Liberal Media?, White-Out of bush’s Impeachable Offense!!!

tian

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Registered
QueEx said:
<font size="6"><center>Bush and 'the memo'</font size></center>

chronicle_logo.gif

Friday, June 10, 2005




PRESIDENT BUSH apparently thinks he can dismiss the damning "Downing Street memo" with a few glib words.

If he is right, it is a sad commentary on the state of American democracy and values.

The memo, recounting the details of a July 23, 2002, meeting at British Prime Minister Tony Blair's official residence on 10 Downing St., strongly suggested that the message had been sent across the Atlantic that the Bush White House had made the decision to wage war on Iraq. The minutes of the meeting indicated that Blair and his top-level intelligence and foreign-policy aides were given clear signals that military action was "inevitable."

In the most disturbing passage of the minutes, the head of Britain's MI6 intelligence service, reporting on his recent trip to Washington, told the group that "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" of a war to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Bush was finally asked about the memo directly this week, during a media availability with Blair. Bush tried to discredit the memo because of the timing of its disclosure -- just days before Blair's re-election. But it is important to note that no one has challenged the authenticity of the memo nor the accuracy of its account of the meeting.

Bush also scoffed at the suggestion that the decision to go to war had been made by July 2002, nearly a year before U.S. bombs began raining on Baghdad. "There's nothing farther from the truth," Bush told reporters. "My conversation with the prime minister was, how can we do this peacefully?"

Americans deserve to have a more intensive investigation and expansive explanation to the extremely serious allegation that their government "fixed" intelligence to justify a pre-emptive war. The White House wants to dismiss it as "old news" and the Republicans who control both houses of Congress assume they can shrug off the demands of a bloc of Democrats -- led by Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich. -- for hearings on the Downing Street memo.

There should be no statute of limitations -- or shortness of public attention span -- on an issue that cuts to the core of this government's integrity and credibility. Congress must fully investigate the actions in Washington that led the highest officials in Great Britain to be convinced that the Bush administration was hell-bent on war and working to concoct a rationalization for it.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/06/10/EDGMMD62O01.DTL


Great editorial comments coming out of the San Francisco Chronicle... Good commentary!


tian
 

muckraker10021

Superstar *****
BGOL Investor
tehuti said:
Lets stop pretending that the intelligence wasn't "fixed" to support a specific policy goal(s).....<font color="#FF0000"><b>such as invading Iraq for Neo-Con Corporatist "GRAND STRATEGIC DESIGN"</b></font>

<table border="4" cellpadding="5" cellspacing="5" width="750" bordercolorlight="#FF0000" bordercolordark="#FF0000"><tbody><tr>
<td class="dclite" nowrap="nowrap" width="1%">&nbsp;</td><td class="dclite" width="99%">
<p class="dcmessage"></p><div class="excerpt">
<font face="Arial Black" size="6" color="#FF0000">"Fuck Saddam. We're taking him out."</font><br>-
<b><font size="4" face="Arial">George W. Bush, March 2002</font></b></div><br><br><a href="http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1101030331-435968,00.html" target="_blank">http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,110103...</a> <br><br>This baby Bush quote from TIME magazine summarizes the spirit and essence of the Downing Street Minutes.
Please ram this quote down the throat of every RepubliKlan that you come
across.<br><br>In addition to baby bush's rant here are quotes from Condi &amp;
Colin:<p><br></p>
<div class="excerpt"><b>"(Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors."</b><br><b><font face="Arial" color="#0000FF" size="4">- Colin Powell, February 24, 2001</font></b></div><br><div class="excerpt"><b>"We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt. He is not a threat. He is contained"</b><br>
<b><font face="Arial" size="4" color="#0000FF">- Condoleeza Rice, July 2001</font></b></div><p></p></td></tr></tbody></table>
 

muckraker10021

Superstar *****
BGOL Investor
<font face="arial black" size="6" color="#D90000">The Last Laugh?</font>
<font face="arial" size="4" color="#0000FF"><b>
History will hold Bush and Blair accountable for their lies in the run-up to the Iraq war, even if the D.C. press corps just finds them funny.</b></font>

<font face="Trebuchet MS, arial unicode ms, helvetica, verdana, arial, sans-serif" size="3" color="#000000">
<b>By Joe Conason


June 10, 2005 |</b> On Tuesday, more than a month after the "Downing Street memo" first appeared on Britain's front pages, a Reuters correspondent asked George W. Bush and Tony Blair to explain the secret document that says the Bush administration had decided by July 2002 to invade Iraq -- and that the intelligence on Saddam Hussein's arsenal was then being "fixed" to bolster an otherwise exceedingly "thin" justification for war.

While the president and the prime minister airily attempted to dismiss the explosive memo -- just as many mainstream and conservative journalists in the United States did at first -- they have a lot more explaining to do. History will hold them accountable even if the press does not. For unlike previous indications of Bush's duplicity in promoting the war, this document provides historical evidence of a kind that usually remains hidden in a vault for years or even decades.

The Downing Street memo meets a higher standard of proof than gossip from one of Bob Woodward's unnamed sources or the memoirs of a disgruntled former official like Paul O'Neill. It is the official classified record of a crucial meeting of the British government's security cabinet on July 23, 2002 -- including the prime minister, the attorney general, the foreign secretary, the defense secretary and the chief of MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service. It details their worried discussion of their American ally's premature and absolute determination to wage a war that the president publicly claimed he hoped to avoid, and of the difficulty they would have in justifying that war.

Stodgy and fearful, the Washington press corps seemed unable to process this revelatory document, concocting various excuses to ignore it or relegate it to the back pages. Until Tuesday, it seemed likely to fade into the archives, despite the best efforts of dissident politicians and bloggers.

So the president may have been surprised when Steve Holland of Reuters asked this question: "On Iraq, the so-called Downing Street memo from July 2002 says intelligence and facts were being 'fixed around' the policy of removing Saddam through military action. Is this an accurate reflection of what happened? Could both of you respond?"

Like the eager poodle that will be his permanent caricature, Blair leaped to answer first. His response is worth parsing carefully, especially because neither he nor Bush took any follow-up questions on the subject.

"Well, I can respond to that very easily," Blair said. "No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all."

He didn't deny the authenticity of the memo, nor did he try to claim that the obvious meaning of the phrase "fixed around" is different in London than in Washington. He also didn't try to explain why the memo so clearly quoted Sir Richard Dearlove, head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, making comments precisely to that effect. And he didn't explain why, if the memo was wrong, neither he nor anyone on his staff corrected its contents when it was circulated to all those present after the meeting.

Did Blair mean to suggest that Dearlove -- identified in the memo only by his traditional codename "C" -- had reported inaccurately on what he had learned from his CIA counterparts in Washington? If so, how would Blair know that? Or did Blair mean to imply that Matthew Rycroft -- his foreign policy aide who took the meeting notes and later wrote the memo -- misquoted Dearlove?

Blair moved on swiftly without further clarification, as if he and his government bore no responsibility for the memo's contents -- and he was lucky that nobody asked what he thought he was talking about.

"And let me remind you that that memorandum was written before we then went to the United Nations," he continued blithely. "Now, no one knows more intimately the discussions that we were conducting as two countries at the time than me. And the fact is, we decided to go to the United Nations and went through that process, which resulted in the November 2002 United Nations resolution to give a final chance to Saddam Hussein to comply with international law. He didn't do so. And that was the reason why we had to take military action."

The credibility of Blair's remarks can be judged only in context of the Downing Street memo and other documents leaked in Britain, all of which show that "going to the U.N." was merely a pretext for military action -- which he had committed his country to support months earlier.

Yes, the Downing Street memo was written before the United States and the United Kingdom brought Iraq before the U.N. Security Council. But as Blair well knows, the decision to return to the United Nations had nothing to do with Bush's ultimate goal. The question debated among his advisors and with the British was what route they would take to get to Baghdad -- and how to manage world opinion along the way.

On May 1, the Sunday Times of London also published another classified British government document, titled "Iraq: Conditions for Military Action" and dated July 19, 2002 -- four days before the Blair security cabinet met at Downing Street. Circulated to the officials at that meeting, the memo emphasized the commitment Blair had already made when he visited Texas several months earlier:

"When the prime minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford [Texas] in April, he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change." The memo noted that the United States should meet "certain conditions" and that both governments would have to "shape public opinion" to make war politically feasible.

At the time, like his friend Bush, Blair was telling his public and elected officials that he had made no decision to invade Iraq. But still another memo shows that his denials were misleading. In a classified report, Sir David Manning, the prime minister's foreign policy advisor, informed Blair about his March 14, 2002, meeting with then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. "I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change, but you had to manage a press, a parliament, and a public opinion."

Or as Christopher Meyer, then the British ambassador to the United States, put it in still another leaked memo, dated March 18, 2003, about a conversation with Rice: "We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option."

In other words, as the Downing Street memo also indicates, the United Nations was nothing more than the stage set for a "clever" plan to manage public opinion. At the July 23 meeting, Foreign Minister Jack Straw admitted that the case against Iraq "was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran." Straw's solution was to "work up an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the U.N. weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."

According to the memo, Blair hoped that Saddam would cooperate -- by refusing to cooperate with the U.N. "The prime minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the U.N. inspectors ... Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD ... If the political context were right, people would support regime change."

