U.S. - China: Currency Wars

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China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar By STEPHANIE HOO, Associated Press Writer
17 minutes ago



China dropped its politically volatile policy of linking its currency to the U.S. dollar on Thursday, adopting a more flexible system based on a basket of foreign currencies that could push up the price of Chinese exports to the United States and Europe.

The government also strengthened the state-set exchange rate to 8.11 yuan to the dollar — from 8.277 yuan, where it had been fixed for more than a decade — in a surprise announcement on state television's evening news. That raised the value of one yuan by about one-quarter of one U.S. cent to 12.33 cents.

China had been under pressure for years from its trading partners to let the value of the yuan float or at least trade at a stronger rate and some U.S. lawmakers had threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if China didn't adjust its currency scheme. The United States and others had said the communist nation undervalued the yuan by up to 40 percent, giving Chinese exporters an unfair price advantage.

The Bush administration on Thursday praised China's decision but said it planned to monitor the country's implementation of the new arrangement.

"I welcome China's announcement today that it is adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime," Treasury Secretary John Snow said in a statement. "As we have said, reform of China's currency regime is important for China and the international financial system."

The White House also hailed the announcement. "We are encouraged by China's announcement today that they are adopting a more flexible market-based currency system," Bush spokesman Scott McClellan said.

The new system puts tight daily limits on changes in the yuan's value but could allow it to change substantially over time.

Beginning Friday, the yuan will be limited to moving each day within a 0.3 percent band against a collection of foreign currencies, the government said. But the officially announced price at the end of each day will become the midpoint of trading for the next day, which could let the yuan edge up incrementally.

"This is the start of a gradual appreciation process," said Frank Gong, managing director of JPMorgan Chase & Co. in Hong Kong. "It will help balance Chinese trade flows. Export volumes will come down. Import volumes will pick up. It will help reduce trade tensions."

The move could nonetheless help Chinese exporters' profits by cutting costs for imported oil, iron ore and other raw materials whose prices have been surging in dollar terms, Gong said.

And it could encourage domestic spending, making China's economic growth less dependent on exports, Gong said.

"China is finally doing the right thing," he said.

The U.S. dollar dropped against the Japanese yen — an Asian benchmark — on the news, falling to 110 yen from about 112 yen. U.S. treasuries fell alongside the dollar as investors feared the possible inflationary effect of higher import prices in the U.S. The yield on the 10-year Treasury note rose to 4.22 percent from 4.18 percent late Wednesday.

Japan, one of China's trade partners that had urged it to let the yuan float, welcomed China's decision.

"We hope that this decision will lead to more balanced and stable economic growth for China," the Bank of Japan's international department said in a statement. "We highly value this move."

In South Korea, government officials said they didn't expect it to have a big impact on the nation's economy, the third largest in Asia following Japan and China.

"Yuan's revaluation was only a matter of timing; we knew it was going to happen," said Rhee Yeung-kyun, assistant governor of Bank of Korea. "I don't expect much effect the Korean won as the won has been sufficiently been appreciated."

Philippine central bank Gov. Amando Tetangco said the move was expected to strengthen regional currencies, including the Philippine peso.

The governor of the Bank of Thailand held an urgent meeting with other senior central bank officials as soon as they learned of the news, but no details of their meeting were immediately available.

Yuji Kameoka, currency analyst at Daiwa Institute of Research in Tokyo, said China's decision made sense.

"It was good timing because the dollar has been strengthening lately," he said. "It would have been very difficult to do if the dollar had stayed weak."

Hong Kong, a key Chinese banking center that has its own currency, will keep its currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, the city's acting financial secretary Stephen Ip said.

Malaysia simultaneously announced it was dropping its own policy that tied its currency, the ringgit, to the U.S. dollar and would adopt a currency basket arrangement similar to China's.

Chinese leaders have said for years that they eventually would let the yuan trade freely on world markets. But they said any decision would be based on China's economic needs, not foreign pressure.

Chinese officials said any abrupt change in its currency system would cause turmoil, hurting its fragile banks and financial industries.

The central bank's news department said there no plans for a news conference to clarify the new policy.
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

QueEx said:
So begins what ???

QueEx

The DOWN Fall of America Middle class into lower class.

Greed is going to be our down fall folks.

I am so sick of BOTH political parties right now. I used to be a Dem but now they are NOT fighting for the little man anymore. People, I think it is time for a strong independent president who is not in bed with corporate America and will fight for the little and middle man.
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

A New prez is a short term solution (and not a good one at that). The REAL powers that be do not and have never given a damn about the middle or lower class. The only one looking out for you is YOU.
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

easy_b said:
The DOWN Fall of America Middle class into lower class.

Greed is going to be our down fall folks.

I am so sick of BOTH political parties right now. I used to be a Dem but now they are NOT fighting for the little man anymore. People, I think it is time for a strong independent president who is not in bed with corporate America and will fight for the little and middle man.

Maybe I can't make the connection here, but how does China allowing its currency to float freely in the markets contribute to the: downfall of the American middle class as you put it?
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

eewwll said:
Maybe I can't make the connection here, but how does China allowing its currency to float freely in the markets contribute to the: downfall of the American middle class as you put it?


shopping at Walmart now a bit more expensive... :D On a serious note this will weaken the dollar, China or other countries will lose their appetite to hold US treasuries - rates will be moving up, real estate bubble may cool off cause of major dislocations in the banking, finance and other sectors of the economy. Things could get "real" quick(Folks Will Find Out Who's Been Propping Up The US), but at 2% i doubt any major change will occur right away... We need our manufacturing base again.

http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4539
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

pitbull said:
shopping at Walmart now a bit more expensive... :D On a serious note this will weaken the dollar, China or other countries will lose their appetite to hold US treasuries - rates will be moving up, real estate bubble may cool off cause of major dislocations in the banking, finance and other sectors of the economy. Things could get "real" quick(Folks Will Find Out Who's Been Propping Up The US), but at 2% i doubt any major change will occur right away... We need our manufacturing base again.

http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4539

The rates are going up anyway(the fed wants to cool the RE boom), the dollar will continue its decline because of our growing trade deficits, ever expanding national debt....the real estate bubble is bound to burst regardless as it is the classic case of irrational exuberance...

I guess my question wasn't detailed enough. How is their decision to float their currency a U.S. government conspiracy against the middle class like the other poster stated. I get the implications of the currency peg change and I was being a bit sarcastic...i just question easy_b's theory of this implicitly being the beginning of the decline of the middle class. This was an inevitable decision.
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

I wouldn't call it the beginning of a decline in anything at 2%. Especially when the Yuan is 40% off. I don't know what the deal is, I'd have thought they'd have done something more drastic in light of the fact they just were shit on with the Exxon deal and washed their own hands of Maytag. Maybe it is a threat to certain people.

Their trade deficit does more to hurt America in general and keep money and power in the connected Chinese person's hands. The Yuan at a proper valuation would pretty much put a serious dent in the "outsourcing of America". I had to state some things straight out since the other people who know aren't saying ;)

Notice how even with that little 2% change the Yen and Rupee(Indian) went higher? Malaysia made monetary changes as well based on China's decision.
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

[frame]http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,16017270%255E31478,00.html[/frame]
 
Economic superpowers turn up the heat on a reluctant China

Economic superpowers turn up the heat on a reluctant China
Sun Apr 23, 8:30 AM ET

Foreign appeals for China to revalue its currency and so help balance the dangerously lopsided world economy are reaching fever pitch. But Beijing shows every sign of biding its time.

President Hu Jintao gave little away on a visit to Washington last week. He told President George W. Bush that China would move towards a flexible currency regime and open up its markets more, but was vague on when and how.

