Top Secret America

SPECTRE1

SE for CI, Terrorism, Revenge, Extortion
Registered
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/

The Post investigation uncovered what amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America created since 9/11 that is hidden from public view, lacking in thorough oversight and so unwieldy that its effectiveness is impossible to determine.

It is also a system in which contractors are playing an ever more important role. The Post estimates that out of 854,000 people with top-secret clearances, 265,000 are contractors. There is no better example of the government's dependency on them than at the CIA, the one place in government that exists to do things overseas that no other U.S. agency is allowed to do.

Private contractors working for the CIA have recruited spies in Iraq, paid bribes for information in Afghanistan and protected CIA directors visiting world capitals. Contractors have helped snatch a suspected extremist off the streets of Italy, interrogated detainees once held at secret prisons abroad and watched over defectors holed up in the Washington suburbs. At Langley headquarters, they analyze terrorist networks. At the agency's training facility in Virginia, they are helping mold a new generation of American spies.

Through the federal budget process, the George W. Bush administration and Congress made it much easier for the CIA and other agencies involved in counterterrorism to hire more contractors than civil servants. They did this to limit the size of the permanent workforce, to hire employees more quickly than the sluggish federal process allows and because they thought - wrongly, it turned out - that contractors would be less expensive.

Nine years later, well into the Obama administration, the idea that contractors cost less has been repudiated, and the administration has made some progress toward its goal of reducing the number of hired hands by 7 percent over two years. Still, close to 30 percent of the workforce in the intelligence agencies is contractors.

"For too long, we've depended on contractors to do the operational work that ought to be done" by CIA employees, Panetta said. But replacing them "doesn't happen overnight. When you've been dependent on contractors for so long, you have to build that expertise over time."

A second concern of Panetta's: contracting with corporations, whose responsibility "is to their shareholders, and that does present an inherent conflict."

Or as Gates, who has been in and out of government his entire life, puts it: "You want somebody who's really in it for a career because they're passionate about it and because they care about the country and not just because of the money."

Contractors can offer more money - often twice as much - to experienced federal employees than the government is allowed to pay them. And because competition among firms for people with security clearances is so great, corporations offer such perks as BMWs and $15,000 signing bonuses, as Raytheon did in June for software developers with top-level clearances.

The idea that the government would save money on a contract workforce "is a false economy," said Mark M. Lowenthal, a former senior CIA official and now president of his own intelligence training academy.

As companies raid federal agencies of talent, the government has been left with the youngest intelligence staffs ever while more experienced employees move into the private sector. This is true at the CIA, where employees from 114 firms account for roughly a third of the workforce, or about 10,000 positions. Many of them are temporary hires, often former military or intelligence agency employees who left government service to work less and earn more while drawing a federal pension.

Across the government, such workers are used in every conceivable way.

Contractors kill enemy fighters. They spy on foreign governments and eavesdrop on terrorist networks. They help craft war plans. They gather information on local factions in war zones. They are the historians, the architects, the recruiters in the nation's most secretive agencies. They staff watch centers across the Washington area. They are among the most trusted advisers to the four-star generals leading the nation's wars.
 
Why Top Secret America should be a Pulitzer candidate

Last week, I promised to offer a few reactions to the Washington Post series on "Top Secret America," which deserves to be on everybody's short list for the Pulitzer Prize. In a brilliant piece of investigative journalism, reporters Dana Priest and William Arkin uncovered the vast expansion of the U.S. "intelligence" industry since 9/11, and suggest that this largely-unknown array of secret agencies and private contractors is expensive, frequently unaccountable, often dysfunctional, and nearly impossible to rein in.

Talk about previously "unknown unknowns!"

My first thought, of course, was "Osama wins again!" It's hardly a fresh insight to observe that we've done more damage to ourselves since 9/11 than Osama and his murderous band of misguided criminals ever did, and the Post article suggests that this bloated bureaucratic excess is yet another self-inflicted wound. Not only have we spent billions of dollars that might have been devoted to more constructive purposes, but we seem to have created an intelligence system that may be even less effective than the imperfect one we had before. I can't decide if it's just the intelligence equivalent of the "Sorcerer's Apprentice," or maybe a real-world manifestation of Terry Gilliam's Brazil. Either way, it ain't good.

One problem, of course, is that the very nature of top-secret agencies makes it very difficult to hold them accountable. If you don't know how much they actually cost and you don't know exactly what they are collecting, analyzing, or doing, then there's no way to do a proper cost-benefit analysis. Although it is our taxes that fund these agencies and our own security that is ultimately at stake, these super-secret agencies are basically saying to all of us: "Trust me!" Some of you may think Congressional oversight is sufficient to deal with this problem, but the track record in the past is disheartening, and Priest and Arkin's account isn't reassuring about the current state of affairs. On the contrary, they suggest that the people in charge of these various agencies have at-best imperfect knowledge of what they are actually doing, which makes it hard to believe that the designated Congressional watchdogs are doing their jobs either.

To make matters worse, the system they depict gives the participants (and especially those private contractors) an obvious incentive to hype threats, both to cover their bureaucratic tails and to justify their own existence and profits. Nobody wants to be caught downplaying a possible danger (which would be embarrassing later on), and suggesting that a potential threat might not be that serious is a good way to get your budget cut. As one of the sources quoted by Priest and Arkin put it, the post-9/11 intelligence maze has become a "self-licking ice cream cone," and the overall effect will be to make the world's most powerful and secure country even more paranoid than before. And when everyone in the system has an incentive to maximize dangers, the whole apparatus gets drowned in more data than it can absorb and assess.

The larger problem, it seems to me, is trying to get better intelligence by throwing billions of dollars at the problem and by recruiting thousands of new analysts is like trying to write Shakespeare by putting a million chimpanzees at computer keyboards and letting them type forever. One of them might eventually produce a decent sonnet, but mostly you'll get a lot of gibberish that nobody has time to read, vet, or evaluate.

It isn't the volume of data that we collect that matters, it is the insight, knowledge, analytical ability, and good judgment of the people who are assessing it. I would rather have a relatively small number of very smart, well-trained, and independent-minded people working on critical intelligence problems than hundreds or thousands of inexperienced and poorly-trained "analysts" who were mostly looking to make a buck.

And you may rest assured this problem isn't going to go away. Conservatives have long complained that government agencies are virtually impossible to kill once they are established (a position for which I have some sympathy), and that means that we are going to be wrestling with this unwieldy bureaucratic behemoth for decades to come. Indeed, as noted above, getting it under control is likely to be even more difficult with other government agencies, because those in charge can classify the information needed to evaluate them properly and thus keep it out of the public eye.

Finally, we shouldn't lose sight of the taproot of this whole problem. The expansion of "Top Secret America" was a direct response to the 9/11 attacks. As the 9/11 Commission Report and other independent studies have confirmed, the motivation for those attacks was al Qaeda's anger at America's entire Middle East policy, including our intimate ties to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the stationing of U.S. air and ground forces in the Gulf as part of "dual containment," and our unconditional support for Israel. To say this does not excuse what Obama bin Laden and his murderous associates did, of course, it just reminds us that the money we have spent, are spending, and will continue to spend on "Top Secret America" is part of the price we pay for those policies. Some Americans undoubtedly think the price is worth it and that these policies shouldn't change. Others disagree, and believe that a different approach would help marginalize terrorist organizations, undermine their recruiting ability, and allow the United States to gradually rebuild a positive relationship with many of these societies. Whatever position you take on that issue, the one thing you shouldn't do is deny that there is a price for our current approach. Thanks to Priest and Arkin, we now know that it's even bigger than we thought.

Postscript: The Priest and Arkin series also reminds us why we need a large and profitable mainstream media industry. Many bloggers (including me) are quick to criticize mainstream media organizations for their various shortcomings, but we shouldn't forget that this sort of investigative journalism takes time and money and there are few if any bloggers who could have produced something similar to the Post series. If these organizations succumb to market forces and are not replaced by news organizations with an ethos that prizes truth and sufficient resources to ferret it out, our ability to know what is really going on in the world will be diminished and the informed debate that is essential to democracy will be further imperiled.

LINK

Top Secret America Washington Post Page
LINK

<script type="text/javascript" src="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/js/pap/embed.js?frol02n4186qf18"></script>
 
Pulitzer?

The article didn't expose anything that wasn't known, pointed out that a bunch of money was being spent on intelligence and contractors are being used. Every agency in the government is using a bunch of high paid contractors, based on the incompetence of management in government, they need outside people to help

The Washington Post should get a Pulitzer when they uncover the obvious domestic surveillance going on. There is domestic surveillance being performed if you are red flagged for certain activities, doesn't have to be related to terrorism (engaging in a lawsuit of a business). There also appears to be unaffiliated/unofficial informants, that report on your activities, to some front organization like the Stasi (East Germany) had millions of unofficial informers. Red flagged? prepare for the following:

1. All Financial Activities
2. Internet Activity
3. Cellphone/Smartphone
4. Mail (Sender Information)
5. Credit Report
6. Business and Government Agencies are Alerted and share information on your Activities.
7. Unofficial informants, paid money through employment opportunities, money, or promotions based on info. Makes it difficult to link this person to any organization or group. Gaining, Sustaining Employment is used to turn people into unofficial informers. Watch out for people wanting to hang all the time and talk.
8. Police (Security Guards for Corporations) collect information and target you for harassment. Aggressively look for opportunities to charge you with a crime.
9. Collect extensive information from people that know you to attempt to dig up dirt, discredit you
10. Aggregate information into a secret file and share
11. Sneak and Peek in your house or car
12. Backdoor, Keylogger software on your computer for monitoring
13. Disinformation
14. Suspicious car crashes
15. GPS tracking

Think I am joking? I have experienced all of them...

