Supreme Court

Justices weigh would-be judges' appeals for campaign cash

Justices weigh would-be judges' appeals for campaign cash
Associated Press
By MARK SHERMAN
January 19, 2015 10:01 AM

WASHINGTON (AP) — Voters in the Tampa area didn't think much of Lanell Williams-Yulee's campaign for county judge in 2010, and the group that regulates Florida's lawyers didn't much like her campaign tactics.

Along with being drubbed in the election, she was hauled before the Florida Bar for violating its ban on personally soliciting campaign contributions by sending a "Dear Friend" letter asking for money.

Five years after the Supreme Court freed corporations and labor unions to spend freely in federal elections, the justices will hear arguments Tuesday in Williams-Yulee's challenge to the Florida rules, which she says violate her right to speak freely. The state bar, defending the ban on personal fundraising, says it's more important to preserve public confidence in an impartial judiciary.

In 39 states, state and local judges get their jobs by being elected. Florida is among the 30 of those that prohibit candidates from personally asking for campaign contributions. If Williams-Yulee prevails, it could free judicial candidates in those states to make personal appeals for campaign cash. In the federal judicial system, including the Supreme Court, judges are appointed to life terms and must be confirmed by the Senate.

Supporters of the solicitation ban point to a dramatic increase in money raised and spent on judicial campaigns. In state Supreme Court races alone, $207 million was spent between 2000 and 2009, up from $83 million in the preceding decade, according to a study by several groups concerned about money in politics. Polls also have shown that the public thinks campaign contributions make a difference in the outcome of cases.

The Supreme Court has generally been skeptical of limits on political campaigns, though slightly less so when it comes to those involving judges.

In 2002, the court struck down rules aimed at fostering impartiality among judges that barred candidates for elected judgeships from speaking out on controversial issues. But in 2009, the court held in a case from West Virginia that elected judges could be forced to step aside from ruling on cases when large campaign contributions from interested parties create the appearance of bias.

Lower courts have been split on the issue in the Florida case.

Yulee-Williams' transgression was signing and sending a generic, mass-mailed letter asking for up to $500 in campaign contributions. She also posted it on her website. She would have avoided legal trouble had the letter been signed by anyone else. And nothing prevents a candidate from learning who did or did not give, or writing personal thank-you notes to contributors.

She received a public reprimand and had to pay $1,860 in legal costs, a penalty that the Florida Supreme Court upheld.

Williams-Yulee argued in court papers that states that worry about bias among judges should focus on rules that force judges to recuse themselves in cases where they may have a conflict or limits on the size of campaign contributions. The American Civil Liberties Union is supporting her.

On the other side, the state bar and interest groups that lament the rising influence of money in judicial elections say the restriction at issue in Florida and the other states is reasonable.

Former elected chief justices in Alabama and Texas — which permit candidates for judgeships to ask for campaign funds — called on the court to uphold the prohibition and said they are "well-acquainted with the genuine dangers — and sometimes actual abuse" when candidates solicit contributions from lawyers and others.

Some of the backers of the limits also have pointed to comments from retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who has suggested that she regrets her vote in the 5-4 decision in 2002 to strike down the rules on what judicial candidates can say. O'Connor has said the decision contributed to the politicization of judicial elections.

But the words of another justice who remains on the court might be more important to the outcome of the Florida case. "The state cannot opt for an elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to work as desired, compels the abridgment of speech," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in the 2002 case.

Williams-Yulee received just 20 percent of the vote in 2010. Her appeal for money was no rousing success either. Her lawyer, Andrew Pincus, said it didn't yield a cent.

http://news.yahoo.com/justices-weigh-judges-appeals-campaign-cash-145428819--politics.html
 
Who holds the redistricting power? Supreme Court will decide

Who holds the redistricting power? Supreme Court will decide
National Constitution Center
By Juliana Stiles
February 18, 2015 10:30 AM

With the case of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission currently before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Arizona legislature’s struggle to regain congressional redistricting power may soon be over.

