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ISIS fighters do wear uniforms and can be easily identified because they drive US Made Hummers, and Toyota pickup trucks.
Its basically a country with a leader, Capitol city, etc....
..........
It's a caliphate as dictated to them by the Koran. Caliph Abramasumshit is their leader - same asshole the US claimed to have killed but who is now showing his face again. If he didn't declare his caliphate others would have killed him.Where is the country? Who is the leader? Where is the capitol? Point it on a map. And why wernt the paris bombers wearing their uniforms?![]()
Where is the country? Who is the leader? Where is the capitol? Point it on a map. And why wernt the paris bombers wearing their uniforms?![]()
so you figure they would try to meet the U.S. Army head up on the battle field.... Terrorism is an idea, you cant fight a war against an idea.
On point.Well they do have US Humvees, Toyota trucks and other armored vehicles they captured from the Iraqi army. They also put up their flag over the land that they capture and are lead by former officers of Sadaam Husseins Army.
“...That plan was to use a number of different factors to create paranoia within the Syrian government; to push it to overreact, to make it fear there's a coup...so in theory it says 'We have a problem with Islamic extremists crossing over the border with Iraq, and we're taking actions against them to take this information and make the Syrian government look weak, the fact that it is dealing with Islamic extremists at all.'”
He added that the most serious part of the plan was to “foster tensions between Shiites and Sunnis. In particular, to take rumors that are known to be false...or exaggerations and promote them – that Iran is trying to convert poor Sunnis, and to work with Saudi and Egypt to foster that perception in order to make it harder for Iran to have influence, and also harder for the government to have influence in the population.”
Assange stressed that this particular cable was “quite concerning,” adding that while you often have to read between the lines in cables, “its all hanging out” in that one.
To understand what is happening in and around Syria, one must look at regional alliances, Assange said.
“Part of the problem in Syria is that you have a number of US allies surrounding it, principally Saudi and Qatar, that are funneling in weapons. Turkey as well [is] a very serious actor. [They] each have their own hegemonic ambitions in the region. Israel also, no doubt, if Syria sufficiently destabilized, it might be in a position where it can keep the Golan Heights forever, or even advance that territory. So you've got a number of players around Syria that are looking to bite off pieces...”
'US empire'
Assange said that when the US government wants something, it brings together the various arms of American power – including military, intelligence, financial, and commercial, as well as its informational and diplomatic power, in order to “push” on a country.
But Washington's habits don't pay off so easily in South America, according to Assange. He said the US empire's influence is harder to achieve there, because those nations are surrounded by relatively supportive states.
One cable in Assange's book details an instance when the US went to Brazil, telling the country that it wanted to reign in Venezuela. Brazil responded with a resounding “no.”
But while Assange maintains that the US is indeed an empire, he says it's not one in the classical sense. Instead, its imperialism lies in over 1,400 US military bases in more than 120 countries, as well in its trade deals.
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
Canonical ID: 06DAMASCUS5399_a
Subject: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006
From: Syria Damascus
To: Department of the Treasury, Israel Tel Aviv, National
Security Council, Secretary of State, The League of Arab States, U.S.
Mission to European Union (formerly EC) (Brussels), United Nations
(New York), United States Central Command, White House
Original Classification: SECRET
Current Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: -- Not Assigned --
Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --
Type: TE
Locator: TEXT ONLINE
Reference(s): -- N/A or Blank --
Executive Order (E.O.): -- Not Assigned --
Markings: -- Not Assigned --
Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --
Concepts: -- Not Assigned --
TAGS: Political Affairs--External Political Relations [PREL]
Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs [PGOV]
Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism [PTER]
Syria [SY]
Office: -- N/A or Blank --
Document Character Count: 14470
Date: 2006 December 13, 16:03 (Wednesday)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 005399
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR MARCHESE
TREASURY FOR GLASER/LEBENSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, SY
SUBJECT: INFLUENCING THE SARG IN THE END OF 2006
Classified By: CDA William Roebuck, for reasons 1.5 b/d
1. (S) Summary. The SARG ends 2006 in a much stronger
position domestically and internationally than it did 2005.