There was no discussion at the July 23 meeting, or in any of the leaked documents, about how to avoid war -- although Blair continues to insist that was his fondest wish.

Both Blair and Bush have frequently asserted, as the prime minister again repeated at the White House this week, that in fact Saddam didn't comply with the U.N. resolutions. Indeed, Blair rather strangely behaves as if the world hadn't seen the inspectors return to Iraq during the weeks before the invasion; as if the world hadn't watched the destruction of illegal missile parts found by the inspectors; as if the world hadn't learned, after exhaustive post-invasion searching, that there were simply no weapons of mass destruction hidden in Iraq.

Blair apparently thinks that everyone should simply believe him -- regardless of the Downing Street memo and other inconvenient realities -- because nobody knows what went on between him and Bush "more intimately ... than me." As Groucho Marx would have said, should we believe Tony or our own lying eyes?

As for Bush, he too tried to wave off the memo by asserting his own version of what happened three years ago -- and by insinuating that the American press somehow deserved blame for a story that it had scarcely dared to report.

"Well, I -- you know, I read kind of the characterizations of the memo, particularly when they dropped it out in the middle of [Blair's] race," he said. "I'm not sure who 'they dropped it out' is, but -- I'm not suggesting that you all dropped it out there." At that the reporters in the White House press room laughed along with Bush. That was some funny joke, especially coming from a president whose administration has so successfully intimidated the national media.

"And somebody said, well, you know, we had made up our mind to go to use military force to deal with Saddam. There's nothing farther from the truth," he continued. "My conversation with the prime minister was, how could we do this peacefully? what could we do?"

Nobody asked Bush to explain why the memo quotes Foreign Secretary Straw telling Blair and his other colleagues that according to his contacts in Washington, "it seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided." And incidentally, nowhere in the memo does Blair contradict any of his ministers' damning assertions about his friend Bush.

There remain many more questions to be asked and answered, now that the forbidden issue has been broached in our own press. Will the American media rectify its original error and pursue the story of the Downing Street documents? Or will it again drop the subject, even though both the president and the prime minister have implicitly confirmed the memo's authenticity?

Past performance on this and other stories displeasing to the White House suggests that their unconvincing and incomplete answers will be allowed to stand, even though the president's popularity and public support for the war have reached new lows.

For anyone who recalls the blazing indignation of the Washington press corps and the nation's talking heads after Bill Clinton lied about his sad philandering, the passive media response to this president's fatal dishonesty is astonishing.

He brandishes the "smoking memo" in their faces and laughs -- and they laugh with him.

</font>
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
<font size="4">
Okay, let me see if I got this right,

"The sanctions, as they are called, have succeeded over the last 10 years ... The Iraqi regime militarily remains fairly weak. It doesn't have the capacity it had 10 or 12 years ago. It has been <u>contained</u> ...

(Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is <u>unable to project</u> conventional <u>power</u> against his neighbors."
- Colin Powell, February 24, 2001

"We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt. He is not a threat. He is <u>contained</u>"
- Condoleeza Rice, July 2001

AND ...

"Saddam Hussein's <u>bottled up</u>, at this point, but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy where the Iraqis are concerned."
- Dick Cheney, September 16, 2001


Do I have this right ???

QueEx</font size>
 
T

tehuti

Guest
Don't Follow the Money

By FRANK RICH
June 12, 2005

THE morning the Deep Throat story broke, the voice on my answering machine was as raspy as Hal Holbrook's. "I just want you to remember that I wrote 'Follow the money,' " said my caller. "I want to know if anybody will give me credit. Watch for the accuracy of the media!"

The voice belonged to my friend William Goldman, who wrote the movie "All the President's Men." His words proved more than a little prescient. As if on cue, journalists everywhere - from The New York Times to The Economist to The Washington Post itself - would soon start attributing this classic line of dialogue to the newly unmasked Deep Throat, W. Mark Felt. But the line was not in Woodward and Bernstein's book or in The Post's Watergate reportage or in Bob Woodward's contemporaneous notes. It was the invention of the author of "Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid," "Marathon Man" and "The Princess Bride."

This confusion of Hollywood's version of history with the genuine article would quickly prove symptomatic of the overall unreality of the Deep Throat coverage. Was Mr. Felt a hero or a villain? Should he "follow the money" into a book deal, and if so, how would a 91-year-old showing signs of dementia either write a book or schmooze about it with Larry King? How did Vanity Fair scoop The Post? How does Robert Redford feel about it all? Such were the questions that killed time for a nation awaiting the much-heralded feature mediathon, the Michael Jackson verdict.

Richard Nixon and Watergate itself, meanwhile, were often reduced to footnotes. Three years ago, on Watergate's 30th anniversary, an ABC News poll found that two-thirds of Americans couldn't explain what the scandal was, and no one was racing to enlighten them this time around. Vanity Fair may have taken the trouble to remind us that Watergate was a web of crime yielding the convictions and guilty pleas of more than 30 White House and Nixon campaign officials, but few others did. Watergate has gone back to being the "third-rate burglary" of Nixon administration spin. It is once again being covered up.

Not without reason. Had the scandal been vividly resuscitated as the long national nightmare it actually was, it would dampen all the Felt fun by casting harsh light on our own present nightmare. "The fundamental right of Americans, through our free press, to penetrate and criticize the workings of our government is under attack as never before" was how the former Nixon speech writer William Safire put it on this page almost nine months ago. The current administration, a second-term imperial presidency that outstrips Nixon's in hubris by the day, leads the attack, trying to intimidate and snuff out any Woodwards or Bernsteins that might challenge it, any media proprietor like Katharine Graham or editor like Ben Bradlee who might support them and any anonymous source like Deep Throat who might enable them to find what Carl Bernstein calls "the best obtainable version of the truth."

The attacks continue to be so successful that even now, long after many news organizations, including The Times, have been found guilty of failing to puncture the administration's prewar W.M.D. hype, new details on that same story are still being ignored or left uninvestigated. The July 2002 "Downing Street memo," the minutes of a meeting in which Tony Blair and his advisers learned of a White House effort to fix "the intelligence and facts" to justify the war in Iraq, was published by The London Sunday Times on May 1. Yet in the 19 daily Scott McClellan briefings that followed, the memo was the subject of only 2 out of the approximately 940 questions asked by the White House press corps, according to Eric Boehlert of Salon.

This is the kind of lapdog news media the Nixon White House cherished. To foster it, Nixon's special counsel, Charles W. Colson, embarked on a ruthless program of intimidation that included threatening antitrust action against the networks if they didn't run pro-Nixon stories. Watergate tapes and memos make Mr. Colson, who boasted of "destroying the old establishment," sound like the founding father of today's blogging lynch mobs. He exulted in bullying CBS to cut back its Watergate reports before the '72 election. He enlisted NBC in pro-administration propaganda by browbeating it to repackage 10-day-old coverage of Tricia Nixon's wedding as a prime-time special. It was the Colson office as well that compiled a White House enemies list that included journalists who had the audacity to question administration policies.

Such is the equivalently supine state of much of the news media today that Mr. Colson was repeatedly trotted out, without irony, to pass moral judgment on Mr. Felt - and not just on Fox News, the cable channel that is actually run by the former Nixon media maven, Roger Ailes. "I want kids to look up to heroes," Mr. Colson said, oh so sorrowfully, on NBC's "Today" show, condemning Mr. Felt for dishonoring "the confidence of the president of the United States." Never mind that Mr. Colson dishonored the law, proposed bombing the Brookings Institution and went to prison for his role in the break-in to steal the psychiatric records of The Times's Deep Throat on Vietnam, Daniel Ellsberg. The "Today" host, Matt Lauer, didn't mention any of this - or even that his guest had done jail time. None of the other TV anchors who interviewed Mr. Colson - and he was ubiquitous - ever specified his criminal actions in the Nixon years. Some identified him onscreen only as a "former White House counsel."

Had anyone been so rude (or professional) as to recount Mr. Colson's sordid past, or to raise the question of whether he was a hero or a traitor, the genealogical line between his Watergate-era machinations and those of his present-day successors would have been all too painfully clear. The main difference is that in the Nixon White House, the president's men plotted behind closed doors. The current administration is now so brazen it does its dirty work in plain sight.

In the most recent example, all the president's men slimed and intimidated Newsweek by accusing it of being an accessory to 17 deaths for its errant Koran story; led by Scott McClellan, they said it was unthinkable that any American guard could be disrespectful of Islam's holy book. These neo-Colsons easily drowned out Gen. Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, both of whom said that the riots that led to the 17 deaths were unrelated to Newsweek. Then came the pièce de résistance of Nixon mimicry: a Pentagon report certifying desecrations of the Koran by American guards was released two weeks after the Newsweek imbroglio, at 7:15 p.m. on a Friday, to assure it would miss the evening newscasts and be buried in the Memorial Day weekend's little-read papers.

At other times the new Colsons top the old one. Though Nixon aspired to punish public broadcasting by cutting its funding, he never imagined that his apparatchiks could seize the top executive positions at the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Nor did he come up with the brilliant ideas of putting journalists covertly on the administration payroll and of hiring an outside P.R. firm (Ketchum) to codify an enemies list by ranking news organizations and individual reporters on the basis of how favorably they cover a specific administration policy (No Child Left Behind). President Bush has even succeeded in emasculating the post-Watergate reform that was supposed to help curb Nixonian secrecy, the Presidential Records Act of 1978.