Legislators filed suit against the AIRC in June 2012. Following a loss in district court, they appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

The legislature claims that Proposition 106, passed by Arizona voters in 2000, is unconstitutional under the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The initiative took congressional redistricting authority, previously given to the legislature, and vested it in the AIRC.

This new body has the power to redraw the congressional map, though there are limitations on how AIRC members are appointed and what procedures must be followed. The commission is also required to allow for a public comment period after releasing its proposed congressional map.

Under the Elections Clause (Article I, Section 4), the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” in each state is determined by that state’s legislature. The Arizona legislature therefore claims that Proposition 106 violates this constitutional provision by completely removing the legislature from the redistricting process.

Moreover, Arizona legislators argue that the meaning of “Legislature” in the Elections Clause is clear, as is the Framers’ intent to vest this power in the state’s law-making body. The Election Clause is an express delegation of that power, they say, so there is no need to interpret whether “Legislature” refers to the law-making body or the state more generally.

The legislature also claims that it is excluded entirely from the redistricting process, since it cannot repeal any maps drawn by the AIRC or create new legislation to alter those maps. It does retain the power to appoint AIRC members, but those appointments can only be made from a pre-determined list, so this power has minimal impact.

For its part, the AIRC argues that, according to Supreme Court precedent (namely, Smiley v. Holm and Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant), “Legislature” can refer to the legislative process more generally and not only to the body itself.

The initiative passed by Arizona voters was a legitimate part of that legislative process, as prescribed by the Arizona state constitution. The AIRC therefore claims that the resulting law, the entity created by that law, and the congressional maps drawn by that entity, are all constitutional under this common interpretation.

The AIRC also argues that there is still a clear role for the Arizona legislature in the overall process. After all, it has the ability to pass a redistricting plan that can then be referred to voters for approval. With this potential influence, state legislators are not, as they claim, wholly excluded from the process.

The prevailing argument is yet to be determined, but amicus briefs have been filed in support of the AIRC from multiple non-profit organizations, current and former politicians, and states themselves. Indeed, several states with similar independent redistricting entities, including California, New Jersey and Washington, will be left with the task of changing their redistricting laws if the Arizona legislature is victorious.

Many states and government officials have also weighed in with concerns about the fairness in redistricting procedures and the resulting impact on congressional elections should the Court rule against the AIRC.

Oral arguments are scheduled for March 2

http://news.yahoo.com/holds-redistricting-power-supreme-court-decide-103209963--politics.html
 
Re: Supreme Court: Should ban on juvenile life sentences be retroactive?

Supreme Court: Should ban on juvenile life sentences be retroactive?
The Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that mandatory life sentences for juveniles constituted 'cruel and unusual punishment.' On Friday, it agreed to take up a case that will decide whether that earlier decision should be applied retroactively, thereby giving 'hundreds' of prisoners a shot at parole.
Christian Science Monitor
By Warren Richey
December 12, 2014 4:31 PM

http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-ban-juvenile-life-sentences-retroactive-213111388.html

Louisiana inmate with case before top U.S. court freed after 30 years
By Jonathan Kaminsky
January 29, 2015 8:27 PM

NEW ORLEANS (Reuters) - A Louisiana inmate whose case for leniency is before the U.S. Supreme Court was freed from prison on Thursday after 30 years behind bars in a deal with prosecutors that cancels his life sentence handed down when he was a teenager, his lawyers said.

In exchange for his release from prison and having his second-degree murder conviction vacated, George Toca entered a "best interest" plea to the killing and pleaded guilty to attempted armed robbery, his attorneys said.

Toca has long maintained his innocence, but pleaded guilty to the lesser charges in order to secure his release, his attorneys said.

