washington Post, July 14-15, 1998.
30 Ambassador Marshal McCallie, Special Coordinator for ACRI, quoted in "U.S. Diplomat Pleads with ACRI," The Independent, January 14, 1999.
31 Daniel Volman, "Africa Policy Report: The Development of the African Crisis Response Initiative," April 23, 1998.
32 See Benjamin Gilman, "Ethiopia Needs a Push Toward Peace," Washington Post, January 3, 2000.
33 Daniel Volman, "Africa Policy Report: The Development of the African Crisis Response Initiative," April 23, 1998.
34 Department of Defense, "ACSS Program Outline," July 1999.
35 Clarissa Kayosa, "Open Letter on the Africa Center for Security Studies," Demilitarization for Democracy, September 1999.
36 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
37 Ibid.
38 Department of Defense, Report on the Status of DoD Direct Loans as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
39 "Why the U.S. Won’t Help," The East African, Nairobi, November 29, 1999.
40 See Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues, (Washington, DC), August 19, 1999.
41 Jim Cason, "Foreign Aid Programs Provide No Protection for Aid to Africa," The Africa Fund, February 28, 1998.
42 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999.
43 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
44 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes Fact Sheet," November 1999.
45 Thomas Lippman, "Washington Resigned to Congo Instability,"Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1998, p A30.
46 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa, Weekly Round-Up 44, October 30 - November 5, 1999.
47 Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, UN Security Council Ministerial on Small Arms, New York, New York, September 24, 1999.
48 U.S. State Department, Section 655 Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1998, submitted on June 30, 1999.
49 U.S. State Department Briefing, Assistant Secretary Rice on Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 18, 1999.
50 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence, "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes Fact Sheet," November 1999.
U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War
by William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix of the Arms Trade Resource Center
"We hope to build a new and lasting partnership between Africa and the world, based on common interests, mutual respect, and a shared commitment to peace, prosperity, and freedom."- U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Statement to the UN Security Council Ministerial on Africa, Sept. 24, 1998
"When the United States assumes the Presidency of the Security Council next month, in January 2000 – the first month of the first year of the new millennium – I wish to announce today that we intend to make Africa the priority of the month."- U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke Pretoria, South Africa, Dec. 6, 1999
"The problem of all the ethnic and tribal wars must be either resolved or at least largely reduced through a big effort by the countries that deal in arms to prevent the over-militarisation of Africa."- Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Michel Camdessus Comments to French radio, Jan. 2, 2000
Executive Summary
I. Introduction
II. U.S.-Congo Relations: Stabilizing the Region or Handicapping Peace?
III. The U.S. Role in Militarizaing Africa
IV. Changing Rhetoric, Changing Policy
Key Policy Recommendations
Other Resources for Information and Action
Endnotes
Tables:
Table 1: Post-Cold War U.S. Arms Transfers to Governments Involved in the Congo War, 1989-1998
Table 2: Post-Cold War U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) to Countries Involved in the Congo War, 1989-1998
African Militaries Trained by the U.S., 1997-1998
Executive Summary
As the Clinton administration moves into the presidency of the United Nations Security Council, it is declaring January 2000, "the month of Africa." Hoping to counter criticisms that it has been engaged in a rhetorical promotion of U.S.-Africa relations over the past two years without substantive follow-up, the administration has announced its intent to prioritize finding solutions to the ongoing conflicts in the region, including a 30-year civil war that trudges on in Angola and the ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It has not, however, accepted its own responsibility in helping to create the conditions that have led to these seemingly intractable conflicts.
Over the past few years, the administration has made considerable effort to put a new and improved face on its relations with African countries. High-level visits to the region – first by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, then President Clinton himself in the spring of 1998, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke this past December – have reinforced the idea of a new partnership with the continent based on promoting "African solutions to African problems." The reality, however, is that the problems facing Africa and her people – violent conflict, political instability, and the lowest regional rate of economic growth worldwide – have been fueled in part by a legacy of U.S. involvement in the region. Moreover, the solutions being proposed by the Clinton administration remain grounded in the counter-productive Cold-War policies that have defined U.S.-Africa relations for far too long.