In talks Friday, the world's seven most powerful economies said it was "critical" for China and other Asian economies to pursue greater currency flexibility, so as to help redress enormous imbalances in global trade.

The finance ministers of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States admitted the imbalances are a "shared responsibility".

But the G7 ministers' emphasis was very much on Asia, and especially China, as they issued a catalogue of recommendations on how to rectify imbalances that the IMF warns present a clear and present danger to world growth.

"In emerging Asia, particularly China, greater flexibility in exchange rates is critical to allow necessary appreciations, as is strengthening domestic demand, lessening reliance on export-led growth strategies, and actions to strengthen financial sectors," the ministers said.

The new focus on China was a victory for the United States, whose trade deficit with the country last year exploded to a record 202 billion dollars.

For more than a year, Washington has been prodding both its G7 partners and the International Monetary Fund to take a stronger stand on China's system of confining its yuan currency to a tightly controlled trading regime.

In their communique, the G7 ministers also endorsed a new "multilateral surveillance" overview by the IMF.

Such IMF surveillance would focus on exchange rate policies, with a view to "the spillover effects of domestic policies on other countries", the seven nations said.

But that call was firmly rebuffed by People's Bank of China governor Zhou Xiaochuan, who in a speech Saturday at IMF talks here said "over-simplistic and drastic unilateral movements" would not help the world economy.

IMF surveillance should "respect the autonomy as to exchange rate systems that is granted to all member countries", said Zhou, who is regarded by Washington powerbrokers as one of China's more forward-thinking leaders.

At its weekend meetings, the IMF stepped up warnings that the world economy is seriously out of kilter as the US current account deficit surges to record levels on the back of record oil prices and China's trade boom.

The higher the US deficit goes, the IMF fears, the greater the risk of foreign investors deserting the US economy, and so the greater the risk of a global economic crash.

Even a less dramatic scenario could wreak havoc. As US Treasury Secretary John Snow noted, countries like China that rely so much on export-led growth are vulnerable to any slowdown in the world's biggest economy.

"It's natural, since China is such a huge part of the global economy, it should be a focal point," Snow said late Friday, arguing oil exporters are also part of the equation.

China appears to be listening, to an extent. Since a small revaluation of the yuan last July, Beijing has stepped up incremental reforms to its currency markets and foreign investment rules.

But the progress is painfully slow for a US administration that is under pressure from many in Congress and in industry who complain that Chinese trade policies have cost thousands of American jobs.

The Treasury Department is under pressure to formally label China a currency "manipulator" in an upcoming report, a designation that could ultimately result in US trade sanctions.

China says it recognises the need for a more supple set of financial tools to sustain its economic boom.

But it fears that by moving too suddenly on currency reform, it risks economic instability. That is unthinkable in a country where rapid rates of growth have become the raison d'etre for the communist regime.

Any drastic revaluation would create pressure on China to open up its heavily restricted capital account, University of California at Davis economics professor Wing Thye Woo said.

"But that is a very dangerous thing to do because the banks are in pretty poor shape, and that opening of the capital account could lead to a financial crisis," he said at a recent Brookings Institution seminar.

"That is why I think the leadership is unlikely to engineer a large appreciation in the first place. They would resist."

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/2006042...Z6FOrgF;_ylu=X3oDMTA5aHJvMDdwBHNlYwN5bmNhdA--
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

[RM]http://www.cato.org/realaudio/ikenson-on-cnbc-04-18-06.ram[/RM]
 
Re: China Severs Its Currency's Link to Dollar...So it begins

[frame]http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/IA19Cb04.html[/frame]
 
Re: China calling for new reserve currency

The follow up.....

Russia and China are coordinating proposals on a new global currency that could replace the US dollar as a reserve currency to prevent a repeat of the global economic crisis, the Kremlin said on Monday.

"We have received proposals from our colleagues in China, detailed proposals," President Dmitry Medvedev's top economic adviser Arkady Dvorkovich said. "Our positions are very similar.

"We have similar positions on the development of the international financial architecture," he told reporters.

Ahead of the Group of 20 summit in London later this week, the Kremlin has published a raft of proposals to overhaul the global economic order, including plans for a supra-national currency that could replace the US dollar.

China has come forward with similar ideas.

US President Barack Obama has said he does not see why the dollar should be replaced and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said the summit would have more immediate issues to discuss.

"So far, not everybody is ready for that," acknowledged Dvorkovich. "We will insist on that at all levels."

Medvedev has said the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications, as in the US financial crisis, sparked by the collapse of the market for subprime or higher risk mortgages.

Moscow also understood however, that many countries were not ready to undertake additional "political obligations," said Dvorkovich, expressing hope that major economies would at least be open to consultations on the subject.

Dvorkovich said he hoped Russia and other major developing economies would also get an equal say and the attention they deserve during the G20 meeting.

"We are hoping that our voice will be heard but I would like to stress that we do not have a desire to pit our voice against that of our partners," he said, referring to developing economies Brazil, India and China who join Russia in what is known collectively as 'BRIC.'

"There will be no separate joint (BRIC) communique, nor should there be," Dvorkovich said. "This is the summit of the leaders of the G20 countries."

Critics have suggested China and the United States, whose economies are closely intertwined, would likely steal the show by promoting their own agenda and turning the G20 forum into a 'G2' summit.

Dvorkovich said the US and China would have ample time to discuss bilateral issues on the summit's sidelines

Separately, Dvorkovich said Medvedev would meet Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on April 1, just before the summit. Medvedev was also scheduled to meet US President Barack Obama, China's Hu Jintao and Britain's Brown that day.

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.7e6cab4fec704a0fdd135ecdac00673b.9c1&show_article=1
 
Re: China calling for new reserve currency

Things are about to get interesting, stay tuned. New worldwide currency coming soon.
 
Re: China calling for new reserve currency

Things are about to get interesting, stay tuned. New worldwide currency coming soon.

GeithnerIdunnoLOL0109.jpg
 
China's Challenge

<font size="5"><center>
China's Challenge</font size></center>



104168



Strategic Forecasting, Inc., "STRATFOR"
Geopolitical Intelligence Report
By Jennifer Richmond and Rodger Baker
March 9, 2010


China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) remains in session. As usual, the meeting has provided Beijing an opportunity to highlight the past year’s successes and lay out the problems that lie ahead.
<font size="3">On the surface at least, China has shown remarkable resilience in the face of global economic crisis. It has posted enviable gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates while keeping factories running (if at a loss) and workers employed. But the economic crisis has exposed the inefficiencies of China’s export-dependent economic model, and the government has had to pump money into a major investment stimulus package to make up for the net drain the export sector currently is exacting on the economy. </font size>​

For years, China’s leaders have recognized the risks of the current economic model. They have debated policy ideas to shift from the current model to one that is more sustainable in the long run and incorporates a more geographically equitable growth and a hefty rise in domestic consumption. While there is general agreement on the need for change, top leaders disagree on the timing and method of transition. This has stirred internal debates, which can lead to factionalization as varying interests align to promote their preferred policy prescription. Entrenched interests in urban areas and the export industry — along with constant fears of triggering major social upheaval — have left the government year after year making only slight changes around the margins. Often, Beijing has taken one step forward only to take two back when social instability and/or institutional resistance emerge.

And this debate becomes even more significant now, as China deals simultaneously with the aftermath of the global economic slowdown and preparations for a leadership transition in 2012.