A "best interest" plea admits no guilt while acknowledging the prosecution would likely secure a conviction.
http://news.yahoo.com/louisiana-inmate-case-top-u-court-freed-30-012743109.html
 
Justices: Fisherman is off the hook in grouper-tossing case

Justices: Fisherman is off the hook in grouper-tossing case
Associated Press
By SAM HANANEL
February 25, 2015 1:15 PM

WASHINGTON (AP) — A Florida fisherman convicted of tossing undersized grouper off his boat is off the hook after a divided Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that he should not have been ensnared by a law targeting accounting fraud.





In a 5-4 decision the justices threw out the conviction of commercial fishing boat captain John Yates, who was prosecuted under a law passed in the wake of the Enron scandal.

Yates was convicted of getting rid of fish he had caught that were under the minimum legal size permitted in the Gulf of Mexico. A Florida fish and wildlife officer said Yates illegally dumped the smaller fish overboard to avoid prosecution.

The law's anti-shredding provision prohibits destruction of "any tangible object" during a federal investigation. But Yates argued that the law was aimed at the destruction of financial documents — not fish.

Explaining the decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that given the context and purpose of the law, it covers only objects used to record or preserve information and "does not include any and every object found on land or in the sea."

"Fish one may fry, but may one falsify, or make a false entry in the sea dwelling creatures?" Ginsburg said as she read a summary of her opinion from the bench.

In an unusual lineup of justices, Ginsburg was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a separate opinion agreeing with the result.

In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan said Congress intended the law to have a wide scope to ban destruction of any physical evidence that could thwart law enforcement.

"A fisherman like John Yates, who dumps undersized fish to avoid a fine is no less blameworthy than one who shreds his vessel's catch log for the same reason," she said.

Kagan's dissent was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.

The case began in 2007 when a Florida fish and wildlife officer discovered 72 grouper on Yates' boat that appeared to be smaller than the 20 inches permitted by law. The officer told Yates the fish would be seized once he returned to port.

Once Yates returned, however, the officer found only 69 fish and many seemed longer than those he originally inspected. A crewmember later testified that Yates had ordered the undersized fish to be thrown overboard and replaced with larger fish.

Yates was charged under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which prohibits knowingly altering or destroying "any record, document, or tangible object" with the intent to obstruct an investigation. Congress passed the law after the Enron scandal, when scores of documents were shredded to conceal wrongdoing.

A federal jury convicted Yates and he was sentenced to 30 days in jail. The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals based in Atlanta upheld the conviction.

In going after missing fish, critics said the government was using the law on a scale that Congress never intended. Yates argued that the phrase "tangible object" in the context of the law was limited to computers, servers or other storage devices used to preserve information.

But the Obama administration said the plain language of the law included fish. It has been used in other cases where defendants destroyed a wide array of physical evidence, including human bodies, guns, drugs, cash and cars.

Yates' attorney, federal defender John Badalamenti, said his client was pleased with the court's decision, though his days as a fisherman are over.

"He's no longer able to fish because no boat owner will hire him since his arrest in this case," Badalamenti said. "He lost his living."

Yates now earns his living finishing furniture in Holmes Beach, Florida.

http://news.yahoo.com/justices-fisherman-off-hook-grouper-tossing-case-151501061--politics.html
 
Dred Scott decision still resonates today

Dred Scott decision still resonates today
By NCC Staff
4 hours ago

On March 6, 1857, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Dred Scott case, which had a direct impact on the coming of the Civil War and Abraham Lincoln’s presidency four years later.

The case of Dred Scott v. Sanford was one of the most controversial decisions in the court’s history. At the time, the Supreme Court’s majority came from pro-slavery states or had connections to pro-slavery presidents.

The case had been in the court system for more than a decade. Scott had been born into slavery in 1795. In subsequent years, he lived in two parts of the United States that didn’t allow slavery, Illinois and Wisconsin, along with his master.

When his current master died in 1846, Scott filed suit on behalf of himself and his wife, also a slave, to gain their freedom. The case was heard by three other courts as it made its way to Washington.

The Dred Scott decision came just two days after President James Buchanan took office, and it set the tone for his controversial term that led to the Civil War.

