Supreme Court
- Thread starter Greed
- Start date
You acting like you don't want that?
They already do. who do you think is a major investor in the Keystone Pipeline.
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Another potential big day on tap for the Supreme Court
Another potential big day on tap for the Supreme Court
May 19, 2014
by NCC Staff
The Supreme Court is back in public session on Monday, and as its current term winds down, at least eight big decisions remain to be announced. So the odds are good of something notable coming out of today’s session.
The first order of business will be the announcement of new cases that will be accepted for the Court’s next term, which starts in October 2014.
One proposed case the Court could take on Monday is a case about the public display of religious symbols. Last May, the Court took the case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, which it decided on May 5. In the Town of Greece decision, a divided Court upheld prayers at public government meetings, in what could be a historically significant moment for the religious Establishment clause in the First Amendment.
But also a year ago, the Court put on hold consideration of a second case, Elmbrook School District v. Doe, which involves the rental and use of a church sanctuary to host graduation ceremonies for two public schools.
After it announced the Town of Greece decision, the Court put the Elmbrook School District v. Doe petition back on its calendar for private conference consideration for last Friday.
In addition to the Town of Greece decision, two other big decisions already have been announced in 2014.
In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Court decided that states could restrict their use of affirmative action programs in university admissions and at other public institutions.
And in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief Justice John Roberts and four other justices struck down general limits on how much money can be spent on federal political campaigns over a two-year period.
But eight other big decisions remain unannounced by the Court as it moves toward wrapping up a busy term in late June. Here are the cases to watch, with a brief description of each case (or pair of cases).
Bond v. U.S.
The Bond case was heard in arguments last November, and it remains the lone high-profile case from 2013 that hasn’t been announced yet. The big picture issue in the Bond case is the possible fate of a landmark 1920 Supreme Court decision: Missouri v. Holland. The Holland decision gave Congress the power to pass laws to carry out the U.S. government’s obligations under international treaties.
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning
This high-profile case asks the Court to interpret the breadth of the President’s constitutional authority to make appointments during Senate recesses.
McCullen v. Coakley
This case is about Massachusetts’s selective exclusion law – which makes it a crime for public speakers other than clinic “employees or agents . . . acting within the scope of their employment” to protest within 35 feet of a reproductive health care facility.
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius
In Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the national hobby and crafts chain store asked the Court to take on the Affordable Care Act birth control mandate that applies to for-profit companies. The Obama administration also had asked the Court to take up the Hobby Lobby case.
In the Conestoga Wood case, a Mennonite family-owned, profit-making business claims that the ACA’s birth control mandate violates the company’s rights under the First Amendment free exercise clause and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Hall v. Florida
The Justices will determine how states define if a person is mentally disabled to the point of becoming ineligible for the death penalty.
American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo
The highly publicized case involves a copyright battle between Aereo, a tech TV startup, and the major television networks that could affect the future of broadcast television and cloud computing.
Riley v. California and U.S. v. Wurie
Both cases examine the power of the police, acting without a search warrant in certain circumstances, to look at information stored on a cellphone taken from a suspect at the time of an arrest.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/05/another-potential-big-day-on-tap-for-the-supreme-court/
Another potential big day on tap for the Supreme Court
May 19, 2014
by NCC Staff
The Supreme Court is back in public session on Monday, and as its current term winds down, at least eight big decisions remain to be announced. So the odds are good of something notable coming out of today’s session.
The first order of business will be the announcement of new cases that will be accepted for the Court’s next term, which starts in October 2014.
One proposed case the Court could take on Monday is a case about the public display of religious symbols. Last May, the Court took the case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, which it decided on May 5. In the Town of Greece decision, a divided Court upheld prayers at public government meetings, in what could be a historically significant moment for the religious Establishment clause in the First Amendment.
But also a year ago, the Court put on hold consideration of a second case, Elmbrook School District v. Doe, which involves the rental and use of a church sanctuary to host graduation ceremonies for two public schools.
After it announced the Town of Greece decision, the Court put the Elmbrook School District v. Doe petition back on its calendar for private conference consideration for last Friday.
In addition to the Town of Greece decision, two other big decisions already have been announced in 2014.
In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Court decided that states could restrict their use of affirmative action programs in university admissions and at other public institutions.
And in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, Chief Justice John Roberts and four other justices struck down general limits on how much money can be spent on federal political campaigns over a two-year period.
But eight other big decisions remain unannounced by the Court as it moves toward wrapping up a busy term in late June. Here are the cases to watch, with a brief description of each case (or pair of cases).
Bond v. U.S.
The Bond case was heard in arguments last November, and it remains the lone high-profile case from 2013 that hasn’t been announced yet. The big picture issue in the Bond case is the possible fate of a landmark 1920 Supreme Court decision: Missouri v. Holland. The Holland decision gave Congress the power to pass laws to carry out the U.S. government’s obligations under international treaties.
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning
This high-profile case asks the Court to interpret the breadth of the President’s constitutional authority to make appointments during Senate recesses.
McCullen v. Coakley
This case is about Massachusetts’s selective exclusion law – which makes it a crime for public speakers other than clinic “employees or agents . . . acting within the scope of their employment” to protest within 35 feet of a reproductive health care facility.
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius
In Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the national hobby and crafts chain store asked the Court to take on the Affordable Care Act birth control mandate that applies to for-profit companies. The Obama administration also had asked the Court to take up the Hobby Lobby case.
In the Conestoga Wood case, a Mennonite family-owned, profit-making business claims that the ACA’s birth control mandate violates the company’s rights under the First Amendment free exercise clause and the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Hall v. Florida
The Justices will determine how states define if a person is mentally disabled to the point of becoming ineligible for the death penalty.
American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo
The highly publicized case involves a copyright battle between Aereo, a tech TV startup, and the major television networks that could affect the future of broadcast television and cloud computing.
Riley v. California and U.S. v. Wurie
Both cases examine the power of the police, acting without a search warrant in certain circumstances, to look at information stored on a cellphone taken from a suspect at the time of an arrest.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/05/another-potential-big-day-on-tap-for-the-supreme-court/
Overlooked Supreme Court case could impact public unions
Overlooked Supreme Court case could impact public unions
by Nicandro Iannacci
May 27, 2014
A largely overlooked Supreme Court case has the potential to fundamentally alter the right of public employees to unionize—and a ruling could be handed down as early as this week.
That case, Harris v. Quinn, comes from the great state of Illinois, which recognizes a union for its home health care workers. One of those workers, Pamela Harris, is the lead plaintiff.
At issue are two critical questions. First, can the state actually recognize a union of such workers? And second, do these workers have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their “fair share” of the cost for union representation?
Illinois began recognizing a union for its home health care aides 10 years ago, largely in an effort to reduce turnover and provide stability for an increasingly elderly and disabled population. While individuals are empowered to choose their own aides and organize their daily activity, the state sets the number of hours aides can work and the required qualifications for such a position, in addition to paying their wages.
Moreover, no one is required to be an official member of the union, but they are required to support the costs of collective bargaining on their behalf. The rule harkens back to Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1976), in which the Court held that public employees “may be compelled to support legitimate, non-ideological, union activities germane to collective-bargaining representation.”
In doing so, the Court recognized a state interest in simplifying the management of its employees, as well as a labor interest in avoiding “free rider” situations in which non-union colleagues benefit from the union’s advocacy without paying for it.
But the Court also recognized First Amendment interests in free association and free speech. By permitting public employees to remain non-members of the union, and by restricting the use of their contributions to the costs of representation and not to political activities, the Court struck a balance between these concerns and those of the workplace.
Harris, who cares for her son at home, rejects this precedent, telling NPR, “I object to my home being a union workplace.” She believes that the state cannot be considered her employer and that she is being forced to associate with an organization with whose speech she does not agree.
At oral arguments on January 21, several justices appeared sympathetic to the arguments forwarded by Ms. Harris’ attorney, William Messenger of the National Right to Work Legal Foundation, according to SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston, who also contributes to Constitution Daily.
Several justices appeared alarmed by such arguments and more sympathetic to Paul Smith of Jenner & Block, who represented the union, and U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., who weighed in on behalf of the federal government.
A decision will be announced by the end of June.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/05/overlooked-supreme-court-case-could-impact-public-unions/
Overlooked Supreme Court case could impact public unions
by Nicandro Iannacci
May 27, 2014
A largely overlooked Supreme Court case has the potential to fundamentally alter the right of public employees to unionize—and a ruling could be handed down as early as this week.
That case, Harris v. Quinn, comes from the great state of Illinois, which recognizes a union for its home health care workers. One of those workers, Pamela Harris, is the lead plaintiff.
At issue are two critical questions. First, can the state actually recognize a union of such workers? And second, do these workers have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their “fair share” of the cost for union representation?
Illinois began recognizing a union for its home health care aides 10 years ago, largely in an effort to reduce turnover and provide stability for an increasingly elderly and disabled population. While individuals are empowered to choose their own aides and organize their daily activity, the state sets the number of hours aides can work and the required qualifications for such a position, in addition to paying their wages.
Moreover, no one is required to be an official member of the union, but they are required to support the costs of collective bargaining on their behalf. The rule harkens back to Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1976), in which the Court held that public employees “may be compelled to support legitimate, non-ideological, union activities germane to collective-bargaining representation.”
In doing so, the Court recognized a state interest in simplifying the management of its employees, as well as a labor interest in avoiding “free rider” situations in which non-union colleagues benefit from the union’s advocacy without paying for it.
But the Court also recognized First Amendment interests in free association and free speech. By permitting public employees to remain non-members of the union, and by restricting the use of their contributions to the costs of representation and not to political activities, the Court struck a balance between these concerns and those of the workplace.
Harris, who cares for her son at home, rejects this precedent, telling NPR, “I object to my home being a union workplace.” She believes that the state cannot be considered her employer and that she is being forced to associate with an organization with whose speech she does not agree.
At oral arguments on January 21, several justices appeared sympathetic to the arguments forwarded by Ms. Harris’ attorney, William Messenger of the National Right to Work Legal Foundation, according to SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston, who also contributes to Constitution Daily.
Several justices appeared alarmed by such arguments and more sympathetic to Paul Smith of Jenner & Block, who represented the union, and U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., who weighed in on behalf of the federal government.
A decision will be announced by the end of June.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/05/overlooked-supreme-court-case-could-impact-public-unions/
Stating the obvious, after a while
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/stating-the-obvious-after-a-while/
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/stating-the-obvious-after-a-while/
Supreme Court rules on 'straw purchaser' law
Supreme Court rules on 'straw purchaser' law
By SAM HANANEL
47 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (AP) — A divided Supreme Court sided with gun control groups and the Obama administration Monday, ruling that the federal ban on "straw" purchases of guns can be enforced even if the ultimate buyer is legally allowed to own a gun.
The justices ruled 5-4 that the law applied to a Virginia man who bought a gun with the intention of transferring it to a relative in Pennsylvania who was not prohibited from owning firearms.
The ruling settles a split among appeals courts over federal gun laws intended to prevent sham buyers from obtaining guns for the sole purpose of giving them to another person. The laws were part of Congress' effort to make sure firearms did not get into the hands of unlawful recipients.
Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan said the federal government's elaborate system of background checks and record-keeping requirements help law enforcement investigate crimes by tracing guns to their buyers. Those provisions would mean little, she said, if a would-be gun buyer could evade them by simply getting another person to buy the gun and fill out the paperwork.
Kagan's opinion was joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who is often considered the court's swing vote, as well as liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia said the language of the law does not support making it a crime for one lawful gun owner to buy a gun for another lawful gun owner. He was joined by the court's other conservatives — Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.
The case began after Bruce James Abramski, Jr. bought a Glock 19 handgun in Collinsville, Virginia, in 2009 and later transferred it to his uncle in Easton, Pennsylvania. Abramski, a former police officer, had assured the Virginia dealer he was the "actual buyer" of the weapon even though he had already offered to buy the gun for his uncle using a police discount.
Abramski purchased the gun three days after his uncle had written him a check for $400 with "Glock 19 handgun" written in the memo line. During the transaction, he answered "yes" on a federal form asking "Are you the actual transferee buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you."
Police later arrested Abramski after they thought he was involved in a bank robbery in Rocky Mount, Virginia. No charges were ever filed on the bank robbery, but officials charged him with making false statements about the purchase of the gun.
A federal district judge rejected Abramski's argument that he was not a straw purchaser because his uncle was eligible to buy firearms and the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Obama administration had argued that accepting Abramski's defense would impair the ability of law enforcement officials to trace firearms involved in crimes and keep weapons away from people who are not eligible to buy them. The administration said that even if the purchase is made on behalf of someone eligible to buy a firearm, the purpose of the law is frustrated since Congress requires the gun dealers — not purchasers — to run federal background checks on people buying guns.
Abramski claimed Congress' goal was to prevent guns from falling into the hands of convicted felons and others barred from owning firearms. He said that goal is not furthered if the gun is transferred to someone legally allowed to own guns.
The National Rifle Association sided with Abramski, asserting that the government wrongly interpreted the law and improperly expanded the scope of gun regulations. Twenty-six states also submitted a brief supporting Abramski's view of the law, while nine states and Washington, D.C., filed papers bolstering the Obama administration.
http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-rules-straw-purchaser-law-140713053--finance.html
Supreme Court rules on 'straw purchaser' law
By SAM HANANEL
47 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (AP) — A divided Supreme Court sided with gun control groups and the Obama administration Monday, ruling that the federal ban on "straw" purchases of guns can be enforced even if the ultimate buyer is legally allowed to own a gun.
The justices ruled 5-4 that the law applied to a Virginia man who bought a gun with the intention of transferring it to a relative in Pennsylvania who was not prohibited from owning firearms.
The ruling settles a split among appeals courts over federal gun laws intended to prevent sham buyers from obtaining guns for the sole purpose of giving them to another person. The laws were part of Congress' effort to make sure firearms did not get into the hands of unlawful recipients.
Writing for the majority, Justice Elena Kagan said the federal government's elaborate system of background checks and record-keeping requirements help law enforcement investigate crimes by tracing guns to their buyers. Those provisions would mean little, she said, if a would-be gun buyer could evade them by simply getting another person to buy the gun and fill out the paperwork.
Kagan's opinion was joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who is often considered the court's swing vote, as well as liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia said the language of the law does not support making it a crime for one lawful gun owner to buy a gun for another lawful gun owner. He was joined by the court's other conservatives — Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.
The case began after Bruce James Abramski, Jr. bought a Glock 19 handgun in Collinsville, Virginia, in 2009 and later transferred it to his uncle in Easton, Pennsylvania. Abramski, a former police officer, had assured the Virginia dealer he was the "actual buyer" of the weapon even though he had already offered to buy the gun for his uncle using a police discount.
Abramski purchased the gun three days after his uncle had written him a check for $400 with "Glock 19 handgun" written in the memo line. During the transaction, he answered "yes" on a federal form asking "Are you the actual transferee buyer of the firearm(s) listed on this form? Warning: You are not the actual buyer if you are acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you."
Police later arrested Abramski after they thought he was involved in a bank robbery in Rocky Mount, Virginia. No charges were ever filed on the bank robbery, but officials charged him with making false statements about the purchase of the gun.
A federal district judge rejected Abramski's argument that he was not a straw purchaser because his uncle was eligible to buy firearms and the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Obama administration had argued that accepting Abramski's defense would impair the ability of law enforcement officials to trace firearms involved in crimes and keep weapons away from people who are not eligible to buy them. The administration said that even if the purchase is made on behalf of someone eligible to buy a firearm, the purpose of the law is frustrated since Congress requires the gun dealers — not purchasers — to run federal background checks on people buying guns.
Abramski claimed Congress' goal was to prevent guns from falling into the hands of convicted felons and others barred from owning firearms. He said that goal is not furthered if the gun is transferred to someone legally allowed to own guns.
The National Rifle Association sided with Abramski, asserting that the government wrongly interpreted the law and improperly expanded the scope of gun regulations. Twenty-six states also submitted a brief supporting Abramski's view of the law, while nine states and Washington, D.C., filed papers bolstering the Obama administration.
http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-rules-straw-purchaser-law-140713053--finance.html
Software Patent Protection Curbed by U.S. Supreme Court
Software Patent Protection Curbed by U.S. Supreme Court
By Greg Stohr and Susan Decker Jun 19, 2014 2:31 PM CT
Software developers can’t get a patent simply for taking an abstract idea and implementing it on a computer, the U.S. Supreme Court said, ruling for the first time in decades on protection for software innovation.