God knows what these secrets sites are doing, which the Washington Post never uncovered, there is no civilian oversight of their activity. It can't be all related to terrorism.

Emblema_Stasi.svg
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stasi

Check out some of these front organization:

http://www.infragard.net/
http://www.uschamber.com/
 
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If I tried to tell you before Watergate, the president was authorizing break-ins, people would think you are nuts. We know how that turned out....

The government won't help you either, the Obama administration was openly trying to expand its powers to get transactional data from the website you visited, and many other areas. Google CEO was saying there is no expectation of privacy on the internet, it is okay to collect information on you and share it for whatever reasons. Finally, there is no criminal laws protecting the privacy of your banking transactions, the information can be shared freely with other people to track you around. I have seen spooks pop out as soon as I swipe my card to buy something, don't know who they were connected with.

Look at what Chevron tried to do; turn this reporter with money into an informant, send her down posing as an independent journalist and report pro-Chevron news for PR reasons. She told them to get lost. They probably found another reporter desperate for money and paid them off.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/08/a-spy-in-the-jungle/60770/
 
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Thanks for the info and articles Pro. Very interesting read. I actually thought about becoming a CIA agent when I graduated from undergrad, but never went through with it. I guess that was a good thing...
 
http://www.infragard.net/

InfraGard is an information sharing and analysis effort serving the interests and combining the knowledge base of a wide range of members. At its most basic level, InfraGard is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the private sector. InfraGard is an association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the United States. InfraGard Chapters are geographically linked with FBI Field Office territories.
 
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US govt secretly collecting data on millions of Verizon users: Report

US govt secretly collecting data on millions of Verizon users: Report
By Olivier Knox, Yahoo! News | The Ticket
1 hr 21 mins ago

Can you hear me now? Eep. The National Security Agency (NSA) has been collecting telephone records of millions of Verizon customers – right down to local call data – under a top-secret court order issued in April, Britain’s The Guardian newspaper reported late Wednesday.

Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order, the Guardian reported, Verizon Business Services must provide the NSA “on an ongoing daily basis” with information from calls between the U.S. and overseas – but also with calls entirely inside the United States. Calls made entirely overseas were not affected. It was unclear whether phones in other Verizon divisions -- its regular cell phone operations, for instance -- were similarly targeted.

Guardian writer Glenn Greenwald, a frequent and fierce critic of the national security state’s expansion since 9-11, writes in his bombshell report that:

The document shows for the first time that under the Obama administration the communication records of millions of US citizens are being collected indiscriminately and in bulk – regardless of whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing.​

The order, issued April 25 and valid through July 19, requires Verizon to turn over the numbers of both parties, location data, call duration, and other information – though not the contents of the calls.

Judge Roger Vinson’s order relies on Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. That part of the law, also known as the “business records provision,” permits FBI agents to seek a court order for “any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)” it deems relevant to an investigation.

Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon, who sits on the Senate Intelligence Committee, has repeatedly sounded the alarm about the way the government interprets that provision -- though he is sharply limited in what he can say about classified information. Wyden and Democratic Sen. Mark Udall of Colorado, another committee member, wrote a scathing letter to Attorney General Eric Holder in Sept. 2011 warning that Americans would be "stunned" if they learned what the government was doing.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) denounced the scope of the surveillance. "It’s analogous to the FBI stationing an agent outside every home in the country to track who goes in and who comes out," said Jameel Jaffer, ACLU Deputy Legal Director. The organization's Legislative Counsel, Michelle Richardson, bluntly branded the surveillance "unconstitutional" and insisted that "the government should end it and disclose its full scope, and Congress should initiate a full investigation."

The White House declined to comment -- but former vice president Al Gore, on Twitter, sharply condemned the government's actions:

In digital era, privacy must be a priority. Is it just me, or is secret blanket surveillance obscenely outrageous? ow.ly/lKS13
— Al Gore (@algore) June 6, 2013​

http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/...ng-data-millions-verizon-users-013542225.html
 
Driving somewhere? There's a gov't record of that

Driving somewhere? There's a gov't record of that
By ANNE FLAHERTY | Associated Press
10 mins ago

WASHINGTON (AP) — Chances are, your local or state police departments have photographs of your car in their files, noting where you were driving on a particular day, even if you never did anything wrong.

Using automated scanners, law enforcement agencies across the country have amassed millions of digital records on the location and movement of every vehicle with a license plate, according to a study published Wednesday by the American Civil Liberties Union. Affixed to police cars, bridges or buildings, the scanners capture images of passing or parked vehicles and note their location, uploading that information into police databases. Departments keep the records for weeks or years, sometimes indefinitely.

As the technology becomes cheaper and more ubiquitous, and federal grants focus on aiding local terrorist detection, even small police agencies are able to deploy more sophisticated surveillance systems. While the Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that a judge's approval is needed to track a car with GPS, networks of plate scanners allow police effectively to track a driver's location, sometimes several times every day, with few legal restrictions. The ACLU says the scanners assemble what it calls a "single, high-resolution image of our lives."

"There's just a fundamental question of whether we're going to live in a society where these dragnet surveillance systems become routine," said Catherine Crump, a staff attorney with the ACLU. The civil rights group is proposing that police departments immediately delete any records of cars not linked to a crime.

Law enforcement officials said the scanners can be crucial to tracking suspicious cars, aiding drug busts and finding abducted children. License plate scanners also can be efficient. The state of Maryland told the ACLU that troopers could "maintain a normal patrol stance" while capturing up to 7,000 license plate images in a single eight hour shift.

"At a time of fiscal and budget constraints, we need better assistance for law enforcement," said Harvey Eisenberg, chief of the national security section and assistant U.S. attorney in Maryland.

Law enforcement officials also point out that the technology is legal in most cases, automating a practice that's been done for years. The ACLU found that only five states have laws governing license plate readers. New Hampshire, for example, bans the technology except in narrow circumstances, while Maine and Arkansas limit how long plate information can be stored.

"There's no expectation of privacy" for a vehicle driving on a public road or parked in a public place, said Lt. Bill Hedgpeth, a spokesman for the Mesquite Police Department in Texas, which has records stretching back to 2008, although the city plans next month to begin deleting files older than two years. "It's just a vehicle. It's just a license plate."

In Yonkers, N.Y., just north of the Bronx, police said retaining the information indefinitely helps detectives solve future crimes. In a statement, the department said it uses license plate readers as a "reactive investigative tool" that is only accessed if detectives are looking for a particular vehicle in connection to a crime.

"These plate readers are not intended nor used to follow the movements of members of the public," the department's statement said.

But even if law enforcement officials say they don't want a public location tracking system, the records add up quickly. In Jersey City, N.J., for example, the population is only 250,000 but the city collected more than 2 million plate images on file. Because the city keeps records for five years, the ACLU estimates that it has some 10 million on file, making it possible for police to plot the movements of most residents depending upon the number and location of the scanners, according to the ACLU.

The ACLU study, based on 26,000 pages of responses from 293 police departments and state agencies across the country, also found that license plate scanners produced a small fraction of "hits," or alerts to police that a suspicious vehicle has been found. In Maryland, for example, the state reported reading about 29 million plates between January and May of last year. Of that amount, about 60,000 — or roughly 1 in every 500 license plates — were suspicious. The No. 1 crime? A suspended or revoked registration, or a violation of the state's emissions inspection program accounted for 97 percent of all alerts.

Eisenberg, the assistant U.S. attorney, said the numbers "fail to show the real qualitative assistance to public safety and law enforcement." He points to the 132 wanted suspects the program helped track. They were a small fraction of the 29 million plates read, but he said tracking those suspects can be critical to keeping an area safe.

Also, he said, Maryland has rules in place restricting access for criminal investigations only. Most records are retained for one year in Maryland, and the state's privacy policies are reviewed by an independent board, Eisenberg noted.

At least in Maryland, "there are checks, and there are balances," Eisenberg said.

http://news.yahoo.com/driving-somewhere-theres-govt-record-140052644.html
 
Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans

Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans
By John Shiffman and Kristina Cooke
WASHINGTON | Mon Aug 5, 2013 3:25pm EDT

(Reuters) - A secretive U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration unit is funneling information from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants and a massive database of telephone records to authorities across the nation to help them launch criminal investigations of Americans.

Although these cases rarely involve national security issues, documents reviewed by Reuters show that law enforcement agents have been directed to conceal how such investigations truly begin - not only from defense lawyers but also sometimes from prosecutors and judges.

The undated documents show that federal agents are trained to "recreate" the investigative trail to effectively cover up where the information originated, a practice that some experts say violates a defendant's Constitutional right to a fair trial. If defendants don't know how an investigation began, they cannot know to ask to review potential sources of exculpatory evidence - information that could reveal entrapment, mistakes or biased witnesses.