Chief Justice Roger Taney gave the court’s opinion; it had ruled 7-2 against Scott.

Taney announced that slaves were not citizens of the United States and had no rights to sue in federal courts, and in fact, blacks couldn’t be citizens.

“There are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed,” Taney argued.

The court also declared the Missouri Compromise of 1820 to be unconstitutional. And it said that Congress did not have the authority to prohibit slavery in the territories.

The decision was celebrated in the South and by slavery supporters. There was outrage in the North and among abolitionists.

One person who was publicly upset with the Dred Scott decision was Lincoln, who was a rising figure in the newly formed Republican Party. The Dred Scott case was a focal point of the famous debates between Lincoln and Stephen Douglas in 1858.

The decision also made the Republican Party a national force, and led to the division of the Democratic Party during the 1860 presidential elections.

The growing power of the Republicans, who received considerable support from the northern states, directly led to fears in the South that slavery would be ended, and those fears started the momentum for secession and the Civil War.

Scott died in 1858 about a year after he and his family had gained their freedom, when his owner (under pressure from her husband) sent the Scotts back to their original owners, who promptly freed them.

Taney passed away in 1864. A year later, a request to include a bust of Taney in a hall that recognized chief justices was blocked by Republicans.

“I declare that the opinion of the chief justice in the case of Dred Scott was more thoroughly abominable than anything of the kind in the history of courts. Judicial baseness reached its lowest point on that occasion,” said Charles Sumner, a leading Radical Republican.

Sumner had been brutally beaten and almost killed on the Senate floor in 1856 when he made antislavery remarks. His attacker was Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina.

After the Civil War, the 13th Amendment and 14th Amendment effectively overturned the Dred Scott decision.

Today, the words “Dred Scott” are tossed out by politicians when they vehemently try to link a recent Supreme Court decision to a historically bad precedent. In 2010, for example, some critics compared the Citizens United v. FEC decision to it.

In 2007, Lynette Jackson, Scott’s great-great-granddaughter, told NPR on the 150th anniversary of the decision that the lesson from the case is that people should try to do what is right.

“Even if it doesn’t look like it’s going to work out, in the end, it usually does,” she said.

http://news.yahoo.com/dred-scott-decision-still-resonates-140207577.html
 
Constitution Check: Is an old doctrine of separating government powers getting new li

Constitution Check: Is an old doctrine of separating government powers getting new life?
National Constitution Center
By Lyle Denniston
March 10, 2015 10:48 AM


Lyle Denniston, the National Constitution Center’s constitutional literacy adviser, looks at Monday’s Supreme Court Amtrak decision as a sign that a constitutional separation-of-powers argument from the 1930s could be back in play.

THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE:

“The principle that Congress cannot delegate away its vested powers exists to protect liberty. Our Constitution, by careful design, prescribes a process for making law, and within that process there are many accountability checkpoints….It would dash the whole scheme if Congress could give its power away to an entity that is not constrained by those checkpoints.”

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., in a separate opinion on Monday, when the Supreme Court ruled that Amtrak, the operator of the nation’s passenger trains, is a part of the government but must stay within limits of its power to impose regulation on other parts of the railroad industry as it seeks to make its trains run on time.

“At issue in this case is the proper division between legislative and executive powers. An examination of the history of those powers reveals how far our modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence has departed from the original meaning of the Constitution.”

Justice Clarence Thomas, in his own separate opinion on Monday in the Amtrak case.

WE CHECKED THE CONSTITUTION, AND…

From the time the Founders were working out the details of the new Constitution, until as recently as this week, a lively debate has persisted over how to divide up the powers of government in general, and between branches of the national government in particular. Three branches of the national government were created, and they were not totally walled off from each other, but their separate powers had to be kept more or less divided from each other – the checks-and-balances notion.