The justices today unanimously rejected a bid by Melbourne-based Alice Corp. to patent a computerized system for limiting the risk that one party to a financial transaction will renege on its obligations. Writing for the court, Justice Clarence Thomas said the patent improperly covered a “fundamental economic practice.”
The decision may give a new tool to Google Inc. (GOOG) and other companies fighting what they say are frivolous lawsuits over software patents. At the same time, the ruling stopped short of creating special standards restricting software patents.
“People were fearful this would be some broad, sweeping decision saying you can’t patent a computer-implemented invention,” said Peg Duncan, a patent lawyer with McDermott Will & Emery in Chicago. “The Supreme Court didn’t say that.”
Dozens of companies took positions in the case. Retailers and Internet businesses including Google and Amazon.com Inc. urged the court to weed out baseless royalty demands, while software makers led by Microsoft Corp. (MSFT) said overly strict limits on patents would reduce incentives to develop cutting-edge programs.
Both sides declared victory.
‘Existing Law’
“Microsoft is pleased that the court has confirmed existing law that abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection and distinguished the Alice patent from software inventions,” said Horacio Gutierrez, the company’s deputy general counsel.
While the decision “could have gone farther,” it might help eliminate some of the patents frequently used in lawsuits against technology companies, said Matt Levy, counsel for the Computer & Communications Industry Association, whose members include Google, Facebook Inc. (FB) and EBay Inc.
“The kind of software patents that are just egregious, that just say, ‘we do X on a computer,’ are not patentable,” Levy said in a conference call.
The ruling marks the sixth time this year the Supreme Court has limited the power of patent holders.
“The court is doing many things that are restricting the ability to enforce patents rights and in this case to obtain patent rights,” Robert Sachs, a patent lawyer at Fenwick & West in San Francisco.
Infringement Claimed
The latest case centered on claims that CLS Bank International, a New York-based provider of financial settlement services, infringed patents owned by Alice Corp. The patents involve the use of a third party to reduce settlement risk.
In ruling against Alice, Thomas pointed to past Supreme Court decisions that say abstract ideas aren’t entitled to legal protection. Alice’s patents, Thomas said, “merely require generic computer implementation” of that sort of abstract idea.
Alice, which is partially owned by National Australia Bank Ltd. (NAB), unsuccessfully argued that the abstract-idea exception to patent eligibility is a narrow one.
“Obviously, the client is disappointed, but not surprised,” said Carter Phillips, the lawyer who argued on Alice’s behalf in the case. “The court clearly was unimpressed by the patent and the presence of a computer as part of the invention did not change its view that the patent really just embodies an abstract idea.”
Direct Threat
CLS says it processes more than $5 trillion worth of foreign exchange transactions per day.
Alice’s patent claims “directly threatened an entity that is vital to the functioning of the largest and most liquid market in the world, foreign exchange,” CLS Chief Executive Officer David Puth said in an e-mailed statement after today’s ruling.
Some companies expressed frustration that the court didn’t provide more guidance. The opinion was so specific to the Alice patent that it did little to clarify the line between what’s eligible for a patent and what isn’t, said Manny Schecter, chief patent counsel for Armonk, New York-based International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) The problem, he said, is in defining what’s “abstract.”
“They still don’t provide any more guidance that will help us with the next case that comes along,” Schecter said in a telephone interview. “I can’t imagine that the Supreme Court wants to take on every one of these cases. It’s going to be a source of great frustration.”
Ruling Upheld
Today’s decision upheld a ruling by the Washington-based federal appeals court that handles patent cases.
The case involved the basic question of eligibility for patent protection. Other parts of the Patent Act, not directly at issue before the Supreme Court, impose additional requirements, including novelty and usefulness.
It can be faster and cheaper to challenge a patent by arguing that an invention isn’t eligible for protection than to dig into details of the validity or infringement of the patent. The eligibility argument is used by many companies sued by owners of patents for common Internet functions.
The case is Alice v. CLS Bank International, 13-298.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...eligibility-limited-by-u-s-supreme-court.html
Software Patent Protection Curbed by U.S. Supreme Court
By Greg Stohr and Susan Decker Jun 19, 2014 2:31 PM CT
Software developers can’t get a patent simply for taking an abstract idea and implementing it on a computer, the U.S. Supreme Court said, ruling for the first time in decades on protection for software innovation.
The justices today unanimously rejected a bid by Melbourne-based Alice Corp. to patent a computerized system for limiting the risk that one party to a financial transaction will renege on its obligations. Writing for the court, Justice Clarence Thomas said the patent improperly covered a “fundamental economic practice.”
The decision may give a new tool to Google Inc. (GOOG) and other companies fighting what they say are frivolous lawsuits over software patents. At the same time, the ruling stopped short of creating special standards restricting software patents.
“People were fearful this would be some broad, sweeping decision saying you can’t patent a computer-implemented invention,” said Peg Duncan, a patent lawyer with McDermott Will & Emery in Chicago. “The Supreme Court didn’t say that.”
Dozens of companies took positions in the case. Retailers and Internet businesses including Google and Amazon.com Inc. urged the court to weed out baseless royalty demands, while software makers led by Microsoft Corp. (MSFT) said overly strict limits on patents would reduce incentives to develop cutting-edge programs.
Both sides declared victory.
‘Existing Law’
“Microsoft is pleased that the court has confirmed existing law that abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection and distinguished the Alice patent from software inventions,” said Horacio Gutierrez, the company’s deputy general counsel.
While the decision “could have gone farther,” it might help eliminate some of the patents frequently used in lawsuits against technology companies, said Matt Levy, counsel for the Computer & Communications Industry Association, whose members include Google, Facebook Inc. (FB) and EBay Inc.
“The kind of software patents that are just egregious, that just say, ‘we do X on a computer,’ are not patentable,” Levy said in a conference call.
The ruling marks the sixth time this year the Supreme Court has limited the power of patent holders.
“The court is doing many things that are restricting the ability to enforce patents rights and in this case to obtain patent rights,” Robert Sachs, a patent lawyer at Fenwick & West in San Francisco.
Infringement Claimed
The latest case centered on claims that CLS Bank International, a New York-based provider of financial settlement services, infringed patents owned by Alice Corp. The patents involve the use of a third party to reduce settlement risk.
In ruling against Alice, Thomas pointed to past Supreme Court decisions that say abstract ideas aren’t entitled to legal protection. Alice’s patents, Thomas said, “merely require generic computer implementation” of that sort of abstract idea.
Alice, which is partially owned by National Australia Bank Ltd. (NAB), unsuccessfully argued that the abstract-idea exception to patent eligibility is a narrow one.
“Obviously, the client is disappointed, but not surprised,” said Carter Phillips, the lawyer who argued on Alice’s behalf in the case. “The court clearly was unimpressed by the patent and the presence of a computer as part of the invention did not change its view that the patent really just embodies an abstract idea.”
Direct Threat
CLS says it processes more than $5 trillion worth of foreign exchange transactions per day.
Alice’s patent claims “directly threatened an entity that is vital to the functioning of the largest and most liquid market in the world, foreign exchange,” CLS Chief Executive Officer David Puth said in an e-mailed statement after today’s ruling.
Some companies expressed frustration that the court didn’t provide more guidance. The opinion was so specific to the Alice patent that it did little to clarify the line between what’s eligible for a patent and what isn’t, said Manny Schecter, chief patent counsel for Armonk, New York-based International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) The problem, he said, is in defining what’s “abstract.”
“They still don’t provide any more guidance that will help us with the next case that comes along,” Schecter said in a telephone interview. “I can’t imagine that the Supreme Court wants to take on every one of these cases. It’s going to be a source of great frustration.”
Ruling Upheld
Today’s decision upheld a ruling by the Washington-based federal appeals court that handles patent cases.
The case involved the basic question of eligibility for patent protection. Other parts of the Patent Act, not directly at issue before the Supreme Court, impose additional requirements, including novelty and usefulness.
It can be faster and cheaper to challenge a patent by arguing that an invention isn’t eligible for protection than to dig into details of the validity or infringement of the patent. The eligibility argument is used by many companies sued by owners of patents for common Internet functions.
The case is Alice v. CLS Bank International, 13-298.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-...eligibility-limited-by-u-s-supreme-court.html
Supreme Court limits police searches of cellphones
Supreme Court limits police searches of cellphones
Richard Wolf, USA TODAY
8:11 a.m. EDT June 26, 2014
WASHINGTON —- Cellphones and smartphones generally cannot be searched by police without a warrant during arrests, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously Wednesday in a major victory for privacy rights.
Ruling on two cases from California and Massachusetts, the justices acknowledged both a right to privacy and a need to investigate crimes. But they came down squarely on the side of privacy rights.
"Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet or a purse," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the court.
"We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime," he said. "Privacy comes at a cost."
The justices struck down an extensive smartphone search in California that had been upheld by the state Court of Appeals, as well as a more limited probe of an old flip-top cellphone in Massachusetts that a federal judge had thrown out.
Currently, police can search a person under arrest and whatever physical items are within reach to find weapons and preserve evidence that might be destroyed. But the justices noted that vast amounts of sensitive data on modern smartphones raise privacy concerns that differentiate them from other items.
To liken physical objects to digital data, as federal and state government officials did in justifying cellphone searches, Roberts said, "is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together."
Roberts said police still can examine "the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon." But once secured, he said, "data on the phone can endanger no one" and the arrested person will not be able to "delete incriminating data."
Justice Department spokeswoman Ellen Canale said prosecutors and police still will "make use of whatever technology is available to preserve evidence on cellphones while seeking a warrant.... Our commitment to vigorously enforcing the criminal laws and protecting the public while respecting the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is unwavering."
In the past two years, the court has ruled that police can swab a suspect's cheek for DNA to put into an unsolved crimes database, as well as conduct strip searches of prisoners without reasonable suspicion.
But the justices also have said police need a warrant to attach a GPS device to a suspect's car, to obtain blood from a drunken driver who refuses a breathalyzer test, and to bring a drug-sniffing dog up to the door of a suspect's house.
The cellphone cases may be just a precursor to more expansive and potentially explosive high court inquiries. Among them: an examination of the National Security Agency's phone and computer surveillance methods, on which two federal district courts recently diverged.
Privacy advocates hailed the ruling. "By recognizing that the digital revolution has transformed our expectations of privacy, today's decision is itself revolutionary and will help to protect the privacy rights of all Americans," said Steven Shapiro, national legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union.
The two cellphone cases, heard back-to-back in April, involved different crimes, different responses and different lower-court rulings. What joined them was the fact that police searched cellphones without first obtaining warrants.
A California court upheld David Riley's conviction on gang-related weapons offenses that police uncovered after stopping his car for expired tags, finding guns under the hood and then discovering incriminating photos and video on his smartphone. The justices overturned that ruling.
In Massachusetts, a federal appeals court threw out Brima Wurie's conviction after a specifically targeted search of his old-fashioned flip-phone following a street arrest led police to find a cache of drugs and weapons at his home. The high court upheld that ruling.
Because the California search was extensive and the Massachusetts search aimed only at incoming calls and addresses, both cases had appeared ripe for reversal. But with appeals courts divided on the issue of cellphone searches, the justices also were being asked to devise bright-line rules for police to follow — something Roberts emphasized in his opinion.
That's particularly true because technology is advancing, creating new Fourth Amendment puzzles for police to solve. Nine in 10 adults in the U.S. own cellphones, more than half of them smartphones. Eight in 10 use those phones to send text messages; more than half send or receive e-mail, download applications or access the Internet.
Cellphones "are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy," the chief justice said.
"The phrase, 'There's an app for that' is now part of the popular lexicon," he said. "The average smartphone user has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of the user's life."
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/...urt-cellphone-search-privacy-arrest/10025923/
Supreme Court limits police searches of cellphones
Richard Wolf, USA TODAY
8:11 a.m. EDT June 26, 2014
WASHINGTON —- Cellphones and smartphones generally cannot be searched by police without a warrant during arrests, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously Wednesday in a major victory for privacy rights.
Ruling on two cases from California and Massachusetts, the justices acknowledged both a right to privacy and a need to investigate crimes. But they came down squarely on the side of privacy rights.
"Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet or a purse," Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the court.
"We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime," he said. "Privacy comes at a cost."
The justices struck down an extensive smartphone search in California that had been upheld by the state Court of Appeals, as well as a more limited probe of an old flip-top cellphone in Massachusetts that a federal judge had thrown out.
Currently, police can search a person under arrest and whatever physical items are within reach to find weapons and preserve evidence that might be destroyed. But the justices noted that vast amounts of sensitive data on modern smartphones raise privacy concerns that differentiate them from other items.
To liken physical objects to digital data, as federal and state government officials did in justifying cellphone searches, Roberts said, "is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together."
Roberts said police still can examine "the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon." But once secured, he said, "data on the phone can endanger no one" and the arrested person will not be able to "delete incriminating data."
Justice Department spokeswoman Ellen Canale said prosecutors and police still will "make use of whatever technology is available to preserve evidence on cellphones while seeking a warrant.... Our commitment to vigorously enforcing the criminal laws and protecting the public while respecting the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is unwavering."
In the past two years, the court has ruled that police can swab a suspect's cheek for DNA to put into an unsolved crimes database, as well as conduct strip searches of prisoners without reasonable suspicion.
But the justices also have said police need a warrant to attach a GPS device to a suspect's car, to obtain blood from a drunken driver who refuses a breathalyzer test, and to bring a drug-sniffing dog up to the door of a suspect's house.
The cellphone cases may be just a precursor to more expansive and potentially explosive high court inquiries. Among them: an examination of the National Security Agency's phone and computer surveillance methods, on which two federal district courts recently diverged.
Privacy advocates hailed the ruling. "By recognizing that the digital revolution has transformed our expectations of privacy, today's decision is itself revolutionary and will help to protect the privacy rights of all Americans," said Steven Shapiro, national legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union.
The two cellphone cases, heard back-to-back in April, involved different crimes, different responses and different lower-court rulings. What joined them was the fact that police searched cellphones without first obtaining warrants.
A California court upheld David Riley's conviction on gang-related weapons offenses that police uncovered after stopping his car for expired tags, finding guns under the hood and then discovering incriminating photos and video on his smartphone. The justices overturned that ruling.
In Massachusetts, a federal appeals court threw out Brima Wurie's conviction after a specifically targeted search of his old-fashioned flip-phone following a street arrest led police to find a cache of drugs and weapons at his home. The high court upheld that ruling.
Because the California search was extensive and the Massachusetts search aimed only at incoming calls and addresses, both cases had appeared ripe for reversal. But with appeals courts divided on the issue of cellphone searches, the justices also were being asked to devise bright-line rules for police to follow — something Roberts emphasized in his opinion.
That's particularly true because technology is advancing, creating new Fourth Amendment puzzles for police to solve. Nine in 10 adults in the U.S. own cellphones, more than half of them smartphones. Eight in 10 use those phones to send text messages; more than half send or receive e-mail, download applications or access the Internet.
Cellphones "are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy," the chief justice said.
"The phrase, 'There's an app for that' is now part of the popular lexicon," he said. "The average smartphone user has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of the user's life."
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/...urt-cellphone-search-privacy-arrest/10025923/
Supreme Court Narrows President's Recess-Appointment Powers
Supreme Court Narrows President's Recess-Appointment Powers
Justices Rule Obama's Appointments to NLRB During Senate Break in 2012 Were Invalid
By JESS BRAVIN And MELANIE TROTTMAN CONNECT
Updated June 26, 2014 11:38 a.m. ET
WASHINGTON—The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that President Barack Obama exceeded his authority in appointing three National Labor Relations Board members during a brief Senate break in 2012, holding presidents may only exercise their appointment powers during recesses of 10 or more days.
The decision provides a narrow win for employers who contested the validity of labor board rulings made by the recess appointees. But by a 5-4 vote, the court refused to virtually eliminate the president's power to fill vacancies when the Senate wasn't transacting business, as a lower court had done.
The ruling puts in question hundreds of decisions the labor board issued during the time the recess appointees were seated, including a decision that protected workers from being fired for complaining about working conditions on sites like Facebook and a decision that gave unions greater rights in employee-discipline cases.
The board issued 436 decisions in contested cases between Jan. 31, 2012, and July 16, 2013, an NLRB spokesman said. Two of the recess appointees—Democrats Richard Griffin and Sharon Block—were on the board during that 18-month period, while the other—Republican Terence Flynn—stepped down in the summer of 2012.