<font size="4">The Hu Agenda</font size>

Chinese President Hu Jintao came into office eight years ago with the ambitious goal of closing a widening wealth gap by equalizing economic growth between the rural interior and coastal cities. Hu inherited the results of Deng Xiaoping’s opening and reform, which focused on the rapid development of the coastal areas, which were better geographically positioned for international trade. The vast interior took second billing, being kept in line with the promise that in time the rising tide of economic wealth would float all ships. Eventually it did, somewhat. But while the interior saw significant improvements over the early Mao period, the growth and rise in living standards and disposable income in the urban coastal areas far outstripped rural growth. Some coastal urban areas are now approaching Western standards of living, while much of the interior remains mired in Third World conditions. And the faster the coast grows, the more dependent China becomes on the money from that growth to facilitate employment and subsidize the rural population.

Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, also recognized these problems. To address them, he promoted a “Go West” economic policy designed to shift investment further inland. But Jiang faced the same entrenched interests that have opposed Hu’s efforts at significant change. While Jiang was able to begin reform of the bloated state-owned enterprises, he softened his Westward economic drive. Amid cyclical global economic downturns, China fell back on the subsidized export model to keep employment levels up and keep money flowing in. Concern over social instability held radical reform in check, and the closer Jiang got to the end of his term in power, the less likely he was to make significant changes that could undermine social cohesion. No Chinese leader wants to preside over a major economic policy that fails out of fear of being the Chinese Mikhail Gorbachev.

For those like Hu who have argued that rapid reform is worth the risk of potential short-term social dislocation, the global downturn was seen as validating their policies — and as confirming that the risks to China of not changing far outweigh the risks of changing now. The export industry’s drag on GDP has forced Beijing to enact a massive investment and loan program. By some accounts, fixed investments in 2009 accounted for more than 90 percent of GDP. Those arguing for faster reform have noted that the pace of investment growth is unsustainable in the long run, and that the flood of money into the system has created new inflationary pressures.

Much of this investment came in the form of bank loans that need to be serviced and repaid. But as the government tries to cool the economy, the risk of companies defaulting on their loans looms. Cooling the economy also threatens to burst China’s real estate bubble. This not only compounds problems in related industry sectors, it could also trigger massive social discord in the urban areas, where housing has taken the place of the stock market as the investment of choice.


<font size="4">Beijing’s Ongoing Dilemma</font size>

Chinese leaders face the constant dilemma of needing to allow the economy to maintain its three-decade long export-oriented growth pattern even though this builds in long-term weaknesses, but shifting the economy is not something that can be done without its own consequences. Social pressures are convincing the government of the need to raise the minimum wage to keep up with economic pressures. At the same time, misallocation of labor and new job formation incentives in the interior are causing shortages of labor in some sectors in major coastal export zones. If coastal factories increase wages to attract labor or appease workers, they run the risk of going under due to the already razor-thin margins. But if they don’t, the labor fueling these industries at best may riot and at worst might simply move back home, leaving exporters with little option but to close shop.

Looming demographic changes around the globe also impact the Chinese situation, and the government can no longer rely on an ever-increasing export market to drive the Chinese economy. Some international companies operating in China already are beginning to consider relocating manufacturing operations to places with cheaper labor or back to their home countries to save on transportation costs Chinese wages are no longer mitigating.

With its export markets unlikely to recover to pre-crisis levels any time soon, competition and protectionism are on the rise. The United States is growing bolder in its restrictions on Chinese exports, and China may no longer avoid having the U.S. government label it a currency manipulator. While this may be an extreme measure in 2010, the pressures for such a scenario are rising.

Amid its domestic and global challenges, Chinese leaders are engaged in economic policy debates. It appears that internal criticism is being directed against Hu as social tensions over issues like rising housing prices and inflation grow. In some ways, this is not unusual. National presidents often bear the brunt of dissatisfaction with economic downturns no matter whether their policies were to blame. In China, however, criticism against economic policy falls on the premier, who is responsible for setting the country’s economic direction. The focus on Hu reflects both the depth of the current crisis and the underlying political tensions over economic policy in a time of both global economic unpredictability and preparations for the end of Hu’s presidency in 2012.

To bridge the gulf between the urban coast and the rural interior, Hu and his supporters have pursued a multiphased plan. First, they sought to rein in some of the most independent of the coastal areas — Shanghai in particular, which served as a center of power and influence not only in promoting the continuation of unfettered coastal growth but also of Hu’s predecessor, Jiang. Second, a plan was put in motion to consolidate redundancies in China’s economy and to shift light- and low-skilled industry inland by increasing wages in the key coastal export manufacturing areas, reducing their cost competitiveness. And Beijing added an urbanization drive in traditionally rural and inland areas. Together, this represented a joint attempt to bring the jobs to the interior rather than continue the pattern of migrant workers moving to the coast.

The core of the Hu policies was an overall attempt to re-centralize economic control. This would allow the central government to begin weeding out redundancies left over from Mao’s era of provincial self-sufficiency, which the Deng and Jiang eras of uncoordinated and locally-directed economic growth often driven by corruption and nepotism exacerbated. In short, Hu planned to centralize the economy to consolidate industry, redistribute wealth and urbanize the interior to create a more balanced economy that emphasized domestic consumption over exports. However, Hu’s push, under the epithet “harmonious society,” has been anything but smooth and its successes have been limited at best.


<font size="4">Hu Meets Resistance</font size>

Institutional and local government resistance to re-centralization has hounded the policy from its inception, and resistance has grown with the economic crisis. Money is now pouring into the economy via massive government-mandated bank lending to stimulate growth through investments as exports wane. Consequently, housing prices and inflation fears now plague the government — two issues that could lead to increased social tensions and are already leading to louder questioning of Hu’s policies. With just two years to go in his administration, Hu already is looking to his legacy, weighing the risks and rewards between promoting long-term economic sustainability or short-term economic survival. The next two years will witness seemingly incongruent policy pronouncements as the two opposing directions and their proponents battle over China’s economic and political landscape.

Hu’s rise to the presidency was all but assured long before he took office. From a somewhat simplified perspective, the PRC has had only four leaders: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. When Mao died, his appointed successor, Hua Guofeng (who was settled upon after several other candidates fell out of favor), lasted only a short time. Amid the political chaos of the post-Cultural Revolution era, Deng rose to the top. Both Mao and Deng were strong leaders who, although contending with rivals, could rule almost single-handedly when the need arose.

To avoid the confusion of the post-Mao transition, Deng created a long-term succession plan. He ultimately settled on Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin as his successor. But in an effort to preserve his vision and legacy, Deng also chose Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao. Barring some terrible breach of office, Hu was more or less guaranteed the presidency a decade before he took office, and there was little Jiang could do to alter this outcome. Jiang, however, made sure that he left his mark by lining up Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping. Despite Jiang’s support, Xi has not risen through the ranks in the same manner as Hu did, raising speculation of internal disagreements on the succession plan.

Vice President Xi is considered one of the “princelings,” leaders whose parents were part of the revolutionary-era governments under Mao and Deng who mainly have cut their teeth through business ventures concentrated in the coastal regions. Hu, on the other hand, is considered among the “tuanpai” or “tuanxi,” leaders who come primarily from the ranks of the Communist Youth League and interior provinces. While these “groups” are not in and of themselves cohesive factions, and China’s political networks are complex, Hu’s and Xi’s backgrounds reflect their differing policy approaches. As such, the question of the next Chinese leader is shaped by opposing economic plans.

On one hand are those like Hu who support a more rapid and immediate refocusing on rural and interior economic growth, even at the cost of reduced coastal and urban power. On the other hand, those like Jiang and his protege Xi have an interest in maintaining the status quo of regionalized semi-independence in economic matters and continued strong coastal growth. They are proceeding on the assumption that a strong coastal-led economy will both provide more immediate rewards for themselves and strengthen China’s international position and its national defense.