"I have never heard of anything like this at all," said Nancy Gertner, a Harvard Law School professor who served as a federal judge from 1994 to 2011. Gertner and other legal experts said the program sounds more troubling than recent disclosures that the National Security Agency has been collecting domestic phone records. The NSA effort is geared toward stopping terrorists; the DEA program targets common criminals, primarily drug dealers.

"It is one thing to create special rules for national security," Gertner said. "Ordinary crime is entirely different. It sounds like they are phonying up investigations."

THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

The unit of the DEA that distributes the information is called the Special Operations Division, or SOD. Two dozen partner agencies comprise the unit, including the FBI, CIA, NSA, Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Homeland Security. It was created in 1994 to combat Latin American drug cartels and has grown from several dozen employees to several hundred.

Today, much of the SOD's work is classified, and officials asked that its precise location in Virginia not be revealed. The documents reviewed by Reuters are marked "Law Enforcement Sensitive," a government categorization that is meant to keep them confidential.

"Remember that the utilization of SOD cannot be revealed or discussed in any investigative function," a document presented to agents reads. The document specifically directs agents to omit the SOD's involvement from investigative reports, affidavits, discussions with prosecutors and courtroom testimony. Agents are instructed to then use "normal investigative techniques to recreate the information provided by SOD."

A spokesman with the Department of Justice, which oversees the DEA, declined to comment.

But two senior DEA officials defended the program, and said trying to "recreate" an investigative trail is not only legal but a technique that is used almost daily.

A former federal agent in the northeastern United States who received such tips from SOD described the process. "You'd be told only, ‘Be at a certain truck stop at a certain time and look for a certain vehicle.' And so we'd alert the state police to find an excuse to stop that vehicle, and then have a drug dog search it," the agent said.

"PARALLEL CONSTRUCTION"

After an arrest was made, agents then pretended that their investigation began with the traffic stop, not with the SOD tip, the former agent said. The training document reviewed by Reuters refers to this process as "parallel construction."

The two senior DEA officials, who spoke on behalf of the agency but only on condition of anonymity, said the process is kept secret to protect sources and investigative methods. "Parallel construction is a law enforcement technique we use every day," one official said. "It's decades old, a bedrock concept."

A dozen current or former federal agents interviewed by Reuters confirmed they had used parallel construction during their careers. Most defended the practice; some said they understood why those outside law enforcement might be concerned.

"It's just like laundering money - you work it backwards to make it clean," said Finn Selander, a DEA agent from 1991 to 2008 and now a member of a group called Law Enforcement Against Prohibition, which advocates legalizing and regulating narcotics.

Some defense lawyers and former prosecutors said that using "parallel construction" may be legal to establish probable cause for an arrest. But they said employing the practice as a means of disguising how an investigation began may violate pretrial discovery rules by burying evidence that could prove useful to criminal defendants.

A QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

"That's outrageous," said Tampa attorney James Felman, a vice chairman of the criminal justice section of the American Bar Association. "It strikes me as indefensible."

Lawrence Lustberg, a New Jersey defense lawyer, said any systematic government effort to conceal the circumstances under which cases begin "would not only be alarming but pretty blatantly unconstitutional."

Lustberg and others said the government's use of the SOD program skirts established court procedures by which judges privately examine sensitive information, such as an informant's identity or classified evidence, to determine whether the information is relevant to the defense.

"You can't game the system," said former federal prosecutor Henry E. Hockeimer Jr. "You can't create this subterfuge. These are drug crimes, not national security cases. If you don't draw the line here, where do you draw it?"

Some lawyers say there can be legitimate reasons for not revealing sources. Robert Spelke, a former prosecutor who spent seven years as a senior DEA lawyer, said some sources are classified. But he also said there are few reasons why unclassified evidence should be concealed at trial.

"It's a balancing act, and they've doing it this way for years," Spelke said. "Do I think it's a good way to do it? No, because now that I'm a defense lawyer, I see how difficult it is to challenge."

CONCEALING A TIP

One current federal prosecutor learned how agents were using SOD tips after a drug agent misled him, the prosecutor told Reuters. In a Florida drug case he was handling, the prosecutor said, a DEA agent told him the investigation of a U.S. citizen began with a tip from an informant. When the prosecutor pressed for more information, he said, a DEA supervisor intervened and revealed that the tip had actually come through the SOD and from an NSA intercept.

"I was pissed," the prosecutor said. "Lying about where the information came from is a bad start if you're trying to comply with the law because it can lead to all kinds of problems with discovery and candor to the court." The prosecutor never filed charges in the case because he lost confidence in the investigation, he said.

A senior DEA official said he was not aware of the case but said the agent should not have misled the prosecutor. How often such misdirection occurs is unknown, even to the government; the DEA official said the agency does not track what happens with tips after the SOD sends them to agents in the field.

The SOD's role providing information to agents isn't itself a secret. It is briefly mentioned by the DEA in budget documents, albeit without any reference to how that information is used or represented when cases go to court.

The DEA has long publicly touted the SOD's role in multi-jurisdictional and international investigations, connecting agents in separate cities who may be unwittingly investigating the same target and making sure undercover agents don't accidentally try to arrest each other.

SOD'S BIG SUCCESSES

The unit also played a major role in a 2008 DEA sting in Thailand against Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout; he was sentenced in 2011 to 25 years in prison on charges of conspiring to sell weapons to the Colombian rebel group FARC. The SOD also recently coordinated Project Synergy, a crackdown against manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of synthetic designer drugs that spanned 35 states and resulted in 227 arrests.

Since its inception, the SOD's mandate has expanded to include narco-terrorism, organized crime and gangs. A DEA spokesman declined to comment on the unit's annual budget. A recent LinkedIn posting on the personal page of a senior SOD official estimated it to be $125 million.

Today, the SOD offers at least three services to federal, state and local law enforcement agents: coordinating international investigations such as the Bout case; distributing tips from overseas NSA intercepts, informants, foreign law enforcement partners and domestic wiretaps; and circulating tips from a massive database known as DICE.

The DICE database contains about 1 billion records, the senior DEA officials said. The majority of the records consist of phone log and Internet data gathered legally by the DEA through subpoenas, arrests and search warrants nationwide. Records are kept for about a year and then purged, the DEA officials said.

About 10,000 federal, state and local law enforcement agents have access to the DICE database, records show. They can query it to try to link otherwise disparate clues. Recently, one of the DEA officials said, DICE linked a man who tried to smuggle $100,000 over the U.S. southwest border to a major drug case on the East Coast.

"We use it to connect the dots," the official said.

"AN AMAZING TOOL"

Wiretap tips forwarded by the SOD usually come from foreign governments, U.S. intelligence agencies or court-authorized domestic phone recordings. Because warrantless eavesdropping on Americans is illegal, tips from intelligence agencies are generally not forwarded to the SOD until a caller's citizenship can be verified, according to one senior law enforcement official and one former U.S. military intelligence analyst.

"They do a pretty good job of screening, but it can be a struggle to know for sure whether the person on a wiretap is American," the senior law enforcement official said.

Tips from domestic wiretaps typically occur when agents use information gleaned from a court-ordered wiretap in one case to start a second investigation.

As a practical matter, law enforcement agents said they usually don't worry that SOD's involvement will be exposed in court. That's because most drug-trafficking defendants plead guilty before trial and therefore never request to see the evidence against them. If cases did go to trial, current and former agents said, charges were sometimes dropped to avoid the risk of exposing SOD involvement.

Current and former federal agents said SOD tips aren't always helpful - one estimated their accuracy at 60 percent. But current and former agents said tips have enabled them to catch drug smugglers who might have gotten away.

"It was an amazing tool," said one recently retired federal agent. "Our big fear was that it wouldn't stay secret."

DEA officials said that the SOD process has been reviewed internally. They declined to provide Reuters with a copy of their most recent review.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805
 
Report: Obama brings chilling effect on journalism

Report: Obama brings chilling effect on journalism
By BRETT ZONGKER | Associated Press
1 hr 31 mins ago

WASHINGTON (AP) — The U.S. government's aggressive prosecution of leaks and efforts to control information are having a chilling effect on journalists and government whistle-blowers, according to a report released Thursday on U.S. press freedoms under the Obama administration.

The Committee to Protect Journalists conducted its first examination of U.S. press freedoms amid the Obama administration's unprecedented number of prosecutions of government sources and seizures of journalists' records. Usually the group focuses on advocating for press freedoms abroad.

Leonard Downie Jr., a former executive editor of The Washington Post, wrote the 30-page analysis entitled "The Obama Administration and the Press." The report notes President Barack Obama came into office pledging an open, transparent government after criticizing the Bush administration's secrecy, "but he has fallen short of his promise."

"In the Obama administration's Washington, government officials are increasingly afraid to talk to the press," wrote Downie, now a journalism professor at Arizona State University. "The administration's war on leaks and other efforts to control information are the most aggressive I've seen since the Nixon administration, when I was one of the editors involved in The Washington Post's investigation of Watergate."

Downie interviewed numerous reporters and editors, including a top editor at The Associated Press, following revelations this year that the government secretly seized records for telephone lines and switchboards used by more than 100 AP journalists. Downie also interviewed journalists whose sources have been prosecuted on felony charges
Those suspected of discussing classified information are increasingly subject to investigation, lie-detector tests, scrutiny of telephone and email records and now surveillance by co-workers under a new "Insider Threat Program" that has been implemented in every agency.