The majority opinion, by Justice Stephen Breyer, cited more than a century of historical practice that has treated the recess power more broadly, saying that was entitled to judicial respect. Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined him.
"This court must hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that over time the elected branches of government have reached," Justice Breyer said, delivering his opinion from the bench.
The power's purpose was to "ensure the continued functioning of the federal government when the Senate is away," he said. "The Senate is equally away during both an intersession and an intrasession recess."
He said traditional practice also pointed to the working definition of a recess. "Ultimately, having examined the history, we find that to count as a 'recess,' a break—whether intersession or intrasession—must normally last for 10 days or more. That is a length sufficient to create a potential need for a presidential appointment."
President Obama went too far, Justice Breyer said, because he made his appointments during a three-day Senate break between two pro-forma sessions, during which the chamber is gaveled to order but no business is transacted. The Senate, he said, was entitled to break up a long recess into shorter breaks to prevent the president from making recess appointments.
"The Senate said it was in session," Justice Breyer said, and that was enough.
The White House said Thursday it was "deeply disappointed" with the court's decision, but said it would honor the ruling.
Justice Antonin Scalia, in a separate opinion, said the majority gave too broad an interpretation of the president's power to fill positions without the Senate's consent. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined him.
"The majority practically bends over backwards to ensure that recess appointments will remain a powerful weapon in the president's arsenal," Justice Scalia said. The decision would likely "have the effect of aggrandizing the presidency beyond its constitutional bounds," he said, resonating "well beyond the dispute at hand."
While periods may have existed in the nation's earlier days when the Senate wasn't available to consider nominations, Justice Scalia said modern communications and transportation methods had rendered the recess appointment power "an anachronism." Its only remaining "practical use" was "the ignoble one of enabling president's to circumvent the Senate's role in the appointment process, which is precisely what happened here," he said.
The Constitution authorizes the president "to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." For more than a century, presidents of both parties have construed that power broadly, using it to bypass a hostile Senate by installing their appointees during holiday breaks and other periods when the Senate wasn't meeting.
Although Democrats have held the Senate throughout the Obama administration, minority Republicans blocked many presidential appointments with filibusters, a procedural device that prevented confirmation votes without a 60-senator supermajority, until a November 2013 rule change. Those tactics effectively disabled agencies. At the National Labor Relations Board, three vacancies deprived the five-member board of a quorum.
To reactivate the agency, which administers federal laws involving labor organizing, Mr. Obama made the three recess appointments in January 2012. The White House contended the Senate effectively had recessed for a holiday break, even though Republicans, specifically aiming to stymie recess appointments, had forced the body to continue holding so-called pro-forma sessions, in which a single senator called a nearly empty chamber to order and quickly adjourned it.
After losing a case before the reconstituted labor board, soda bottler Noel Canning, a unit of Noel Corp. in Yakima, Wash., sued to invalidate the decision on grounds that the members were unlawfully appointed while the Senate was in session. In January 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sided with Noel Canning, issuing a decision that drastically narrowed the definition of "recess" to contradict decades of executive practice.
The appeals court found that the Constitution's reference to the recess encompassed only the period between the roughly yearlong formal "sessions" of Congress, rather than during an effective break in proceedings. In this case, the Republicans contend Congress started a new session on Jan. 3, and Mr. Obama made the recess appointments on Jan. 4.
As a result of the circuit court's decision, dozens of companies, as well as a handful of unions, began trying to reverse decisions they had lost before the labor board during the prior year. Employers have also argued that at least 10 NLRB regional directors were illegitimate because they were installed by invalid Obama labor-board appointees, making regional decisions voidable, too. As of May, more than 100 suits challenging NLRB decisions were pending in the federal courts, a board spokesman said.
Created by New Deal legislation, the NLRB is an independent agency intended to promote labor peace by fairly adjudicating disputes between workers and management in the private sector. Still, board members are presidential appointees and a majority traditionally come from the president's party, leading to criticism that decisions tilt toward employers during Republican administrations and labor under Democrats.
At oral arguments in January, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, representing the Obama administration, had portrayed the Constitution's recess-appointment provisions as a kind of safety valve allowing the president to staff government agencies when political processes were stymied.
Several justices, however, seemed uncomfortable at the time with handing the executive branch authority to decide when the Senate had ceased to function adequately, despite the fact that presidents had on occasion invoked the power in such circumstances.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-rules-nlrb-recess-appointments-invalid-1403791866
Supreme Court Narrows President's Recess-Appointment Powers
Justices Rule Obama's Appointments to NLRB During Senate Break in 2012 Were Invalid
By JESS BRAVIN And MELANIE TROTTMAN CONNECT
Updated June 26, 2014 11:38 a.m. ET
WASHINGTON—The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that President Barack Obama exceeded his authority in appointing three National Labor Relations Board members during a brief Senate break in 2012, holding presidents may only exercise their appointment powers during recesses of 10 or more days.
The decision provides a narrow win for employers who contested the validity of labor board rulings made by the recess appointees. But by a 5-4 vote, the court refused to virtually eliminate the president's power to fill vacancies when the Senate wasn't transacting business, as a lower court had done.
The ruling puts in question hundreds of decisions the labor board issued during the time the recess appointees were seated, including a decision that protected workers from being fired for complaining about working conditions on sites like Facebook and a decision that gave unions greater rights in employee-discipline cases.
The board issued 436 decisions in contested cases between Jan. 31, 2012, and July 16, 2013, an NLRB spokesman said. Two of the recess appointees—Democrats Richard Griffin and Sharon Block—were on the board during that 18-month period, while the other—Republican Terence Flynn—stepped down in the summer of 2012.
The majority opinion, by Justice Stephen Breyer, cited more than a century of historical practice that has treated the recess power more broadly, saying that was entitled to judicial respect. Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined him.
"This court must hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that over time the elected branches of government have reached," Justice Breyer said, delivering his opinion from the bench.
The power's purpose was to "ensure the continued functioning of the federal government when the Senate is away," he said. "The Senate is equally away during both an intersession and an intrasession recess."
He said traditional practice also pointed to the working definition of a recess. "Ultimately, having examined the history, we find that to count as a 'recess,' a break—whether intersession or intrasession—must normally last for 10 days or more. That is a length sufficient to create a potential need for a presidential appointment."
President Obama went too far, Justice Breyer said, because he made his appointments during a three-day Senate break between two pro-forma sessions, during which the chamber is gaveled to order but no business is transacted. The Senate, he said, was entitled to break up a long recess into shorter breaks to prevent the president from making recess appointments.
"The Senate said it was in session," Justice Breyer said, and that was enough.
The White House said Thursday it was "deeply disappointed" with the court's decision, but said it would honor the ruling.
Justice Antonin Scalia, in a separate opinion, said the majority gave too broad an interpretation of the president's power to fill positions without the Senate's consent. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined him.
"The majority practically bends over backwards to ensure that recess appointments will remain a powerful weapon in the president's arsenal," Justice Scalia said. The decision would likely "have the effect of aggrandizing the presidency beyond its constitutional bounds," he said, resonating "well beyond the dispute at hand."
While periods may have existed in the nation's earlier days when the Senate wasn't available to consider nominations, Justice Scalia said modern communications and transportation methods had rendered the recess appointment power "an anachronism." Its only remaining "practical use" was "the ignoble one of enabling president's to circumvent the Senate's role in the appointment process, which is precisely what happened here," he said.
The Constitution authorizes the president "to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." For more than a century, presidents of both parties have construed that power broadly, using it to bypass a hostile Senate by installing their appointees during holiday breaks and other periods when the Senate wasn't meeting.
Although Democrats have held the Senate throughout the Obama administration, minority Republicans blocked many presidential appointments with filibusters, a procedural device that prevented confirmation votes without a 60-senator supermajority, until a November 2013 rule change. Those tactics effectively disabled agencies. At the National Labor Relations Board, three vacancies deprived the five-member board of a quorum.
To reactivate the agency, which administers federal laws involving labor organizing, Mr. Obama made the three recess appointments in January 2012. The White House contended the Senate effectively had recessed for a holiday break, even though Republicans, specifically aiming to stymie recess appointments, had forced the body to continue holding so-called pro-forma sessions, in which a single senator called a nearly empty chamber to order and quickly adjourned it.
After losing a case before the reconstituted labor board, soda bottler Noel Canning, a unit of Noel Corp. in Yakima, Wash., sued to invalidate the decision on grounds that the members were unlawfully appointed while the Senate was in session. In January 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sided with Noel Canning, issuing a decision that drastically narrowed the definition of "recess" to contradict decades of executive practice.
The appeals court found that the Constitution's reference to the recess encompassed only the period between the roughly yearlong formal "sessions" of Congress, rather than during an effective break in proceedings. In this case, the Republicans contend Congress started a new session on Jan. 3, and Mr. Obama made the recess appointments on Jan. 4.
As a result of the circuit court's decision, dozens of companies, as well as a handful of unions, began trying to reverse decisions they had lost before the labor board during the prior year. Employers have also argued that at least 10 NLRB regional directors were illegitimate because they were installed by invalid Obama labor-board appointees, making regional decisions voidable, too. As of May, more than 100 suits challenging NLRB decisions were pending in the federal courts, a board spokesman said.
Created by New Deal legislation, the NLRB is an independent agency intended to promote labor peace by fairly adjudicating disputes between workers and management in the private sector. Still, board members are presidential appointees and a majority traditionally come from the president's party, leading to criticism that decisions tilt toward employers during Republican administrations and labor under Democrats.
At oral arguments in January, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, representing the Obama administration, had portrayed the Constitution's recess-appointment provisions as a kind of safety valve allowing the president to staff government agencies when political processes were stymied.
Several justices, however, seemed uncomfortable at the time with handing the executive branch authority to decide when the Senate had ceased to function adequately, despite the fact that presidents had on occasion invoked the power in such circumstances.
http://online.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-rules-nlrb-recess-appointments-invalid-1403791866
Re: Supreme Court Narrows President's Recess-Appointment Powers
A new report from the Obama administration finds that women saved more than $483 million on prescriptions for oral contraceptives last year, thanks to an Affordable Care Act provision that requires certain medications to be covered at no cost to plan members.
Friday's report from the Department of Health and Human Services comes as the U.S. Supreme Court prepares to rule on the constitutionality of a health law requirement that for-profit corporations cover birth control for women under employee health insurance plans.
The health law allows non-profit religious organizations to forego the coverage if they have religious objections.
But in the so-called "Hobby Lobby" case, for-profit employers are challenging the health law's contraceptive coverage requirement, saying it violates their rights of religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/27/231796/prescriptions-for-contraceptives.html#storylink=cpy
A new report from the Obama administration finds that women saved more than $483 million on prescriptions for oral contraceptives last year, thanks to an Affordable Care Act provision that requires certain medications to be covered at no cost to plan members.
Friday's report from the Department of Health and Human Services comes as the U.S. Supreme Court prepares to rule on the constitutionality of a health law requirement that for-profit corporations cover birth control for women under employee health insurance plans.
The health law allows non-profit religious organizations to forego the coverage if they have religious objections.
But in the so-called "Hobby Lobby" case, for-profit employers are challenging the health law's contraceptive coverage requirement, saying it violates their rights of religious freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/06/27/231796/prescriptions-for-contraceptives.html#storylink=cpy
The Supreme Court Sides with Hobby Lobby on Contraceptive Mandate Challenge
The Supreme Court Sides with Hobby Lobby on Contraceptive Mandate Challenge
ABBY OHLHEISER
1 HR AGO
Update: In a 5-4 decision penned by conservative Justice Alito, the Supreme Court ruled that "closely held" corporations can't be required to provide contraceptive coverage, thanks to the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In his decision, Alito wrote that the government failed to demonstrate in court that the contraceptive mandate as it stands is the "least restrictive means" of providing birth control at no extra cost. The decision leaves unanswered the question of whether publicly-held corporations are also considered "people" under the RFRA, instead limiting its reach to "closely-held," private companies, and to objections to the contraceptive mandate. It doesn't apply to religious employers who would like to challenge coverage for, say, blood transfusions on religious grounds. "Nor does it
provide a shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination
as a religious practice," Alito added.
Justice Kennedy, believed to be the "swing vote" on this case after oral arguments, filed a separate concurring opinion for the majority in which he suggests that the government could pay for the coverage Hobby Lobby refuses to provide to its employees, as SCOTUSblog reported. In addition to Kennedy's concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a 35-page dissent in the case. She read from her dissent on the bench on Monday. Justices Breyer and Kagan filed a separate dissenting opinion.
The full opinion is here.
Original Post: Later this morning, the Supreme Court will issue its final opinions of the term, including a widely-anticipated ruling on the Hobby Lobby challenge to the contraceptive mandate. The case asked the high court to answer two questions: do corporations have the right to religious exercise under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and if so, is the contraceptive mandate a violation of that right? The court will decide the Hobby Lobby case along with a second, similar, challenge to the mandate from Conestoga Wood Specialties.
What's this all about?
Both companies believe they are entitled to refuse to provide health insurance to female employees that includes coverage of several contraceptives at no additional cost. Although scientific consensus disagrees, Hobby Lobby believes that four covered forms of contraception — two brands of emergency contraception and two kinds of IUDs — are abortifacients, or abortion-inducing birth control methods. The company objects to the Affordable Care Act's requirement that it provide employee insurance that covers those specific forms of birth control.
There are dozens of legal challenges to the contraceptive mandate. The Supreme Court decided to weigh in on this issue, in part, because the federal appeals courts are split on the question.
Why is this case so important?
Basically, the case deals with two controversial issues. A broad decision from the court on either question could have huge implications for corporate religious freedom, and for the contraceptive mandate itself. If the court does decide that corporations have the right to religious exercise, we could end up seeing religious freedom challenges to laws preventing businesses from discriminating against LGBT people and other employment laws. It's important to note, however, that today's decision will almost certainly not strike down the entire mandate itself, as SCOTUSBlog's Lyle Denniston explained before the oral arguments in this case: "The nation’s politics, and many of its legislatures (including Congress), are absorbed with debates over whether to keep the law, to amend it, to render it unenforceable, or to repeal it altogether," Denniston wrote, adding, "None of that depends upon the outcome of this case."
It's probably more useful to think of this case in terms of what doors it could open or close to private corporations seeking to challenge laws on religious freedom grounds.
So, what will they decide?
Ha ha, we're not going to fall into the trap of predicting the outcome of a Supreme Court decision. However, there are a few clues as to the thinking of some of the justices. During the oral arguments, Justice Kagan and Justice Scalia give different interpretations of the intentions of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The three liberal justices seemed to side with Kagan, and it looks like Justice Kennedy, once again, will be the swing vote. But as the National Journal noted at the time, the Roberts court likes narrow decisions, and there's certainly a way to do one today. Chief Justice Roberts even offered a proposal for how that could work in these cases from the bench: essentially, by differentiating between the religious freedom rights of "closely held" corporations, as opposed to large, publicly traded ones. He said:
"Whether it applies in the other situations is a question that we'll have to await another case when a large publicly-traded corporation comes in and says, we have religious principles — the sort of situation I don't think is going to happen."
We have more on the Court's thinking on this case in our write-up of the oral arguments, here.
http://www.thewire.com/politics/201...ised-to-hand-down-hobby-lobby-opinion/373683/
The Supreme Court Sides with Hobby Lobby on Contraceptive Mandate Challenge
ABBY OHLHEISER
1 HR AGO
Update: In a 5-4 decision penned by conservative Justice Alito, the Supreme Court ruled that "closely held" corporations can't be required to provide contraceptive coverage, thanks to the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
In his decision, Alito wrote that the government failed to demonstrate in court that the contraceptive mandate as it stands is the "least restrictive means" of providing birth control at no extra cost. The decision leaves unanswered the question of whether publicly-held corporations are also considered "people" under the RFRA, instead limiting its reach to "closely-held," private companies, and to objections to the contraceptive mandate. It doesn't apply to religious employers who would like to challenge coverage for, say, blood transfusions on religious grounds. "Nor does it
provide a shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination
as a religious practice," Alito added.
Justice Kennedy, believed to be the "swing vote" on this case after oral arguments, filed a separate concurring opinion for the majority in which he suggests that the government could pay for the coverage Hobby Lobby refuses to provide to its employees, as SCOTUSblog reported. In addition to Kennedy's concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a 35-page dissent in the case. She read from her dissent on the bench on Monday. Justices Breyer and Kagan filed a separate dissenting opinion.