THE journalists who do note the resonances of now with then rarely get to connect those dots on the news media's center stage of television. You are more likely to hear instead of how Watergate inspired too much "gotcha" journalism. That's a rather absurd premise given that no "gotcha" journalist got the goods on the biggest story of our time: the false intimations of incipient mushroom clouds peddled by American officials to sell a war that now threatens to match the unpopularity and marathon length of Vietnam.

Only once during the Deep Throat rollout did I see a palpable, if perhaps unconscious, effort to link the White House of 1972 with that of 2005. It occurred at the start, when ABC News, with the first comprehensive report on Vanity Fair's scoop, interrupted President Bush's post-Memorial Day Rose Garden news conference to break the story. Suddenly the image of the current president blathering on about how hunky-dory everything is in Iraq was usurped by repeated showings of the scene in which the newly resigned Nixon walked across the adjacent White House lawn to the helicopter that would carry him into exile.

But in the days that followed, Nixon and his history and the long shadows they cast largely vanished from the TV screen. In their place were constant nostalgic replays of young Redford and flinty Holbrook. Follow the bait-and-switch.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/12/opinion/12rich.html?hp&oref=login
 
T

tehuti

Guest
Memo: U.S. Lacked Full Postwar Iraq Plan

Advisers to Blair Predicted Instability

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, June 12, 2005; A01

A briefing paper prepared for British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top advisers eight months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq concluded that the U.S. military was not preparing adequately for what the British memo predicted would be a "protracted and costly" postwar occupation of that country.

The eight-page memo, written in advance of a July 23, 2002, Downing Street meeting on Iraq, provides new insights into how senior British officials saw a Bush administration decision to go to war as inevitable, and realized more clearly than their American counterparts the potential for the post-invasion instability that continues to plague Iraq.

In its introduction, the memo "Iraq: Conditions for Military Action" notes that U.S. "military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace," but adds that "little thought" has been given to, among other things, "the aftermath and how to shape it."

The July 21 memo was produced by Blair's staff in preparation for a meeting with his national security team two days later that has become controversial on both sides of the Atlantic since last month's disclosure of official notes summarizing the session.

In those meeting minutes -- which have come to be known as the Downing Street Memo -- British officials who had just returned from Washington said Bush and his aides believed war was inevitable and were determined to use intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his relations with terrorists to justify invasion of Iraq.

The "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," said the memo -- an assertion attributed to the then-chief of British intelligence, and denied by U.S. officials and by Blair at a news conference with Bush last week in Washington. Democrats in Congress led by Rep. John Conyers Jr. (Mich.), however, have scheduled an unofficial hearing on the matter for Thursday.

Now, disclosure of the memo written in advance of that meeting -- and other British documents recently made public -- show that Blair's aides were not just concerned about Washington's justifications for invasion but also believed the Bush team lacked understanding of what could happen in the aftermath.

In a section titled "Benefits/Risks," the July 21 memo states, "Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks."

Saying that "we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective," the memo's authors point out, "A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise." The authors add, "As already made clear, the U.S. military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden."

That memo and other internal British government documents were originally obtained by Michael Smith, who writes for the London Sunday Times. Excerpts were made available to The Washington Post, and the material was confirmed as authentic by British sources who sought anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the matter.

The Bush administration's failure to plan adequately for the postwar period has been well documented. The Pentagon, for example, ignored extensive State Department studies of how to achieve stability after an invasion, administer a postwar government and rebuild the country. And administration officials have acknowledged the mistake of dismantling the Iraqi army and canceling pensions to its veteran officers -- which many say hindered security, enhanced anti-U.S. feeling and aided what would later become a violent insurgency.

Testimony by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, one of the chief architects of Iraq policy, before a House subcommittee on Feb. 28, 2003, just weeks before the invasion, illustrated the optimistic view the administration had of postwar Iraq. He said containment of Hussein the previous 12 years had cost "slightly over $30 billion," adding, "I can't imagine anyone here wanting to spend another $30 billion to be there for another 12 years." As of May, the Congressional Research Service estimated that Congress has approved $208 billion for the war in Iraq since 2003.

The British, however, had begun focusing on doubts about a postwar Iraq in early 2002, according to internal memos.

A March 14 memo to Blair from David Manning, then the prime minister's foreign policy adviser and now British ambassador in Washington, reported on talks with then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Among the "big questions" coming out of his sessions, Manning reported, was that the president "has yet to find the answers . . . [and] what happens on the morning after."

About 10 days later, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote a memo to prepare Blair for a meeting in Crawford, Tex., on April 8. Straw said "the big question" about military action against Hussein was, "how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be any better," as "Iraq has no history of democracy."

Straw said the U.S. assessments "assumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured. . . ."

Later in the summer, the postwar doubts would be raised again, at the July 23 meeting memorialized in the Downing Street Memo. Richard Dearlove, then head of MI6, the British intelligence service, reported on his meetings with senior Bush officials. At one point, Dearlove said, "There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

Republican Party Chairman Ken Mehlman, appearing June 5 on "Meet the Press," disagreed with Dearlove's remark. "I think that there was clearly planning that occurred."

The Blair government, unlike its U.S. counterparts, always doubted that coalition troops would be uniformly welcomed, and sought U.N. participation in the invasion in part to set the stage for an international occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, said British officials interviewed recently. London was aware that the State Department had studied how to deal with an invasion's aftermath. But the British government was "shocked," in the words of one official, "when we discovered that in the postwar period the Defense Department would still be running the show."

The Downing Street Memo has been the subject of debate since the London Sunday Times first published it May 1. Opponents of the war say it proved the Bush administration was determined to invade months before the president said he made that decision.

Neither Bush nor Blair has publicly challenged the authenticity of the July 23 memo, nor has Dearlove spoken publicly about it. One British diplomat said there are different interpretations.

Last week, it was the subject of questions posed to Blair and Bush during the former's visit to Washington.

Asked about Dearlove being quoted as saying that in the United States, intelligence was being "fixed around the policy" of removing Hussein by military action, Blair said, "No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all." He then went on to discuss the British plan, outlined in the memo, to go to the United Nations to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq.

Bush said he had read "characterizations of the memo," pointing out that it was released in the middle of Blair's reelection campaign, and that the United States and Britain went to the United Nations to exhaust diplomatic options before the invasion.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100723.html
 

tian

Star
Registered
That's News??? We already knew that the US lacked a good Post-war plan, don't we? We have insurgents killing Americans everyday! What's the news story? Someone outside the country knew about it, yet joined the coalition anyway?
tian



tehuti said:
Memo: U.S. Lacked Full Postwar Iraq Plan

Advisers to Blair Predicted Instability

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, June 12, 2005; A01

A briefing paper prepared for British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top advisers eight months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq concluded that the U.S. military was not preparing adequately for what the British memo predicted would be a "protracted and costly" postwar occupation of that country.

The eight-page memo, written in advance of a July 23, 2002, Downing Street meeting on Iraq, provides new insights into how senior British officials saw a Bush administration decision to go to war as inevitable, and realized more clearly than their American counterparts the potential for the post-invasion instability that continues to plague Iraq.

In its introduction, the memo "Iraq: Conditions for Military Action" notes that U.S. "military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace," but adds that "little thought" has been given to, among other things, "the aftermath and how to shape it."

The July 21 memo was produced by Blair's staff in preparation for a meeting with his national security team two days later that has become controversial on both sides of the Atlantic since last month's disclosure of official notes summarizing the session.

In those meeting minutes -- which have come to be known as the Downing Street Memo -- British officials who had just returned from Washington said Bush and his aides believed war was inevitable and were determined to use intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his relations with terrorists to justify invasion of Iraq.

The "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," said the memo -- an assertion attributed to the then-chief of British intelligence, and denied by U.S. officials and by Blair at a news conference with Bush last week in Washington. Democrats in Congress led by Rep. John Conyers Jr. (Mich.), however, have scheduled an unofficial hearing on the matter for Thursday.

Now, disclosure of the memo written in advance of that meeting -- and other British documents recently made public -- show that Blair's aides were not just concerned about Washington's justifications for invasion but also believed the Bush team lacked understanding of what could happen in the aftermath.

In a section titled "Benefits/Risks," the July 21 memo states, "Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks."

Saying that "we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective," the memo's authors point out, "A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise." The authors add, "As already made clear, the U.S. military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden."

That memo and other internal British government documents were originally obtained by Michael Smith, who writes for the London Sunday Times. Excerpts were made available to The Washington Post, and the material was confirmed as authentic by British sources who sought anonymity because they are not authorized to discuss the matter.

The Bush administration's failure to plan adequately for the postwar period has been well documented. The Pentagon, for example, ignored extensive State Department studies of how to achieve stability after an invasion, administer a postwar government and rebuild the country. And administration officials have acknowledged the mistake of dismantling the Iraqi army and canceling pensions to its veteran officers -- which many say hindered security, enhanced anti-U.S. feeling and aided what would later become a violent insurgency.

Testimony by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, one of the chief architects of Iraq policy, before a House subcommittee on Feb. 28, 2003, just weeks before the invasion, illustrated the optimistic view the administration had of postwar Iraq. He said containment of Hussein the previous 12 years had cost "slightly over $30 billion," adding, "I can't imagine anyone here wanting to spend another $30 billion to be there for another 12 years." As of May, the Congressional Research Service estimated that Congress has approved $208 billion for the war in Iraq since 2003.