"There's no question that sources are looking over their shoulders," Michael Oreskes, the AP's senior managing editor, told Downie. "Sources are more jittery and more standoffish, not just in national security reporting. A lot of skittishness is at the more routine level. The Obama administration has been extremely controlling and extremely resistant to journalistic intervention."

To bypass journalists, the White House developed its own network of websites, social media and even created an online newscast to dispense favorable information and images. In some cases, the White House produces videos of the president's meetings with major figures that were never listed on his public schedule. Instead, they were kept secret — a departure from past administrations, the report noted.

Frank Sesno, a former CNN Washington bureau chief who is now director of George Washington University's School of Media and Public Affairs, told Downie the combined efforts of the Obama administration are "squeezing the flow of information."

"Open dialogue with the public without filters is good, but if used for propaganda and to avoid contact with journalists, it's a slippery slope," Sesno said.

In the report, White House officials objected to findings that the administration has limited transparency or information. Press Secretary Jay Carney said such complaints are part of the "natural tension" between the White House and the press.

"The idea that people are shutting up and not leaking to reporters is belied by the facts," Carney told Downie.

National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said there is still investigative reporting about national security issues with information from "nonsanctioned sources with lots of unclassified information and some sensitive information."

Downie found the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks were a "watershed moment," leading to increased secrecy, surveillance and control of information. There is little direct comparison between the Bush and Obama administrations, though some journalists told Downie the Obama administration exercises more control.

"Every administration learns from the previous administration," said CBS Chief Washington Correspondent Bob Schieffer. "They become more secretive and put tighter clamps on information."

Shortly after Obama entered office, the White House was under pressure from intelligence agencies and Congress to stop leaks of national security information. The administration's first prosecution for leaking information came in April 2009 after a Hebrew linguist working for the FBI gave a blogger classified information about Israel.

Other prosecutions followed, targeting some government employees who believed they were whistle-blowers. The administration has rejected whistle-blower claims if they do not involve "waste, fraud or abuse," according to report. So sources exposing questionable or illegal practices are considered leaks.

To date, six government employees and two contractors have been targeted for prosecution under the 1917 Espionage Act for accusations that they leaked classified information to the press. There were just three such prosecutions under all previous U.S. presidents.

By 2012, an AP report about the CIA's success in foiling a bomb plot in Yemen further escalated the Obama administration's efforts, even as the White House congratulated the CIA on the operation, Downie wrote. The disclosure in May that the government had secretly subpoenaed and seized AP phone records drew sharp criticism from many news organizations and civil rights advocates.

In September, the Justice Department announced AP's phone records led investigators to a former FBI bomb technician who pleaded guilty to disclosing the operation to a reporter.

"This prosecution demonstrates our deep resolve to hold accountable anyone who would violate their solemn duty to protect our nation's secrets and to prevent future, potentially devastating leaks by those who would wantonly ignore their obligations to safeguard classified information," the Justice Department said last month.

Kathleen Carroll, AP's executive editor, said the report highlights the growing threats to independent journalism in a country that has upheld press freedom as a measure of democratic society for two centuries.

"We find we must fight for those freedoms every day as the fog of secrecy descends on every level of government activity," she said in a statement. "That fight is worthwhile, as we learned when the outcry over the Justice Department's secret seizure of AP phone records led to proposed revisions intended to protect journalists from overly broad investigative techniques. Implementation of those revisions is an important next step."

In its report, the Committee to Protect Journalists recommends several reforms, including ending the practice of charging people who leak information to journalists with espionage and preventing secret subpoenas of journalists' records.

http://news.yahoo.com/report-obama-brings-chilling-effect-journalism-140240984.html
 
The Washington Post should get a Pulitzer when they uncover the obvious domestic surveillance going on. There is domestic surveillance being performed if you are red flagged for certain activities, doesn't have to be related to terrorism There also appears to be unaffiliated/unofficial informants, that report on your activities, to some front organization like the Stasi (East Germany) had millions of unofficial informers. Red flagged? prepare for the following:

1. All Financial Activities
2. Internet Activity
3. Cellphone/Smartphone
4. Mail (Sender Information)
5. Credit Report
6. Business and Government Agencies are Alerted and share information on your Activities.
7. Unofficial informants, paid money through employment opportunities, money, or promotions based on info. Makes it difficult to link this person to any organization or group. Gaining, Sustaining Employment is used to turn people into unofficial informers. Watch out for people wanting to hang all the time and talk.
12. Backdoor, Keylogger software on your computer for monitoring

I was talking about this crap in 2010 before Snowden came out about the NSA. At least we have a clue now on the agencies that are involved.

<iframe width="640" height="360" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/Z91NaF0kVLw" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>

I was just playing around with a video editor using this clip I had downloaded. It was published before the leaks on the NSA. Now that I look at it, it seemed I was being threatened, harassed by somebody who got nervous about somebody talking about a police state, NSA pictures, and surveillance.


My intuition on this police state created was that 9/11 was manufactured by the government by winding somebody up like Bin Laden (how many failed hits were attempted or using the Northern Alliance to let him go) to get an attack on U.S. soil, this is similar to WWII and Japan - Roosevelt wanted to get involved in the conflict. The internet was just starting to take off, one person could reach millions of people bypassing state controlled media outlets. The government wanted to have eyes and ears on this technology.

China imposed the great firewall to control information. Russia has the ability to monitor and block websites or change content. Other countries simply block access. The U.S. regrettable antagonize the Middle East and got a terror attack that was used to establish a police state.

If the NSA was caught without 9/11, than people would be going to prison, the motives of the government would look obvious. Now, the government can hide behind terrorism and looking to protect us.


Many governments are overthrown, just through coordination done on the internet alone.

:lol::lol::lol:
 
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Posted this on 6-4-2013, a couple of days later, the NSA affair came out. Maybe I was hitting a nerve, and people were getting nervous.

Since Bradley Manning trial is coming up, it is time to reflect on what happened. I believe the media should have access to classified information to expose government corruption, misconduct, and illegal surveillance. There should be a few people from the media that can undergo background checks and polygraphs similar to a contractor that is gaining access to this information.

If a person like Bradley Manning felt that classified information should be disclosed to the public than this information could be provided to these individuals without going to prison for the rest of his life. If these individuals with security clearances felt that this information should be disclosed to the public than they can petition a court for its release.

Nobody knows what the government is doing due to its ability to classify projects and incarcerate individuals if they speak to the media or release information to the public. In the past, the government has been caught intercepting Internet traffic and engaged in many other nefarious activities.

The government benefits because it does not have to obtain reporters telephone records since this secure process can be established. Classified information is less likely to go to a secretive offshore organization like WikiLeaks, without being thoroughly vetted to the courts.

:lol::lol::lol:
 
Re: Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans

Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up program used to investigate Americans
By John Shiffman and Kristina Cooke
WASHINGTON | Mon Aug 5, 2013 3:25pm EDT

(Reuters) - A secretive U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration unit is funneling information from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants and a massive database of telephone records to authorities across the nation to help them launch criminal investigations of Americans.

Although these cases rarely involve national security issues, documents reviewed by Reuters show that law enforcement agents have been directed to conceal how such investigations truly begin - not only from defense lawyers but also sometimes from prosecutors and judges.

The undated documents show that federal agents are trained to "recreate" the investigative trail to effectively cover up where the information originated, a practice that some experts say violates a defendant's Constitutional right to a fair trial. If defendants don't know how an investigation began, they cannot know to ask to review potential sources of exculpatory evidence - information that could reveal entrapment, mistakes or biased witnesses.

"I have never heard of anything like this at all," said Nancy Gertner, a Harvard Law School professor who served as a federal judge from 1994 to 2011. Gertner and other legal experts said the program sounds more troubling than recent disclosures that the National Security Agency has been collecting domestic phone records. The NSA effort is geared toward stopping terrorists; the DEA program targets common criminals, primarily drug dealers.

"It is one thing to create special rules for national security," Gertner said. "Ordinary crime is entirely different. It sounds like they are phonying up investigations."
Debate: Does Spying Keep Us Safe? (50:24)
by NPR STAFF
November 26, 2013 9:51 AM

The recent revelations about National Security Agency surveillance programs have renewed the debate over the balance between national security and civil liberties.

Some argue that mass electronic surveillance is vital to the fight against terrorism, even if it makes some people uneasy. But others say spying on vast numbers of innocent people is a violation of privacy, as well as a waste of security resources.

A team of experts recently faced off on the topic of mass electronic surveillance in an Oxford-style debate for Intelligence Squared U.S. They debated two against two on the motion "Spy On Me, I'd Rather Be Safe."

Those debating were:

FOR THE MOTION

Stewart Baker practices law at Steptoe & Johnson, covering homeland security, cybersecurity, data protection, encryption, lawful intercepts, intelligence and law enforcement issues, and foreign investment regulation. He is the author of Skating on Stilts – Why We Aren't Stopping Tomorrow's Terrorism, a book on the security challenges posed by technology, and he writes on cybersecurity and privacy law at skatingonstilts.com. From 2005 to 2009, Baker was the first assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security. During 2004 and 2005, Baker served as general counsel of the WMD Commission investigating intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war. From 1992 to 1994, he was general counsel of the National Security Agency, where he led NSA and interagency efforts to reform commercial encryption and computer security law and policy. His book on these topics, The Limits of Trust: Cryptography, Governments, and Electronic Commerce, analyzes encryption and authentication laws in dozens of countries.