The full opinion is here.
Original Post: Later this morning, the Supreme Court will issue its final opinions of the term, including a widely-anticipated ruling on the Hobby Lobby challenge to the contraceptive mandate. The case asked the high court to answer two questions: do corporations have the right to religious exercise under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and if so, is the contraceptive mandate a violation of that right? The court will decide the Hobby Lobby case along with a second, similar, challenge to the mandate from Conestoga Wood Specialties.
What's this all about?
Both companies believe they are entitled to refuse to provide health insurance to female employees that includes coverage of several contraceptives at no additional cost. Although scientific consensus disagrees, Hobby Lobby believes that four covered forms of contraception — two brands of emergency contraception and two kinds of IUDs — are abortifacients, or abortion-inducing birth control methods. The company objects to the Affordable Care Act's requirement that it provide employee insurance that covers those specific forms of birth control.
There are dozens of legal challenges to the contraceptive mandate. The Supreme Court decided to weigh in on this issue, in part, because the federal appeals courts are split on the question.
Why is this case so important?
Basically, the case deals with two controversial issues. A broad decision from the court on either question could have huge implications for corporate religious freedom, and for the contraceptive mandate itself. If the court does decide that corporations have the right to religious exercise, we could end up seeing religious freedom challenges to laws preventing businesses from discriminating against LGBT people and other employment laws. It's important to note, however, that today's decision will almost certainly not strike down the entire mandate itself, as SCOTUSBlog's Lyle Denniston explained before the oral arguments in this case: "The nation’s politics, and many of its legislatures (including Congress), are absorbed with debates over whether to keep the law, to amend it, to render it unenforceable, or to repeal it altogether," Denniston wrote, adding, "None of that depends upon the outcome of this case."
It's probably more useful to think of this case in terms of what doors it could open or close to private corporations seeking to challenge laws on religious freedom grounds.
So, what will they decide?
Ha ha, we're not going to fall into the trap of predicting the outcome of a Supreme Court decision. However, there are a few clues as to the thinking of some of the justices. During the oral arguments, Justice Kagan and Justice Scalia give different interpretations of the intentions of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The three liberal justices seemed to side with Kagan, and it looks like Justice Kennedy, once again, will be the swing vote. But as the National Journal noted at the time, the Roberts court likes narrow decisions, and there's certainly a way to do one today. Chief Justice Roberts even offered a proposal for how that could work in these cases from the bench: essentially, by differentiating between the religious freedom rights of "closely held" corporations, as opposed to large, publicly traded ones. He said:
"Whether it applies in the other situations is a question that we'll have to await another case when a large publicly-traded corporation comes in and says, we have religious principles — the sort of situation I don't think is going to happen."
We have more on the Court's thinking on this case in our write-up of the oral arguments, here.
http://www.thewire.com/politics/201...ised-to-hand-down-hobby-lobby-opinion/373683/
Supreme Court issues narrow ruling against labor unions
Supreme Court issues narrow ruling against labor unions
10:25 AM, June 30, 2014
WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 along ideological lines Monday that home-care workers in Illinois do not have to pay dues to public employees unions.
The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito was a narrow loss for organized labor. It did not overrule the court's "agency shop" precedent applying to all public employee unions.
The challenge to the mandatory union dues, brought by eight home-care workers in Illinois, represented the biggest labor case to come before the court this term -- putting at potential risk the future viability of public employee unions.
For decades, the law has allowed unions to collect dues from all private or public employees they are required to represent. Those who object don't have to contribute to political or lobbying activities, but they must chip in for the unions' efforts in fighting for better wages, benefits and working conditions.
The home-care workers in Harris v. Quinn served individuals with disabilities through the federal-state Medicaid program. They argued they should not have to pay dues for the state's contract with the Service Employees International Union, even though the union is required to represent them and they benefit from its services.
The workers, who were represented in court by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, contended that public employee unions are engaged in lobbying the government, often on issues the workers oppose. That implicates their First Amendment rights because the union speaks for them.
The importance of the case to public employee unions wasn't lost on the justices during oral argument in January. A decision against the union "would radically restructure the way workplaces across this country are run," Justice Elena Kagan said then.
Justice Antonin Scalia had expressed concern that letting public employees bail out would deprive the unions of funds needed to carry out their legally required duties.
Going into Monday, organized labor had been batting .500 at the court this term. The court dismissed a case in December that threatened to strike down labor-management agreements that help unions organize workers in exchange for concessions.
In January, the court unanimously denied 800 Indiana steelworkers compensation for the time it takes to put on and take off protective gear.
http://www.freep.com/article/20140630/BUSINESS07/306300094/scotus-labor-union-dues
Supreme Court issues narrow ruling against labor unions
10:25 AM, June 30, 2014
WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 along ideological lines Monday that home-care workers in Illinois do not have to pay dues to public employees unions.
The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito was a narrow loss for organized labor. It did not overrule the court's "agency shop" precedent applying to all public employee unions.
The challenge to the mandatory union dues, brought by eight home-care workers in Illinois, represented the biggest labor case to come before the court this term -- putting at potential risk the future viability of public employee unions.
For decades, the law has allowed unions to collect dues from all private or public employees they are required to represent. Those who object don't have to contribute to political or lobbying activities, but they must chip in for the unions' efforts in fighting for better wages, benefits and working conditions.
The home-care workers in Harris v. Quinn served individuals with disabilities through the federal-state Medicaid program. They argued they should not have to pay dues for the state's contract with the Service Employees International Union, even though the union is required to represent them and they benefit from its services.
The workers, who were represented in court by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, contended that public employee unions are engaged in lobbying the government, often on issues the workers oppose. That implicates their First Amendment rights because the union speaks for them.
The importance of the case to public employee unions wasn't lost on the justices during oral argument in January. A decision against the union "would radically restructure the way workplaces across this country are run," Justice Elena Kagan said then.
Justice Antonin Scalia had expressed concern that letting public employees bail out would deprive the unions of funds needed to carry out their legally required duties.
Going into Monday, organized labor had been batting .500 at the court this term. The court dismissed a case in December that threatened to strike down labor-management agreements that help unions organize workers in exchange for concessions.
In January, the court unanimously denied 800 Indiana steelworkers compensation for the time it takes to put on and take off protective gear.
http://www.freep.com/article/20140630/BUSINESS07/306300094/scotus-labor-union-dues
Re: The Supreme Court Sides with Hobby Lobby on Contraceptive Mandate Challenge
<iframe width="780" height="1500" src="http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jul/01/sally-kohn/did-hobby-lobby-once-provide-birth-control-coverag/" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<iframe width="780" height="1500" src="http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jul/01/sally-kohn/did-hobby-lobby-once-provide-birth-control-coverag/" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe>
Chief Justice Roberts's Maneuvering Draws in Court's Liberal Bloc
Chief Justice Roberts's Maneuvering Draws in Court's Liberal Bloc
Supreme Court's Leader Joined Liberal Colleagues to Achieve Some Major Decisions This Term
By JESS BRAVIN CONNECT
Updated July 1, 2014 7:45 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON—Chief Justice John Roberts joined with unexpected allies—his liberal colleagues—in an alliance that drew some of the Supreme Court's major decisions closer toward the ideological middle in the term just concluded.
The approach separated the chief justice, who has been on the court nine terms, from the other conservative justices—who ended up breaking with him at times.
The balancing act sometimes left conservatives such as Justice Antonin Scalia fuming over what they saw as missed opportunities to reduce the federal government's treaty powers, curb environmental regulation and relax limits on antiabortion activism outside women's clinics.
But Chief Justice Roberts may be aiming to build a stronger foundation for his jurisprudence by making appeals toward the four liberal-leaning justices, who could see partial accommodation as preferable to outright defeat by the court's usual five-member conservative bloc.
To an extent, he is doing what he said he would during his 2005 confirmation hearings after his nomination by President George W. Bush, when he spoke of a commitment to "judicial modesty."
"You don't obviously compromise strongly held views, but you do have to be open to the considered views of your colleagues," he said at the hearings. The chief justice, he added, "has a particular obligation to try to achieve consensus."
Cornell law professor Michael Dorf said demonstrating the ability to work with different factions on the court builds legitimacy for a chief justice.
"I think he cares about that, and he's going to take those opportunities when they present themselves," Mr. Dorf said. He added it is "also possible that the liberals are pulling Roberts a little bit towards the center."
In some instances the chief justice influenced rulings that ended up in split votes, while in others the court ruled unanimously on the main holding while conservatives disagreed with the outcome's limited scope.
In June, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a majority opinion that overturned a Pennsylvania woman's conviction for violating federal laws concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention. His opinion, joined by all four liberals and Justice Anthony Kennedy —a conservative who often is a swing vote—said federal prosecutors overreached.
The majority found that Congress implemented the treaty to cover weapons of mass destruction, not the case at hand: a romantic squabble in which a wronged wife put a chemical irritant on her rival's doorknob.
Justice Scalia, joined by conservative Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, said the court should have gone much further and overturned a 1920 precedent that he believed overstated the federal treaty power.
"We have here a supposedly 'narrow' opinion which, in order to be 'narrow,' sets forth interpretive principles never before imagined," Justice Scalia wrote. The Roberts approach "shirked our duty" to correct a constitutional error, he said.
Justice Clarence Thomas made a similar complaint three weeks later in a case involving Halliburton Co., lamenting the chief justice squandered a chance to overrule a 1988 precedent allowing shareholder class actions against corporations under the theory that misleading public statements perpetrated a "fraud on the market."
"Time and experience have pointed up the error of that decision," Justice Thomas wrote, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito. But Chief Justice Roberts chose instead to reaffirm the 1988 precedent—even while refining it so that corporate defendants could more easily get class-action suits thrown out of court.
That was a compromise the liberals and Justice Kennedy could support. "The court's judgment, therefore, should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
In another June decision, Chief Justice Roberts struck down a Massachusetts law creating a 35-foot buffer zone outside abortion clinics aimed at restricting how antiabortion activists approach clinic visitors.
The Roberts opinion, which the four liberals joined, rejected claims that the zone targeted only antiabortion speech because clinic employees were free to speak with patients approaching the clinic. Instead, the majority simply held that the speech-free zone was bigger than necessary to protect public safety and left standing a precedent upholding more limited zones.
The four other conservatives agreed the Massachusetts zone was unconstitutional, but none joined the chief justice.
Justice Scalia again faulted the opinion. He said it gives "abortion-rights advocates a pass when it comes to suppressing the free-speech rights of their opponents," adding it perpetuated "an entirely separate, abridged edition of the First Amendment applicable to speech against abortion."
Yet Chief Justice Roberts doesn't always find a middle ground with his liberal colleagues. On Monday, the final day of the court's 2013-2014 term, the justices broke into ideological camps allowing "closely held" companies to cite religious objections to avoid covering contraception in workers' health plans, and handed unions a defeat in a decision that said Illinois home-based care workers can't be forced to pay dues to a union they don't want to join.
In both instances the 5-4 votes fell along the court's traditional conservative-liberal lines, with Chief Justice Roberts joining Justice Kennedy and the court's other three conservative justices.
In April, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the court's opinion, backed by the four other conservatives, invalidating an overall cap on personal political contributions, freeing individuals who chafed at the $123,200 biennial limit. The conservatives said they were protecting free-speech rights; the liberal dissent, by Justice Breyer, said the majority opened the door to corruption.
Similarly, in May the chief justice joined Justice Kennedy and the court's three other conservatives in a 5-4 opinion authorizing prayers at town council meetings.
Chief Justice Roberts in the court's ruling on the recess appointment powers of presidents sided with his conservative colleagues, who argued for going much further than the court's main holding did to limit the president's authority to make temporary appointments when the Senate isn't conducting business. The sweep of the ruling was limited by Justice Kennedy, who joined the liberals to more modestly curb the president's ability to install appointees.
Prof. Dorf of Cornell said that in some instances, "the liberals are being naive" when they lend their votes. He pointed to a 2009 Roberts opinion that upheld the toughest
parts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, while opening new exemptions from federal oversight for local governments that once discriminated against minority voters.
Four years later, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by his four fellow conservatives, built on the groundwork he had laid in 2009 by sweeping aside Voting Rights Act oversight that had been in place since 1965. All four liberals dissented.
In an interview earlier this year, Justice Ginsburg she didn't regret voting for the 2009 Roberts opinion, only "where it went" in 2013. "It was a kind of hold-the-line decision," she said.
Write to Jess Bravin at jess.bravin@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion invalidating an overall cap on personal political contributions. A previous version of this article incorrectly identified the author as Justice Antonin Scalia. (July 2, 2014)
http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ering-draws-in-courts-liberal-bloc-1404238811
Chief Justice Roberts's Maneuvering Draws in Court's Liberal Bloc
Supreme Court's Leader Joined Liberal Colleagues to Achieve Some Major Decisions This Term
By JESS BRAVIN CONNECT
Updated July 1, 2014 7:45 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON—Chief Justice John Roberts joined with unexpected allies—his liberal colleagues—in an alliance that drew some of the Supreme Court's major decisions closer toward the ideological middle in the term just concluded.
The approach separated the chief justice, who has been on the court nine terms, from the other conservative justices—who ended up breaking with him at times.
The balancing act sometimes left conservatives such as Justice Antonin Scalia fuming over what they saw as missed opportunities to reduce the federal government's treaty powers, curb environmental regulation and relax limits on antiabortion activism outside women's clinics.
But Chief Justice Roberts may be aiming to build a stronger foundation for his jurisprudence by making appeals toward the four liberal-leaning justices, who could see partial accommodation as preferable to outright defeat by the court's usual five-member conservative bloc.
To an extent, he is doing what he said he would during his 2005 confirmation hearings after his nomination by President George W. Bush, when he spoke of a commitment to "judicial modesty."
"You don't obviously compromise strongly held views, but you do have to be open to the considered views of your colleagues," he said at the hearings. The chief justice, he added, "has a particular obligation to try to achieve consensus."
Cornell law professor Michael Dorf said demonstrating the ability to work with different factions on the court builds legitimacy for a chief justice.
"I think he cares about that, and he's going to take those opportunities when they present themselves," Mr. Dorf said. He added it is "also possible that the liberals are pulling Roberts a little bit towards the center."
In some instances the chief justice influenced rulings that ended up in split votes, while in others the court ruled unanimously on the main holding while conservatives disagreed with the outcome's limited scope.
In June, Chief Justice Roberts wrote a majority opinion that overturned a Pennsylvania woman's conviction for violating federal laws concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention. His opinion, joined by all four liberals and Justice Anthony Kennedy —a conservative who often is a swing vote—said federal prosecutors overreached.
The majority found that Congress implemented the treaty to cover weapons of mass destruction, not the case at hand: a romantic squabble in which a wronged wife put a chemical irritant on her rival's doorknob.
Justice Scalia, joined by conservative Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, said the court should have gone much further and overturned a 1920 precedent that he believed overstated the federal treaty power.
"We have here a supposedly 'narrow' opinion which, in order to be 'narrow,' sets forth interpretive principles never before imagined," Justice Scalia wrote. The Roberts approach "shirked our duty" to correct a constitutional error, he said.
Justice Clarence Thomas made a similar complaint three weeks later in a case involving Halliburton Co., lamenting the chief justice squandered a chance to overrule a 1988 precedent allowing shareholder class actions against corporations under the theory that misleading public statements perpetrated a "fraud on the market."
"Time and experience have pointed up the error of that decision," Justice Thomas wrote, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito. But Chief Justice Roberts chose instead to reaffirm the 1988 precedent—even while refining it so that corporate defendants could more easily get class-action suits thrown out of court.
That was a compromise the liberals and Justice Kennedy could support. "The court's judgment, therefore, should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor.
In another June decision, Chief Justice Roberts struck down a Massachusetts law creating a 35-foot buffer zone outside abortion clinics aimed at restricting how antiabortion activists approach clinic visitors.
The Roberts opinion, which the four liberals joined, rejected claims that the zone targeted only antiabortion speech because clinic employees were free to speak with patients approaching the clinic. Instead, the majority simply held that the speech-free zone was bigger than necessary to protect public safety and left standing a precedent upholding more limited zones.
The four other conservatives agreed the Massachusetts zone was unconstitutional, but none joined the chief justice.