The British, however, had begun focusing on doubts about a postwar Iraq in early 2002, according to internal memos.

A March 14 memo to Blair from David Manning, then the prime minister's foreign policy adviser and now British ambassador in Washington, reported on talks with then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. Among the "big questions" coming out of his sessions, Manning reported, was that the president "has yet to find the answers . . . [and] what happens on the morning after."

About 10 days later, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote a memo to prepare Blair for a meeting in Crawford, Tex., on April 8. Straw said "the big question" about military action against Hussein was, "how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime will be any better," as "Iraq has no history of democracy."

Straw said the U.S. assessments "assumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured. . . ."

Later in the summer, the postwar doubts would be raised again, at the July 23 meeting memorialized in the Downing Street Memo. Richard Dearlove, then head of MI6, the British intelligence service, reported on his meetings with senior Bush officials. At one point, Dearlove said, "There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

Republican Party Chairman Ken Mehlman, appearing June 5 on "Meet the Press," disagreed with Dearlove's remark. "I think that there was clearly planning that occurred."

The Blair government, unlike its U.S. counterparts, always doubted that coalition troops would be uniformly welcomed, and sought U.N. participation in the invasion in part to set the stage for an international occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, said British officials interviewed recently. London was aware that the State Department had studied how to deal with an invasion's aftermath. But the British government was "shocked," in the words of one official, "when we discovered that in the postwar period the Defense Department would still be running the show."

The Downing Street Memo has been the subject of debate since the London Sunday Times first published it May 1. Opponents of the war say it proved the Bush administration was determined to invade months before the president said he made that decision.

Neither Bush nor Blair has publicly challenged the authenticity of the July 23 memo, nor has Dearlove spoken publicly about it. One British diplomat said there are different interpretations.

Last week, it was the subject of questions posed to Blair and Bush during the former's visit to Washington.

Asked about Dearlove being quoted as saying that in the United States, intelligence was being "fixed around the policy" of removing Hussein by military action, Blair said, "No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all." He then went on to discuss the British plan, outlined in the memo, to go to the United Nations to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq.

Bush said he had read "characterizations of the memo," pointing out that it was released in the middle of Blair's reelection campaign, and that the United States and Britain went to the United Nations to exhaust diplomatic options before the invasion.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100723.html
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
tian said:
That's News??? We already knew that the US lacked a good Post-war plan, don't we? We have insurgents killing Americans everyday! What's the news story? Someone outside the country knew about it, yet joined the coalition anyway?
tian
LMBAO. You jumped on this memo Tian, but you vacated the discussion above. LOL

QueEx
 
T

tehuti

Guest
Grounds for Impeachment

"Most authorities agree--and the precedents are in accord--that an impeachable offense is not limited to conduct which is indictable. Conduct that undermines the integrity of a public office or is in disregard of constitutional duties or involves abuse of power is generally regarded as grounds for impeachment. Since impeachment is a drastic sanction, the misconduct must be substantial and serious."

http://www.abanet.org/publiced/impeach2.html

Federal Impeachment is designed to reach the most powerful public officials and to protect our institutions of
government. It is one remedy that is available in order that the body politic may express its intolerance for such
abrogation of duty, misconduct, or violation of some public trust, that may have been committed by the President, Vice President, or any Civil Officer of the United States.


It is clear that Impeachment is a political process more than a legal one. It is characterized by political
possibilities rather than the clearly measured principles and remedies of law. Our Constitution provides only the
authority for Impeachment. It has left the question as to what may be an impeachable offense to the Congress,
to the people. The Impeachment process, then, especially when it involves the President of the United States,
deeply involves us all.


http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/lawlibrary/guides/fedimp/fedimp.pdf

Not included in the final language, but it is important to note what was debated as an impeachable offense:

Farrand, Max. Ed. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 4 Vols., New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1937. The Index in Vol. 4 affords comprehensive treatment of Impeachment as discussed
during the Convention. All of the various plans for an Impeachment clause, as well as the provisions for the
establishment of a federal judiciary and judicial tenure, are easily accessed (Cf. commentary by William Mason,
James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Franklin.) It may be of special interest
to trace the impeachment provision from the date of its original phrasing on July 20 ("...to be removable on
impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty," Vol. II, p. 64)
, to the final version accepted on
September 8 (Vol. II, p. 550). LAW KF 4510 1911 and 1937 (Index Volume).

http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/lawlibrary/guides/fedimp/fedimp.pdf
 
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hoodedgoon

Potential Star
Registered
Proved that bush and the coalition of the pussies dont' give a dam about those troops fighting for what they thought was a honourable cause.
 

muckraker10021

Superstar *****
BGOL Investor
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<font face="arial" size="4" color="#FFFFFF">U.S. soldiers cover the body of a comrade killed when a roadside bomb
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tian

Star
Registered
QueEx said:
LMBAO. You jumped on this memo Tian, but you vacated the discussion above. LOL

QueEx


What discussion? You weren't finished? All I'm seeing is the same information and the same arguments... going over and over. "Bush lied!" "Bush knew that there were no WMDs!" "Bush needs to be impeached, because he knew he lied!" All of these arguments, with not one proven accusation in the now, what 80+ posts.

I responded to the last post because I was amazed that it was news. It is apparent that the US went to war without a clear vision of the war's aftermath. They went and won, but now the insurgency is trying to throw Iraq into a civil war. It's been all over the news for a while, now. My 5 year old son knows that the US needed to better plan the war's aftermath.

So, what is that... an impeachable offense? Are we going to impeach Bush because the war's aftermath wasn't better planned?

See, in this situation, there's no woman under the table, waiting to tell the whole truth. There's no witness. There's no memo that explains that there is no WMDs in Iraq. There's no document that says that the Bush administration put a war with Iraq in their agenda prior to 9/11. There's no stained dress, no lipstick, nothing.

All we have are memos that said that perhaps there's not enough WMDs to warrant war, or that perhaps the war's aftermath needs to be thought through better, or that prior to 9/11 they didn't see Saddam as a big threat. The same way that they didn't see Al Qaeda as a big threat, as the 9/11 Commission documents have pointed out. OK. So, now what do we do? Impeach Bush because he KNOWINGLY betrayed the public's trust?

This whole argument is shallow, unless, of course, you can add anything else.

Impeachment will never happen. Get over it. Be ready for 2008, when Bush retires, and elect a president that you like.


tian
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
tian said:
What discussion? ... All we have are memos that said that perhaps [Your characerization]there's not enough WMDs to warrant war, or ... that prior to 9/11 they didn't see Saddam as a big threat.
tian

<font size="4">
Okay, WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THIS, SO FAR ???

"The sanctions, as they are called, have succeeded over the last 10 years ... The Iraqi regime militarily remains fairly weak. It doesn't have the capacity it had 10 or 12 years ago. It has been <u>contained</u> ...

(Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is <u>unable to project</u> conventional <u>power</u> against his neighbors."
- Colin Powell, February 24, 2001

"We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt. He is not a threat. He is <u>contained</u>"
- Condoleeza Rice, July 2001

AND ...

"Saddam Hussein's <u>bottled up</u>, at this point, but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy where the Iraqis are concerned."
- Dick Cheney, September 16, 2001


Do you accept this as truth ???

QueEx</font size>
 

tian

Star
Registered
QueEx said:
<font size="4">
Okay, WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THIS, SO FAR ???

"The sanctions, as they are called, have succeeded over the last 10 years ... The Iraqi regime militarily remains fairly weak. It doesn't have the capacity it had 10 or 12 years ago. It has been <u>contained</u> ...

(Saddam Hussein) has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is <u>unable to project</u> conventional <u>power</u> against his neighbors."
- Colin Powell, February 24, 2001

"We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt. He is not a threat. He is <u>contained</u>"
- Condoleeza Rice, July 2001

AND ...

"Saddam Hussein's <u>bottled up</u>, at this point, but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy where the Iraqis are concerned."
- Dick Cheney, September 16, 2001


Do you accept this as truth ???

QueEx</font size>


Didn't I answer this in Post #62 of this post? Where in this post did Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, nor anyone else say that they believed that Iraq had no WMDs? Did not Colin Powell and others say that they thought they had WMDs even back then?

tian
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Tian,

The WMD were "supposedly" A THREAT - hence the need to take Saddam out. If they were not a THREAT, there was no need to invade. Were they CONTAINED, or Were they a THREAT ???

Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained.

QueEx
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
.

<font size="5">September 16, 2001:</font size>
<font size="4">
Woodward reports that just five days after Sept. 11, President Bush indicated to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that while he had to do Afghanistan first, he was also determined to do something about Saddam Hussein.

”There's some pressure to go after Saddam Hussein. Don Rumsfeld has said, ‘<u>This is an opportunity to take out Saddam Hussein</u>, perhaps. We should consider it.’ And the president says to Condi Rice meeting head to head, ‘<u>We won't do Iraq now</u>.’ <u>But it is a question we're gonna have to return to</u>,’” says Woodward. </font size>


.
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
.