When one thinks generally about major conflicts in U.S. history over separation of powers, the New Deal era comes immediately to mind, because the Supreme Court repeatedly struck down some of President Franklin Roosevelt’s economic policies by ruling that Congress had given away to the White House too much of its powers to make law for the nation’s governance. The court’s rationale was called then, and still is called, the “non-delegation doctrine.”

Part of the reason that this seems like an out-of-date constitutional theory is that the Supreme Court has not used that doctrine to strike down a federal law since the 1930s – nearly eight decades. In other words, the court has been quite tolerant of Congress when it has written broad new legislation, and has then handed over to government agencies the specific authority to write the details to put such measures into real-world practice.

In recent years, however, conservative scholars – and some jurists – have begun talking of a revival of the non-delegation doctrine, as a way to curb what some perceive to be the excessive use of regulatory power by government agencies in Washington. This sentiment has been strengthened by the “Tea Party” movement, as activists in those circles looked for ways to cut back on the authority of federal agencies. Within that movement, there is often talk of “unelected bureaucrats” running the country, and, they claim, running it into the ground.

The Supreme Court was drawn directly into the middle of this ongoing controversy when it took on a case involving the nation’s operator of railroad passenger service, Amtrak. In 2008, Congress had passed a law to give Amtrak – which it considered to be a private, profit-making corporation – significant authority to write new standards on how railroad tracks and other rail facilities are used, in the interest of improving the on-time performance of passenger trains.

A federal appeals court in Washington, reviving the old “non-delegation doctrine,” had ruled that Amtrak was, in fact and in legal terms, a private firm, and decided that Congress had unconstitutionally handed over to that entity the authority to legislate operating rules for the freight railroads, as well as for Amtrak’s own trains. It was the first use by a court of the old doctrine since New Deal days.

To illustrate its judicial offense at this scheme, that appeals court began its opinion this way: “Imagine a scenario in which Congress has given to General Motors the power to co-author, alongside the Department of Transportation, regulations that will govern all automobile manufacturers>” With the opinion started that way, there was no doubt what the outcome would be.

The case then went on to the Supreme Court, appealed there by the federal government’s Department of Transportation. And, on Monday, it was decided.

Ruling that Amtrak was too closely linked to government, and too tightly controlled by government, to be a private entity, the court ruled unanimously that it was governmental in nature. If the ruling had stopped there, it might seem that Amtrak as a part of government could go right on regulating the operating standards of the entire rail industry.

Not so. All members of the court made clear, in the three separate opinions that emerged, that merely being a part of government did not free Amtrak from constitutional limitations. Far from it. The main opinion written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and separate opinions by Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Clarence Thomas, made clear that this experiment by Congress might still fail under some version of the separation-of-powers notion that lies behind the “non-delegation doctrine.”

As a part of the government, the opinions said, Amtrak had to be kept within the bounds of what Executive Branch officials are allowed to do under the Constitution. Its officers had to be selected in the way the Constitution mandates, and it had to carry out any duties assigned to it by Congress in a way that respects the separation of legislative and executive authority.

While the main opinion by Justice Kennedy was fairly restrained in its reach, the sweeping separate Alito and Scalia opinions sought to make very strong cases for ending the Amtrak experiment as it has operated as a regulator of the uses of rail facilities.

To be sure, the case now has to go back down to the appeals court for another look, based on what the Supreme Court has now settled, and on what, by implication, the Justices’ opinions seem to suggest about putting new reins on Executive Branch authority. But, even at this stage, the revival of a deep judicial skepticism about how powers are divided up in Washington might suggest the dawning of a new constitutional era, one that may ask more of Congress to write legislation more clearly and within constitutional limits, and that may trim down the powers of the bureaucratic agencies in Washington. The more times change, the more they remain the same.

http://news.yahoo.com/constitution-...nment-powers-getting-105036985--politics.html
 
Supreme Court considers impact of disability law on police

Supreme Court considers impact of disability law on police
Associated Press
By BY SAM HANANEL
7 hours ago

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court is considering whether the Americans With Disabilities Act requires police to take special precautions when trying to arrest armed and violent suspects who are mentally ill.