Justice Scalia again faulted the opinion. He said it gives "abortion-rights advocates a pass when it comes to suppressing the free-speech rights of their opponents," adding it perpetuated "an entirely separate, abridged edition of the First Amendment applicable to speech against abortion."
Yet Chief Justice Roberts doesn't always find a middle ground with his liberal colleagues. On Monday, the final day of the court's 2013-2014 term, the justices broke into ideological camps allowing "closely held" companies to cite religious objections to avoid covering contraception in workers' health plans, and handed unions a defeat in a decision that said Illinois home-based care workers can't be forced to pay dues to a union they don't want to join.
In both instances the 5-4 votes fell along the court's traditional conservative-liberal lines, with Chief Justice Roberts joining Justice Kennedy and the court's other three conservative justices.
In April, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the court's opinion, backed by the four other conservatives, invalidating an overall cap on personal political contributions, freeing individuals who chafed at the $123,200 biennial limit. The conservatives said they were protecting free-speech rights; the liberal dissent, by Justice Breyer, said the majority opened the door to corruption.
Similarly, in May the chief justice joined Justice Kennedy and the court's three other conservatives in a 5-4 opinion authorizing prayers at town council meetings.
Chief Justice Roberts in the court's ruling on the recess appointment powers of presidents sided with his conservative colleagues, who argued for going much further than the court's main holding did to limit the president's authority to make temporary appointments when the Senate isn't conducting business. The sweep of the ruling was limited by Justice Kennedy, who joined the liberals to more modestly curb the president's ability to install appointees.
Prof. Dorf of Cornell said that in some instances, "the liberals are being naive" when they lend their votes. He pointed to a 2009 Roberts opinion that upheld the toughest
parts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, while opening new exemptions from federal oversight for local governments that once discriminated against minority voters.
Four years later, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by his four fellow conservatives, built on the groundwork he had laid in 2009 by sweeping aside Voting Rights Act oversight that had been in place since 1965. All four liberals dissented.
In an interview earlier this year, Justice Ginsburg she didn't regret voting for the 2009 Roberts opinion, only "where it went" in 2013. "It was a kind of hold-the-line decision," she said.
Write to Jess Bravin at jess.bravin@wsj.com
Corrections & Amplifications
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion invalidating an overall cap on personal political contributions. A previous version of this article incorrectly identified the author as Justice Antonin Scalia. (July 2, 2014)
http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ering-draws-in-courts-liberal-bloc-1404238811
10 cases coming soon to the Supreme Court
10 cases coming soon to the Supreme Court
by Nicandro Iannacci
July 7, 2014
After a week of blockbuster rulings on religious liberty, executive power, digital privacy, and more, the Supreme Court is already set for another exciting term.
The Court has already granted certiorari in nearly 40 cases turning on important questions, including the limits of free speech online, the racial composition of legislative districts, the treatment of pregnant workers, and the regulation of church advertising.
All of the accepted cases are expected to be heard before the end of the calendar year. Keep coming back to Constitution Daily for the latest news and analysis as these cases develop.
Elonis v. United States
In this case originating near Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, the 30-year-old Anthony Elonis is challenging a 44-month prison sentence for posts on Facebook that appeared to threaten his wife with violence. The Court will decide whether it is enough that a “reasonable person” would view his comments as a serious threat, or if Elonis’ “subjective intent” changes the calculation.
Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama
With little over a year passed since Shelby County v. Holder, the justices are again set to weigh in on voting rights in two consolidated cases. The Alabama state legislature is accused of “racial gerrymandering”—that is, redrawing the legislative map to pack greater numbers of minority voters into fewer districts. The state says the map is true to the previous racial composition of those districts; minority lawmakers say it unjustly dilutes constituent power.
Young v. United Parcel Service
Peggy Young, a part-time truck driver for UPS, asked her employer to relieve her of lifting packages greater than 20 pounds during her pregnancy. The company refused, even though Young insists the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires employers to provide accommodations to pregnant women similar to accommodations provided to non-pregnant workers. The Court will resolve the question.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
An ordinance in the town of Gilbert, Arizona, distinguishes “political” or “ideological” signs from other non-commercial signs—like those displayed by the Good News Community Church. The church is asking the Court to strike down the law because it is not “content-neutral” and therefore violates the First Amendment—perhaps an echo of McCullen v. Coakley.
Mach Mining v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
This case features an Illinois mining company that was sued by the EEOC over alleged gender discrimination. The company argues that the EEOC did not make an honest effort to negotiate a settlement before trial—a requirement of federal law. The Court will determine what precisely the standard should be for enforcing that effort.
Kellogg Brown & Root v. United States
The former Halliburton subsidiary is accused of defrauding the U.S. government in Iraq for water-purification services never actually performed. The case turns in part on whether or not the U.S. was “at war” when former employee Benjamin Carter brought the charge. If so, his claim is protected by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry
The parents of Menachem B. Zivotofsky, born in Jerusalem in 2002, wish for Israel to be listed as their son’s place of birth on his passport. Federal law requires the State Department to recognize Israel as such for all such citizens born there. However, both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have claimed that the law “impermissibly interferes” with the president’s authority over foreign affairs.
Comptroller v. Wynne
This so-called “double taxation” case centers on the Wynne family, who claims that the state of Maryland must offer a tax credit for income tax paid to other states as well as Maryland. That is currently true for state taxes, but not true for county taxes—and there’s the rub. The Wynnes see a violation of the Commerce Clause; the state believes it is justified under Due Process jurisprudence.
Gelboim v. Bank of America
Since 2011, investors have filed dozens of lawsuits against banks accused of conspiring to set Libor, a global interest rate charged for many short-term interbank loans. Last year, a federal judge dismissed their antitrust claims—a key part of the suits. The Court will determine if those investors can appeal on antitrust grounds separate from their other claims.
Jesinoski v. Countryside
Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski seek to rescind a 2007 mortgage with Countryside under the Truth in Lending Act, which permits such an action if the lender failed to provide the borrower with particular information. But lower courts are split or whether the law requires the couple to bring a lawsuit, or simply to send a letter, in order to redeem that protection.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/07/10-cases-coming-soon-to-the-supreme-court/
10 cases coming soon to the Supreme Court
by Nicandro Iannacci
July 7, 2014
After a week of blockbuster rulings on religious liberty, executive power, digital privacy, and more, the Supreme Court is already set for another exciting term.
The Court has already granted certiorari in nearly 40 cases turning on important questions, including the limits of free speech online, the racial composition of legislative districts, the treatment of pregnant workers, and the regulation of church advertising.
All of the accepted cases are expected to be heard before the end of the calendar year. Keep coming back to Constitution Daily for the latest news and analysis as these cases develop.
Elonis v. United States
In this case originating near Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, the 30-year-old Anthony Elonis is challenging a 44-month prison sentence for posts on Facebook that appeared to threaten his wife with violence. The Court will decide whether it is enough that a “reasonable person” would view his comments as a serious threat, or if Elonis’ “subjective intent” changes the calculation.
Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama
With little over a year passed since Shelby County v. Holder, the justices are again set to weigh in on voting rights in two consolidated cases. The Alabama state legislature is accused of “racial gerrymandering”—that is, redrawing the legislative map to pack greater numbers of minority voters into fewer districts. The state says the map is true to the previous racial composition of those districts; minority lawmakers say it unjustly dilutes constituent power.
Young v. United Parcel Service
Peggy Young, a part-time truck driver for UPS, asked her employer to relieve her of lifting packages greater than 20 pounds during her pregnancy. The company refused, even though Young insists the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires employers to provide accommodations to pregnant women similar to accommodations provided to non-pregnant workers. The Court will resolve the question.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
An ordinance in the town of Gilbert, Arizona, distinguishes “political” or “ideological” signs from other non-commercial signs—like those displayed by the Good News Community Church. The church is asking the Court to strike down the law because it is not “content-neutral” and therefore violates the First Amendment—perhaps an echo of McCullen v. Coakley.
Mach Mining v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
This case features an Illinois mining company that was sued by the EEOC over alleged gender discrimination. The company argues that the EEOC did not make an honest effort to negotiate a settlement before trial—a requirement of federal law. The Court will determine what precisely the standard should be for enforcing that effort.
Kellogg Brown & Root v. United States
The former Halliburton subsidiary is accused of defrauding the U.S. government in Iraq for water-purification services never actually performed. The case turns in part on whether or not the U.S. was “at war” when former employee Benjamin Carter brought the charge. If so, his claim is protected by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry
The parents of Menachem B. Zivotofsky, born in Jerusalem in 2002, wish for Israel to be listed as their son’s place of birth on his passport. Federal law requires the State Department to recognize Israel as such for all such citizens born there. However, both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have claimed that the law “impermissibly interferes” with the president’s authority over foreign affairs.
Comptroller v. Wynne
This so-called “double taxation” case centers on the Wynne family, who claims that the state of Maryland must offer a tax credit for income tax paid to other states as well as Maryland. That is currently true for state taxes, but not true for county taxes—and there’s the rub. The Wynnes see a violation of the Commerce Clause; the state believes it is justified under Due Process jurisprudence.
Gelboim v. Bank of America
Since 2011, investors have filed dozens of lawsuits against banks accused of conspiring to set Libor, a global interest rate charged for many short-term interbank loans. Last year, a federal judge dismissed their antitrust claims—a key part of the suits. The Court will determine if those investors can appeal on antitrust grounds separate from their other claims.
Jesinoski v. Countryside
Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski seek to rescind a 2007 mortgage with Countryside under the Truth in Lending Act, which permits such an action if the lender failed to provide the borrower with particular information. But lower courts are split or whether the law requires the couple to bring a lawsuit, or simply to send a letter, in order to redeem that protection.
http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/07/10-cases-coming-soon-to-the-supreme-court/
Re: The Supreme Court Sides with Hobby Lobby on Contraceptive Mandate Challenge
The high court's high-handedness
It is a case of Supreme hypocrisy.
The adjective (Supreme) refers to that nine-person tribunal at the top of the American legal system, the noun (Hypocrisy) to its latest act of judicial malpractice. Meaning not the notorious Hobby Lobby decision handed down at the end of June but a less-noticed ruling a few days later.
We have to revisit the former to provide context for the latter:
Indeed, the malleability of the court's logic suggests these rulings are based less in law than in the personal beliefs of the men on the tribunal. One gets the sense they chose the desired result first, then backfilled whatever "reasoning" would get them there.
Which is not just Supreme hypocrisy, but also Supreme faithlessness. And, yes, Supreme sexism.
I once saw a protest sign to the effect that if men gave birth, contraception would be bacon flavored and dispensed from vending machines. Can anyone argue the truth in that? Would we even be having this debate if some company had a religious objection to Viagra - or vasectomies?
And how far down the line must a company's religious scruples be honored anyway? If it is too much to ask Wheaton College to fill out a form because an employee will be "triggered" to buy contraception on her own, does the school also have a right to scrutinize and approve other purchases made with the salary she earns from them? If she buys whiskey or pornography with "their" money, does the school have a right to object?
Not to mention the frightening precedent the court is setting in the name of religious liberty. It makes faith a potential get-out-of-jail-free card, exempting the holder from any law he finds onerous. Given that Mormons once embraced a theology of racism and evangelical Christians still deny basic freedoms to gay people, the danger of this is obvious.
In its rush to confer personhood on organizations and constrain women's choices, the court steers us toward a day in which corporate rights would trump human rights and you could no longer take for granted that you would be served by a given business without first checking to make sure you didn't offend the owner's religious sensibilities. It's hard to imagine what that world would be like.
Pretty soon, we may not have to.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Leonard Pitts Jr., winner of the 2004 Pulitzer Prize for commentary, is a columnist for the Miami Herald, 3511 N.W. 91 Avenue, Doral, Fla. 33172. Readers may write to him via email at lpitts@miamiherald.com.
Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/07/13/233168/leonard-pitts-jr-the-high-courts.html#storylink=cpy
The high court's high-handedness
It is a case of Supreme hypocrisy.
The adjective (Supreme) refers to that nine-person tribunal at the top of the American legal system, the noun (Hypocrisy) to its latest act of judicial malpractice. Meaning not the notorious Hobby Lobby decision handed down at the end of June but a less-noticed ruling a few days later.
We have to revisit the former to provide context for the latter:
Hobby Lobby
On June 30, the court ruled that a "closely held" corporation may deny employees health insurance covering any contraceptive method that conflicts with the company's religious beliefs.
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito faulted the government for failing, under the Affordable Care Act, to choose the "least restrictive" means of ensuring women access to all FDA-approved methods of birth control.
He pointed out that the ACA already makes an exemption for nonprofit groups with religious objections; simply fill out a form certifying those objections and they are relieved from having to provide the disputed contraceptives.
Alito saw this as a win-win. Employees get the birth control they want - they pay directly to the insurance company - but the government does not "impinge" on the organization's religious beliefs.
Wheaton College
Three days later,the court issued an injunction freeing a Christian school - Wheaton College in Illinois - from having to fill out the certification form. The school had argued that simply doing the paperwork - the form asks only for name, contact information, signature and date - infringed upon its religious liberty because it would trigger the employee's ability to get the disputed contraception.
So the same form that the court held to be a reasonable compromise on Monday [in Hobby Lobby] was judged an unreasonable burden on Thursday [in Wheaton College].
Or as Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it in a withering dissent, "Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so today."
On June 30, the court ruled that a "closely held" corporation may deny employees health insurance covering any contraceptive method that conflicts with the company's religious beliefs.
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito faulted the government for failing, under the Affordable Care Act, to choose the "least restrictive" means of ensuring women access to all FDA-approved methods of birth control.
He pointed out that the ACA already makes an exemption for nonprofit groups with religious objections; simply fill out a form certifying those objections and they are relieved from having to provide the disputed contraceptives.
Alito saw this as a win-win. Employees get the birth control they want - they pay directly to the insurance company - but the government does not "impinge" on the organization's religious beliefs.
Wheaton College
Three days later,the court issued an injunction freeing a Christian school - Wheaton College in Illinois - from having to fill out the certification form. The school had argued that simply doing the paperwork - the form asks only for name, contact information, signature and date - infringed upon its religious liberty because it would trigger the employee's ability to get the disputed contraception.
So the same form that the court held to be a reasonable compromise on Monday [in Hobby Lobby] was judged an unreasonable burden on Thursday [in Wheaton College].
Or as Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it in a withering dissent, "Those who are bound by our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so today."
Indeed, the malleability of the court's logic suggests these rulings are based less in law than in the personal beliefs of the men on the tribunal. One gets the sense they chose the desired result first, then backfilled whatever "reasoning" would get them there.
Which is not just Supreme hypocrisy, but also Supreme faithlessness. And, yes, Supreme sexism.
I once saw a protest sign to the effect that if men gave birth, contraception would be bacon flavored and dispensed from vending machines. Can anyone argue the truth in that? Would we even be having this debate if some company had a religious objection to Viagra - or vasectomies?
And how far down the line must a company's religious scruples be honored anyway? If it is too much to ask Wheaton College to fill out a form because an employee will be "triggered" to buy contraception on her own, does the school also have a right to scrutinize and approve other purchases made with the salary she earns from them? If she buys whiskey or pornography with "their" money, does the school have a right to object?
Not to mention the frightening precedent the court is setting in the name of religious liberty. It makes faith a potential get-out-of-jail-free card, exempting the holder from any law he finds onerous. Given that Mormons once embraced a theology of racism and evangelical Christians still deny basic freedoms to gay people, the danger of this is obvious.
In its rush to confer personhood on organizations and constrain women's choices, the court steers us toward a day in which corporate rights would trump human rights and you could no longer take for granted that you would be served by a given business without first checking to make sure you didn't offend the owner's religious sensibilities. It's hard to imagine what that world would be like.
Pretty soon, we may not have to.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Leonard Pitts Jr., winner of the 2004 Pulitzer Prize for commentary, is a columnist for the Miami Herald, 3511 N.W. 91 Avenue, Doral, Fla. 33172. Readers may write to him via email at lpitts@miamiherald.com.
Read more here: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/07/13/233168/leonard-pitts-jr-the-high-courts.html#storylink=cpy
Re: The Supreme Court Sides with Hobby Lobby on Contraceptive Mandate Challenge
Supreme Court dodges gay marriage,
allowing weddings in five states
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/us-usa-court-gaymarriage-idUSKCN0HV19020141006
Supreme Court dodges gay marriage,
allowing weddings in five states
(Reuters) - The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday declined to decide once and for all whether states can ban gay marriage, a surprise move that will allow gay men and women to marry in five states where same-sex weddings were previously forbidden.