It is important not to overstress the differences. Each has the same ultimate goal, namely, maintaining the CPC as the central authority and building a strong China; it is just their paths to these ends that differ. But the economic policy differences are now becoming key questions of Party survival and Chinese stability and strength. Factional struggles that in normal circumstances can be largely controlled, or at least would not get out of hand, are now shaping up in an environment where China’s three-decade economic growth spurt may be reaching its climax. Meanwhile, social pressures are rising amid uncertainties and instabilities in Chinese economic structures.

Beijing has emerged from the economic crisis bolder and more self-confident than ever. But this is driven more by a recognition of weakness than a false assessment of strength. China’s leadership is in crisis mode, and at this time of economic instability and uncertainty, the leadership must also manage a transition that is bringing competing economic policies into stark contrast. And this is the sort of pressure that can cause the gloves to come off and throw expectations of unity and smooth transitions out the window.

Everything may pass smoothly; two years is a long time, after all. But if there is one thing certain about the upcoming change of presidents, it is that nothing is certain.


This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
 
Senate Lawmakers To Introduce China Currency Manipulation Bill

source: Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--A bipartisan group of senators will introduce legislation Tuesday that would oblige the Obama administration to take reciprocal action against any country deemed to be manipulating its currency.

The bill will be introduced later Tuesday, but details of it were reviewed by Dow Jones Newswires.

The measure is primarily aimed at China, a country many congressional lawmakers believe is keeping its currency artificially low to boost its exports.

It would require the Treasury and the Commerce Department to implement several reactive steps against countries seen to be using its foreign exchange policy as a countervailing subsidy.

The law would replace the current framework, which gives the administration discretion when dealing with countries seen to be engaging in currency manipulation. Instead, it would apply an "objective test" that would require the administration to take action if a country failed it.

The bill was introduced by Sens. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.), Debbie Stabenow (D., Mich.) and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.).

It comes a day after the House Ways & Means Committee announced plans to convene a hearing into the Chinese currency situation in two weeks&apos; time.

The rising tide of anger in Congress toward China&apos;s utilization of its currency as an economic weapon places the Obama administration in a difficult bind.

President Barack Obama himself has said he believes the government is manipulating its currency, as has his Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner.

But China is among the nation&apos;s largest creditors, owning around $889 billion in the country&apos;s foreign-held debt. Increasingly, it is also one of the U.S.&apos;s most significant trading partners.

Given the shortened congressional calendar due to the November elections, the legislation is unlikely to be passed into law this year. But the administration will continue to be confronted with the issue by lawmakers until it determines its policy on the matter.

For its part China has responded by accusing the U.S. of also trying to weaken the dollar to increase its exports.
 
China: Crunch Time

<font size="6"><center>
China: Crunch Time</font size></center>



104168




Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR)
Geopolitical Intelligence Report
By Peter Zeihan
March 30, 2010


The global system is undergoing profound change. Three powers — Germany, China and Iran — face challenges forcing them to refashion the way they interact with their regions and the world. We are exploring each of these three states in detail in three geopolitical weeklies, highlighting how STRATFOR’s assessments of these states are evolving. First we examined Germany. We now examine China.

U.S.-Chinese relations have become tenser in recent months, with the United States threatening to impose tariffs unless China agrees to revalue its currency and, ideally, allow it to become convertible like the yen or euro. China now follows Japan and Germany as one of the three major economies after the United States. Unlike the other two, it controls its currency’s value, allowing it to decrease the price of its exports and giving it an advantage not only over other exporters to the United States but also over domestic American manufacturers. The same is true in other regions that receive Chinese exports, such as Europe.

What Washington considered tolerable in a small developing economy is intolerable in one of the top five economies. The demand that Beijing raise the value of the yuan, however, poses dramatic challenges for the Chinese, as the ability to control their currency helps drive their exports. The issue is why China insists on controlling its currency, something embedded in the nature of the Chinese economy. A collision with the United States now seems inevitable. It is therefore important to understand the forces driving China, and it is time for STRATFOR to review its analysis of China.


<font size="4">An Inherently Unstable Economic System</font size>

China has had an extraordinary run since 1980. But like Japan and Southeast Asia before it, dramatic growth rates cannot maintain themselves in perpetuity. Japan and non-Chinese East Asia didn’t collapse and disappear, but the crises of the 1990s did change the way the region worked. The driving force behind both the 1990 Japanese Crisis and the 1997 East Asian Crisis was that the countries involved did not maintain free capital markets. Those states managed capital to keep costs artificially low, giving them tremendous advantages over countries where capital was rationally priced. Of course, one cannot maintain irrational capital prices in perpetuity (as the United States is learning after its financial crisis); doing so eventually catches up. And this is what is happening in China now.

STRATFOR thus sees the Chinese economic system as inherently unstable. The primary reason why China’s growth has been so impressive is that throughout the period of economic liberalization that has led to rising incomes, the Chinese government has maintained near-total savings capture of its households and businesses. It funnels these massive deposits via state-run banks to state-linked firms at below-market rates. It’s amazing the growth rate a country can achieve and the number of citizens it can employ with a vast supply of 0 percent, relatively consequence-free loans provided from the savings of nearly a billion workers.

It’s also amazing how unprofitable such a country can be. The Chinese system, like the Japanese system before it, works on bulk, churn, maximum employment and market share. The U.S. system of attempting to maximize return on investment through efficiency and profit stands in contrast. The American result is sufficient economic stability to be able to suffer through recessions and emerge stronger. The Chinese result is social stability that wobbles precipitously when exposed to economic hardship. The Chinese people rebel when work is not available and conditions reach extremes. It must be remembered that of China’s 1.3 billion people, more than 600 million urban citizens live on an average of about $7 a day, while 700 million rural people live on an average of $2 a day, and that is according to Beijing’s own well-scrubbed statistics.

Moreover, the Chinese system breeds a flock of other unintended side effects.

  • There is, of course, the issue of inefficient capital use: When you have an unlimited number of no-consequence loans, you tend to invest in a lot of no-consequence projects for political reasons or just to speculate. In addition to the overall inefficiency of the Chinese system, another result is a large number of property bubbles. Yes, China is a country with a massive need for housing for its citizens, but even so, local governments and property developers collude to build luxury dwellings instead of anything more affordable in urban areas. This puts China in the odd position of having both a glut and a shortage in housing, as well as an outright glut in commercial real estate, where vacancy rates are notoriously high.

  • There is also the issue of regional disparity. Most of this lending occurs in a handful of coastal regions, transforming them into global powerhouses, while most of the interior — and thereby most of the population — lives in abject poverty.

  • There is also the issue of consumption. Chinese statistics have always been dodgy, but according to Beijing’s own figures, China has a tiny consumer base. This base is not much larger than that of France, a country with roughly one twentieth China’s population and just over half its gross domestic product (GDP). China’s economic system is obviously geared toward exports, not expanding consumer credit.

  • Which brings us to the issue of dependence. Since China cannot absorb its own goods, it must export them to keep afloat. The strategy only works when there is endless demand for the goods it makes. For the most part, this demand comes from the United States. But the recent global recession cut Chinese exports by nearly one fifth, and there were no buyers elsewhere to pick up the slack. Meanwhile, to boost household consumption China provided subsidies to Chinese citizens who had little need for — and in some cases little ability to use — a number of big-ticket products. The Chinese now openly fear that exports will not make a sustainable return to previous levels until 2012. And that is a lot of production — and consumption — to subsidize in the meantime. Most countries have another word for this: waste.