<font size="5">November 21, 2001:</font size>
<font size="4">
“And there's this low boil on Iraq until the day before Thanksgiving, Nov. 21, 2001. This is 72 days after 9/11. This is part of this secret history. <u>President Bush</u>, after a National Security Council meeting, takes Don Rumsfeld aside, collars him physically, and takes him into a little cubbyhole room and closes the door and says, <u>‘What have you got in terms of plans for Iraq? What is the status of the war plan? I want you to get on it. I want you to keep it secret</u>.’"

Woodward says immediately after that, Rumsfeld told Gen. Tommy Franks to develop a war plan to invade Iraq and remove Saddam - and that Rumsfeld gave Franks a blank check. </font size>


.Last 2 posts: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/15/60minutes/main612067.shtml
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
<font size="4">
[1] The President's men and woman state: Saddam and his weapons are CONTAINED;

[2] And, Saddam's weapons are CONTAINED, says Cheney, as late as September 16, 2001,

[3] On the same day that Cheney says CONTAINED (5 days after 9-11), Bush relates that "This is an opportunity to take out Saddam Hussein, perhaps. We should consider it.’ And the president says to Condi Rice meeting head to head, ‘We won't do Iraq now.’ But it is a question we're gonna have to return to.’”

[4] 72 days after 9-11, Bush asks Rumsfeld: "What is the status of the war plan? I want you to get on it. I want you to keep it secret.’"

[5] Obviously, Bush has ordered war plans prepared before November 21, 2001 as he asks Rumsfeld, what is the status of the plans; and that he'd better get on it. And, "keep it secret."

[6] Saddam is CONTAINED; the President has not by September 16, 2001 or November 21, 2001 said anything to the people that the CONTAINED Saddam is NOW UNCONTAINED OR A THREAT; jets are constantly over Saddam's head enforcing the CONTAINMENT; and nothing has changed, intelligence or otherwise, in what Bush knew about Saddam or WMD between September 16, 2001 and November 21, 2001; yet, plans are already underway to take out Saddam.

[7] If nothing has changed between September 16, 2001 and November 21, 2001 to justify invading a CONTAINED MAN and his suppposed weapons and you already are drafting secret plans to invade and you didn't have GROUNDS to invade before September 11, 2001 or November 21, 2001 -- what you now need is a reason ... hence, the hype, the fix that ensued ... </font size>

QueEx
 

tian

Star
Registered
QueEx said:
Tian,

The WMD were "supposedly" A THREAT - hence the need to take Saddam out. If they were not a THREAT, there was no need to invade. Were they CONTAINED, or Were they a THREAT ???

Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained.

QueEx



Again, as in my previous posts, the US received intel from Great Britian that Saddam Hussein was not contained; that he had WMDs and could release a bomb within 45 minutes, or something like that. It was in a previous post. (I think we are repeating ourselves here...)

So, at first, they saw him as no big threat. After 9/11 and intel from Great Britian, they saw him as a big threat, OK?


Tian
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
QueEx said:
<font size="4">
[1] The President's men and woman state: Saddam and his weapons are CONTAINED;

[2] And, Saddam's weapons are CONTAINED, says Cheney, as late as September 16, 2001,

[3] On the same day that Cheney says CONTAINED (5 days after 9-11), Bush relates that "This is an opportunity to take out Saddam Hussein, perhaps. We should consider it.’ And the president says to Condi Rice meeting head to head, ‘We won't do Iraq now.’ But it is a question we're gonna have to return to.’”

[4] 72 days after 9-11, Bush asks Rumsfeld: "What is the status of the war plan? I want you to get on it. I want you to keep it secret.’"

[5] Obviously, Bush has ordered war plans prepared before November 21, 2001 as he asks Rumsfeld, what is the status of the plans; and that he'd better get on it. And, "keep it secret."

[6] Saddam is CONTAINED; the President has not by September 16, 2001 or November 21, 2001 said anything to the people that the CONTAINED Saddam is NOW UNCONTAINED OR A THREAT; jets are constantly over Saddam's head enforcing the CONTAINMENT; and nothing has changed, intelligence or otherwise, in what Bush knew about Saddam or WMD between September 16, 2001 and November 21, 2001; yet, plans are already underway to take out Saddam.

[7] If nothing has changed between September 16, 2001 and November 21, 2001 to justify invading a CONTAINED MAN and his suppposed weapons and you already are drafting secret plans to invade and you didn't have GROUNDS to invade before September 11, 2001 or November 21, 2001 -- what you now need is a reason ... hence, the hype, the fix that ensued ... </font size>

QueEx
... to put this post on the next page; this thread is getting long and its getting hard to refer back to previous pages ...
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
tian said:
Again, as in my previous posts, the US received intel from Great Britian that Saddam Hussein was not contained; that he had WMDs and could release a bomb within 45 minutes, or something like that. It was in a previous post. (I think we are repeating ourselves here...)

So, at first, they saw him as no big threat. After 9/11 and intel from Great Britian, they saw him as a big threat, OK?


Tian
Now you can remain in "Denial" and refuse to think or Demand The Truth, but you could at least put up something more credible than that he [Blair] said it. For one thing, when did Blair say it[/i] and compare that with November 21, 2001.

... and we're just getting started ...

QueEx

P.S.: W'ere not repeaating ourselves; you are. I keep adding a brick to the house and you keep saying the lot is still vacant -- despite the bricks ...

.
 

tian

Star
Registered
QueEx said:
Now you can remain in "Denial" and refuse to think or Demand The Truth, but you could at least put up something more credible than that he [Blair] said it. For one thing, when did Blair say it[/i] and compare that with November 21, 2001.

... and we're just getting started ...

QueEx

P.S.: W'ere not repeaating ourselves; you are. I keep adding a brick to the house and you keep saying the lot is still vacant -- despite the bricks ...

.


No, you are lookig for conspiracies and I can remember how it went down and played in the media. Remember, this just happened less than five years ago. I read the accounts and saw it take place on CNN.

Now, we can build the biggest brick house in the neighborhood; until something is proven, all we have is a house with no substance... an empty lot, is how you put it.

We can timeline quotes until our fingertips bleed, but this is mere theory. Anything could have happened to change our position. And, according to bad intel, it did.


tian
 

muckraker10021

Superstar *****
BGOL Investor
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<p align="center">
<font color="#FFFFFF" size="5" face="Arial Black">THE SMOKING GUN
- Downing Street Minutes Video -</font><br />
</p>
<center><div><embed width="320" height="285" AUTOSTART=false src="http://win20ca.audiovideoweb.com/ca20win15004/smokinggun_300k.wmv"><p>
<b><font face="Arial" color="#FFFFFF">Video</font></b></div><p>
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<p></center></td></tr></table>


www.truthout.org/docs_2005/061505X.shtml

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<img src="http://us.news1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/p/uc/20050614/lpo050614.gif">


<hr noshade color="#FF0000" size="12"></hr>
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
<font size="6"><center><u>New</u> 'Downing Street Memo'
says Bush, Blair agreed on
'regime change' in 2002</font size></center>


SF Gate
Tuesday, June 14, 2005
By: Edward M. Gomez, special to SF Gate

Is it a second Downing Street Memo -- or something even more damning for both the Bush administration and the government of British Prime Minister Tony Blair?

On May 1, Britain's Sunday Times broke the story of the now-infamous Downing Street Memo; that document, the minutes of a meeting of Blair's top advisers, showed that the prime minister had known, some eight months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, that a war not authorized by the United Nations would be illegal for British troops to take part in. Now The Times has scooped its rivals again with the news -- and the text of -- a leaked, extremely secret British Cabinet Office briefing paper dated July 23, 2002.

Prepared for Blair and his closest advisers, this newly discovered document clearly states that [color]"since regime change was illegal, it was 'necessary to create the conditions' which would make it legal." [/color]

The Times' news story, written by defense reporter Michael Smith, about the newly discovered, secret briefing paper noted that it had confirmed that Blair "had already agreed to back military action to get rid of Saddam Hussein at a summit at the Texas ranch of President George W. Bush three months earlier." In his news article, Smith explained that fabricating conditions for going to war "was required because, even if ministers decided Britain should not take part in an invasion, the American military would be using British bases. This would automatically make Britain complicit in any illegal U.S. action."

The British Cabinet Office briefing paper also stated that "U.S. views of international law vary from that of the U.K. and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law." It further stated that the British government "would regard the use of force against Iraq, or any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective self-defense, if carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe or if authorized by the U.N. Security Council." As it turned out, the U.S.-led attack on Iraq met none of those criteria.

Although mainstream American news media were very slow or apparently even reluctant to publish news of the Downing Street Memo until as late as the middle of May, this time, in the United States, the Times' revelation of the Cabinet Office briefing paper made the front page of The Washington Post.

Smith noted that many U.S. citizens, as they have learned about the Downing Street Memo and have become "angry at what they see as media self-censorship in ignoring [it]," have been flooding Web sites that have been set up to focus on the controversial British document. Many Americans, Smith noted, have "demanded to know why [it] has been largely ignored by the U.S. mainstream media" and have expressed their support for a letter that U.S. Rep. John Conyers (D-Michigan.) and 88 other Democratic members of Congress have sent to President Bush. That missive asked Bush to confirm or deny that, as the Downing Street Memo asserted, in the run-up to the war, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" that led to the U.S.-led invasion. (Times)

Smith also noted that, because Bush has so far refused to answer the U.S. lawmakers, the members of Congress have set up a Web site named Downingstreetmemo.com to collect signatures on a petition that urges the president to respond to their question. Another new site set up since the Downing Street Memo became known, AfterDowningStreet.org, "is calling for a congressional committee to consider whether Bush's actions as depicted in the memo constitute grounds for impeachment."