By rejecting appeals in cases involving Virginia, Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin and Indiana, the court left intact lower-court rulings that had struck down the bans in those states. But the high court's action means there will be no imminent national ruling on the issue, with litigation in states where gay marriage is still banned likely to continue.
Other states under the jurisdiction of appeals courts that have struck down the bans will also be affected by the Supreme Court's decision, meaning the number of states with gay marriage is likely to quickly jump from 19 to 30. The other states would be North Carolina, West Virginia, South Carolina, Wyoming, Kansas and Colorado.
The court could still take a future case, but its move on Monday is likely to send a strong signal to lower court judges that rulings striking down marriage bans are consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
MESSAGE SENT
The issue could still return to the court, but the message sent by the court in declining to hear the matter would be a boost to gay marriage advocates involved in similar litigation in states that still have bans on the books.
Just over a year ago, the justices ruled 5-4 in June 2013 to strike down a key part of a federal law that had restricted the definition of marriage to heterosexual couples for the purpose of federal government benefits.
That decision in the case U.S. v. Windsor led to a series of court rulings favoring gay marriage in numerous states. In a separate case decided on the same day, the justices sidestepped the broader question of whether state bans violated the U.S. Constitution but allowed gay marriage to move forward in California.
The momentum within America's courts in favor of gay marriage reflects a sea-change in public opinion in the past decade, with polls showing a steady increase in support. Politicians, mostly Democrats but also some notable Republicans, have increasingly voiced their support for ending bans.
It was only as recently as 2004 that Massachusetts became the first state to allow gay marriage following a state court ruling the previous year.
In 17 other states, judges have issued rulings in favor of gay marriage - most of which struck down bans - although the prohibitions have remained intact while litigation continues.
State officials defending their bans counter that the Constitution does not dictate how states should define marriage and that there is no deeply rooted legal tradition that supports a right to gay marriage.
By rejecting appeals in cases involving Virginia, Oklahoma, Utah, Wisconsin and Indiana, the court left intact lower-court rulings that had struck down the bans in those states. But the high court's action means there will be no imminent national ruling on the issue, with litigation in states where gay marriage is still banned likely to continue.
Other states under the jurisdiction of appeals courts that have struck down the bans will also be affected by the Supreme Court's decision, meaning the number of states with gay marriage is likely to quickly jump from 19 to 30. The other states would be North Carolina, West Virginia, South Carolina, Wyoming, Kansas and Colorado.
The court could still take a future case, but its move on Monday is likely to send a strong signal to lower court judges that rulings striking down marriage bans are consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
MESSAGE SENT
The issue could still return to the court, but the message sent by the court in declining to hear the matter would be a boost to gay marriage advocates involved in similar litigation in states that still have bans on the books.
Just over a year ago, the justices ruled 5-4 in June 2013 to strike down a key part of a federal law that had restricted the definition of marriage to heterosexual couples for the purpose of federal government benefits.
That decision in the case U.S. v. Windsor led to a series of court rulings favoring gay marriage in numerous states. In a separate case decided on the same day, the justices sidestepped the broader question of whether state bans violated the U.S. Constitution but allowed gay marriage to move forward in California.
The momentum within America's courts in favor of gay marriage reflects a sea-change in public opinion in the past decade, with polls showing a steady increase in support. Politicians, mostly Democrats but also some notable Republicans, have increasingly voiced their support for ending bans.
It was only as recently as 2004 that Massachusetts became the first state to allow gay marriage following a state court ruling the previous year.
In 17 other states, judges have issued rulings in favor of gay marriage - most of which struck down bans - although the prohibitions have remained intact while litigation continues.
State officials defending their bans counter that the Constitution does not dictate how states should define marriage and that there is no deeply rooted legal tradition that supports a right to gay marriage.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/06/us-usa-court-gaymarriage-idUSKCN0HV19020141006
An Unlikely Trio Files a Rare Supreme Court Protest
An Unlikely Trio Files a Rare Supreme Court Protest
By Russell Berman
17 hours ago
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia share a famous fondness for the opera, but they don't often find themselves on the same side of divided Supreme Court decisions. So it was noteworthy on Tuesday when, along with conservative Justice Clarence Thomas, Ginsburg and Scalia teamed up to file a strongly-worded dissent in the court's decision to reject an appeal in a crack-cocaine sentencing case.
The move to submit a signed dissent, noted first by Reason.com, was rare enough. The Supreme Court denies a vast majority of the petitions it receives, usually without any explanation or dissenting opinions. That's true even in major cases, such as last week's decision not to hear appeals from states whose bans on same-sex marriage were overturned by lower courts.
"This has gone on long enough," Scalia wrote.
The fact that three justices submitted a dissent indicates that the decision not to hear an appeal on the case known as Jones v. United States was as close as it gets. While a ruling on a case heard by the court requires a majority of the nine justices, the threshold to hear arguments in the first place, known as granting certiorari, is only four. In other words, the trio of Ginsburg, Scalia and Thomas lost by just one vote in their push to have the Court review the case.
The three petitioners were convicted by jury of dealing very small amounts of crack cocaine and acquitted on a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs. But the sentencing judge essentially ignored the latter acquittal and imposed a prison term that, according to the petitioners, exceeded the guidelines for the dealing conviction alone.
"If so, their constitutional rights were violated," Scalia wrote in the dissent that Ginsburg and Thomas joined. His reasoning was that because of the Sixth Amendment's explicit right to a trial "by an impartial jury," a judge cannot substitute his judgment for one already made by a jury on a finding of fact.
Why did the justices get so worked up about this case in particular? In essence, this was a last straw. Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court had declined to hear similar cases too many times previously. The lower courts, he wrote, "have uniformly taken our continuing silence to suggest that the Constitution does permit otherwise unreasonable sentences supported by judicial fact-finding."
"This has gone on long enough," Scalia wrote.
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas have served together on the Court for more than 20 years, and this is, of course, not the first time they have agreed on a case. As Salon's Jillian Rayfield noted last year, Scalia joined with the liberal justices on a litany of Fourth Amendment cases. But given the passion behind Scalia's dissent, it's too bad, at least for court-watchers, that the trio lost out on Tuesday. The argument would have been a doozy.
http://news.yahoo.com/unlikely-trio-files-rare-supreme-court-protest-171417806.html
An Unlikely Trio Files a Rare Supreme Court Protest
By Russell Berman
17 hours ago
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia share a famous fondness for the opera, but they don't often find themselves on the same side of divided Supreme Court decisions. So it was noteworthy on Tuesday when, along with conservative Justice Clarence Thomas, Ginsburg and Scalia teamed up to file a strongly-worded dissent in the court's decision to reject an appeal in a crack-cocaine sentencing case.
The move to submit a signed dissent, noted first by Reason.com, was rare enough. The Supreme Court denies a vast majority of the petitions it receives, usually without any explanation or dissenting opinions. That's true even in major cases, such as last week's decision not to hear appeals from states whose bans on same-sex marriage were overturned by lower courts.
"This has gone on long enough," Scalia wrote.
The fact that three justices submitted a dissent indicates that the decision not to hear an appeal on the case known as Jones v. United States was as close as it gets. While a ruling on a case heard by the court requires a majority of the nine justices, the threshold to hear arguments in the first place, known as granting certiorari, is only four. In other words, the trio of Ginsburg, Scalia and Thomas lost by just one vote in their push to have the Court review the case.
The three petitioners were convicted by jury of dealing very small amounts of crack cocaine and acquitted on a charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs. But the sentencing judge essentially ignored the latter acquittal and imposed a prison term that, according to the petitioners, exceeded the guidelines for the dealing conviction alone.
"If so, their constitutional rights were violated," Scalia wrote in the dissent that Ginsburg and Thomas joined. His reasoning was that because of the Sixth Amendment's explicit right to a trial "by an impartial jury," a judge cannot substitute his judgment for one already made by a jury on a finding of fact.
"It unavoidably follows that any fact necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable—thereby exposing the defendant to the longer sentence—is an element that must be either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. It may not be found by a judge."
Why did the justices get so worked up about this case in particular? In essence, this was a last straw. Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court had declined to hear similar cases too many times previously. The lower courts, he wrote, "have uniformly taken our continuing silence to suggest that the Constitution does permit otherwise unreasonable sentences supported by judicial fact-finding."
"This has gone on long enough," Scalia wrote.
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas have served together on the Court for more than 20 years, and this is, of course, not the first time they have agreed on a case. As Salon's Jillian Rayfield noted last year, Scalia joined with the liberal justices on a litany of Fourth Amendment cases. But given the passion behind Scalia's dissent, it's too bad, at least for court-watchers, that the trio lost out on Tuesday. The argument would have been a doozy.
http://news.yahoo.com/unlikely-trio-files-rare-supreme-court-protest-171417806.html
Court: Traffic stop OK despite mistake of law
Court: Traffic stop OK despite mistake of law
Associated Press By SAM HANANEL
57 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruled Monday that police can use evidence seized during a traffic stop even if it turns out the officers were mistaken in thinking the driver had broken the law when they pulled the vehicle over.
The 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts said that such a stop does not violate the Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches.
The ruling came in a North Carolina case in which a police officer pulled over Nicholas Heien's car because the right brake light was out, although the left one still worked. A search led to the discovery of cocaine in the trunk.
A state appeals court said the stop was impermissible because state law only requires a car to have one functioning brake light. But the state's highest court reversed, saying that the officer's misunderstanding of law was reasonable.
The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the Fourth Amendment requires police to act reasonably, but not perfectly. Roberts said that just as a police officer's mistake of fact can justify a traffic stop, a reasonable misunderstanding about the law can also satisfy the Constitution.
Heien had argued that ignorance of the law is no excuse for citizens accused of crimes and said there shouldn't be a double standard for police. But Roberts said that simply means the state can't impose a punishment for something that isn't illegal.
"Heien is not appealing a brake-light ticket," Roberts said. "He is appealing a cocaine-trafficking conviction as to which there is no asserted mistake of fact or law."
The state had argued that refusing to allow such stops would inject too much uncertainty into the daily actions of police in the field who need to make quick decisions. Reasonable mistakes of law are acceptable, the state argued, especially when dealing with a "confusing" law that might be subject to different interpretations.
In this case, North Carolina's antiquated law required cars made after 1955 to have a "stop lamp." No court had ever interpreted the decades-old law in the modern era to require only one working brake light.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor was the lone dissenter. She said an officer's mistake of law "no matter how reasonable, cannot support the individualized suspicion necessary to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."
Court: Traffic stop OK despite mistake of law
Associated Press By SAM HANANEL
57 minutes ago
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruled Monday that police can use evidence seized during a traffic stop even if it turns out the officers were mistaken in thinking the driver had broken the law when they pulled the vehicle over.
The 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts said that such a stop does not violate the Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches.
The ruling came in a North Carolina case in which a police officer pulled over Nicholas Heien's car because the right brake light was out, although the left one still worked. A search led to the discovery of cocaine in the trunk.
A state appeals court said the stop was impermissible because state law only requires a car to have one functioning brake light. But the state's highest court reversed, saying that the officer's misunderstanding of law was reasonable.
The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the Fourth Amendment requires police to act reasonably, but not perfectly. Roberts said that just as a police officer's mistake of fact can justify a traffic stop, a reasonable misunderstanding about the law can also satisfy the Constitution.
Heien had argued that ignorance of the law is no excuse for citizens accused of crimes and said there shouldn't be a double standard for police. But Roberts said that simply means the state can't impose a punishment for something that isn't illegal.
"Heien is not appealing a brake-light ticket," Roberts said. "He is appealing a cocaine-trafficking conviction as to which there is no asserted mistake of fact or law."
The state had argued that refusing to allow such stops would inject too much uncertainty into the daily actions of police in the field who need to make quick decisions. Reasonable mistakes of law are acceptable, the state argued, especially when dealing with a "confusing" law that might be subject to different interpretations.
In this case, North Carolina's antiquated law required cars made after 1955 to have a "stop lamp." No court had ever interpreted the decades-old law in the modern era to require only one working brake light.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor was the lone dissenter. She said an officer's mistake of law "no matter how reasonable, cannot support the individualized suspicion necessary to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment."
Korematsu: A decision that is still questioned today
Korematsu: A decision that is still questioned today
National Constitution Center
By NCC Staff 18 hours ago
On December 18, 1944, the Supreme Court announced one of its most controversial decisions ever. The Korematsu decision is still controversial, since it allowed the federal government to detain a person based on their race during a wartime situation.
Several years ago, a panel of Supreme Court scholars met at Pepperdine University to discuss what they had determined as the five biggest mistakes made by the Court.
The Korematsu case ranked with the Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson decisions as the worst ever made by the Court.
“One of the worst aspects of American history is that at times of crisis we compromise our most basic constitutional rights, and only in hindsight do we recognize that it didn’t make us safer,” said Erwin Chemerinsky, from the University of California Irvine.
To put that in context, the Dred Scott decision said that the descendants of slaves weren’t entitled to protection by the Constitution. The Plessy decision established the “separate but equal” rule that allowed segregation to continue for decades.
Jamal Greene, another scholar, ranked Korematsu among four “worst-case” scenarios in a 2011 Harvard Law Review article (along with Dred Scott, Plessy and the Lochner labor-law case).
Greene looked at the frequency of law review articles about decision that were anti-canonical, or anti-precedent. Korematsu was ranked as the fourth most-mentioned case.
Peter Irons, a law professor who represented Fred Korematsu in his 1983 successful effort to get his wartime conviction overturned, is campaigning to get the Supreme Court to apologize for its 1944 decision.
Irons says the Court should “issue a public statement acknowledging that these decisions were based upon numerous and knowing acts of governmental misconduct before the Court … that has left a stain on the Court’s integrity that requires the long overdue correction of public repudiation and apology, as both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government–to their credit–have now done.”
In 2009, Los Angeles Times Supreme Court correspondent David G. Savage wrote in the ABA Journal that Dred Scott, Plessy and Korematsu were the three Supreme Court decisions that liberals and conservatives agreed were historically bad.
“After that, it depends on which side of the political aisle the experts occupy,” he said.
So what led to the Korematsu decision?
On December 7, 1941, Japanese military forces attacked the United States base in Hawaii without warning. More than 2,000 Americans died in the attack, and a united Congress answered President Franklin Roosevelt’s request for war.
In early 1942, President Roosevelt issued Presidential Executive Order 9066, after fears generated by the Japanese attack made the safety of America’s West Coast a priority.
The order started a process that gave the military power to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from regions called “military areas.”
Under another provision, called Exclusion Order No. 34, a Japanese-American citizen named Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was arrested for going into hiding in Northern California after refusing to go to an internment camp.
There were 10 camps set up nationally, and about 120,000 people were interned in the camps during the war. About two-thirds of them were Japanese-Americans who were born in the United States.
Korematsu appealed his conviction through the legal system, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in late 1944.
The court had heard a similar case in 1943, Hirabayashi v. United States, and decided that Gordon Hirabayashi, a college student, was guilty of violating a curfew order.
The Korematsu v. U.S. decision referenced the Hirabayashi case, but it also ruled on the ability of the military, in times of war, to exclude and intern minority groups.
The court ruled by a 6 to 3 vote that the government had the power to arrest and intern Fred Korematsu. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, included a paragraph that is still debated today:
“It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can,” Black said.
Later in the decision, Black argued the necessity of the military’s decision.
“Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily,” he said.
The three dissenting Justices said Korematsu’s constitutional rights had been clearly violated.
“I dissent, because I think the indisputable facts exhibit a clear violation of Constitutional rights,” said Justice Owen Roberts.
“Such exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism,” said Justice Frank Murphy. “The broad provisions of the Bill of Rights… are [not] suspended by the mere existence of a state of war. Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our traditions and ideals.”
In subsequent years, the American internment policy has been met with harsh criticism. In 1988, Congress awarded restitution payments of $20,000 to each survivor of the 10 camps.
As part of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Congress apologized “on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident aliens.”
President Bill Clinton awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Korematsu in 1998, and President Barack Obama bestowed the same honor on Hirabayashi in 2012.
During the 1999 ceremony, Clinton said, “In the long history of our country’s constant search for justice, some names of ordinary citizens stand for millions of souls–Plessy, Brown, Parks. To that distinguished list today we add the name of Fred Korematsu.”