    This waste can be broken down into two main categories:

    • First, the government roughly tripled the amount of cash it normally directs the state banks to lend to sustain economic activity during the recession. The new loans added up to roughly a third of GDP in a single year. Remember, with no-consequence loans, profitability or even selling goods is not an issue; one must merely continue employing people. Even if China boasted the best loan-quality programs in history, a dramatic increase in lending of that scale is sure to generate mountains of loans that will go bad.

    • Second, not everyone taking out those loans even intends to invest prudently: Chinese estimates indicate that about one-fourth of this lending surge was used to play China’s stock and property markets.

It is not that the Chinese are foolish; that is hardly the case. Given their history and geographical constraints, we would be hard-pressed to come up with a better plan were we to be selected as Party general secretary for a day. Beijing is well aware of all these problems and more and is attempting to mitigate the damage and repair the system. For example, it is considering legalizing portions of what it calls the shadow-lending sector. Think of this as a sort of community bank or credit union that services small businesses. In the past, China wanted total savings capture and centralization to better direct economic efforts, but Beijing is realizing that these smaller entities are more efficient lenders — and that over time they may actually employ more people without subsidization.

But the bottom line is that this sort of repair work is experimental and at the margins, and it doesn’t address the core damage that the financial model continuously inflicts. The Chinese fear their economic strategy has taken them about as far as they can go. STRATFOR used to think that these sorts of internal weaknesses would eventually doom the Chinese system as it did the Japanese system (upon which it is modeled). Now, we’re not so sure.

Since its economic opening in 1978, China has taken advantage of a remarkably friendly economic and political environment. In the 1980s, Washington didn’t obsess overmuch about China, given its focus on the “Evil Empire.” In the 1990s, it was easy for China to pass inconspicuously in global markets, as China was still a relatively small player. Moreover, with all the commodities from the former Soviet Union hitting the global market, prices for everything from oil to copper neared historic lows. No one seemed to fight against China’s booming demand for commodities or rising exports. The 2000s looked like they would be more turbulent, and early in the administration of George W. Bush the EP-3 incident landed the Chinese in Washington’s crosshairs, but then the Sept. 11 attacks happened and U.S. efforts were redirected toward the Islamic world.

Believe it or not, the above are coincidental developments. In fact, there is a structural factor in the global economy that has protected the Chinese system for the past 30 years that is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy: Bretton Woods.


<font size="4">Rethinking Bretton Woods</font size>

Bretton Woods is one of the most misunderstood landmarks in modern history. Most think of it as the formation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the beginning of the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the international system. It is that, but it is much, much more.

In the aftermath of World War II, Germany and Japan had been crushed, and nearly all of Western Europe lay destitute. Bretton Woods at its core was an agreement between the United States and the Western allies that the allies would be able to export at near-duty-free rates to the U.S. market in order to boost their economies. In exchange, the Americans would be granted wide latitude in determining the security and foreign policy stances of the rebuilding states. In essence, the Americans took what they saw as a minor economic hit in exchange for being able to rewrite first regional, and in time global, economic and military rules of engagement. For the Europeans, Bretton Woods provided the stability, financing and security backbone Europe used first to recover, and in time to thrive. For the Americans, it provided the ability to preserve much of the World War II alliance network into the next era in order to compete with the Soviet Union.

The strategy proved so successful with the Western allies that it was quickly extended to World War II foes Germany and Japan, and shortly thereafter to Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and others. Militarily and economically, it became the bedrock of the anti-Soviet containment strategy. The United States began with substantial trade surpluses with all of these states, simply because they had no productive capacity due to the devastation of war. After a generation of favorable trade practices, surpluses turned into deficits, but the net benefits were so favorable to the Americans that the policies were continued despite the increasing economic hits. The alliance continued to hold, and one result (of many) was the eventual economic destruction of the Soviet Union.

Applying this little history lesson to the question at hand, Bretton Woods is the ultimate reason why the Chinese have succeeded economically for the last generation. As part of Bretton Woods, the United States opens its markets, eschewing protectionist policies in general and mercantilist policies in particular. Eventually the United States extended this privilege to China to turn the tables on the Soviet Union. All China has to do is produce — it doesn’t matter how — and it will have a market to sell to.

But this may be changing. Under President Barack Obama, the United States is considering fundamental changes to the Bretton Woods arrangements. Ostensibly, this is to update the global financial system and reduce the chances of future financial crises. But out of what we have seen so far, the National Export Initiative (NEI) the White House is promulgating is much more mercantilist. It espouses doubling U.S. exports in five years, specifically by targeting additional sales to large developing states, with China at the top of the list.

STRATFOR finds that goal overoptimistic, and the NEI is maddeningly vague as to how it will achieve this goal. But this sort of rhetoric has not come out of the White House since pre-World War II days. Since then, international economic policy in Washington has served as a tool of political and military policy; it has not been a beast unto itself. In other words, the shift in tone in U.S. trade policy is itself enough to suggest big changes, beginning with the idea that the United States actually will compete with the rest of the world in exports.

If — and we must emphasize if — there will be force behind this policy shift, the Chinese are in serious trouble. As we noted before, the Chinese financial system is largely based on the Japanese model, and Japan is a wonderful case study for how this could go down. In the 1980s, the United States was unhappy with the level of Japanese imports. Washington found it quite easy to force the Japanese both to appreciate their currency and accept more exports. Opening the closed Japanese system to even limited foreign competition gutted Japanese banks’ international positions, starting a chain reaction that culminated in the 1990 collapse. Japan has not really recovered since, and as of 2010, total Japanese GDP is only marginally higher than it was 20 years ago.


<font size="4">China’s Limited Options</font size>

China, which unlike Japan is not a U.S. ally, would have an even harder time resisting should Washington pressure Beijing to buy more U.S. goods. Dependence upon a certain foreign market means that market can easily force changes in the exporter’s trade policies. Refusal to cooperate means losing access, shutting the exports down. To be sure, the U.S. export initiative does not explicitly call for creating more trade barriers to Chinese goods. But Washington is already brandishing this tool against China anyway, and it will certainly enter China’s calculations about whether to resist the U.S. export policy. Japan’s economy, in 1990 and now, only depended upon international trade for approximately 15 percent of its GDP. For China, that figure is 36 percent, and that is after suffering the hit to exports from the global recession. China’s only recourse would be to stop purchasing U.S. government debt (Beijing can’t simply dump the debt it already holds without taking a monumental loss, because for every seller there must be a buyer), but even this would be a hollow threat.

First, Chinese currency reserves exist because Beijing does not want to invest its income in China. Underdeveloped capital markets cannot absorb such an investment, and the reserves represent the government’s piggybank. Getting a 2 percent return on a rock-solid asset is good enough in China’s eyes. Second, those bond purchases largely fuel U.S. consumers’ ability to purchase Chinese goods. In the event the United States targets Chinese exports, the last thing China would want is to compound the damage. Third, a cold stop in bond purchases would encourage the U.S. administration — and the American economy overall — to balance its budgets. However painful such a transition may be, it would not be much as far as retaliation measures go: “forcing” a competitor to become economically efficient and financially responsible is not a winning strategy. Granted, interest rates would rise in the United States due to the reduction in available capital — the Chinese internal estimate is by 0.75 percentage points — and that could pinch a great many sectors, but that is nothing compared to the tsunami of pain that the Chinese would be feeling.

For Beijing, few alternatives exist to American consumption should Washington limit export access; the United States has more disposable income than all of China’s other markets combined. To dissuade the Americans, China could dangle the carrot of cooperation on sanctions against Iran before Washington, but the United States may already be moving beyond any use for that. Meanwhile, China would strengthen domestic security to protect against the ramifications of U.S. pressure. Beijing perceives the spat with Google and Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama as direct attacks by the United States, and it is already bracing for a rockier relationship. While such measures do not help the Chinese economy, they may be Beijing’s only options for preserving internal stability.