Richard Falkenrath, deputy assistant to President Bush and former deputy homeland security adviser, has held a range of leadership positions in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The principal author of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, he served as senior director of policy and plans within the Office of Homeland Security after Sept. 11, 2001. From 2006 to 2010, he served as the New York City Police Department's deputy commissioner for counterterrorism, where he worked to strengthen the city's overall effort to prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. Falkenrath is now a principal at the Chertoff Group, a global security and risk-management advisory firm; an adjunct senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations; and a contributing editor at Bloomberg News.

AGAINST THE MOTION

David Cole is a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, a volunteer attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights, the legal affairs correspondent for The Nation, and a regular contributor to The New York Review of Books. He is the author of seven books, including the American Book Award-winning Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. He has litigated many significant constitutional cases in the Supreme Court, including Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, which extended First Amendment protection to flagburning, and, most recently, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which challenged the constitutionality of the statute prohibiting "material support" to terrorist groups. Cole has received numerous awards for his human rights work, including the inaugural Norman Dorsen Prize from the American Civil Liberties Union for lifetime commitment to civil liberties.

Michael German is the senior policy counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union's Washington Legislative Office, where he develops policy positions and strategies concerning national security and open government. Prior to joining the ACLU, he served for 16 years as a special agent with the FBI, where he specialized in domestic terrorism and covert operations. He also served as an adjunct professor for law enforcement and terrorism at the National Defense University and is a senior fellow with GlobalSecurity.org. German's first book, Thinking Like a Terrorist, was published in January 2007.

http://www.npr.org/2013/11/26/246774367/debate-does-spying-keep-us-safe
 
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Candidate Barack Obama used to say the Bush administration’s covert war on terror “should be dramatically reined in.” As Dana Priest remembers these olden days—some three ago—questions continue to swirl concerning the extent and costs of that war. As she and William Arkin pursued these questions for their Washington Post series and book, Top Secret America, they came to see how deeply post-9/11 America is immersed in secrets.

As the guide for Frontline‘s investigation, also titled Top Secret America, Priest is by turns informative, poised, and suitably horrified by what she’s found, the government’s escalation, its efforts not only to deceive and manipulate, but also to expand itself surreptitiously, and to claim power in the name of protecting others. Given that the intelligence community’s stated directive following 9/11 was to consolidate, to work together, and to share information in order to ensure that such an attack could never happen again—an attack that came as an apparent complete surprise to everyone in that community—it’s troubling that this end is nowhere in sight.

This secrecy, Frontline notes, is “key” to the plans formulated in the days after 9/11, mainly by the CIA’s Cofer Black. “All you need to know is there was a before 9/11 and there was an after 9/11,” he tells a congressional panel in archival footage, “Gloves come off.” Even as this secrecy became institutionalized—as agents and workers came to see their activities as secret by definition—the intelligence community has been transformed. It’s not that the CIA or the Defense Department Intelligence Agency (DIA) were new to this game. The changes involve size (the numbers of workers, technologies, and spaces used have grown exponentially) and also philosophy. That is, Top Secret America submits, secrecy is not only a means to an end so much as it seems a self-justifying mode of thought, a self-perpetuating process—with devastating effects. When Dick Cheney said the U.S. would “have to work the dark side, if you will,” he was laying out a rationale that would shape the objective. As Priest says, “I think the reality is that they wanted to keep it secret because they were doing things that a lot of people would not approve of and they wanted to do them as long as they could without being found out.”

Perhaps “they” needn’t have worried. For it appears that even as some of these distasteful and/or illegal “things” emerge, they’re able to keep doing them. Even if Top Secret America covers ground that will be familiar to viewers who have read the Post series or seen the 18 January Frontline, Are We Safer? The new Frontline includes pieces from the previous one, like Post photographer Michael Williamson’s interview concerning the building now housing intelligence offices: “It’s four stories high, but goes down 10 stories,” creating a “whole world, with of shops and places to eat, that’s just for them.” Such material reality speaks to a disturbing metaphor, that agents and workers are immersed in that “whole world,” removed from the rest of us. These spaces exist everywhere (that is, in 10,000 locations across the United States), says Richard Clarke. The program offers a map, and also a drive through DC, where, Clarke observes, the decision was made to “scatter it around so it fits into the fabric of metropolitan Washington,” where 33 building complexes have been built since 2001, making this system at once hidden and also pervasive.

While Are We Safer? asked an earnest question, Top Secret America asks how “safety” has come to be a business, subject to decisions by individuals with a stake in particular answers. Following the military-industrial complex identified by Dwight Eisenhower (and expanded to include corporate interests, with lobbyists, according to Eugene Jarecki’s film, Why We Fight), the new system turns to private contractors to get its work done. Priest lists the many technologies manufacturers with dogs in the hunt (companies like Boeing and Casci, some 1,931 private companies and counting), who have been working with the CIA, JSOC, and the NSA—even the supposedly overarching National Intelligence Program, first headed by John Negroponte. He appears here briefly, mostly to outline how impossible his job was from 2005 to 2007, when he had no actual authority to run the program.

Lack of oversight is a problem noted repeated by Top Secret America. Priest makes this case in dramatic ways (she appears, for instance, driving her car in a shadowy parking garage, her eyes eerily visible in her rearview mirror) and also in her commentary. Reporting on the moment when the CIA blew up a vehicle bearing “known terrorists” in Yemen, firing a Hellfire missile from a drone that was controlled from Tampa, Florida, in November 2002. “They fired an armed predator at a vehicle in Yemen with a weapon we didn’t know they had,” she says. The public response was muted.

This is alarming, but so is Frontline‘s interview with Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong, former deputy commander to General Tommy Franks at Central Command (CENTCOM), who explains why the event should have passed without fanfare: “It’s just war,” he says, “No different than going to the store to buy some eggs. That’s something you’ve got to do.” He goes on to describe the vehicle’s passengers as “the same people who killed 3,000 people” on 9/11, but of course that’s not accurate. The war on terror has changed the ways targets are “acquired,” how they’re dispatched, and what kinds of damage they can wreak (and a Hellfire missile wreaks a lot of it).

At least part of this aggression was enabled by the expanded role taken on by JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) after 9/11, namely “paving the way” for the shock and awe campaign in Iraq in March 2003, as well as capture and targeted killing operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Moreover, Priest underscores the secret facilities built after 9/11 for holding prisoners, the black sites in other nations (including Libya, Egypt, and Morocco) where interrogators used “enhanced interrogation techniques.”

Top Secret America reports on these techniques, as well as targeted assassinations and captures, not to celebrate successes but to ponder the consequences of all this expanded secrecy. As it notes as well that the Obama administration has expanded the expansion, the future looks increasingly unknowable.
 
Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer

Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer
By Joseph Menn | Reuters
Fri, Dec 20, 2013

SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) - As a key part of a campaign to embed encryption software that it could crack into widely used computer products, the U.S. National Security Agency arranged a secret $10 million contract with RSA, one of the most influential firms in the computer security industry, Reuters has learned.

Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden show that the NSA created and promulgated a flawed formula for generating random numbers to create a "back door" in encryption products, the New York Times reported in September. Reuters later reported that RSA became the most important distributor of that formula by rolling it into a software tool called Bsafe that is used to enhance security in personal computers and many other products.

Undisclosed until now was that RSA received $10 million in a deal that set the NSA formula as the preferred, or default, method for number generation in the BSafe software, according to two sources familiar with the contract. Although that sum might seem paltry, it represented more than a third of the revenue that the relevant division at RSA had taken in during the entire previous year, securities filings show.

The earlier disclosures of RSA's entanglement with the NSA already had shocked some in the close-knit world of computer security experts. The company had a long history of championing privacy and security, and it played a leading role in blocking a 1990s effort by the NSA to require a special chip to enable spying on a wide range of computer and communications products.

RSA, now a subsidiary of computer storage giant EMC Corp, urged customers to stop using the NSA formula after the Snowden disclosures revealed its weakness.

RSA and EMC declined to answer questions for this story, but RSA said in a statement: "RSA always acts in the best interest of its customers and under no circumstances does RSA design or enable any back doors in our products. Decisions about the features and functionality of RSA products are our own."

The NSA declined to comment.

The RSA deal shows one way the NSA carried out what Snowden's documents describe as a key strategy for enhancing surveillance: the systematic erosion of security tools. NSA documents released in recent months called for using "commercial relationships" to advance that goal, but did not name any security companies as collaborators.

The NSA came under attack this week in a landmark report from a White House panel appointed to review U.S. surveillance policy. The panel noted that "encryption is an essential basis for trust on the Internet," and called for a halt to any NSA efforts to undermine it.

Most of the dozen current and former RSA employees interviewed said that the company erred in agreeing to such a contract, and many cited RSA's corporate evolution away from pure cryptography products as one of the reasons it occurred.

But several said that RSA also was misled by government officials, who portrayed the formula as a secure technological advance.