And in 1983, federal courts had also overturned the original convictions of Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
http://news.yahoo.com/korematsu-decision-still-questioned-today-110213543--politics.html
Korematsu: A decision that is still questioned today
National Constitution Center
By NCC Staff 18 hours ago
On December 18, 1944, the Supreme Court announced one of its most controversial decisions ever. The Korematsu decision is still controversial, since it allowed the federal government to detain a person based on their race during a wartime situation.
Several years ago, a panel of Supreme Court scholars met at Pepperdine University to discuss what they had determined as the five biggest mistakes made by the Court.
The Korematsu case ranked with the Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson decisions as the worst ever made by the Court.
“One of the worst aspects of American history is that at times of crisis we compromise our most basic constitutional rights, and only in hindsight do we recognize that it didn’t make us safer,” said Erwin Chemerinsky, from the University of California Irvine.
To put that in context, the Dred Scott decision said that the descendants of slaves weren’t entitled to protection by the Constitution. The Plessy decision established the “separate but equal” rule that allowed segregation to continue for decades.
Jamal Greene, another scholar, ranked Korematsu among four “worst-case” scenarios in a 2011 Harvard Law Review article (along with Dred Scott, Plessy and the Lochner labor-law case).
Greene looked at the frequency of law review articles about decision that were anti-canonical, or anti-precedent. Korematsu was ranked as the fourth most-mentioned case.
Peter Irons, a law professor who represented Fred Korematsu in his 1983 successful effort to get his wartime conviction overturned, is campaigning to get the Supreme Court to apologize for its 1944 decision.
Irons says the Court should “issue a public statement acknowledging that these decisions were based upon numerous and knowing acts of governmental misconduct before the Court … that has left a stain on the Court’s integrity that requires the long overdue correction of public repudiation and apology, as both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government–to their credit–have now done.”
In 2009, Los Angeles Times Supreme Court correspondent David G. Savage wrote in the ABA Journal that Dred Scott, Plessy and Korematsu were the three Supreme Court decisions that liberals and conservatives agreed were historically bad.
“After that, it depends on which side of the political aisle the experts occupy,” he said.
So what led to the Korematsu decision?
On December 7, 1941, Japanese military forces attacked the United States base in Hawaii without warning. More than 2,000 Americans died in the attack, and a united Congress answered President Franklin Roosevelt’s request for war.
In early 1942, President Roosevelt issued Presidential Executive Order 9066, after fears generated by the Japanese attack made the safety of America’s West Coast a priority.
The order started a process that gave the military power to exclude citizens of Japanese ancestry from regions called “military areas.”
Under another provision, called Exclusion Order No. 34, a Japanese-American citizen named Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu was arrested for going into hiding in Northern California after refusing to go to an internment camp.
There were 10 camps set up nationally, and about 120,000 people were interned in the camps during the war. About two-thirds of them were Japanese-Americans who were born in the United States.
Korematsu appealed his conviction through the legal system, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in late 1944.
The court had heard a similar case in 1943, Hirabayashi v. United States, and decided that Gordon Hirabayashi, a college student, was guilty of violating a curfew order.
The Korematsu v. U.S. decision referenced the Hirabayashi case, but it also ruled on the ability of the military, in times of war, to exclude and intern minority groups.
The court ruled by a 6 to 3 vote that the government had the power to arrest and intern Fred Korematsu. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, included a paragraph that is still debated today:
“It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can,” Black said.
Later in the decision, Black argued the necessity of the military’s decision.
“Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily,” he said.
The three dissenting Justices said Korematsu’s constitutional rights had been clearly violated.
“I dissent, because I think the indisputable facts exhibit a clear violation of Constitutional rights,” said Justice Owen Roberts.
“Such exclusion goes over ‘the very brink of constitutional power,’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism,” said Justice Frank Murphy. “The broad provisions of the Bill of Rights… are [not] suspended by the mere existence of a state of war. Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our traditions and ideals.”
In subsequent years, the American internment policy has been met with harsh criticism. In 1988, Congress awarded restitution payments of $20,000 to each survivor of the 10 camps.
As part of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Congress apologized “on behalf of the people of the United States for the evacuation, relocation, and internment of such citizens and permanent resident aliens.”
President Bill Clinton awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Korematsu in 1998, and President Barack Obama bestowed the same honor on Hirabayashi in 2012.
During the 1999 ceremony, Clinton said, “In the long history of our country’s constant search for justice, some names of ordinary citizens stand for millions of souls–Plessy, Brown, Parks. To that distinguished list today we add the name of Fred Korematsu.”
And in 1983, federal courts had also overturned the original convictions of Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
http://news.yahoo.com/korematsu-decision-still-questioned-today-110213543--politics.html
Supreme Court: Should ban on juvenile life sentences be retroactive?
Supreme Court: Should ban on juvenile life sentences be retroactive?
The Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that mandatory life sentences for juveniles constituted 'cruel and unusual punishment.' On Friday, it agreed to take up a case that will decide whether that earlier decision should be applied retroactively, thereby giving 'hundreds' of prisoners a shot at parole.
Christian Science Monitor
By Warren Richey
December 12, 2014 4:31 PM
The US Supreme Court on Friday announced that it will take up a case testing whether a 2012 high court decision barring mandatory life prison terms for juvenile offenders should be applied retroactively.
The question arises in the case of George Toca, who is serving a life prison sentence without the possibility of parole in Louisiana.
Mr. Toca was convicted of accidentally shooting his best friend during an attempted armed robbery in 1984. He was 17 years old at the time of the alleged crime.
Recommended: How much do you know about the US Constitution? A quiz.
Toca was identified by the two white victims of the robbery. They said Toca was the black teenager who accidentally shot his partner during the confrontation, according to court documents.
Toca’s lawyer, Emily Maw of the Innocence Project New Orleans, argues that the witnesses were mistaken and that a different man is responsible for the accidental slaying.
Louisiana has a mandatory minimum sentencing regime. Under that regime, after his conviction, Toca was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The sentencing court did not consider Toca’s young age or other mitigating circumstances of the offense.
Twenty-seven years later, in June 2012, the US Supreme Court ruled that an automatic, mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for anyone under 18 amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment,” in violation of the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.
Three days after that high court decision in Miller v. Alabama, a judge ruled that the Supreme Court’s holding should be applied retroactively in Toca’s case.
Prosecutors filed an appeal, but lost. They then turned to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which ruled 6 to 1 that the US Supreme Court’s decision did not apply retroactively to Toca’s case.
In urging the Supreme Court to take up the issue, Ms. Maw argued that most state and federal courts have ruled that the prohibition on automatic, mandatory life sentences for juveniles applies retroactively to other young offenders whose cases were completed prior to the high court ruling.
State supreme courts in Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Texas have concluded that the decision should be applied retroactively, according to Maw.
In addition federal appeals court panels in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have permitted retroactive application of the decision, she said.
In contrast, only the 11th Circuit and the supreme courts of Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania have determined the new rule is not retroactive.
“If this court denies this writ and continues to allow Louisiana to deny [Toca] a sentencing hearing that was mandated by this court in Miller, George Toca will die in prison,” Maw wrote in her petition.
“He will die in prison even though other life-sentenced prisoners around the country who were convicted as juveniles are given individual sentencing hearings,” she said. “And he will die in prison even though he personifies rehabilitation and the facts of his conviction are a striking example of why mandatory life without parole for some juveniles is cruel and unusual.”
Maw urged the court to take up the case to resolve the conflict for “hundreds” of juvenile offenders entitled to new sentencing hearings.
She said the slain friend’s family believes Toca is innocent.
“Since Mr. Toca was convicted of this shooting 30 years ago, he has grown into a peaceful adult who can make a valuable contribution to society,” Maw wrote. “He entered prison without even a high school diploma and he has since earned a Bachelor’s degree.”
The case is Toca v. Louisiana (14-6381).
It will likely be set for oral argument next spring and decided by June.
http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-ban-juvenile-life-sentences-retroactive-213111388.html
Supreme Court: Should ban on juvenile life sentences be retroactive?
The Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that mandatory life sentences for juveniles constituted 'cruel and unusual punishment.' On Friday, it agreed to take up a case that will decide whether that earlier decision should be applied retroactively, thereby giving 'hundreds' of prisoners a shot at parole.
Christian Science Monitor
By Warren Richey
December 12, 2014 4:31 PM
The US Supreme Court on Friday announced that it will take up a case testing whether a 2012 high court decision barring mandatory life prison terms for juvenile offenders should be applied retroactively.
The question arises in the case of George Toca, who is serving a life prison sentence without the possibility of parole in Louisiana.
Mr. Toca was convicted of accidentally shooting his best friend during an attempted armed robbery in 1984. He was 17 years old at the time of the alleged crime.
Recommended: How much do you know about the US Constitution? A quiz.
Toca was identified by the two white victims of the robbery. They said Toca was the black teenager who accidentally shot his partner during the confrontation, according to court documents.
Toca’s lawyer, Emily Maw of the Innocence Project New Orleans, argues that the witnesses were mistaken and that a different man is responsible for the accidental slaying.
Louisiana has a mandatory minimum sentencing regime. Under that regime, after his conviction, Toca was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The sentencing court did not consider Toca’s young age or other mitigating circumstances of the offense.
Twenty-seven years later, in June 2012, the US Supreme Court ruled that an automatic, mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for anyone under 18 amounted to “cruel and unusual punishment,” in violation of the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.
Three days after that high court decision in Miller v. Alabama, a judge ruled that the Supreme Court’s holding should be applied retroactively in Toca’s case.
Prosecutors filed an appeal, but lost. They then turned to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which ruled 6 to 1 that the US Supreme Court’s decision did not apply retroactively to Toca’s case.
In urging the Supreme Court to take up the issue, Ms. Maw argued that most state and federal courts have ruled that the prohibition on automatic, mandatory life sentences for juveniles applies retroactively to other young offenders whose cases were completed prior to the high court ruling.
State supreme courts in Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Texas have concluded that the decision should be applied retroactively, according to Maw.
In addition federal appeals court panels in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have permitted retroactive application of the decision, she said.
In contrast, only the 11th Circuit and the supreme courts of Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania have determined the new rule is not retroactive.
“If this court denies this writ and continues to allow Louisiana to deny [Toca] a sentencing hearing that was mandated by this court in Miller, George Toca will die in prison,” Maw wrote in her petition.
“He will die in prison even though other life-sentenced prisoners around the country who were convicted as juveniles are given individual sentencing hearings,” she said. “And he will die in prison even though he personifies rehabilitation and the facts of his conviction are a striking example of why mandatory life without parole for some juveniles is cruel and unusual.”
Maw urged the court to take up the case to resolve the conflict for “hundreds” of juvenile offenders entitled to new sentencing hearings.
She said the slain friend’s family believes Toca is innocent.
“Since Mr. Toca was convicted of this shooting 30 years ago, he has grown into a peaceful adult who can make a valuable contribution to society,” Maw wrote. “He entered prison without even a high school diploma and he has since earned a Bachelor’s degree.”
The case is Toca v. Louisiana (14-6381).
It will likely be set for oral argument next spring and decided by June.
http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-ban-juvenile-life-sentences-retroactive-213111388.html
Re: Supreme Court: Should ban on juvenile life sentences be retroactive?
Why not? If its cruel and unusual, its cruel and unusual. If it was cruel and unusual in 1984 and the Court came to that conclusion in 2012, retrospectively and applying it prospectively, what would make it not cruel and unusual before or after that date with respect to those who meet the criteria
Why not? If its cruel and unusual, its cruel and unusual. If it was cruel and unusual in 1984 and the Court came to that conclusion in 2012, retrospectively and applying it prospectively, what would make it not cruel and unusual before or after that date with respect to those who meet the criteria
High court case could foil government suits over job bias
High court case could foil government suits over job bias
Associated Press
By SAM HANANEL
January 11, 2015 4:30 PM
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court could put the brakes on the Obama administration's growing crackdown against companies facing claims of discrimination against women, minorities and other protected groups.
Justices will hear arguments Tuesday in a case that considers whether employers can defend discrimination lawsuits by asserting that government lawyers did not try hard enough to settle claims before going to court.
Companies are complaining increasingly about the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's "systemic litigation" program, which turns individual complaints of bias into high-stakes class-action cases on behalf of dozens or even hundreds of workers.
The enforcement strategy has netted over $100 million in legal judgments and settlements from more than 50 companies since 2011, including $20 million from Verizon Inc. to settle allegations that the company unfairly fired or disciplined hundreds of disabled workers for missing work.
EEOC general counsel P. David Lopez has said the bigger cases send a stronger message to all employers about complying with the law. But employer groups deride the strategy as "sue first and negotiate later." They complain of government bullying tactics and unfair take-it-or-leave-it offers that do not allow for meaningful settlement talks.
Many employers confronted with claims of workplace bias would rather negotiate a minimal settlement with the EEOC and pledge to fix the problems than mount a costly legal defense in court.
The case before the high court involves an Illinois mining company sued by the EEOC in 2011 for failing to hire any female workers despite receiving applications from many qualified women. Mach Mining says the suit should be thrown out because the commission did not try in good faith to reach a settlement before taking the company to court.
A federal judge agreed to look into whether the EEOC's attempt to settle the case was "sincere and reasonable." But the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago reversed that, saying a court has no business peering into the EEOC's private settlement talks.
Federal law does require the EEOC to attempt to halt unlawful employment practices by "informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." But the EEOC may choose to sue if it is unable to reach a settlement that is "acceptable to the commission."
Lower courts have struggled to determine exactly what that means. Some courts have required a minimal showing of "good faith," while other courts probe more deeply.
But the 7th Circuit is the first to reject the inquiry altogether. It said there was no clear standard of "how many offers, counteroffers, conferences or phone calls" would be needed to satisfy a court.
Lawyers for Mach Mining argue that judicial review of the conciliation process is needed to find out whether the EEOC complied with basic steps such as giving an employer enough information about the charges or providing enough time to respond to settlement offers.
In an unusual move, the EEOC also asked the Supreme Court to take up the case. The Justice Department argues that allowing employers to question the government's settlement efforts at all undermines law enforcement and only encourages companies to drag out settlement talks.
If the high court affirms the decision, it would help the EEOC overturn nearly four decades of case law that has allowed courts outside the 7th Circuit to get a look at the settlement process and derail EEOC suits.
Some federal judges have thrown out EEOC class-action cases after inspecting the settlement process. Last year, for example, a New York judge dismissed most of the EEOC's pregnancy bias charges against financial news company Bloomberg LP. The judge ruled that the EEOC did not adequately identify the class members or provide other important details to the company during settlement talks before suing.
Business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, say the EEOC is shortchanging the settlement process in favor of litigation to pursue a policy agenda.
"The feeling among employers is that it's very unfair when the weight of the federal government comes down on you and says, 'We want millions of dollars,' but won't put its cards on the table and negotiate with you," said Gerald Maatman, a Chicago lawyer who filed a brief on behalf of the American Insurance Association.
A brief filed on behalf of more than a dozen women's rights organizations, including the National Organization for Women, argues that letting a judge review informal and confidential settlement discussions will burden courts and make it easier for companies to avoid liability.
Systemic cases now make up nearly 25 percent of the EEOC's litigation docket, up sharply from less than 5 percent before Obama took office, according to the agency and lawyers familiar with the caseload.
In a recent case, JPMorgan Chase & Co. paid nearly $1.5 million last year to settle charges of sexual harassment against 16 female mortgage bankers at an Ohio office. Also in 2014, McCormick & Schmick's Seafood Restaurants Inc. paid $1.3 million to settle allegations that hundreds of African-Americans were denied jobs for "front of the house" positions at restaurants in Baltimore. Neither company admitted wrongdoing.
https://news.yahoo.com/high-court-case-could-foil-government-suits-over-124355282--finance.html
High court case could foil government suits over job bias
Associated Press
By SAM HANANEL
January 11, 2015 4:30 PM
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court could put the brakes on the Obama administration's growing crackdown against companies facing claims of discrimination against women, minorities and other protected groups.
Justices will hear arguments Tuesday in a case that considers whether employers can defend discrimination lawsuits by asserting that government lawyers did not try hard enough to settle claims before going to court.
Companies are complaining increasingly about the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's "systemic litigation" program, which turns individual complaints of bias into high-stakes class-action cases on behalf of dozens or even hundreds of workers.
The enforcement strategy has netted over $100 million in legal judgments and settlements from more than 50 companies since 2011, including $20 million from Verizon Inc. to settle allegations that the company unfairly fired or disciplined hundreds of disabled workers for missing work.