In China, fears of this coming storm are becoming palpable — and by no means limited to concerns over the proposed U.S. export strategy. With the Democratic Party in the United States (historically the more protectionist of the two mainstream U.S. political parties) both in charge and worried about major electoral losses, the Chinese fear that midterm U.S. elections will be all about targeting Chinese trade issues. Specifically, they are waiting for April 15, when the U.S. Treasury Department is expected to rule whether China is a currency manipulator — a ruling Beijing fears could unleash a torrent of protectionist moves by the U.S. Congress. Beijing already is deliberating on the extent to which it should seek to defuse American anger. But the Chinese probably are missing the point. If there has already been a decision in Washington to break with Bretton Woods, no number of token changes will make any difference. STRATFOR sees a race on, but it isn’t a race between the Chinese and the Americans or even China and the world. It’s a race to see what will smash China first, its own internal imbalances or the U.S. decision to take a more mercantilist approach to international trade.Such a shift in the U.S. trade posture will see the Americans going for China’s throat (no matter whether by design or unintentionally).

And the United States can do so with disturbing ease. The Americans don’t need a public works program or a job-training program or an export-boosting program. They don’t even have to make better — much less cheaper — goods. They just need to limit Chinese market access, something that can be done with the flick of a pen and manageable pain on the U.S. side.



This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
 
Re: China: Crunch Time

<font size="5"><center>
This Could Be Significant:
Announcement of RMB "Flexibility"</font size></center>



The Atlantic
By James Fallows
Jun 19 2010


Yesterday I mentioned the mounting concern I'd been hearing in China that despite everything -- despite a "decent interval" of minimal public criticism from the US including deferral of a "currency manipulator" judgment from the Treasury Department, despite the recovery of China's economy and its exports, despite faltering recovery efforts elsewhere -- the Chinese government might end up stonewalling and refuse to make even the tiniest gesture toward letting its currency, the RMB, start rising in value again.

The RMB had been pegged at around 8 to the dollar until July, 2005; began a "managed float" to about 6.8 to the dollar until July, 2008; and has been frozen again at around 6.8 ever since, as part of a Chinese government effort to preserve its export industries when the financial crisis made foreign demand collapse, especially in the US. The assumed deadline for the Chinese government to do something to show movement on this front has been the G20 meetings a week from now in Canada.

At 7am this morning US East Coast time, the People's Bank of China published an announcement on its website that appears to signal the change everyone has been expecting. Chinese version here, with a posting date two minutes earlier. It begins:


PBOC-thumb-275x89-28292.png


Further Reform the RMB Exchange Rate Regime and Enhance the RMB Exchange Rate Flexibility

In view of the recent economic situation and financial market developments at home and abroad, and the balance of payments (BOP) situation in China, the People´s Bank of China has decided to proceed further with reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and to enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibility.​

We'll see next week, and in months to come, what exactly this will mean. Early analysis here. But to yesterday's question -- might they really decide to stonewall? and make their intransigence the center of the G20 meetings? -- the answer appears to be No. Which matters. More later.

Andy Rothman of CLSA in Shanghai, in his "Sinology" newsletter, sums up the situation thus:

I expect Treasury and the White House to support even the extremely slow rate of appreciation I anticipate over the coming months. The Obama Administration will make the case that 1) re-breaking the peg is the most important thing, and 2) with Europe - - China's largest export market - - in economic turmoil, it is realistic for Beijing to only make marginal changes in the exchange rate at this time.... Today's PBOC announcement reflects an exceptionally high degree of political and economic pragmatism in Beijing, and a strong desire to avoid conflict with Washington.​

I agree. We have heard a lot in the last six months, especially after Barack Obama's supposedly "humiliating" visit to China late last year, about the shift of power that has made the Chinese government dismissive of outside views, especially America's. That argument has seemed overstated all along, but would have had been powerful if Chinese officials had refused to budge on the RMB. More on this soon.

http://www.theatlantic.com/internat...uld-be-significant-announcement-of-rmb/58405/
 
Re: China: Crunch Time

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China to allow more exchange rate flexibility

<font size="5"><center>
China to allow more exchange rate flexibility</font size>
<font size="4">

Central bank suggests it’s ready to break yuan’s peg to U.S. dollar</center></font size>




yuan_713261a_jpg_713261gm-a.jpg

An employee counts U.S. dollar banknotes as yuan
banknotes are seen at a branch of the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China in Huaibei, Anhui pro-
vince in this May 25, 2010 file photo. China has
ended its "crisis-mode" pegging of the yuan to the
dollar with a statement that it will gradually increase
the flexibility of its exchange rate, an adviser to the
central bank Li Daokui told Reuters on Saturday.
REUTERS/Stringer/Files


REUTERS
Michael Wei
and Alister Bull
Beijing and Washington
Saturday, Jun. 19, 2010


China said on Saturday it would gradually make the yuan more flexible, in a gesture that may deflect foreign criticism at next week’s G20 summit but will not quickly yield a big move by its currency.

U.S. President Barack Obama, who prodded China over the yuan in a letter released on Friday, welcomed the news in an indication the danger of a market-roiling confrontation at the Group of 20 meeting in Canada had eased.

“China’s decision to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate is a constructive step that can help safeguard the recovery and contribute to a more balanced global economy,” Mr. Obama said in a statement.

Other Western leaders and the International Monetary Fund also voiced encouragement that an important strategic ally was making a concession which improves the chances of success at the June 26-27 summit.

But the announcement by China’s central bank, which strongly suggested it was ready to break the currency’s 23-month-old dollar peg, was conditioned by an explicit warning ruling out a one-off revaluation or major yuan appreciation.

“The basis for large-scale appreciation of the RMB exchange rate does not exist,” the People’s Bank of China said.

The yuan is also known as the renminbi, or RMB. China, the largest holder of U.S. sovereign debt, may reduce its demand for those securities in the future. China buys U.S. bonds to manage the yuan’s peg to the dollar, and greater currency flexibility may dilute that necessity.

The peg, which Beijing defended as a source of stability during the recent global financial crisis, has come under intense criticism from abroad as China’s export juggernaut roared back to life.

Much of the rest of the global economy remains sluggish and beset by unemployment in the wake of the financial crisis, and China’s policy is seen as stealing jobs from foreign markets.

In particular, by keeping the yuan artificially cheap against the dollar, China makes its imports more attractive for U.S. consumers while making U.S. exports to China more costly.

That has contributed to a massive surplus in China’s trade account with the United States, sparking protests that the policy is at the direct expense of American jobs.

U.S. patience with Beijing over the yuan has worn thin and lawmakers threaten to penalize it for a strategy they say is unfair and breaks the rules.

Democratic U.S. Senator Charles Schumer, a leading critic, said China’s statement was too vague and pledged to press ahead with legal action to raise trade barriers.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who has delayed publication of a potentially embarrassing report that could cite China as a currency manipulator, also stressed that China’s actions would speak louder than words.

“This is an important step but the test is how far and how fast they let the currency appreciate,” he said.

The currency report, due on April 15, was put on the back-burner until after the G20 to give China time to act.

Mr. Obama needs China’s help on a range of other delicate issues, including sanctions against Iran and North Korea for their nuclear programs.

But he must balance quiet diplomacy against an urgent domestic political need to be seen fighting China for U.S. jobs before congressional elections in November.

U.S. businesses must also tread softly with China. Caterpillar Inc, which sells billions of dollars of earthmoving equipment and other products to China each year, said it was heartened by the decision.

G20 leaders have promised to tackle so-called global macro imbalances, posed by massive trade surpluses and deficits.