While there may be additional bilateral or multilateral
pressure that can impact Syria, the regime is based on a
small clique that is largely immune to such pressure.
However, Bashar Asad's growing self-confidence )- and
reliance on this small clique -- could lead him to make
mistakes and ill-judged policy decisions through trademark
emotional reactions to challenges, providing us with new
opportunities. For example, Bashar,s reaction to the
prospect of Hariri tribunal and to publicity for Khaddam and
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
the National Salvation Front borders on the irrational.
Additionally, Bashar,s reported preoccupation with his image
and how he is perceived internationally is a potential
liability in his decision making process. We believe
Bashar,s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to
looming issues, both perceived and real, such as a the
conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and
entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the
potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence
of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our
assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there
may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send
that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities
arising. These proposals will need to be fleshed out and
converted into real actions and we need to be ready to move
quickly to take advantage of such opportunities. Many of our
suggestions underline using Public Diplomacy and more
indirect means to send messages that influence the inner
circle. End Summary.
2. (S) As the end of 2006 approaches, Bashar appears in some
ways stronger than he has in two years. The country is
economically stable (at least for the short term), internal
opposition the regime faces is weak and intimidated, and
regional issues seem to be going Syria,s way, from
Damascus, perspective. Nonetheless, there are some
long-standing vulnerabilities and looming issues that may
provide opportunities to up the pressure on Bashar and his
inner circle. Regime decision-making is limited to Bashar
and an inner circle that often produces poorly thought-out
tactical decisions and sometimes emotional approaches, such
as Bashar,s universally derided August 15 speech. Some of
these vulnerabilities, such as the regime,s near-irrational
views on Lebanon, can be exploited to put pressure on the
regime. Actions that cause Bashar to lose balance and
increase his insecurity are in our interest because his
inexperience and his regime,s extremely small
decision-making circle make him prone to diplomatic stumbles
that can weaken him domestically and regionally. While the
consequences of his mistakes are hard to predict and the
benefits may vary, if we are prepared to move quickly to take
advantage of the opportunities that may open up, we may
directly impact regime behavior where it matters--Bashar and
his inner circle.
3. (S) The following provides our summary of potential
vulnerabilities and possible means to exploit them:
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE HARIRI INVESTIGATION AND THE TRIBUNAL: The Hariri
investigation ) and the prospect of a Lebanon Tribunal --
has provoked powerful SARG reactions, primarily because of
the embarrassment the investigation causes. Rationally, the
regime should calculate that it can deal with any summons of
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
Syrian officials by refusing to turn any suspects over, or,
in extreme cases by engineering "suicides.8 But it seems
the real issue for Bashar is that Syria,s dignity and its
international reputation are put in question. Fiercely-held
sentiments that Syria should continue to exercise dominant
control in Lebanon play into these sensitivities. We should
seek to exploit this raw nerve, without waiting for formation
of the tribunal.
-- Possible action:
-- PUBLICITY: Publicly highlighting the consequences of the
ongoing investigation a la Mehlis causes Bashar personal
DAMASCUS 00005399 002 OF 004
angst and may lead him to act irrationally. The regime has
deep-seated fears about the international scrutiny that a
tribunal -- or Brammertz accusations even against
lower-echelon figures -- would prompt. The Mehlis
accusations of October 2005 caused the most serious strains
in Bashar's inner circle. While the family got back
together, these splits may lie just below the surface.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE ALLIANCE WITH TEHRAN: Bashar is walking a fine line in
his increasingly strong relations with Iran, seeking
necessary support while not completely alienating Syria,s
moderate Sunni Arab neighbors by being perceived as aiding
Persian and fundamentalist Shia interests. Bashar's decision
to not attend the Talabani ) Ahmadinejad summit in Tehran
following FM Moallem,s trip to Iraq can be seen as a
manifestation of Bashar's sensitivity to the Arab optic on
his Iranian alliance.
-- Possible action:
-- PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears
in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia
proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though
often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused
on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through
activities ranging from mosque construction to business.
Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as
prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving
increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate
more closely with their governments on ways to better
publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE INNER CIRCLE: At the end of the day, the regime is
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
dominated by the Asad family and to a lesser degree by Bashar
Asad,s maternal family, the Makhlufs, with many family
members believe to be increasingly corrupt. The family, and
hangers on, as well as the larger Alawite sect, are not
immune to feuds and anti-regime conspiracies, as was evident
last year when intimates of various regime pillars (including
the Makhloufs) approached us about post-Bashar possibilities.
Corruption is a great divider and Bashar's inner circle is
subject to the usual feuds and squabbles related to graft and
corruption. For example, it is generally known that Maher
Asad is particularly corrupt and incorrigible. He has no
scruples in his feuds with family members or others. There
is also tremendous fear in the Alawite community about
retribution if the Sunni majority ever regains power.
-- Possible Action:
-- ADDITIONAL DESIGNATIONS: Targeted sanctions against regime
members and their intimates are generally welcomed by most
elements of Syrian society. But the way designations are
applied must exploit fissures and render the inner circle
weaker rather than drive its members closer together. The
designation of Shawkat caused him some personal irritation
and was the subject of considerable discussion in the
business community here. While the public reaction to
corruption tends to be muted, continued reminders of
corruption in the inner circle have resonance. We should
look for ways to remind the public of our previous
designations.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE KHADDAM FACTOR: Khaddam knows where the regime
skeletons are hidden, which provokes enormous irritation from
Bashar, vastly disproportionate to any support Khaddam has
within Syria. Bashar Asad personally, and his regime in
general, follow every news item involving Khaddam with
tremendous emotional interest. The regime reacts with
self-defeating anger whenever another Arab country hosts
Khaddam or allows him to make a public statement through any
of its media outlets.
-- Possible Action:
DAMASCUS 00005399 003 OF 004
-- We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to
allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him
with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry. We should
anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its
isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors.
Vulnerability:
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
-- DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SERVICES: Bashar
constantly guards against challenges from those with ties
inside the military and security services. He is also
nervous about any loyalties senior officers (or former senior
officers) feel toward disaffected former regime elements like
Rif,at Asad and Khaddam. The inner circle focuses
continuously on who gets what piece of the corruption action.
Some moves by Bashar in narrowing the circle of those who
benefit from high-level graft has increased those with ties
to the security services who have axes to grind.
-- Possible Action:
-- ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:
The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about
coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and
military. Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should
be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rif,at
Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate
leaking of the meetings afterwards. This again touches on
this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility
of a self-defeating over-reaction.
Vulnerability:
-- REFORM FORCES VERSUS BAATHISTS-OTHER CORRUPT ELITES:
Bashar keeps unveiling a steady stream of initiatives on
economic reform and it is certainly possible he believes this
issue is his legacy to Syria. While limited and ineffectual,
these steps have brought back Syrian expats to invest and
have created at least the illusion of increasing openness.
Finding ways to publicly call into question Bashar,s reform
efforts )- pointing, for example to the use of reform to
disguise cronyism -- would embarrass Bashar and undercut
these efforts to shore up his legitimacy. Revealing Asad
family/inner circle corruption would have a similar effect.
-- Possible Action:
-- HIGHLIGHTING FAILURES OF REFORM: Highlighting failures of
reform, especially in the run-up to the 2007 Presidential
elections, is a move that Bashar would find highly
embarrassing and de-legitimizing. Comparing and contrasting
puny Syrian reform efforts with the rest of the Middle East
would also embarrass and irritate Bashar.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE ECONOMY: Perpetually under-performing, the Syrian
economy creates jobs for less than 50 percent of the
country,s university graduates. Oil accounts for 70 percent
of exports and 30 percent of government revenue, but
production is in steady decline. By 2010 Syria is expected
to become a net importer of oil. Few experts believe the
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
SARG is capable of managing successfully the expected
economic dislocations.
-- DISCOURAGE FDI, ESPECIALLY FROM THE GULF: Syria has
enjoyed a considerable up-tick in foreign direct investment
(FDI) in the last two years that appears to be picking up
steam. The most important new FDI is undoubtedly from the
Gulf.