Unfortunately, the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a vivid example of how U.S. policies – past and present – have failed the people of Africa. After more than two years of devastating war, African leaders are struggling, with little success, to implement the Lusaka peace accord. Signatories to the treaty continue to call for UN peacekeeping support even as they prepare for continued fighting. Despite its demonstrable role in planting the seeds of this conflict, the U.S. has done little to either acknowledge its complicity or help create a viable resolution. Official tours of the region and impressive rhetoric will not be enough to contribute to lasting peace, democratic stability, and economic development in Africa.
Major Findings
- Finding 1 – Due to the continuing legacies of its Cold War policies toward Africa, the U.S. bears some responsibility for the cycles of violence and economic problems plaguing the continent. Throughout the Cold War (1950-1989), the U.S. delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa. Many of the top U.S. arms clients – Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo or DRC) – have turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s in terms of violence, instability, and economic collapse.
- Finding 2 – The ongoing civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) is a prime example of the devastating legacy of U.S. arms sales policy on Africa. The U.S. prolonged the rule of Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Soko by providing more than $300 million in weapons and $100 million in military training. Mobutu used his U.S.-supplied arsenal to repress his own people and plunder his nation’s economy for three decades, until his brutal regime was overthrown by Laurent Kabila’s forces in 1997. When Kabila took power, the Clinton administration quickly offered military support by developing a plan for new training operations with the armed forces.
- Finding 3 – Although the Clinton administration has been quick to criticize the governments involved in the Congo War, decades of U.S. weapons transfers and continued military training to both sides of the conflict have helped fuel the fighting. The U.S. has helped build the arsenals of eight of the nine governments directly involved in the war that has ravaged the DRC since Kabila’s coup. U.S. military transfers in the form of direct government-to-government weapons deliveries, commercial sales, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) to the states directly involved have totaled more than $125 million since the end of the Cold War.
- Finding 4 – Despite the failure of U.S. polices in the region, the current administration continues to respond to Africa’s woes by helping to strengthen African militaries. As U.S. weapons deliveries to Africa continue to rise, the Clinton administration is now undertaking a wave of new military training programs in Africa. Between 1991-1998, U.S. weapons and training deliveries to Africa totaled more than $227 million. In 1998 alone, direct weapons transfers and IMET training totaled $20.1 million. And, under the Pentagon’s Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, U.S. special forces have trained military personnel from at least 34 of Africa’s 53 nations, including troops fighting on both sides of the DRC’s civil war – from Rwanda and Uganda (supporting the rebels) to Zimbabwe and Namibia (supporting the Kabila regime).
- Finding 5 – Even as it fuels military build-up, the U.S. continues cutting development assistance to Africa and remains unable (or unwilling) to promote alternative non-violent forms of engagement. While the U.S. ranks number one in global weapons exports, it falls dead last among industrialized nations in providing non-military foreign aid to the developing world. In 1997, the U.S. devoted only 0.09% of GNP to international development assistance, the lowest proportion of all developed countries. U.S. development aid to all of sub-Saharan Africa dropped to just $700 million in recent years.
- Recommendation 1 – By restricting the flow of weapons and training and increasing support for sustainable development policies, the U.S. could help create the conditions needed for peace and stability to take root. Although Congress recently passed legislation requiring the President to begin negotiations toward an international arms sales code of conduct based on human rights, non-aggression, and democracy, the U.S. continues to exempt its own exports from these same standards. The Clinton administration should make good on its acclaimed commitments to human rights and democracy by supporting passage of the bipartisan McKinney-Rohrabacher Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (HR 2269), a measure which would take U.S. weapons out of the hands of dictators and human rights abusers.
- Recommendation 2 – All U.S. military training programs should receive congressional oversight and approval, with effective mechanisms in place for reviewing and assessing their impact on human rights and democratic consolidation in the recipient countries. Despite congressional action to restrict military training from units engaged in human rights abuses, the Pentagon still carries out largely unmonitored Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) operations under a special forces exemption. Congress should take immediate steps to close the loopholes in JCET and other training programs by passing the International Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act (HR 1063). This bill, introduced by Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) and supported by a strong bi-partisan coalition, would prohibit all forms of military training and services to countries that are already ineligible for IMET.