In Sunday's Times, Smith predicted that Blair's just-uncovered, July 2002 Cabinet Office briefing paper "is certain to add to the pressure, particularly on the American president, because of the damaging revelation that Bush and Blair agreed on regime change in April 2002 and then looked for a way to justify it."


* * * *
In other countries, some commentators have offered highly critical, bluntly worded assessments of just what they believe the Downing Street Memo represents.

In Canada, for example, Toronto Sun columnist Eric Margolis, writing just before news broke of the just-revealed Cabinet Office briefing paper, has authored one of the strongest. Language like his has yet to be seen jumping off the pages or screens of most mainstream U.S. news media outlets.

Of Bush and Blair's rush to war, Margolis writes, "And so it went. Lie after lie. Scare upon scare. Fakery after fakery, trumpeted by the tame [American] media that came to resemble the lickspittle press of the old Soviet Union. Ironically, in the end, horrid Saddam Hussein turned out to be telling the truth all along [about not having weapons of mass destruction], while Bush and Blair were not."

Margolis offers a conclusion that, so far, no major news sources in the United States has dared utter. The Downing Street Memo, he notes, "would have forced any of Europe's democratic governments to resign in disgrace. But not Bush and Blair. Far from it." He also chastises American news corporations for failing -- or refusing -- to investigate what appeared to news watchers in other countries to be a vitally important story linked to the war.

Instead, he observes, the U.S. mass media "amply confirmed charges of bias and politicization leveled against them by first ignoring the [Downing Street Memo] story, then grudgingly devoting a few low-key stories to the dramatic revelation. ... But don't just blame Bush and Blair. [Vice President Dick] Cheney, CIA boss George Tenet (a.k.a. 'Dr. Yes'), Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and other senior administration officials who promoted falsehoods over Iraq and war fever were just as guilty of deceiving and misleading the American people and Congress."

By contrast, he adds, "Kudos go to Blair's former foreign secretary, Robin Cook, who refused to be party to the lies and resigned. No senior U.S. official had the guts or ethics to follow Cook's admirable example." (Toronto Sun)

* * * *
In Washington, U.S. policy makers may be hesitant to admit it, but in Europe, some news outlets are beginning to state clearly that with the "breakdown in security" in much of the country, Iraq has begun an unmistakable "slide into civil war." (L'Humanite) For those who may still not accept -- or want to accept -- this assessment, Behrouz Khosrozadeh, an international-relations professor based in Germany, predicts that "civil war and secession" (of parts of the country dominated by different ethnic or religious groups) will follow if Iraqis charged with drafting a new, permanent constitution fail to do so by their Aug. 15 deadline. (Tachles)

"We've been in a state of civil war for some time already," a doctor named Samir who fled Baghdad with his wife and children told a German reporter upon arrival at the Iraqi-Syrian border. "We're just glad to have escaped that hell."

For Samir, the war scene became unreal when the same Iraqi government that is trying to weed out terrorists began urging doctors to carry guns. The last straw came, he said, when he removed five bullets from a wounded man ("with all his family members by his side"), only to see the patient die. Then the dead man's brother put a gun to Samir's head. He was ready to shoot when, "at the last second, his father grabbed the arm with the weapon and pointed it upward[, and] the shot went into the roof," Samir recalled. "That was my last workday. My nerves were shot." (Schweriner Volkszeitung)

With similar grisliness, a reporter for the French newspaper L'Humanite, Anne Sophie Le Mauff, just back from Baghdad, wrote of an Iraqi man who was killed "with two bullets to the forehead." "His mistake? Working for an American company that specialized in security and being 'a Shiite without honor or shame,'" as a note from his killers indicated. The victim's father told the French journalist, "Killing has become a lucrative job."

Underscoring how unpredictable and frightening life in Iraq has become, Sheik Abdel Salam Koubeissi, a spokesman for a group of leading Muslim theologians, told Le Mauff that ordinary Iraqis feel trapped between the gunfire of insurgents and that of the security forces. As for Iraq's security officials, the sheik said that they had been "accustomed to Saddam's iron fist" and that, under the U.S.-led occupation, "they have very quickly learned from the Americans." Nowadays, he said, "[f]or nothing, they'll seize you, rough you up and throw you in prison even if you're innocent." But, he added, Iraq's police forces will "let terrorists go in exchange for colossal sums of money."

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2005/06/14/worldviews.DTL
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Originally Posted by QueEx

QueEx said:
Now you can remain in "Denial" and refuse to think or Demand The Truth, but you could at least put up something more credible than that he [Blair] said it. For one thing, when did Blair say it[/i] and compare that with November 21, 2001.

... and we're just getting started ...
 

QueEx

Rising Star
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<font size="6">Ministers were told of need for Gulf war ‘excuse’</font size></center>

Michael Smith
Sunday Times - Britian
June 12, 2005


MINISTERS were warned in July 2002 that Britain was committed to taking part in an American-led invasion of Iraq and they had no choice but to find a way of making it legal.

The warning, in a leaked Cabinet Office briefing paper, said Tony Blair had already agreed to back military action to get rid of Saddam Hussein at a summit at the Texas ranch of President George W Bush three months earlier.

The briefing paper, for participants at a meeting of Blair’s inner circle on July 23, 2002, said that since regime change was illegal it was “necessary to create the conditions” which would make it legal.

This was required because, even if ministers decided Britain should not take part in an invasion, the American military would be using British bases. This would automatically make Britain complicit in any illegal US action.


“US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia,” the briefing paper warned. This meant that issues of legality “would arise virtually whatever option ministers choose with regard to UK participation”.

The paper was circulated to those present at the meeting, among whom were Blair, Geoff Hoon, then defence secretary, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, and Sir Richard Dearlove, then chief of MI6. The full minutes of the meeting were published last month in The Sunday Times.

<font size="3">The document said the only way the allies could justify military action was to place Saddam Hussein in a position where he ignored or rejected a United Nations ultimatum ordering him to co-operate with the weapons inspectors. But it warned this would be difficult.

“It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject,” the document says. But if he accepted it and did not attack the allies, they would be “most unlikely” to obtain the legal justification they needed.
</font size>

The suggestions that the allies use the UN to justify war contradicts claims by Blair and Bush, repeated during their Washington summit last week, that they turned to the UN in order to avoid having to go to war. The attack on Iraq finally began in March 2003.

The briefing paper is certain to add to the pressure, particularly on the American president, because of the damaging revelation that Bush and Blair agreed on regime change in April 2002 and then looked for a way to justify it.

There has been a growing storm of protest in America, created by last month’s publication of the minutes in The Sunday Times. A host of citizens, including many internet bloggers, have demanded to know why the Downing Street memo (often shortened to “the DSM” on websites) has been largely ignored by the US mainstream media.

The White House has declined to respond to a letter from 89 Democratic congressmen asking if it was true — as Dearlove told the July meeting — that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” in Washington.

The Downing Street memo burst into the mainstream American media only last week after it was raised at a joint Bush-Blair press conference, forcing the prime minister to insist that “the facts were not fixed in any shape or form at all”.

John Conyers, the Democratic congressman who drafted the letter to Bush, has now written to Dearlove asking him to say whether or not it was accurate that he believed the intelligence was being “fixed” around the policy. He also asked the former MI6 chief precisely when Bush and Blair had agreed to invade Iraq and whether it is true they agreed to “manufacture” the UN ultimatum in order to justify the war.

He and other Democratic congressmen plan to hold their own inquiry this Thursday with witnesses including Joe Wilson, the American former ambassador who went to Niger to investigate claims that Iraq was seeking to buy uranium ore for its nuclear weapons programme

Frustrated at the refusal by the White House to respond to their letter, the congressmen have set up a website — www.downingstreetmemo.com — to collect signatures on a petition demanding the same answers.
Conyers promised to deliver it to Bush once it reached 250,000 signatures. By Friday morning it already had more than 500,000 with as many as 1m expected to have been obtained when he delivers it to the White House on Thursday.



AfterDowningStreet.org, another website set up as a result of the memo, is calling for a congressional committee to consider whether Bush’s actions as depicted in the memo constitute grounds for impeachment.

It has been flooded with visits from people angry at what they see as media self-censorship in ignoring the memo. It claims to have attracted more than 1m hits a day.

Democrats.com, another website, even offered $1,000 (about £550) to any journalist who quizzed Bush about the memo’s contents, although the Reuters reporter who asked the question last Tuesday was not aware of the reward and has no intention of claiming it.

The complaints of media self-censorship have been backed up by the ombudsmen of The Washington Post, The New York Times and National Public Radio, who have questioned the lack of attention the minutes have received from their organisations.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1650822_1,00.html
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
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<font size="6"><center>Cabinet Office paper:
Conditions for military action</font size></center>


Sunday Times - Britian
June 12, 2005

The paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21, 2002, is incomplete because the last page is missing. The following is a transcript rather than the original document in order to protect the source.

<center>________________________________________</center>

<font size="5"><center>PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY </font size>

<font size="4">IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION</font size></center>


Summary

Ministers are invited to:

(1) Note the latest position on US military planning and timescales for possible action.