"They did not show their true hand," one person briefed on the deal said of the NSA, asserting that government officials did not let on that they knew how to break the encryption.

STORIED HISTORY

Started by MIT professors in the 1970s and led for years by ex-Marine Jim Bidzos, RSA and its core algorithm were both named for the last initials of the three founders, who revolutionized cryptography. Little known to the public, RSA's encryption tools have been licensed by most large technology companies, which in turn use them to protect computers used by hundreds of millions of people.

At the core of RSA's products was a technology known as public key cryptography. Instead of using the same key for encoding and then decoding a message, there are two keys related to each other mathematically. The first, publicly available key is used to encode a message for someone, who then uses a second, private key to reveal it.

From RSA's earliest days, the U.S. intelligence establishment worried it would not be able to crack well-engineered public key cryptography. Martin Hellman, a former Stanford researcher who led the team that first invented the technique, said NSA experts tried to talk him and others into believing that the keys did not have to be as large as they planned.

The stakes rose when more technology companies adopted RSA's methods and Internet use began to soar. The Clinton administration embraced the Clipper Chip, envisioned as a mandatory component in phones and computers to enable officials to overcome encryption with a warrant.

RSA led a fierce public campaign against the effort, distributing posters with a foundering sailing ship and the words "Sink Clipper!"

A key argument against the chip was that overseas buyers would shun U.S. technology products if they were ready-made for spying. Some companies say that is just what has happened in the wake of the Snowden disclosures.

The White House abandoned the Clipper Chip and instead relied on export controls to prevent the best cryptography from crossing U.S. borders. RSA once again rallied the industry, and it set up an Australian division that could ship what it wanted.

"We became the tip of the spear, so to speak, in this fight against government efforts," Bidzos recalled in an oral history.

RSA EVOLVES

RSA and others claimed victory when export restrictions relaxed.

But the NSA was determined to read what it wanted, and the quest gained urgency after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

RSA, meanwhile, was changing. Bidzos stepped down as CEO in 1999 to concentrate on VeriSign, a security certificate company that had been spun out of RSA. The elite lab Bidzos had founded in Silicon Valley moved east to Massachusetts, and many top engineers left the company, several former employees said.

And the BSafe toolkit was becoming a much smaller part of the company. By 2005, BSafe and other tools for developers brought in just $27.5 million of RSA's revenue, less than 9% of the $310 million total.

"When I joined there were 10 people in the labs, and we were fighting the NSA," said Victor Chan, who rose to lead engineering and the Australian operation before he left in 2005. "It became a very different company later on."

By the first half of 2006, RSA was among the many technology companies seeing the U.S. government as a partner against overseas hackers.

New RSA Chief Executive Art Coviello and his team still wanted to be seen as part of the technological vanguard, former employees say, and the NSA had just the right pitch. Coviello declined an interview request.

An algorithm called Dual Elliptic Curve, developed inside the agency, was on the road to approval by the National Institutes of Standards and Technology as one of four acceptable methods for generating random numbers. NIST's blessing is required for many products sold to the government and often sets a broader de facto standard.

RSA adopted the algorithm even before NIST approved it. The NSA then cited the early use of Dual Elliptic Curve inside the government to argue successfully for NIST approval, according to an official familiar with the proceedings.

RSA's contract made Dual Elliptic Curve the default option for producing random numbers in the RSA toolkit. No alarms were raised, former employees said, because the deal was handled by business leaders rather than pure technologists.

"The labs group had played a very intricate role at BSafe, and they were basically gone," said labs veteran Michael Wenocur, who left in 1999.

Within a year, major questions were raised about Dual Elliptic Curve. Cryptography authority Bruce Schneier wrote that the weaknesses in the formula "can only be described as a back door."

After reports of the back door in September, RSA urged its customers to stop using the Dual Elliptic Curve number generator.

But unlike the Clipper Chip fight two decades ago, the company is saying little in public, and it declined to discuss how the NSA entanglements have affected its relationships with customers.

The White House, meanwhile, says it will consider this week's panel recommendation that any efforts to subvert cryptography be abandoned.

http://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-sec...rity-industry-pioneer-001729620--finance.html
 
1. Putting backdoors in your product to obtain/retain government contracts as priority to your commercial activity.

2. Overloading a country's leader plane with 'sophisticated' listening bugs that communicate with satellites that interfere with the avionics that could have possibly caused a crash and nuclear war or military conflict.

3. Providing access to millions of classified documents to a private contractor in their 20's.

4. Spending over half the world's defense spending with 5% of the population with a 17 trillion dollar deficit.

5. Spending twice as much on healthcare.

6. Having an incarceration rate that is 25% of the world.

7. Utilizing a education model that causes millions students to drop out.


I could go on and on with this list, there is some serious intelligence deficit within the government and private sector that is scary. Why don't we recruit the best person, instead of where a person went to school.



:hmm::hmm::hmm:
 
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After 42 years, burglars of FBI 'Cointelpro' docs reveal their roles

After 42 years, burglars of FBI 'Cointelpro' docs reveal their roles
By Dylan Stableford, Yahoo News | Yahoo News
Tue, Jan 7, 2014

Three former political activists have revealed their part in a brazen 1971 burglary of an FBI office outside Philadelphia, where they stole as many as 1,000 documents, enraging FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and exposing a domestic spying operation that predated Edward Snowden's leaks by 42 years.

John Raines, an 80-year-old retired Temple University professor, his wife, Bonnie, and Keith Forsyth, a former Philadelphia cab driver, say in a new book they were part of an eight-member ring of anti-Vietnam War protesters who broke into the FBI's Media, Penn., office March 8, 1971.

“We did it because somebody had to do it,” Raines told NBC News. “In this case, by breaking a law -- entering, removing files — we exposed a crime that was going on."

Calling themselves “the Citizens Commission to Investigate the FBI,” Raines says the team was unarmed and broke in with a crowbar. They walked away with suitcases stuffed with documents revealing the infamous Counter Intelligence Program, or Cointelpro, set up to covertly monitor civil rights groups and anti-Vietnam war activists.

The activists-turned-burglars say they believed they had to get proof of the FBI's subversive activities.

“When you talked to people outside the movement about what the FBI was doing, nobody wanted to believe it,” Forsyth, 63, told the New York Times. “There was only one way to convince people that it was true, and that was to get it in their handwriting.”

Added Bonnie Raines, “...All the usual things we always did — picketing, marching, signing petitions — didn’t make any difference whatsoever."

One of the documents stolen in the burglary included a directive from Hoover's office to interview activists in an effort to intimidate them. “It will enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the point across there is an F.B.I. agent behind every mailbox," the memo read.

The plot was hatched by Bill Davidon, then a physics professor at Haverford College and a prominent anti-war protester. He died in late 2013.

Davidon’s daughter, Sarah, told NBC he first told her about it in late 1980s. “He didn’t call it a burglary," she said. "He always referred to it as ‘the Media action.’ ... He did this because he felt strongly about civil liberties.”

The group cased the FBI offices for months, and picked the night of a 15-round title bout between Muhammad Ali and Joe Frazier knowing millions of Americans, including some guards, would be glued to the broadcast.

The book, “The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret FBI,” written by Betty Medsger, a former Washington Post reporter, is being released Tuesday.

Medsger broke the story after receiving the files anonymously in the mail. “These documents were explosive,” she told NBC. “The FBI was never the same.”

After the heist, Hoover launched a massive investigation that, at times, involved more than 200 agents. Hoover pulled the plug on Cointelpro in 1972.

In a statement released ahead of the book, an FBI spokesman said the burglary "contributed to changes to how the FBI identified and addressed domestic security threats, leading to reform of the FBI’s intelligence policies and practices and the creation of investigative guidelines by the Department of Justice.”

The group says they have no fear about revealing their identities now since the the five-year of statute of limitations on the burglary expired in the mid-70s.

But why didn't they come forward then? “We didn’t need attention," John Raines told the Times. "We had done what needed to be done."

http://news.yahoo.com/fbi-media-burglary-solved-1971-165640272.html
 
Senator's spy claims chill CIA-Congress relations

Senator's spy claims chill CIA-Congress relations
By Daniel De Luce, Michael Mathes | AFP
Tue, Mar 11, 2014

Washington (AFP) - A top US lawmaker's hotly disputed charge that the CIA illegally spied on Senate staff has roiled the intelligence community, fraying ties between the agency and its overseers in Congress.

Senator Dianne Feinstein brought what had been a behind-the-scenes spat into the public glare Tuesday with her furious broadside against the Central Intelligence Agency, saying its agents searched computers used by staffers investigating its interrogation methods.

"I have grave concerns that the CIA's search may well have violated the separation of powers principles embodied in the United States Constitution," Feinstein said on the Senate floor.

She alleged the CIA may have breached federal law as well as the executive order that bars it from domestic spying, but the agency's director John Brennan quickly denied the allegations.

"Nothing could be further from the truth," Brennan said at a Washington event.

"The matter is being dealt with in an appropriate way, being looked at by the right authorities, and the facts will come out."

Feinstein said the CIA searched a computer drive used by staffers on the intelligence committee to prepare a major report into a controversial and now defunct agency interrogation program that used "enhanced interrogation techniques" against detainees.

"I have asked for an apology and a recognition that this CIA search of computers... was inappropriate," the California Democrat said. "I have received neither."