Those are blamed for fostering a bubble in the U.S. housing market in 2008, and contributing to the recent European sovereign debt crisis. Economists say such imbalances are not sustainable in the long term, and warn they may trigger another damaging global financial crisis if investors take fright.

Beijing’s recent insistence that the summit was the wrong place to talk about yuan flexibility could have overshadowed the meeting and damaged trust. China reduced that risk with Saturday’s announcement.

“This is an important move as it signals recognition by Chinese officials that a more flexible exchange rate is in China’s own interest and also acknowledges its responsibility to the international community,” said Eswar Prasad, a former head of the International Monetary Fund’s China division.

China has long said it would not bow to international pressure over its currency, and the central bank went out of its way to dampen expectations for any big yuan rise.

“We believe this is a positive gesture, suggesting the yuan will soon resume its appreciation against the dollar,” said Goldman Sachs economists Yu Song and Helen Qiao.

The news could also ease fears of a trade dispute between the United States and China at a delicate time for the world economy and may propel world stocks markets higher on Monday.

It was clear that China intended its announcement -- published in English at around the same time as Chinese, a departure from usual practice -- to mark the end of the yuan’s de facto peg to the dollar. That had been defended as a special protection policy during the global financial crisis.

“The global economy is gradually recovering. The recovery and upturn of the Chinese economy has become more solid with enhanced economic stability,” the Chinese central bank said in a statement on its website.

“It is desirable to proceed further with reform of RMB exchange rate regime and increase the RMB exchange rate flexibility,” it said.

China has held the yuan at roughly 6.83 to the dollar since July 2008 in an attempt to insulate the fastest-growing major economy from the turmoil sparked by the U.S. credit crunch.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/repo...ore-exchange-rate-flexibility/article1610428/
 
Dollar should be replaced as international standard, U.N. report says

New York (CNN) -- The dollar is an unreliable international currency and should be replaced by a more stable system, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs said in a report released Tuesday.

The use of the dollar for international trade came under increasing scrutiny when the U.S. economy fell into recession. "The dollar has proved not to be a stable store of value, which is a requisite for a stable reserve currency," the report said.

Many countries, in Asia in particular, have been building up massive dollar reserves. As a result, those countries' currencies have become undervalued, decreasing their ability to import goods from abroad.

The World Economic and Social Survey 2010 is supporting a proposal long advocated by the International Monetary Fund to create a standardized international system for liquidity transfer.

Under this proposed system, countries would no longer have to buy up foreign currencies, as China has long done with the U.S. dollar. Rather, they would accumulate the right to claim foreign currencies, or special drawing rights, or SDRs, rather than the currencies themselves.

The special drawing rights would be backed by a basket of currencies, which would make them less susceptible to volatility in any one currency. And because the value of a special drawing right is defined by the IMF, changes in the value of any one currency could be adjusted for.

These initiatives, supported by U.N. Secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, are meant to help sustain the international trade and financial systems that will allow less-developed countries to participate and integrate into the global economy.

In addition to the proposed reforms regarding international currency, the survey also offered guidance on increasing social well-being.

The survey said that "the number of the poor in the world living on less than $1.25 a day decreased from 1.8 billion in 1990 to 1.4 billion in 2005, but nearly all of this reduction was concentrated in China."

The number of poor increased in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia over the same period. Income inequalities within countries have increased since the early 1980s with few exceptions, the report said.

"There's too little aid being provided, it's too fragmented, and it's too volatile in terms of the resources that are flowing to countries," said Rob Vos, director of the development policy and analysis division of the U.N.

The survey projects that by 2050 the population will be at 9 billion, with 85 percent living in developing countries, and the global economy will have to sustain a system that will allow for "decent living."

By 2050, one of every four people living in a developed country and one in every seven in countries now being developed will be over age 65. The fast ageing of the population will call for proper pension and health care systems that are sustainable
http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/06/29/un.report.dollar/index.html?hpt=T2
 
Re: Dollar should be replaced as international standard, U.N. report says

its already bake as a cake. the dollar will no longer be world reserve currency by 2018....but i got a feeling its going to move a lot faster than one can expect.:smh:
 
Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?

<font size="4">
Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?
</font size>



Steven Thomma and Kevin G. Hall; McClatchy Newspapers



With President Barack Obama unable to force China to play fair with its
currency, a congressional committee Friday moved to give him a new
weapon — the power to use currency manipulation to justify tariffs on
Chinese goods.

The ultimate goal is to force China to let the value of its currency, the
yuan, float freely. Experts say that would put U.S. exports on an even
playing field, make Chinese exports more expensive, make U.S. exports
to China less expensive, and help create 500,000 jobs.


Moreover, a free-floating Chinese currency is key to a rebalancing a
changing global economy as envisioned by the G-20 group of top economic
powers, according to C. Fred Bergsten, the director of the Peterson
Institute for International Economics.

However, Obama, like his predecessor, thus far has had little luck or
leverage in persuading China to stop undervaluing the yuan, a practice
China resumed in 2008 after a three-year hiatus.

He spent most of a two-hour meeting on the sidelines of the United
Nations in New York Thursday trying to convince Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao to let the currency float. He was unsuccessful.

"Ultimately, they don't have any leverage," said Lloyd Wood, a spokesman
for the American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition, which represents
small U.S. manufacturers that don't produce in China.

First, some economists fear a trade war if the U.S. gets too tough.

In an interview with McClatchy on Thursday, liberal economist Robert
Reich, a Clinton-era labor secretary, warned that an anemic economic
recovery and widening U.S. income inequality could lead to policies that
bring "another era of Smoot-Hawley."

During the Great Depression, the Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930 hit
some 20,000 imported goods with record tariffs in an attempt to protect
American farmers and manufacturers. It helped trigger a global trade war
that economic historians think worsened and prolonged the Great
Depression.​

Second, others think the Obama administration fears a Chinese selloff
of U.S. government bonds.

Earlier this month, members of Congress ripped Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner for not playing hardball with China, accusing the administration of
being afraid to anger a country that helps finance U.S. government debt.

"You know the United States is put at a terrible disadvantage, and you
refuse to act. What are you afraid of?" Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y.,
told Geithner. "Are you afraid that if you cite the Chinese, they will
respond by selling some of the trillions of dollars of Treasuries that they
currently hold? By doing that, they'd be cutting off their nose to spite
their face."​


<font size="3">
What says the Politics Boards' "Resident Expert
Economists" (with or without a degree) ???

  • <font size="3">All opinions welcomed; BUT</font size>

  • <font size="3">Please state the "Facts" that support your opinion.
    (And don't be shy about citations)</font size>

</font size>
QueEx
 
Re: Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?

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Re: Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?

This is like asking...

"Does abortion of black babies help reduce the crime rate?"

It is a stupid question on its face and answering it only legitimizes it.

1st, who said tariffs are a legitimate economic tool?
2nd, who said the United States is in any position to decide what is fair regarding currency when it has the FED?
3rd, is not China a sovereign nation? So, what right does the United States have to dictate anything China does?
4th, what is wrong with the way things are now, or is this some political ploy to create an enemy to keep the incumbent party in power?
 
Re: Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?

Of course it could. But do you honestly think that'll happen? Afterall, how do you think China received "most favored nation" status? Contributions to U.S. politicians that's how. And with the Supreme Court's recent decision allowing coporations and foreign interests to contribute to candidates, no way corrupt legislators are gonna even suggest imposing tariffs. :hmm:
 
Re: Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?