(2) Agree that the objective of any military action should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.

(3) Agree to engage the US on the need to set military plans within a <u>realistic political strategy</u>, which includes identifying the succession to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions necessary to justify government military action, which might include an ultimatum for the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a call from the Prime Minister to President Bush ahead of the briefing of US military plans to the President on 4 August.

(4) Note the potentially long lead times involved in equipping UK Armed Forces to undertake operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the MOD should bring forward proposals for the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements under cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and the outcome of SR2002.

(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office Chairmanship to consider the development of an information campaign to be agreed with the US.

Introduction


1. The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it.

2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford in April he said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change, provided that certain conditions were met: efforts had been made to construct a coalition/shape public opinion, the Israel-Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons inspectors had been exhausted.

3. We need now to reinforce this message and to encourage the US Government to place its military planning within a political framework, partly to forestall the risk that military action is precipitated in an unplanned way by, for example, an incident in the No Fly Zones. This is particularly important for the UK because it is necessary to create the conditions in which we could legally support military action. Otherwise we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support.

4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by the Prime Minister for UK support for military action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be made, and other considerations taken into account. This note sets them out in a form which can be adapted for use with the US Government. Depending on US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed soon on whether and in what form the UK takes part in military action.

The Goal

5. Our objective should be a stable and law-abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely that this could be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. US military planning unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by elimination if Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in the view of UK officials, that one would necessarily follow from the other. Even if regime change is a necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is certainly not a sufficient one.

US Military Planning

6. Although <u>no political decisions have been taken</u>, US military planners have drafted options for the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq. In a 'Running Start', military action could begin as early as November of this year, with no overt military build-up. Air strikes and support for opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to small-scale land operations, with further land forces deploying sequentially, ultimately overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the collapse of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start' would involve a longer build-up before any military action were taken, as early as January 2003. US military plans include no specifics on the strategic context either before or after the campaign. Currently the preference appears to be for the 'Running Start'. CDS will be ready to brief Ministers in more detail.

7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This means that legal base issues would arise virtually whatever option Ministers choose with regard to UK participation.

The Viability of the Plans

8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the viability of US military plans. Their initial view is that there are a number of questions which would have to be answered before they could assess whether the plans are sound. Notably these include the realism of the 'Running Start', the extent to which the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack using chemical or biological weapons and the robustness of US assumptions about the bases and about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight.

UK Military Contribution

9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends on the details of the US military planning and the time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD is examining how the UK might contribute to US-led action. The options range from deployment of a Division (ie Gulf War sized contribution plus naval and air forces) to making available bases. It is already clear that the UK could not generate a Division in time for an operation in January 2003, unless publicly visible decisions were taken very soon. Maritime and air forces could be deployed in time, provided adequate basing arrangements could be made. The lead times involved in preparing for UK military involvement include the procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements, for which there is no financial provision.

<font size="3">The Conditions Necessary for Military Action

10. Aside from the existence of a viable military plan we consider the following conditions necessary for military action and UK participation: justification/legal base; an international coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a positive risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of domestic opinion.

Justification

11. US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law. But regime change could result from action that is otherwise lawful. We would regard the use of force against Iraq, or any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right of individual or collective self-defence, if carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe, or authorised by the UN Security Council. A detailed consideration of the legal issues, prepared earlier this year, is at Annex A. The legal position would depend on the precise circumstances at the time. Legal bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in <u>both the first two instances but would be difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and proportionality</u>. Further legal advice would be needed on this point.

12. This leaves the route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons inspectors. Kofi Annan has held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an attempt to persuade them to admit the UN weapons inspectors. These have made no substantive progress; the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating. Annan has downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are possible. We need to persuade the UN and the international community that this situation cannot be allowed to continue ad infinitum. We need to set a deadline, leading to an ultimatum. It would be preferable to obtain backing of a UNSCR for any ultimatum and early work would be necessary to explore with Kofi Annan and the Russians, in particular, the scope for achieving this.

13. In practice, facing pressure of military action, Saddam is likely to admit weapons inspectors as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he would not allow them to operate freely. UNMOVIC (the successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring and verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary to assess whether Iraq is meeting its obligations. Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by January 2003 they would at best only just be completing setting up. It is possible that they will encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but this more likely when they are fully operational.

14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the international community. However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003. </font size>


An International Coalition

15. An international coalition is necessary to provide a military platform and desirable for political purposes.

16. US military planning assumes that the US would be allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our bases in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi Arabia would withhold co-operation except granting military over-flights. On the assumption that military action would involve operations in the Kurdish area in the North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also be necessary.

17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there will be problems in securing the support of NATO and EU partners. Australia would be likely to participate on the same basis as the UK. France might be prepared to take part if she saw military action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking to improve their US relations, might set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best we could expect from the region would be neutrality. The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part in military action. In practice, much of the international community would find it difficult to stand in the way of the determined course of the US hegemon. However, the greater the international support, the greater the prospects of success.

A Quiescent Israel-Palestine

18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank has dampened Palestinian violence for the time being but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking more trouble for the future. The Bush speech was at best a half step forward. We are using the Palestinian reform agenda to make progress, including a resumption of political negotiations. The Americans are talking of a ministerial conference in November or later. Real progress towards a viable Palestinian state is the best way to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab antipathy to military action against Saddam Hussein. However, another upsurge of Palestinian/Israeli violence is highly likely. The co-incidence of such an upsurge with the preparations for military action against Iraq cannot be ruled out. Indeed Saddam would use continuing violence in the Occupied Territories to bolster popular Arab support for his regime.

Benefits/Risks

19. Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks. In particular, we need to be sure that the outcome of the military action would match our objective as set out in paragraph 5 above. A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely the means by which the desired endstate would be created, in particular what form of Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within which it would be possible to identify a successor. We must also consider in greater detail the impact of military action on other UK interests in the region.

<font size="3">Domestic Opinion

20. Time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also need to be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An information campaign will be needed which has to be closely related to an overseas information campaign designed to influence Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World and the wider international community. This will need to give full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action. </font size>


Timescales

21. Although the US military could act against Iraq as soon as November, we judge that a military campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if only because of the time it will take to reach consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that for climactic reasons, military action would need to start by January 2003, unless action were deferred until the following autumn.

22. As this paper makes clear, even this timescale would present problems. This means that:

(a) We need to influence US consideration of the military plans before President Bush is briefed on 4 August, through contacts betweens the Prime Minister and the President and at other levels;

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1648758_3,00.html

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tian

Star
Registered
Regime change is no big news. The UK, as again in my previous posts, believed that Iraq was a threat. All those memos isn't criminal nor impeachable. Our stance has always been regime change, The UN was only talking about sanctions.

{If Saddam}
"fails to comply, and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop his program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction."

The president's warnings are firm. "If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow." The stakes, he says, could not be higher. "Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal."

The president that spoke these words were Bill Clinton, in Feb.1998.

Here's another quote from Bill Clinton:

"When I left office, there was a substantial amount of biological and chemical material unaccounted for. That is, at the end of the first Gulf War, we knew what he had. We knew what was destroyed in all the inspection processes and that was a lot. And then we bombed with the British for four days in 1998. We might have gotten it all; we might have gotten half of it; we might have gotten none of it. But we didn't know. So I thought it was prudent for the president to go to the U.N. and for the U.N. to say you got to let these inspectors in, and this time if you don't cooperate the penalty could be regime change, not just continued sanctions."
--Bill Clinton, July 22, 2003

So, it was conventional wisdom that the US wanted regime change. (I'm sounding like a broken record) If you had intel that Iraq was stockpiling weapons, and can target another country, then you go to the UN and build your case. So, yes, you campaign for your policy.

But show me where Bush deliberately lied to the American people, and you got a point. But, giving me memos that shows planning wastes my time.


tian
 
T

tehuti

Guest
News Media Give Overlooked Memo on Iraq Second Glance

By Howard Kurtz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, June 16, 2005; C01

For many liberals already frustrated with the media's coverage of President Bush, it has become a rallying cry over the past six weeks: What about the Downing Street memo?

Their anger, amplified by left-wing advocacy groups, columnists, bloggers and some Democrats in Congress, has gradually forced the mainstream media to take a second look at a document that received spotty coverage after it was reported May 1 by London's Sunday Times.

Journalists offered various explanations for the scant attention paid to the July 2002 British memo, which, in recounting a meeting of Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top aides, said that the Bush administration had "fixed" the intelligence on Iraq and that war was inevitable. They said the memo was old, that the U.S. mobilization for war was widely reported at the time, that there was an initial distrust of a British press report. Some maintained that the memo didn't prove anything.

But Peter Hart of the liberal group Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), which sent out several "action alerts" urging members to contact news organizations, said, "Any story that reminds readers that the political and journalistic establishments spectacularly failed on Iraq is a difficult story for the media to report." Now, he said, in conjunction with groups such as MoveOn.org, "activists have pushed this into the media, much to the chagrin of reporters, who have no love for getting e-mails constantly telling them to do the story."