The reverberations shuddered across Washington, as lawmakers voiced concern about a steady infringement on their duty to keep the CIA and National Security Agency in check.

"Today the debate goes right to the heart of the question of how Congress can do effective oversight (of) the modern intelligence apparatus," Senator Ron Wyden, an intelligence committee panel who has long argued that the spy agencies abuse their authority, told reporters.

Senator Lindsey Graham went as far as to declare the actions reminiscent of president Richard Nixon's misdeeds.

"Heads should roll, people should go to jail if it's true," Graham told reporters. "If it is, the legislative branch should declare war on the CIA."

Feinstein herself described the CIA interference as a defining moment.

"How this will be resolved will show whether the intelligence committee can be effective in monitoring and investigating our nation's intelligence activities, or whether our work can be thwarted by those we oversee."

President Barack Obama's spokesman Jay Carney dodged repeated questions about the row, saying the case had been referred to the Justice Department.

"I can't comment on allegations that are under review," he said, adding that the White House took the concerns of Feinstein seriously -- but also saying that Obama had full confidence in Brennan.

- Rare rift -

Feinstein's extraordinary speech marked a break from her usually cordial relations with the intelligence community, which she has often defended against accusations of overstepping its authority.

Her comments came after unnamed administration officials alleged to news media that Senate staffers took sensitive documents without authority, triggering an investigation.

Feinstein rejected those accounts.

She said the CIA and the committee had agreed years ago to set up a secure site in Virginia for Senate staff to review documents, as well as a computer drive separate from the agency's network.

The staffers reviewed 6.2 million documents and at no point did they seek to retrieve files that were marked classified or legally off-limits, she said.

Feinstein said 870 documents were removed by the CIA in February 2010, while 50 others were withdrawn without committee knowledge.

The interrogation report was completed in December 2012, when the committee approved a 6,300-page study that has yet to be released publicly.

Feinstein said a CIA internal review of the interrogation program was among the documents provided to her staff, but that CIA officials demanded to know how staffers obtained the review.

Analysts say the Congress-CIA rift is the worst since the 1970s, when lawmakers uncovered illegal abuses and introduced legal reforms to restrict the power of the spy services.

But the intelligence community today faces rising public anger over shock revelations that the NSA scoops up telephone data from most Americans.

Fugitive former security contractor Edward Snowden told NBC News that "the CIA was trying to play 'keep away' with documents relevant to an investigation by their overseers in Congress."

"That's a serious constitutional concern," he said.

http://news.yahoo.com/us-senator-accuses-cia-illegal-congress-computer-search-142137042.html
 
The Washington Post should get a Pulitzer when they uncover the obvious domestic surveillance going on.

:lol::lol::lol::lol:

My prediction came true...


85


Months after lifting a veil of secrecy from the National Security Agency's surveillance operations, The Washington Post and The Guardian won a Pulitzer Prize for public service Monday. The two papers broke the story in tandem, relying on NSA documents provided by Edward Snowden.

The Pulitzer Prize win comes days after two journalists at the heart of the story, Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras, received a George Polk Award for national security reporting. On that occasion, Greenwald said, "I hope that as journalists we realize not only the importance of defending our own rights, but also those of our sources like Edward Snowden."

But the Polk award rankled some, including Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., who called Greenwald "a disgrace." He added, "No American should give Glenn Greenwald an award for anything."

The staff of The Boston Globe won the Pulitzer for breaking news reporting, for what the Pulitzer panel called "its exhaustive and empathetic coverage of the Boston Marathon bombings and the ensuing manhunt that enveloped the city, using photography and a range of digital tools to capture the full impact of the tragedy."

The Pulitzer winners were announced Monday at Columbia University in New York City. We'll fill in this post with more details about the winners this afternoon.

After observing him and Snowden for awhile, their motives look questionable. If I had came to him, with evidence of corporate surveillance, he would never take a look at it, and would come up with some pretext not to report on it. It would never be covered by any for-profit news organization. He definitely would not win a Pulitzer and may have been terminated and blacklisted. As long as you disparage and discredit the government, you get all kinds of awards for that, the real problem is private sector surveillance which is never talked about or reported on that is rampant.

My angle is the poor business climate it creates. Today's economy is about intellectual property/information, developing something and capitalizing on that knowledge to succeed in the marketplace. If other large companies come along and steal this information through backdoors without compensation to make commericials or develop products, it disrupt other activity that you are doing. You lose leverage and it stop your work on much bigger things. Nobody is held accountable and people that should be policing this activity look the other way.

It is a 99% tax on innovation...
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“United States of Secrets”

Airing May 13 through May 20, 2014 on PBS


Check local listings​


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Good Look on Frontline...
 

Snowden Is The Kind of Guy I Used to Recruit—in Russia
At the CIA, we knew that narcissistic under-achievers were
the easiest to turn. Now he’s put our whole country in danger



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In his new book, No Place to Hide, Glenn Greenwald tells how Edward Snowden once confided to him, “with a hint of embarrassment,” how much he had learned from playing video games. In the black-and-white world of video games, “the protagonist is often an ordinary person, who finds himself faced with grave injustices from powerful forces and has the choice to flee in fear or to fight for his beliefs,” Greenwald writes.

But Edward Snowden’s video-game world is not the real world. I see Snowden in a very different light. My colleagues and I spent our careers in the CIA looking for people like him—on the other side, that is. We worked hard to locate the kind of person who could be persuaded to give up his country’s secrets: narcissistic, often delusional under-achievers whom we could hope to turn into loose-lipped sources in our enemies’ camps and other hostile locations. We understood just how valuable it was to every aspect of our foreign policy to know the plans and intentions of our enemies; the best way to do this was to look for a source and exploit people like Snowden, the National Security Agency leaker, * to target for this purpose.

The Russians weren’t slouches either in searching for sources of classified information. They were looking for their Snowdens too. You don’t have to go back too far to see their success in recruiting American spies with unique access – John Anthony Walker, Aldreich Ames, and Robert Hanssen – who did immense damage to our national security. Moreover, Ames and Hanssen’s compromises led to the death of many of our top Russian sources. Walker’s compromise, by contrast, allowed the Soviets to know the locations of U.S. submarines around the world. One shudders to think what more could have been done against us if they had had Snowden’s access to sensitive communications and his technical know-how on how to extract it from the system. Some people think of Snowden as a latter-day Daniel Ellsberg, a noble whistle-blower. Clearly I do not.

For those who believe that the United States should step back from its engagement from the world, toning down our robust national security and dramatically shrinking our defense and intelligence community, Greenwald’s rationale and Snowden’s behavior might appear to vaguely honorable. And in this next round of debate, the emphasis will once again be on the domestic side of Snowden’s disclosures, as opposed to the enormous international damage done to our country’s self-defense by his revelations.

The picture looks different for those who believe, as I do, that the world is still a very dangerous place and that America faces grave challenges from a range of threats as it plays its essential role as guarantor of global peace: terrorism and instability across the Middle East; China’s military muscle-flexing in Asia; and Putin’s imperial designs in Ukraine and potentially towards other neighbors. From this perspective, Snowden’s actions are deeply troubling in that they directly caused a serious loss of capability to understand the plans and intentions of current and future adversaries. Snowden single-handedly blinded us to critical targets and eliminated our ability to see what some of the key players on the international stage are up to. From first-hand experience, I can state unequivocally that the capability to do this comes at incredibly great cost in time, money and personal sacrifice.

As James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January, Snowden’s disclosures constituted “the most massive and damaging theft of intelligence in our history.” He added that “we’ve lost critical foreign intelligence collection sources, including some shared with us by valued partners. … Terrorists and other adversaries of this country are going to school on U.S. intelligence sources, methods and tradecraft, and the insights they are gaining are making our job much, much harder.”

This is a very hard subject for government officials to talk about without compromising additional capabilities (even this article had to be approved by the CIA’s Publications Review Board). However, only a cursory reading of our history reveals just how important gaining access to the dispatches of our enemies has been in every war since the American Revolution. Moreover, this activity has been authorized by all of our presidents since George Washington. Protestations aside, every nation uses its technical collection capabilities to the maximum in the international arena, and will continue to do so as long as international conflicts are with us. No one should doubt that our adversaries and some of our fair-weather friends are cheering the loss caused by Snowden.


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Within five months of the leaks by Edward Snowden in June of last year, Recorded Future, a Cambridge, Mass., firm that specializes in web intelligence, says it observed an increased pace of innovation by radical groups, specifically new competing jihadist platforms and three major new encryption tools from three different organizations. | Recorded Future



But, to give the devil his due, let’s look at Snowden’s domestic revelations about U.S. citizens’ privacy, which have drawn most of the attention and concern from the American people. It is eminently clear that the intelligence community, Congress and the White House are struggling with the double-edged sword of privacy and national security, particularly as technology progresses at unprecedented speed. And I am reasonably optimistic that, despite the public hand-wringing, they will quickly come up with the right balance that protects our civil liberties and doesn’t cripple our intelligence collection against our enemies, who do, at times, operate in and cooperate with U.S. citizens. When the news cameras stop rolling, these officials all know just how vital these collection platforms are to our defense while at the same time truly appreciating the value of the law and the importance of protection of our citizens’ rights. Nevertheless, implementation won’t be an easy task, and it certainly won’t take place above the requisite Washington self-serving politics.