The justices hear arguments Monday in a dispute over how police in San Francisco dealt with a woman suffering from schizophrenia who had threatened to kill her social worker. Police forced their way into Teresa Sheehan's room at a group home and then shot her five times after she came at them with a knife.

Sheehan survived and later sued the city, claiming police had a duty under the ADA to consider her mental illness and take more steps to avoid a violent confrontation.

Her attorneys say laws protecting the disabled require police to make reasonable accommodations when arresting people who have mental or physical disabilities. They say police could have used less aggressive tactics, such as waiting for backup and trying to talk to her in a nonthreatening way.

City officials argue the ADA does not require accommodations for armed and dangerous people who are mentally ill and pose a threat to others.

The case has attracted attention from mental health advocates who say that failing to take account of a suspect's disability often results in unnecessary shootings by police.

Law enforcement groups have also weighed in, saying a ruling in Sheehan's favor could undermine police tactics, place officers and bystanders at risk and open them to additional liability.

The ADA generally requires public officials to make "reasonable accommodations" to avoid discriminating against people with disabilities. But lower courts have split on how the law should apply to police conduct when public safety is at risk.

In Sheehan's case, her social worker called police for help in restraining her so she could be taken to a hospital for treatment. Officers entered her room with a key, but Sheehan threatened them with a knife, so they closed the door and called for backup. But they said they weren't sure whether Sheehan had a way to escape, and were concerned that she might have other weapons inside.

The officers then forced their way in and tried to subdue her with pepper spray. But she continued to come toward them with the knife and was shot five times.

A federal district court sided with the police, ruling that it would be unreasonable to ask officers trying to detain a violent, mentally disabled person to comply with the ADA before protecting themselves and others. But the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said a jury should decide whether it was reasonable for the officers to use less confrontational tactics.

http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-considers-impact-disability-law-police-071646666--politics.html
 
U.S. justices throw out ruling that upheld Alabama redistricting plan

U.S. justices throw out ruling that upheld Alabama redistricting plan
Reuters
By Lawrence Hurley
March 25, 2015 11:46 AM

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A closely divided U.S. Supreme Court on Wednesday threw out a lower court ruling that upheld a state legislature redistricting plan in Alabama that packed black voters into certain districts in a way critics say diminished their clout at the polls.

In their 5-4 decision, the justices called the lower court ruling backing the redistricting plan "legally erroneous." But the justices ducked a ruling on the plan's lawfulness and sent the case back to a lower court.

The court avoided deciding whether the redistricting plan proposed by the Republican-controlled state legislature in 2012 violates the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law by concentrating black voters, who tend to vote Democratic, into a small number of districts.

The court was divided on ideological lines, with conservative swing vote Justice Anthony Kennedy joining its four liberals in the majority.

The case centers on the practice known as gerrymandering in which election districts are drawn in a way to provide one party an advantage in as many districts as possible while consolidating the other party's voters into as few as possible.

Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, said the lower court should have considered the claims district-by-district rather than focusing on the state as a whole.

"Asking the wrong question may well have led to the wrong answer," Breyer wrote.

Breyer made reference to "the harms that underlie a racial gerrymandering claim."

"Those harms are personal," Breyer wrote. " ... They directly threaten a voter who lives in the district attacked."

The redistricting plan in Alabama, a Deep South state with a past history of erecting hurdles for black voters, was challenged by the Alabama Democratic Conference and the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus.

This was the first voting rights case heard by the high court since its 2013 ruling that gutted a key section of the Voting Rights Act.

Conservatives Antonin Scalia, John Roberts, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito dissented.

Scalia said the ruling undermines states’ ability to manage their own elections and would have "profound implications for the constitutional ideal of one person, one vote." Scalia objected to the challengers getting "a second bite at the apple" under the ruling to attack the state redistricting plan.