- Recommendation 3 – The Clinton administration should provide increased unconditional debt forgiveness to African nations and encourage them to shift resources away from military build-up and toward human development. The U.S. should immediately forgive the hundreds of millions of dollars in military debt accrued by governments in Zaire, the Sudan, and Somalia. It should also take steps toward further debt relief by passing the HOPE for Africa bill introduced by Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr. (D-IL) in the House(HR 772) and Sen. Russell Feingold (D-WI) in the Senate (S 1636).President Clinton should also commit to the Jubilee 2000 campaign’s call for developing a plan, in conjunction with local non-governmental organizations and civil society, for full and unconditional debt relief this year.
- Recommendation 4 – The U.S. should provide increased development assistance to Africa and encourage civil-society building. President Clinton and Congress should restore the previous level of $800 million in development assistance to Africa in the FY2001 budget and work to increase funding to a more responsible level in coming years. The U.S. should strive to raise African development funding to $2 billion by 2003, and consult directly with non-governmental institutions to ensure that these funds are dispersed and used appropriately.
In 1998, Africa suffered 11 major armed conflicts, more than any other continent. For the first time since 1989, Africa is the world’s most war-torn region.[1] In this decade alone, 32 African countries have experienced violent conflict, and many of those face continuing civil war or the looming threat of renewed fighting.[2] Notably, most of the African countries engaged in serious conflict over the past fifty years have also been the recipients of U.S. weapons and training. Throughout the Cold War (1950-1989), the U.S. delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa.[3] Military aid and training, covert weapons shipments, and political and financial backing poured in, as the war against communism was played out on African soil. In the process, the U.S. propped up corrupt dictators, armed some of the world’s worst human rights abusers, and fueled violent conflict. In fact, many of the top U.S. arms clients of the Cold War – Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire (now the DRC) – have turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s in terms of violence, instability, and economic collapse.
Often, the U.S. offered weapons and military assistance to a repressive government with one hand while raising the other in the name of securing democracy and promoting stability. Inevitably, somewhere down the line the regime collapses, and U.S. policy-makers are left struggling to re-write their lines. Once a new government takes power, the cycle reemerges with the same old offers of U.S. military training to help "secure democracy." Despite the astounding regularity with which the policy of arming African governments has failed, U.S. policy-makers have been unable (or unwilling) to develop effective non-military forms of engagement.
Moreover, the U.S. has failed to acknowledge its own role in fueling conflict and undermining democratic development in Africa. A July 1999 Report by the U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research states clearly that "Arms transfers and trafficking and the conflicts they feed are having a devastating impact on Sub-Saharan Africa." Yet, the authors fail to attribute responsibility to the U.S. for either its past or current military weapons and training exports to Africa, explicitly leaving the U.S. out of the picture: "Arms suppliers in Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North America, Latin America, and Asia have sold arms to African clients."[4] In fact, nowhere does the report mention U.S. arms transfers to the region, although more than $20 million worth of U.S. weapons and training were delivered to Africa in 1998 alone.[5] Nor is there any recognition that the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of U.S. equipment transferred to the Mobutu regime in Zaire and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola since the 1970’s are still being utilized in current African conflicts.
Defenders of the Clinton administration’s policy toward the provision of arms and training to African military forces point out that the United States is not the primary supplier of weaponry to the region, and that in any case U.S. military programs in Africa are designed to promote peacekeeping and professionalism, not proliferation and war. As we discuss below, whatever their intention may be, skills and equipment provided by the U.S. have strengthened the military capabilities of combatants involved in some of Africa’s most violent and intractable conflicts. As to the relative importance of U.S. arms transfers to Africa, data from the most recent edition of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s publication, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, ranks the U.S. as the second leading arms supplier to both Central Africa (behind China and ahead of France) and Southern Africa (behind Russia and tied for second with France). In contrast, the most recent data from the Congressional Research Service suggests that at best the United States ranks sixth in arms transfers to Africa for the period from 1995-1998, after China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.[6]
Any assessment of the arms flow to Africa must take account of the substantial transfers of light weaponry that are carried out beyond normal government-to-government channels. For example, as Brian Wood and Johan Peleman point out in their recent report The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, the weapons suppliers to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda included brokers and shippers in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and France, working with collaborators in Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt, Italy, Israel, the Seychelles, and the former Zaire.[7] While the United States was not a major player in this traffic, many of its closest allies were. And the U.S. history of overt and covert weapons trafficking to the region helped nourish the informal networks which are now often the main source of supply for the world’s most vicious ethnic conflicts. So the real question for U.S. policy towards African conflicts has more to do with responsibility than it does with statistics on who may hold the dubious distinction of being the leading arms supplier to the continent. If the United States is to play a credible role in resolving and preventing wars in Africa, it should be reducing its military role in the region, not expanding it. Only then will it have the diplomatic leverage needed to get other suppliers to follow suit.