Debates about civil rights and national defense aside, it is worth talking about Snowden’s motivations before we determine, finally, if he is a sinner, saint or something in between. We must first appreciate just how critical protecting secrets is to our national security, a point that seems to be lost on many participants of this debate. As someone who spent an entire career in the intelligence community, what flashes through my mind first is old the World War II adage, “Loose Lips Sink Ships.” In those first days of the OSS, the predecessor to the CIA, no one had to explain to our people – not to mention our troops — how important secrecy was to operational success. Nor should it be necessary to explain it in the age of terrorism and permanent conflict. But it seems that, today, we do.

It is inconceivable that any country can last long without guarding its sensitive information and capabilities and washing people like Snowden out of the system. Once you accept this principle, it’s becomes imperative that our national security agencies and departments demand all government employees abide by the rules, and expect them to be held accountable when they don’t.

Clearly, Snowden and his supporters see it otherwise. But if Snowden felt the NSA was breaking the law or in violation of accepted human rights principles, he should have stood tall in his job and challenged his superiors verbally and in writing, and if necessary taken his concerns to the Inspector General or General Counsel. If he didn’t get satisfaction there, he should have requested that the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees hear him out. There is, in fact, a mechanism in place already to do this. He almost certainly would have gotten his hearing, and appropriate action would have been taken if his position had merit. He knew it didn’t, since each of those committees had in fact already been briefed on those programs, and there is no indication that he took any action whatsoever in this regard.

In that vein, and moreover, why did Snowden cut and run in the style of past defectors like Kim Philby to Russia in the 60’s and Philip Agee to Cuba in 70’s, not to mention the dozens of other traitors that defected on both sides of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War? There is no doubt in anyone’s mind, including Greenwald’s, that Snowden knew just how much destruction he had done with the information he stole about our national security. What’s more, he knew full well what he was doing when he put himself in the hands of the Russians. He is both naive and delusional if he believes they will keep him around once they have gotten what they want from him, both in terms of intelligence and propaganda value. It is then that he will learn, like the others before him that have fallen into this trap, that when he truly becomes a “man without a country, “ he will have to pay for his keep. He has set a course that will inevitably lead him to disillusionment, despair and guilt.

Like the video-game fanatic he appears to have been, Snowden has made black-and-white what is actually a very complex issue. For most of our history, it was relatively easy to draw a line between domestic and foreign intelligence. For years there were rigid policies set in place that rightly prohibited NSA, CIA, and FBI from collecting on American “persons” (including green-card holders), unless there was a court order demonstrating reasonable cause. The Snowden documents actually reveal the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to gain permission to collect very specific metadata on American citizens for the purposes of tracking suspected terrorists.

It does appear that, unfortunately, the court was overly friendly to the governments’ requests. Consequently, there are a few sensible reforms being put forward to improve the process, including the formation of an independent panel to oversee the activities of the FISC and the relocation of stored metadata outside the NSA. But again, there were ways for Snowden to achieve these ends without betraying his country.

And we must face the fact that it is never going to be easy again to draw that traditional line between domestic and foreign intelligence. The fact remains that with the truly universal explosion of technology, communications, and data movement, as well as connectivity and storage, the government and private sector will continue to struggle with how best to exploit the information available for the purposes of defense and security, while steering clear of unnecessary intrusions into our private lives.

If Snowden really believes in accountability, as he has espoused so often, he should let it start at home and put himself in the hands of the U.S. judicial system, the most impartial in the world, and certainly in contrast to Snowden’s new homeland. If he has a case, he will be exonerated, and if not, he will serve a very long jail sentence. As long as he stays in Russia, Snowden is telling the world that this is a risk he knows he can’t take.


Jack Devine is a former head of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations and president of the Arkin Group, a New York-based firm that specializes in crisis management. He is author of Good Hunting: An American Spymaster’s Story, which is scheduled to be published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux next month.


Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/st...to-recruitin-russia-106648.html#ixzz31h5Pas1z



 

Totally taken out of context:

"While the Union survived the civil war, the Constitution did not. In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the 14th Amendment, ensuring protection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. And yet almost another century would pass before any significant recognition was obtained of the rights of black Americans to share equally even in such basic opportunities as education, housing, and employment, and to have their votes counted, and counted equally. In the meantime, blacks joined America's military to fight its wars and invested untold hours working in its factories and on its farms, contributing to the development of this country's magnificent wealth and waiting to share in its prosperity."

Good thread though.
 
A Brief History of the CIA's Unpunished Spying on the Senate

Senator's spy claims chill CIA-Congress relations
By Daniel De Luce, Michael Mathes | AFP
Tue, Mar 11, 2014

Washington (AFP) - A top US lawmaker's hotly disputed charge that the CIA illegally spied on Senate staff has roiled the intelligence community, fraying ties between the agency and its overseers in Congress.

A Brief History of the CIA's Unpunished Spying on the Senate
The Atlantic
By Conor Friedersdorf
December 23, 2014 6:00 AM

This is the story of John Brennan's CIA spying on Congress and getting away with it.

Last March, Senator Dianne Feinstein accused the CIA of spying on the Senate intelligence committee as it labored to finalize its report on the torture of prisoners. “I have grave concerns that the CIA’s search may well have violated the separation of powers principles embodied in the United States Constitution,” she said. “I have asked for an apology and a recognition that this CIA search of computers used by its oversight committee was inappropriate. I have received neither.”

CIA Director John Brennan denied the charge. “Nothing could be further from the truth,” he said. “We wouldn’t do that. That’s just beyond the scope of reason in terms of what we’d do.” It would be months before his denial was publicly proved false. "An internal investigation by the C.I.A. has found that its officers penetrated a computer network used by the Senate Intelligence Committee in preparing its damning report on the C.I.A.’s detention and interrogation program," The New York Times reported. "The report by the agency’s inspector general also found that C.I.A. officers read the emails of the Senate investigators and sent a criminal referral to the Justice Department based on false information."

The Senate intelligence committee expressed appropriate outraged at these anti-democratic machinations:
A statement issued Thursday morning by a C.I.A. spokesman said that John O. Brennan, the agency’s director, had apologized to Ms. Feinstein and the committee’s ranking Republican, Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, and would set up an internal accountability board to review the issue. The statement said that the board, which will be led by a former Democratic senator, Evan Bayh of Indiana, could recommend “potential disciplinary measures” and “steps to address systemic issues.” But anger among lawmakers grew throughout the day. Leaving a nearly three-hour briefing about the report in a Senate conference room, members of both parties called for the C.I.A. officers to be held accountable, and some said they had lost confidence in Mr. Brennan’s leadership. “This is a serious situation and there are serious violations,” said Mr. Chambliss, generally a staunch ally of the intelligence community. He called for the C.I.A. employees to be “dealt with very harshly.”

Late last week, that internal "accountability board" announced the results of its review. If you've followed the impunity with which the CIA has broken U.S. laws throughout its history, you'll be unsurprised to learn that no one is going to be "dealt with very harshly" after all. "A panel investigating the Central Intelligence Agency’s search of a computer network used by staff members of the Senate Intelligence Committee who were looking into the C.I.A.’s use of torture will recommend against punishing anyone involved in the episode," The New York Times reports. "The panel will make that recommendation after the five C.I.A. officials who were singled out by the agency’s inspector general this year for improperly ordering and carrying out the computer searches staunchly defended their actions, saying that they were lawful and in some cases done at the behest of John O. Brennan."

Done at the behest of Brennan, who once feigned ignorance about the actions in question, going so far as to declare them beyond the scope of reason! "While effectively rejecting the most significant conclusions of the inspector general’s report," the story continues, "the panel, appointed by Mr. Brennan and composed of three C.I.A. officers and two members from outside the agency, is still expected to criticize agency missteps that contributed to the fight with Congress." Who'd have guessed that a panel appointed by Brennan to look into malfeasance presided over and in some cases ordered by Brennan would decide that neither Brennan nor any of the people Brennan leads should be held accountable?

Brennan and the CIA have behaved indefensibly. But substantial blame belongs to the overseers who've permitted them to do so with impunity, including figures in the Obama administration right up to the president and Senate intelligence committee members who, for all their bluster, have yet to react to CIA misbehavior in a way that actually disincentivizes similar malfeasance in the future. President Obama should fire John Brennan, as has previously been suggested by Senator Mark Udall, Trevor Timm, Dan Froomkin, and Andrew Sullivan. And the Senate intelligence committee should act toward the CIA like their predecessors on the Church Committee. Instead, the CIA is asked to investigate its own malfeasance and issue reports suggesting what, if anything, should be done.

The Times reports:
Mr. Brennan has enraged senators by refusing to answer questions posed by the Intelligence Committee about who at the C.I.A. authorized the computer intrusion. Doing so, he said, could compromise the accountability board’s investigation.

“What did he know? When did he know it? What did he order?” said Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is a member of the Intelligence Committee, said in an interview last week. “They haven’t answered those basic questions.”

Senator Levin, you're a member of a coequal branch. You've flagged outrageous behavior among those you're charged with overseeing. What are you going to do about it?

http://news.yahoo.com/brief-history-cias-unpunished-spying-senate-110000318.html
 
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