EEOC general counsel P. David Lopez has said the bigger cases send a stronger message to all employers about complying with the law. But employer groups deride the strategy as "sue first and negotiate later." They complain of government bullying tactics and unfair take-it-or-leave-it offers that do not allow for meaningful settlement talks.
Many employers confronted with claims of workplace bias would rather negotiate a minimal settlement with the EEOC and pledge to fix the problems than mount a costly legal defense in court.
The case before the high court involves an Illinois mining company sued by the EEOC in 2011 for failing to hire any female workers despite receiving applications from many qualified women. Mach Mining says the suit should be thrown out because the commission did not try in good faith to reach a settlement before taking the company to court.
A federal judge agreed to look into whether the EEOC's attempt to settle the case was "sincere and reasonable." But the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago reversed that, saying a court has no business peering into the EEOC's private settlement talks.
Federal law does require the EEOC to attempt to halt unlawful employment practices by "informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." But the EEOC may choose to sue if it is unable to reach a settlement that is "acceptable to the commission."
Lower courts have struggled to determine exactly what that means. Some courts have required a minimal showing of "good faith," while other courts probe more deeply.
But the 7th Circuit is the first to reject the inquiry altogether. It said there was no clear standard of "how many offers, counteroffers, conferences or phone calls" would be needed to satisfy a court.
Lawyers for Mach Mining argue that judicial review of the conciliation process is needed to find out whether the EEOC complied with basic steps such as giving an employer enough information about the charges or providing enough time to respond to settlement offers.
In an unusual move, the EEOC also asked the Supreme Court to take up the case. The Justice Department argues that allowing employers to question the government's settlement efforts at all undermines law enforcement and only encourages companies to drag out settlement talks.
If the high court affirms the decision, it would help the EEOC overturn nearly four decades of case law that has allowed courts outside the 7th Circuit to get a look at the settlement process and derail EEOC suits.
Some federal judges have thrown out EEOC class-action cases after inspecting the settlement process. Last year, for example, a New York judge dismissed most of the EEOC's pregnancy bias charges against financial news company Bloomberg LP. The judge ruled that the EEOC did not adequately identify the class members or provide other important details to the company during settlement talks before suing.
Business groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, say the EEOC is shortchanging the settlement process in favor of litigation to pursue a policy agenda.
"The feeling among employers is that it's very unfair when the weight of the federal government comes down on you and says, 'We want millions of dollars,' but won't put its cards on the table and negotiate with you," said Gerald Maatman, a Chicago lawyer who filed a brief on behalf of the American Insurance Association.
A brief filed on behalf of more than a dozen women's rights organizations, including the National Organization for Women, argues that letting a judge review informal and confidential settlement discussions will burden courts and make it easier for companies to avoid liability.
Systemic cases now make up nearly 25 percent of the EEOC's litigation docket, up sharply from less than 5 percent before Obama took office, according to the agency and lawyers familiar with the caseload.
In a recent case, JPMorgan Chase & Co. paid nearly $1.5 million last year to settle charges of sexual harassment against 16 female mortgage bankers at an Ohio office. Also in 2014, McCormick & Schmick's Seafood Restaurants Inc. paid $1.3 million to settle allegations that hundreds of African-Americans were denied jobs for "front of the house" positions at restaurants in Baltimore. Neither company admitted wrongdoing.
https://news.yahoo.com/high-court-case-could-foil-government-suits-over-124355282--finance.html
A response to Harlow Giles Unger’s National Constitution Center appearance
A response to Harlow Giles Unger’s National Constitution Center appearance
In this commentary, David A. Drachsler, a former Labor Department attorney and past vice chairman of the Virginia Council on Human Rights, clarifies some statements made at a recent National Constitution Center event.
National Constitution Center
By NCC Staff January 12, 2015 10:15 AM
With all due respect to Mr. Harlow Giles Unger, his December 15, 2014 interview at the National Constitution Center in connection with his book “John Marshall: The Chief Justice Who Saved the Nation” contains a number of factual errors and historical misconceptions.
To begin with, the decision in Marbury v. Madison was issued in 1803, not in 1808 as asserted by Mr. Unger. (See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 137)(1803).[1])
More importantly, Mr. Unger declares that Chief Justice John Marshall “invented” and “created” the principle of judicial review. This is, at best, a blinkered view of legal history. To begin with, before the Constitution was written, at least seven state supreme courts had exercised judicial review under their state constitutions and had invalidated state laws as inconsistent with their constitutions. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, several of the delegates had personal experience as lawyers with these state examples of judicial review.
Furthermore, several delegates at the Constitutional Convention explicitly referred to the power of the federal courts that were to be established under the Constitution as having the power of judicial review. James Madison himself said: “A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void,” echoing the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison that “an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.”
At least 25, and as many as 40 delegates to the Constitutional Convention (different scholars have reached different counts) spoke before, during or after the Convention of their interpretation that the federal courts would have the power of judicial review. Ratifying conventions in seven states discussed the power of judicial review, none contravening the concept that the federal courts would have this power. Indeed, several opponents of ratification of the Constitution raised judicial review as an argument against ratification.
Five years before Marbury v. Madison, Justice James Iredell, in a concurring opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), noted that “If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.”
Assertion by Chief Justice Marshall of the power of judicial review was unremarkable at that time and in light of the extensive recognition that the Constitution implicitly granted such power to the federal courts. The aspect of Marbury v. Madison, in the early 19th Century and for decades thereafter, that attracted the most attention was the assertion of the power of a federal court to order a high official of the executive to take or refrain from taking an action- that a writ of mandamus could be issued by a federal court to an official in the executive branch.
Scholars of constitutional law and history have noted that “Public comment at the time revolved around other questions raised by the case [other than judicial review], most notably the chief justice’s assertion that the courts could monitor and correct how cabinet members conducted their duties.” (“Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon,” by Keith E. Whittington and Amanda Rinderle.[2] )
Whittington and Rinderle also paraphrase Cooley’s “General Principles of Constitutional Law” (1880) that “Marbury was treated as a case about judicial oversight of the executive.” Thomas M. Cooley was a respected lawyer, Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and noted legal scholar of the late 19th Century.
Thomas Jefferson, of course, disagreed with Chief Justice Marshall’s most famous declaration in Marbury v. Madison, chiseled in marble next to his larger than life statute in the Supreme Court building, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.” Jefferson’s disagreement with Marshall’s pronouncement that the courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have the power to determine whether a conflict exists between a statute and the constitution and the power to strike down a law repugnant to the constitution went to the very core of the democratic republic Jefferson believed the constitution established. (Contrary to Mr. Unger’s assertion, Jefferson did not believe the president was in effect a king and could do no wrong. See discussion of amending the Constitution below.)
From the time Marbury v. Madison was issued to the end of his life, Jefferson disputed Marshall’s prescription for resolving conflicts between acts of Congress and the constitution. Just a year after the decision, Jefferson wrote Abigail Adams, “”The Constitution . . . meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action but for the Legislature and Executive also in their spheres, would make the Judiciary a despotic branch.” (Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, 1804. )
Jefferson expressed the same opinion to many others: “To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. . . . The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves.” (Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis, 1820; )“This member of the Government [the Supreme Court] was at first considered as the most harmless and helpless of all its organs. But it has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, ad libitum, by sapping and mining slyly and without alarm the foundations of the Constitution, can do what open force would not dare to attempt.” (Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, 1825.)
Jefferson believed that resolution of a conflict between two branches of government was provided for in the Constitution itself. Jefferson said in a letter to Justice William Johnson, “the Chief Justice says, ‘there must be an ultimate arbiter somewhere.’ True, there must; but does that prove it is either party [the Supreme Court or Congress]? The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies in convention, at the call of Congress, or of two-thirds of the States. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs. And it has been the peculiar wisdom and felicity of our constitution, to have provided this peaceable appeal, where that of other nations is at once to force.”
But Jefferson, as a good lawyer, directed his most withering criticism of Marbury v. Madison at all other aspects of the decision, and many legal scholars over the years have agreed. The section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to entertain applications for writs of mandamus was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Article III, Section 2, clause 2, which established those types of cases over which the Supreme Court had “original” jurisdiction. If that were the case, Jefferson said “The court determined at once, that being an original process, they had no cognizance of it [Marbury’s petition]; and therefore the question before them was ended. But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law would be, had they jurisdiction of the case, to wit: that they should command the delivery.” Jefferson commented, “Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is continually cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law, without any animadversion on its being merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief Justice.” (June 12, 1823 letter to Justice William Johnson.)
A number of lawyers and scholars over the years have leveled the same criticism at Marshall’s decision, including Professor James Bradley Thayer, Royall and Weld professor of law at the Harvard Law School in the late 19th Century and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Jefferson and other critics of Marbury v. Madison asserted that Marshall approached the issues in reverse order: a court’s first consideration in any case is whether it has jurisdiction. When the Court found it had no original jurisdiction of a petition for mandamus, it should have refrained from discussion of the other issues and simply dismissed the petition. All other aspects of the decision were, to use the legal term, obiter dicta.
A modern summation of this analysis is Justice Louis Brandeis’ oft-cited concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), enunciating what has come to be called the principle of constitutional avoidance or judicial restraint. Chief Justice, then Judge, John Roberts himself wrote a pithy aphorism on judicial restraint that a “cardinal principle of judicial restraint [is]— if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” (PDK Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (DC Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
As the congressionally chartered institution with the mission of “disseminat[ing] information about the United States Constitution . . . in order to increase awareness and understanding of the Constitution among the American people,” I suggest that the National Constitution Center take steps to correct these misimpressions of the history, origins and role of judicial review in American history and constitutional law.[3]
David A. Drachsler is a retired U.S. Department of Labor attorney and past vice chairman of the Virginia Council on Human Rights. He is Volunteer Senior Counsel for the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. (The views expressed in this letter are those of the author only and should not be attributed to the Washington Lawyers’ Committee.)
http://news.yahoo.com/response-harl...constitution-center-appearance-101608668.html
A response to Harlow Giles Unger’s National Constitution Center appearance
In this commentary, David A. Drachsler, a former Labor Department attorney and past vice chairman of the Virginia Council on Human Rights, clarifies some statements made at a recent National Constitution Center event.
National Constitution Center
By NCC Staff January 12, 2015 10:15 AM
With all due respect to Mr. Harlow Giles Unger, his December 15, 2014 interview at the National Constitution Center in connection with his book “John Marshall: The Chief Justice Who Saved the Nation” contains a number of factual errors and historical misconceptions.
To begin with, the decision in Marbury v. Madison was issued in 1803, not in 1808 as asserted by Mr. Unger. (See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 137)(1803).[1])
More importantly, Mr. Unger declares that Chief Justice John Marshall “invented” and “created” the principle of judicial review. This is, at best, a blinkered view of legal history. To begin with, before the Constitution was written, at least seven state supreme courts had exercised judicial review under their state constitutions and had invalidated state laws as inconsistent with their constitutions. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, several of the delegates had personal experience as lawyers with these state examples of judicial review.
Furthermore, several delegates at the Constitutional Convention explicitly referred to the power of the federal courts that were to be established under the Constitution as having the power of judicial review. James Madison himself said: “A law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void,” echoing the language of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison that “an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.”
At least 25, and as many as 40 delegates to the Constitutional Convention (different scholars have reached different counts) spoke before, during or after the Convention of their interpretation that the federal courts would have the power of judicial review. Ratifying conventions in seven states discussed the power of judicial review, none contravening the concept that the federal courts would have this power. Indeed, several opponents of ratification of the Constitution raised judicial review as an argument against ratification.
Five years before Marbury v. Madison, Justice James Iredell, in a concurring opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), noted that “If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.”
Assertion by Chief Justice Marshall of the power of judicial review was unremarkable at that time and in light of the extensive recognition that the Constitution implicitly granted such power to the federal courts. The aspect of Marbury v. Madison, in the early 19th Century and for decades thereafter, that attracted the most attention was the assertion of the power of a federal court to order a high official of the executive to take or refrain from taking an action- that a writ of mandamus could be issued by a federal court to an official in the executive branch.
Scholars of constitutional law and history have noted that “Public comment at the time revolved around other questions raised by the case [other than judicial review], most notably the chief justice’s assertion that the courts could monitor and correct how cabinet members conducted their duties.” (“Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill? Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon,” by Keith E. Whittington and Amanda Rinderle.[2] )
Whittington and Rinderle also paraphrase Cooley’s “General Principles of Constitutional Law” (1880) that “Marbury was treated as a case about judicial oversight of the executive.” Thomas M. Cooley was a respected lawyer, Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and noted legal scholar of the late 19th Century.
Thomas Jefferson, of course, disagreed with Chief Justice Marshall’s most famous declaration in Marbury v. Madison, chiseled in marble next to his larger than life statute in the Supreme Court building, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.” Jefferson’s disagreement with Marshall’s pronouncement that the courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have the power to determine whether a conflict exists between a statute and the constitution and the power to strike down a law repugnant to the constitution went to the very core of the democratic republic Jefferson believed the constitution established. (Contrary to Mr. Unger’s assertion, Jefferson did not believe the president was in effect a king and could do no wrong. See discussion of amending the Constitution below.)
From the time Marbury v. Madison was issued to the end of his life, Jefferson disputed Marshall’s prescription for resolving conflicts between acts of Congress and the constitution. Just a year after the decision, Jefferson wrote Abigail Adams, “”The Constitution . . . meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action but for the Legislature and Executive also in their spheres, would make the Judiciary a despotic branch.” (Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, 1804. )
Jefferson expressed the same opinion to many others: “To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. . . . The Constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves.” (Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis, 1820; )“This member of the Government [the Supreme Court] was at first considered as the most harmless and helpless of all its organs. But it has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, ad libitum, by sapping and mining slyly and without alarm the foundations of the Constitution, can do what open force would not dare to attempt.” (Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, 1825.)
Jefferson believed that resolution of a conflict between two branches of government was provided for in the Constitution itself. Jefferson said in a letter to Justice William Johnson, “the Chief Justice says, ‘there must be an ultimate arbiter somewhere.’ True, there must; but does that prove it is either party [the Supreme Court or Congress]? The ultimate arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies in convention, at the call of Congress, or of two-thirds of the States. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority claimed by two of their organs. And it has been the peculiar wisdom and felicity of our constitution, to have provided this peaceable appeal, where that of other nations is at once to force.”
But Jefferson, as a good lawyer, directed his most withering criticism of Marbury v. Madison at all other aspects of the decision, and many legal scholars over the years have agreed. The section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to entertain applications for writs of mandamus was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Article III, Section 2, clause 2, which established those types of cases over which the Supreme Court had “original” jurisdiction. If that were the case, Jefferson said “The court determined at once, that being an original process, they had no cognizance of it [Marbury’s petition]; and therefore the question before them was ended. But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law would be, had they jurisdiction of the case, to wit: that they should command the delivery.” Jefferson commented, “Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is continually cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law, without any animadversion on its being merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief Justice.” (June 12, 1823 letter to Justice William Johnson.)
A number of lawyers and scholars over the years have leveled the same criticism at Marshall’s decision, including Professor James Bradley Thayer, Royall and Weld professor of law at the Harvard Law School in the late 19th Century and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Jefferson and other critics of Marbury v. Madison asserted that Marshall approached the issues in reverse order: a court’s first consideration in any case is whether it has jurisdiction. When the Court found it had no original jurisdiction of a petition for mandamus, it should have refrained from discussion of the other issues and simply dismissed the petition. All other aspects of the decision were, to use the legal term, obiter dicta.
A modern summation of this analysis is Justice Louis Brandeis’ oft-cited concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), enunciating what has come to be called the principle of constitutional avoidance or judicial restraint. Chief Justice, then Judge, John Roberts himself wrote a pithy aphorism on judicial restraint that a “cardinal principle of judicial restraint [is]— if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” (PDK Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (DC Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
As the congressionally chartered institution with the mission of “disseminat[ing] information about the United States Constitution . . . in order to increase awareness and understanding of the Constitution among the American people,” I suggest that the National Constitution Center take steps to correct these misimpressions of the history, origins and role of judicial review in American history and constitutional law.[3]
David A. Drachsler is a retired U.S. Department of Labor attorney and past vice chairman of the Virginia Council on Human Rights. He is Volunteer Senior Counsel for the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. (The views expressed in this letter are those of the author only and should not be attributed to the Washington Lawyers’ Committee.)
http://news.yahoo.com/response-harl...constitution-center-appearance-101608668.html
source: Move to Amendent
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