As Clinton administration officials talk more and more of promoting peace and stability, consolidating democracy, and encouraging sustainable growth in Africa, they should also take a closer look at the long-term impacts of past and current policy toward the region. The ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is only the latest example of how the U.S.’s Cold War legacy continues to wreak havoc in the developing world.
I I: U.S.-Congo Relations: Stabilizing the Region or Handicapping Peace?
"Zaire has been a stabilizing force and a staunch supporter of U.S. and Western policies for over two decades." - U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation, 1991
On August 2, 1998, violent conflict erupted in the recently formed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC or Congo). Within months, the civil war had unfolded into a complex international crisis engulfing Central Africa in what some have called Africa’s First World War. In the early months of the war, the U.S. led intense diplomatic efforts to help contain the conflict, shuttling Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice from one end of the continent to the other to urge a withdrawal of foreign troops and an immediate cease-fire. Rice’s efforts were commendable, and the U.S. should continue to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Unfortunately, such last minute band-aid diplomacy is not enough to reverse the effects of decades of destabilizing U.S. involvement in the region.
Despite the signing of an African-brokered peace agreement in Lusaka in July 1999, peace and stability remain distant dreams for the people of Central Africa. Fighting continues in the Congo, and at least nine neighboring countries have become directly involved over the course of the conflict. The historical and political complexity of the war leaves little room for placing clear blame or prescribing simple solutions; however, the U.S. role in fueling the country’s political instability and violent conflict has been swept under the rug for far too long.
Mobutu, Friend and Ally:
Bordering nine other countries and rich in natural resources, Zaire has been the economic and strategic heart of Africa since it gained its independence nearly 40 years ago. In 1965, after five years of political and military scuffling, Mobutu Sese Soko pushed his way into the presidency with the help of external backing from the CIA. Determined to maintain a foothold on the continent, the U.S. provided political and military support to its "friend and ally" for the next 30 years. In that time, Mobutu came to be known as one of Africa’s most brutal dictators.
Despite continued reports of widespread corruption and human rights abuses in Zaire, the U.S. helped build Mobutu’s arsenal with a fleet of C-130 transport aircraft and a steady supply of rifles, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, patrol boats, and communications equipment. By the time the dictator was ousted in 1997, the U.S. had delivered more than $300 million (measured in constant 1998 dollars) in military hardware to Mobutu’s regime. Through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the U.S. also trained 1,350 of Mobutu’s soldiers at a cost of more than $100 million.[8] Although Zairian forces gained a reputation for violence and repression against civilians, the State Department continued to claim IMET training served to "safeguard Zaire’s internal stability and territorial integrity without threatening the security of neighboring countries."[9]
U.S. policy toward Mobutu was rationalized on the grounds of fighting "communism" and Soviet influence in Africa, but the U.S. was clearly more concerned with securing its own interests in the region than helping foster a stable, secure, and peaceful future for the people of Central Africa. Lying at the center of the continent, Zaire could provide the U.S. with access to important resources, transportation routes, and political favors. Over the years, U.S. rhetoric changed slightly, placing greater emphasis on democratic reform of the regime and increased attention to human rights, but in reality policy continued to focus on promoting narrowly defined U.S. economic and strategic interests.
"The U.S. has an interest in having a stable and responsible government in Kinshasa," the 1986 State Department Congressional Presentation reads, "which influences the stability, as well as the foreign and domestic policies, of its nine bordering states."[10] How Mobutu’s human rights abuses, political oppression, siphoning of government money, and use of a lawless military elite to subdue the people could have been justified as part of a "stable and responsible" government remains a disturbing question.