Thomas, the court’s only black justice, criticized state legislators who take race into account, saying, "This is nothing more than a fight over the 'best' racial quota."

The two consolidated cases are Alabama Democratic Conference v. Alabama and Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 13-1138 and 13.895.

https://news.yahoo.com/u-justices-throw-ruling-upheld-alabama-redistricting-plan-141907366.html
 
High court says gov't seizure of raisins is unconstitutional

High court says gov't seizure of raisins is unconstitutional
By SAM HANANEL
16 hours ago

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruled on Monday that the government can't force raisin farmers to give up part of their annual crop for less than it's worth, a victory for conservative groups that hailed the decision as a win for private property rights.

The justices ruled 8-1 that a 1940s-era program born out of the Great Depression is unconstitutional because it allows federal officials to seize personal property from farmers without fully compensating them, even though the goal is to benefit farmers by stabilizing market prices.

The court sided with California farmers Marvin and Laura Horne, who claimed they were losing money under a program they called outdated and ineffective. They had been fined $695,000 for trying to get around it.

Writing for the court, Chief Justice John Roberts said the government must pay "just compensation" when it takes personal goods, just as when it takes land away.

Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Hornes voluntarily chose to participate in the raisin market and have the option of growing different crops if they don't like it.

"'Let them sell wine' is probably not much more comforting to the raisin growers than similar retorts have been to others throughout history," Roberts said. "Property rights cannot be so easily manipulated."

The case was considered one of the most important property disputes to reach the high court since 2005, when the justices ruled that the city of New London, Connecticut, could use the power of eminent domain to hand private homes or businesses to developers to help stimulate economic improvement. That case sparked a backlash in many states and led more than 40 state legislatures to pass laws protecting property rights.

By contrast, Monday's ruling in the raisin case was seen as a decisive win for property-rights advocates seeking to limit government power.

"The decision confirms what should be obvious: the government cannot come and take your personal property without compensation, whether raisins or other property, on the ground that the taking is for your own good," said J. David Breemer, attorney for the Pacific Law Foundation, a conservative group that backed the Hornes.

The program was authorized by a 1937 law that allows the U.S. Department of Agriculture to keep prices for raisins and other crops steady by helping to manage supply. A 1949 marketing order allowed farmers to form a committee that decides how much of the raisin crop handlers must turn over to the government each year.

These raisins would be placed into a reserve pool to be sold outside the open market, used for the school lunch program or given away to charities and foreign governments. Any profits from these reserve sales would go toward funding the committee and anything left over went back to the farmers.

The Hornes refused to participate in the program in 2003, when farmers were required to give up 47 percent of their crop but received far less in return than their costs of production. They also refused to cooperate in 2004, when other farmers gave up 30 percent of the crop in 2004 and were paid nothing.

The Hornes' lawyer, John O'Quinn, called the ruling "a personal vindication" for the couple and "an important win for personal liberty."

Raisin prices have been stable recently, and farmers have not been ordered to put crops in reserve since 2010.

Only a small number of other crops are regulated in the same way, though federal officials say most programs are not active. Those include California dried prunes, California dates, California almonds, tart cherries, walnuts and spearmint oil.

A USDA spokesman said agency officials were reviewing the ruling and had no immediate comment.

Roberts said the government could have restricted raisin sales by limiting production, which is how the vast majority of crops programs work.

In a separate opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer agreed that the Hornes were entitled to be properly paid for their crops, but he said the case should be sent back to a lower court to decide whether they would have been owed any money had they complied with the program.

Breyer's separate opinion was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan.

Justice Clarence Thomas took issue with Breyer's point and wrote separately to say that sending the case back to figure out compensation "in this case would be a fruitless exercise."

Justice Sonia Sotomayor was the only dissenter. She said the program did not deprive the Hornes of all property rights, it just limited the amount of potential income they could earn from it.

https://news.yahoo.com/high-court-s...gram-unconstitutional-142418972--finance.html
 
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