<font size="5"><center>
The recession was made in China</font size></center>



0023ae5d932f0b46365201.jpg

A view of Shanghai's financial district. China is booming at the expense
of the U.S., David Frum says


cable news network
By David Frum,
CNN Contributor
October 11, 201


<font size="3">The Financial Times reported Sunday that "global economic co-operation is in disarray and further battles in the currency war look likely after the weekend's meetings of finance ministers and central bankers end with no resolution."</font size>

The rancorous meeting took place here in Washington, in the sleek headquarters of the International Monetary Fund. The ministers and bankers had gathered to settle a big dispute over interest rates and currency between the United States and China.

  • China thinks U.S. interest rates are too low, and the U.S. dollar too cheap.

  • America argues the contrary: It is China's currency that is out of line.

Many influential Americans share the Chinese point of view:
Thomas Hoenig, head of the Kansas City Federal Reserve, has strongly argued for higher U.S. rates to prevent future inflation. The Hoenig view is endorsed by prominent financial commentators, such as CNBC's Larry Kudlow and the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal.​

But this is one case where the conventional wisdom in America is right.
In fact, the conventional wisdom does not go nearly far enough.

We all can see the responsibility of Wall Street and the U.S. mortgage market for today's global recession. Yet behind both is a more fundamental cause: China's financial rise. As much as the products in the aisles at Wal-Mart, this recession was made in China.

China earns its living by selling to the United States. In recent years, it has sold more and more: China's exports doubled in the 1990s. In the 2000s, they doubled -- twice. And of course far and away the biggest market for Chinese goods was the United States.

Economists would expect that China's huge trade surpluses with the U.S. must sooner or later cancel themselves out. It's basic supply and demand.

1) China sells us more than it buys.

2) Therefore China accumulates dollars.

3) Therefore China spends the dollars.

4) Therefore the dollar declines relative to Chinese currency.

5) Therefore Chinese goods become more expensive.

6) Therefore Americans buy less from China and sell more.

7) Therefore the trade surplus ends. It's all beautifully self-regulating.​

The trouble with the theory is that in China's case, step 3) does not happen.

To keep China's population working -- and to stop China's population from protesting -- the Chinese government must keep the exports moving. To keep the exports moving, China must keep the currency cheap. To keep the currency cheap, China manipulates its banking system so the accumulated surplus dollars never get spent.

Instead, the Chinese lent the dollars back to us. And because the Chinese had so many dollars, they lent the dollars very, very cheaply.​

You got a fabulous deal on your mortgage because China's workers were prevented from spending the money they had earned.

This process accelerated through the 2000s, but it went into hyperdrive in 2005, when China's trade surplus abruptly spiked. Bigger surplus, more dollars, more lending. 2005 was the year the subprime mortgage boom began.

China's lending spree translated into an American debt binge. The debt of the U.S. nongovernmental sector surged after 2005 to levels last seen in -- uh oh -- 1929. And from the top of the roller coaster, it's a long, scary ride back to Earth.

The U.S. Federal Reserve has tried to cushion the pain of the Great Recession by cutting interest rates to zero. But those low interest rates have done an interesting thing: They have turned the tables on the Chinese.

Zero interest rates in the U.S. are pushing down the value of the U.S. dollar against every world currency. A dollar bought about 110 yen in the summer of 2008. A dollar now buys 83 yen.

The Chinese government has fiercely resisted a corresponding decline in Chinese currency. But that resistance has nasty internal effects for China.

As America prints more and more money to prevent deflation, China must (if it wants to sustain the dollar-renminbi parity) print equal money -- risking inflation. The excess cash that once triggered a housing bubble in the U.S. is now sloshing back into China, creating an even more horrifying housing bubble in China's big cities. China has been placed back where we were in 2005.

China faces two main policy options.

One would be to accept the need to stop Chinese inflation and allow its currency to rise -- accepting reduced exports and employment in China.

The other? Continue manipulating the currency to sustain Chinese exports and employment -- and accept accelerating inflation and probably an ultimate crash.

If China's finance ministers and bankers are yelling at Americans at the IMF, it is not because Americans are wastrels and spendthrifts. It is because China wants us to subject the American population to more economic pain to redress a problem the Chinese themselves have created for the world and for us.

Nuts to that. Let 'em howl.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of David Frum.


http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-11/...ency-china-chinese-government/2?_s=PM:OPINION
 
Re: Could tariffs force China to play fair with its currency?

Man, I hate this question.

Could tariffs FORCE China to play fair with ITS currency?

This question embodies so much arrogance, presumptuousness, condescension, and entitlement in so few words, it amazes me that it would ever be asked in public.

It betrays such a casual contempt for the natural order, that it is not difficult to see why the asker is doomed to fail.
 
Currency Wars: How Ben Bernanke Outsmarted China See full article from DailyFinance:

Currency Wars: How Ben Bernanke Outsmarted China
By CHARLES WALLACE Posted 11:00 AM 01/24/11 Economy, Currency

In the currency wars with China, the U.S. seems to be winning: The yuan has appreciated
For years, U.S. officials have ritually complained that China's currency is undervalued and that the country should let it appreciate. But President Obama soft-pedaled the problem at the White House summit with President Hu Jintao last week.

Why? Washington is quietly celebrating that fact that Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has outsmarted the Chinese government, forcing it to revalue its currency or face increasing domestic unrest.

"No U.S. official will admit this, but Bernanke has succeeded in breaking the Bank of China in the same way George Soros broke the Bank of England in 1992," says James Rickards, senior managing director for merchant bank Tangent Capital in New York. "The U.S. has won the first round of the currency war."

He adds: "People forget that one of the factors that caused the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 was popular discontent with inflation, and the Chinese leadership doesn't want anything like that."

China Gets "Hot Money"

How did Bernanke pull off the magic trick that previous U.S. administrations were unable to accomplish? Last fall, he announced a program of quantitative easing -- a federal bond-buying program -- which was targeted, he said, at raising U.S. inflation to head off possible deflation.

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But in reality, it had a completely different result: Money poured out of the U.S. and flowed into China. According to Adam Wolfe, research analyst at Roubini Global Economics, the amount of so-called hot money entering China reached $1 billion a day in 2010.

Coming on top of China's massive trade surplus, those inflows presented a dilemma for the Bank of China. In order to maintain its exchange rate with the U.S. dollar, which was fixed after 2008, the Chinese government bought dollars from exporters and banks and printed local yuan for each dollar it purchased.

But last fall, the supply of yuan skyrocketed, increasing by 19.7% in December, Wolfe says. Increasing the money supply causes prices to increase as more money chases fewer products. Chinese inflation had ramped up 4.9% in November, compared with the same month in 2009.

Two Available Options

China has attempted to keep a lid on prices by cooling the economy, raising interest rates twice last autumn. But that prescription has failed. According to fourth-quarter GDP figures, the economy grew by 9.8%, raising the likelihood that the Beijing government will have to slam even harder on the economic brakes.

It has just two ways to limit prices: impose price controls or raise the value of the yuan, which reduces the price of imports. Price controls rarely work for more than a short time because people find ways around them, such as the black market.

It now seems likely the Chinese will opt for raising the yuan's value. Since last June, the currency has appreciated about 3.5%, or an annual rate of about 7%. When you add inflation, that's 12%. Wolfe says he expects the same level of appreciation for 2011, while Rickards says he sees the yuan rising by at least 10%.

For investors, the yuan is a good one-way bet because it's highly unlikely to come down anytime soon.

China might feel some resentment about its position. "The Chinese feel betrayed by the U. S.," Rickards says. "They feel that part of the deal for buying all those Treasurys was that the U.S. would maintain the value of the dollar. There's an old saying, 'if you're in a poker game and you don't know who the sucker is, then you're the sucker. The Chinese have just woken up to the fact that they're the sucker."

See full article from DailyFinance: http://srph.it/fvfScv

11:00 AM 01/24/11 Economy, Currency
 
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