Moreover, even after the Cold War ended, the U.S. continued to provide military support to the Mobutu dictatorship. In 1991, the U.S. delivered more than $4.5 million in military hardware to Mobutu’s government.[11] That same year, Congress suspended its economic assistance to Congo – not on human rights grounds, but because it had defaulted on loans provided by the U.S. government to cover its weapons purchases.[12] By that time, a hearty arsenal of deadly weaponry had already poured into the country, while Mobutu’s fiscal corruption and brutal rule had incited political unrest and devastated the economy. According to the World Bank, 64.7% of the country’s budget was reserved for Mobutu’s discretionary spending in 1992; official Zaire figures put the estimate at 95%.[13]
Either the U.S. policy for promoting peace and democracy through a steady supply of military hardware and training to an undemocratic regime had failed miserably, or stated rationales masked other agendas. In either case, after three decades of oppressive rule Zaire hung ripe for violent upheaval, and U.S. policy reform was badly needed.
Enter Kabila
In 1996-97, Laurent Desiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo swept through the country and ousted President Mobutu, calling for democratic freedom under a new government. Uncertain whether democratic reforms would actually be implemented under Kabila’s self-installed government, but still hoping for a quiet end to the civil strife of the past few years, the U.S. chose to officially back the new government. At the time, the fact that the U.S. had supported the prior regime under similar rationale raised few eyebrows in Washington.
Before long, however, Kabila began his own anti-democratic crusade. Within a few short months of taking power, the new president banned political parties, suspended civil rights, and was reported to be fueling ethnic hatred. As reports of growing unrest and abuse trickled in, the U.S. held to a policy of engagement with Kabila, largely disregarding the voices of the democratic opposition and civil society groups struggling for reform within the country.
In its Congressional Presentation for FY99 Foreign Operations in Africa (written in 1997, as Kabila was coming to power), the State Department identified its "overriding objective" as "support [for] a successful post-Mobutu transition that results in a stable, prosperous, and democratic Congo." Despite the shaky future of the Kabila regime, U.S. State Department officials have continued to call for resumption of the IMET program (at a U.S. cost of $70,000) to support the new government in "developing an apolitical military cadre that respects human rights, the rule of law, and the concept of civilian control of the military." [14]
In FY2000, the DRC will also be eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a grant basis under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. According to State, "EDA will support a rebuilding and professionalizing of the military following years of internal strife, and assist with maintaining internal security."[15] Why providing military training and equipment to a corrupt and abusive regime would promote democracy under Kabila, after the same policy had failed miserably for decades with Mobutu, was a question U.S. policy-makers should have been asking themselves. Unfortunately, before a debate on renewed military assistance to the Congo could begin, war had broken out.
Although the fighting that erupted in August 1998 between the new government’s forces and a coalition of Mobutu-backers and former Kabila-supporters has remained largely contained within Congolese borders, at least eight other national armies have been pulled into the conflict. Foreign troops from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia, Sudan, Chad, and Zimbabwe have been reported in the region during the conflict, along with as many as twelve irregular, or non-governmental, armed groups, including the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, and the Interhamwe militia forces that were behind the Rwandan genocide. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, as well as UNITA and other rebel forces, have backed the main rebel group known as the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), while Namibia, Chad, Zimbabwe, and Angola contributed troops and hardware in support of Kabila’s government forces. [16]
Other countries have also provided indirect support on both sides of the conflict. Libya is reported to have arranged the transport of troops from Chad to support Kabila. Sudan has financed three Ugandan guerrilla movements and also agreed to back Kabila. The South African government provided weapons to Rwanda in recent years and maintains good relations with President Museveni of Uganda, while private mercenaries from South Africa’s Security Lining Pretoria Company have been commissioned by Kabila.[17] The complex web of alliances has continued to evolve, with factions splitting and leaders being displaced sporadically. Signatories to the Lusaka peace accord this July included six of the governments involved, plus 50 leaders of the various rebel factions fighting in the Congo.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. has provided weapons and training to most of the players in the Congo conflict.
U.S. Military Assistance in Africa’s First World War
In 1998 alone, U.S. weapons to Africa totaled $12.5 million, including substantial deliveries to Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – all now backing Kabila. On the rebel side, Uganda received nearly $1.5 million in weaponry over the past two years, and Rwanda was importing U.S. weapons as late as 1993 (one year before the brutal genocide erupted). U.S. military transfers in the form of direct government-to-government weapons deliveries, commercial sales, and IMET training to the states directly involved has totaled more than $125 million since the end of the Cold War (see Tables 1 and 2.) [18]
All told, the U.S. has helped build the arsenals of eight of the nine governments directly involved in the Congo War. In addition, some of the Rwandan forces which played a key role in toppling the regime of long-time arms client Mobutu Sese Soko in Zaire had received training from U.S. special forces under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. The U.S. also provided an estimated $250 million in covert military assistance to UNITA’s forces between 1986-1991, [19] and is alleged to be backing the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army.