For the past 15 years, conservatives have used their outlets -- in talk radio, right-leaning news operations, editorial pages and, more recently, blogs -- to pressure mainstream journalists into covering stories that might otherwise be ignored. And they have had striking success, from allegations about President Bill Clinton's personal life to CBS's questionable documents on President Bush's National Guard service to the Swift Boat Veterans' attacks on Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) in last year's presidential campaign. Now the left can claim a similar success.

Bob Fesmire said his wife, Gina, a Silicon Valley Web designer, and two others she met on the liberal blog Daily Kos, put together the site DowningStreetMemo.com, which uses the slogan "Awaken the Mainstream Media!" Boosted by a mention last month in Paul Krugman's New York Times column, the site has logged close to 500,000 visits.

After other liberal commentators accused the media of "cowardice," as the Nation Editor Katrina vanden Heuvel put it, for neglecting the Downing Street memo, some Democrats became more vocal in their criticism. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) said it was "shocking when you see how easily they fold" under pressure from the White House and urged journalists to get some "spine." Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), who plans a forum on the memo today, began writing about it on Arianna Huffington's new blog.

"After the abject failure of the media to expose the myth of WMD and Iraq, the cheerleading coverage of 'embedded' reporters, and the transmission of propaganda to the American people . . . aren't we owed some good, sustained and thorough reporting on this?" Conyers wrote.

Critics, however, note that the memo by Richard Dearlove, then head of British intelligence, offered no specifics about any cooking of the intelligence books and could easily have been drawn from ongoing news accounts about the administration gearing up for war. In February 2002, for example, the Los Angeles Times reported that "serious planning is underway within the Bush administration for a campaign against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein" that could include military action. In August 2002, shortly after the memo was written, The Washington Post reported that "an increasingly contentious debate is underway within the Bush administration over how to topple Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, with the civilian leadership pushing for innovative solutions using smaller numbers of troops and military planners repeatedly responding with more cautious approaches that would employ far larger forces."

But the long and bitter debate that followed the war created a climate in which the memo would be seized upon by critics of the administration.

On May 2, the day after the story hit Rupert Murdoch's Sunday Times, the New York Times dealt with the memo in a dispatch from London on the final days of Blair's reelection campaign, beginning in the 10th paragraph.

Asked why the paper did not follow up for weeks, Washington bureau chief Philip Taubman told the Times's public editor, or ombudsman: "Given what has been reported about war planning in Washington, the revelations about the Downing Street meeting did not seem like a bolt from the blue."

John Walcott, Washington bureau chief of Knight Ridder Newspapers, co-authored a substantial story about the memo on May 6, although some of the chain's papers, such as the Philadelphia Inquirer, did not run it.

"We thought it was newsworthy that the British government interpreted their meetings with members of the administration this way and took from it that an attack on Iraq was virtually inevitable," Walcott said. While some in the press "obviously felt this was old news," he said, the question remains "whether the information provided to the American public at the time was the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."

The Los Angeles Times published a story on the memo May 12, citing "growing indignation among critics of the Bush White House." The Washington Post ran one on May 13, and the Chicago Tribune gave the controversy front-page play four days later.

Marjorie Miller, foreign editor of the Los Angeles Times, said she is "a little mystified" at the criticism of the press over the Downing Street memo and a related one written before the Blair meeting.

"I find the memos historically interesting in filling in some of the connective tissue between what was public and what was being discussed privately," she said. "But they still remain Britain's view of the U.S. It's not a smoking gun or anything. And for that reason, I don't think we underplayed it." Miller noted that her newspaper and others were reporting in 2002 "that there was a real likelihood that we would go to war."

Glenn Frankel, The Post's London bureau chief, said he could not initially confirm the memo's authenticity and "didn't really see that there was anything new in it." He said that the paper "should have taken note of it in some form" but that he viewed it as a campaign story and concluded that "its impact here was very limited." Unlike in the United States, Frankel said, "the blogosphere has yet to penetrate the discourse" in official London.

Post ombudsman Michael Getler, saying he was deluged with e-mail prompted by such liberal groups as FAIR and Media Matters for America, wrote that he was "amazed that The Post took almost two weeks to follow up" on the London Times report.

The White House press corps seemed uninterested in the memo for weeks, asking spokesman Scott McClellan only two questions about it out of about 940 queries, according to Salon magazine. That changed on June 7, when Blair visited the White House and Steve Holland of Reuters asked Bush about the memo at a news conference.

USA Today did not mention the memo before the Blair visit. Jim Cox, senior assignment editor for foreign news, told his paper that the staff could not obtain the memo or confirm its authenticity, and was concerned about the "timing" of the leak four days before the British elections.

Some newspaper editors said they were stymied by the Associated Press's lack of coverage of the memo. Deborah Seward, AP's international editor, said in a statement, "There is no question AP dropped the ball in not picking up on the Downing Street memo sooner."

The network newscasts ignored the memo until the Blair visit, and cable news channels carried only occasional reports or discussions. George Stephanopoulos asked Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) about the memo May 15 on ABC's "This Week," and Tim Russert, NBC's Washington bureau chief, raised it with Republican National Committee Chairman Ken Mehlman on "Meet the Press" Sunday.

"This was an issue that was widely debated in the presidential campaign of 2004, whether the intelligence was fixed or embellished," Russert said. "But this was new information to me." Asked about the slow response by NBC and other news outlets, he said, "One thing I've learned is when you see something from the British press, you have to vet it."

Jeffrey Dvorkin, National Public Radio's ombudsman, said the story "went under the radar of a lot of media organizations. This seemed like confirmation of what is already known in the United States, but it's still an extraordinary memo."

When he asked NPR executives why they didn't do more, Dvorkin said, "there was a kind of silence."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/15/AR2005061502571.html
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
<font size="6"><center>What's the Deal With the Downing Street Memo?<font size></center>
<font size="4"><center>Getting a grip on that Bush/Blair war scandal</font size></center>

<center>
mulvaney.jpg

Iraq was actually quite more than a twinkle in their eye.
photo: whitehouse.gov</center>

voicelogo-181.gif

by Patrick Mulvaney
June 16th, 2005 11:47 PM

A group of congressional Democrats held a public forum Thursday in the Capitol to investigate the so-called Downing Street Memo—an account of a British leadership meeting that suggests the Bush administration lied about its intentions and manipulated evidence in the run-up to the war in Iraq. Lawmakers gathered testimony from several witnesses, including former intelligence officials, with the hope of gaining a better understanding of the key decisions that preceded the 2003 invasion.
Representative John Conyers of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, called the Bush administration to task for deceiving the American public during the march to war. The president’s statements in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq contradict the accounts of British intelligence officials as detailed in the Memo, Conyers said. “The veracity of those statements has—to put it mildly—come into question,” he told the assembly.

The Memo has been big, big news in Britain, but had, at least until Thursday, received little attention in the U.S. What follows is a primer on the Memo and its implications.

<center>___________________________</center>

The Memo confirmed what many progressives had long suspected: that the Bush administration first decided to start a war in Iraq and then rigged a case to justify it. According to the Memo, Britain’s intelligence chief reported the following assessment with regard to his then recent trip to Washington: “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”

The British media, from the Guardian to the BBC News, quickly explored the Memo and its implications and subsequently unearthed more documents that cast further doubt on the official Bush-Blair version of the run-up to the war (as well as the preparations for its aftermath). In the meantime, however, the titans of the U.S. press largely dodged the Downing Street bullet. As Media Matters for America noted in a study released June 15, the editorial pages of four of the nation's five largest newspapers—USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times — remained “conspicuously silent about the controversy surrounding the document” in the first six weeks after its publication.

Nonetheless, reactions to the Memo have slowly and quietly gathered steam across the United States. Progressive media outlets including The Village Voice (The Bush Beat, Power Plays), TomPaine.com, Democracy Now!, and The Nation have covered the story on a regular basis, and smaller newspapers from Tennessee to Wisconsin have also taken up the issue. As for blogs, Daily Kos launched a campaign to “lift the virtual news blackout” on the story.

On the advocacy front, more than 500,000 people signed a letter to President Bush earlier this month demanding an explanation for the latest revelations, and groups of veterans and peace activists have formed a coalition to push for a formal congressional investigation. Moreover, Ralph Nader and Kevin Zeese, among others, have actually raised the prospect of impeachment for President Bush.

With the issue clearly gaining momentum, the key question now is whether the Memo has the muscle to sway not only those who opposed the war in the first place, but also those who at some point supported it.

Neither testimony from Joseph Wilson and Richard Clarke nor the enduring absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has unsettled the American public enough to reopen the debate over the war. Controversy with regard to the Downing Street Memo may also wither away.

But there is a real possibility the issue could gain serious traction in the days and weeks ahead. The people of the United States have become increasingly frustrated with the Iraq war; a recent Washington Post poll found that for the first time since major combat operations began in March 2003, more than half of all Americans feel the war has not made the nation safer. And perhaps even more importantly, the Memo is strikingly concrete; beyond its commentary on intelligence-fiddling and fact-tweaking, it notes quite plainly that “the case was thin” for military intervention in Iraq.


http://villagevoice.com/news/0525,memo,65101,6.html
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
<font size="3">The article below is the same as the article immediately
above. The above was cut and pasted because many
times the links go bad with framed posts, however, the
article is framed in this post because it contains numerous
links that I didn't have time to insert in the article above.
_________________________________________________</fontsize>


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[frame]http://villagevoice.com/news/0525,memo,65101,6.html[/frame]
 
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