africafund@igc.org Web:apic@igc.apc.org Web: hartung@newschool.edu Web:pdd@clark.net Web: tamarg@fas.org Web: contact@iansa.org Web:mail@jubilee2000uk.org Web: woa@igc.apc.org Web: www.woaafrica.org
NOTES:
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
2 Demilitarization for Democracy, "Fighting Retreat: Military Political Power and Other Barriers to Africa’s Democratic Transition," July 1997.
3 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Fact as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
4 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "Arms and Conflict in Africa," July 1999.
5 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998.
6 Data cited are from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1997 (Washington, DC: ACDA, 1999), Table III; and Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1991-1998 (Washington, DC: CRS, August 4, 1999), p. 58.
7 Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents, a joint report by the British Security Information Council, the Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers, and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, (Oslo, Norway: PRIO, 1999), p. 29.
8 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts,1981, 1990, and 1997 editions.
9 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY1986, p 333.
10 Ibid.
11 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998.
12 Human Rights Watch, "Clinton Administration Policy and Human Rights in Africa," March 1998.
13 David Schearer, "Africa’s Great War," in Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, p 92.
14 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 1999, p 79.
15 U.S. State Department, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY 2000, p 96.
16 See the International Crisis Group’s "Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict," November 1998, for further detail on international involvement in the war.
17 See David Schearer, "Africa’s Great War," in Survival, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999.
18 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999
19 Human Rights Watch, "Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of Wars Since the 1992 Elections," November 1994.
20 Donald McNeil, "A War Turned Free-for-All Tears at Africa’s Center," New York Times, December 6, Week in Review, p. 5.
21 Al Venter, "Arms Pour Into Africa," New African, January 19, p 10-15.
22 Ibid.
23 Kathi Austin, "Hearts of Darkness," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 1999.
24 Reuters and CNN reports, March 8-10, 1999.
25 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
26 Department of Defense, ACSS Program Outline, July 1999.
27 Department of Defense, Report on Training of Special Operations Forces, April 1, 1998, and Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, FY1998 and FY1999, April 23, 1999.
28 Research estimate by Demilitarization for Democracy.
29 See Lynne Duke, "Africans Use Training in Unexpected Ways," and Priest, Dana, "Special Forces Training Review Sought," Washington Post, July 14-15, 1998.
30 Ambassador Marshal McCallie, Special Coordinator for ACRI, quoted in "U.S. Diplomat Pleads with ACRI," The Independent, January 14, 1999.
31 Daniel Volman, "Africa Policy Report: The Development of the African Crisis Response Initiative," April 23, 1998.
32 See Benjamin Gilman, "Ethiopia Needs a Push Toward Peace," Washington Post, January 3, 2000.
33 Daniel Volman, "Africa Policy Report: The Development of the African Crisis Response Initiative," April 23, 1998.
34 Department of Defense, "ACSS Program Outline," July 1999.
35 Clarissa Kayosa, "Open Letter on the Africa Center for Security Studies," Demilitarization for Democracy, September 1999.
36 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
37 Ibid.
38 Department of Defense, Report on the Status of DoD Direct Loans as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
39 "Why the U.S. Won’t Help," The East African, Nairobi, November 29, 1999.
40 See Congressional Research Service Issue Brief 95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues, (Washington, DC), August 19, 1999.
41 Jim Cason, "Foreign Aid Programs Provide No Protection for Aid to Africa," The Africa Fund, February 28, 1998.
42 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999.
43 Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1998, 1999.
44 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes Fact Sheet," November 1999.
45 Thomas Lippman, "Washington Resigned to Congo Instability,"Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1998, p A30.
46 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa, Weekly Round-Up 44, October 30 - November 5, 1999.
47 Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, UN Security Council Ministerial on Small Arms, New York, New York, September 24, 1999.
48 U.S. State Department, Section 655 Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1998, submitted on June 30, 1999.
49 U.S. State Department Briefing, Assistant Secretary Rice on Democratic Republic of the Congo, November 18, 1999.
50 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence, "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes Fact Sheet," November 1999.
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