-- Vulnerability:
-- THE KURDS: The most organized and daring political
opposition and civil society groups are among the ethnic
minority Kurds, concentrated in Syria,s northeast, as well
as in communities in Damascus and Aleppo. This group has
been willing to protest violently in its home territory when
others would dare not. There are few threats that loom
larger in Bashar,s mind than unrest with the Kurds. In what
DAMASCUS 00005399 004 OF 004
is a rare occurrence, our DATT was convoked by Syrian
Military Intelligence in May of 2006 to protest what the
Syrians believed were US efforts to provide military training
and equipment to the Kurds in Syria.
-- Possible Action:
-- HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish
complaints in public statements, including publicizing human
rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the
Kurdish population. Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish
areas and the SARG,s long-standing refusal to offer
citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds. This issue
would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong
kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a
liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given
Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society,s skepticism of Kurdish
objectives.
-- Vulnerability:
-- Extremist elements increasingly use Syria as a base, while
the SARG has taken some actions against groups stating links
to Al-Qaeda. With the killing of the al-Qaida leader on the
border with Lebanon in early December and the increasing
terrorist attacks inside Syria culminating in the September
12 attack against the US embassy, the SARG,s policies in
Iraq and support for terrorists elsewhere as well can be seen
to be coming home to roost.
-- Possible Actions:
-- Publicize presence of transiting (or externally focused)
http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html
extremist groups in Syria, not limited to mention of Hamas
and PIJ. Publicize Syrian efforts against extremist groups
in a way that suggests weakness, signs of instability, and
uncontrolled blowback. The SARG,s argument (usually used
after terror attacks in Syria) that it too is a victim of
terrorism should be used against it to give greater
prominence to increasing signs of instability within Syria.
4. (S) CONCLUSION: This analysis leaves out the anti-regime
Syrian Islamists because it is difficult to get an accurate
picture of the threat within Syria that such groups pose.
They are certainly a long-term threat. While it alludes to
the vulnerabilities that Syria faces because of its alliance
with Iran, it does not elaborate fully on this topic. The
bottom line is that Bashar is entering the new year in a
stronger position than he has been in several years, but
those strengths also carry with them -- or sometimes mask )
vulnerabilities. If we are ready to capitalize, they will
offer us opportunities to disrupt his decision-making, keep
him off-balance, and make him pay a premium for his mistakes.
ROEBUCK
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The most serious part of the strategy, Assange noted, was the US plan to “foster tensions between Shiites and Sunnis. In particular, to take rumors that are known to be false … or exaggerations and promote them — that Iran is trying to convert poor Sunnis, and to work with Saudi and Egypt to foster that perception in order to make it harder for Iran to have influence, and also harder for the government to have influence in the population.”
We Just Sold Another Billion Dollars Worth of Weapons to Our Frenemies in Saudi Arabia
The longtime US ally has helped fight ISIS, but it also has links to extremists.
—By Bryan Schatz
President Obama meets with King Salman of Saudi Arabia at the G-20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey, on November 15. AP Photo/Susan Walsh
As part of its ongoing effort to promote "stability within the region," the United States inked another giant arms deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Monday. This one was for more than 10,000 advanced air-to-surface munitions like laser-guided bombs, "bunker buster" bombs, and MK84 general purpose bombs—which the Saudis have been raining down on Yemen since March. The deal, reached a week after members of the Gulf Cooperation Council raised concerns over its dwindling arms stockpiles and a few days after the end of the Dubai Airshow, is worth $1.29 billion.
That's a small fraction of the more than $100 billion in arms sales that Washington and Riyadh have conducted in the past five years. And it comes just over a month after a Senate panel voted to delay weapons sales to Saudi Arabia after growing concerns over its reportedly indiscriminate bombing campaign in Yemen. The conflict between the US-backed, Saudi-led coalition against antigovernment rebels has caused more than 2,300 civilian deaths, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
The latest deal, which comes just days after the ISIS terrorist attack in Paris, highlights the Saudis' balancing act: On one hand, the ruling House of Saud is part of the coalition conducting air strikes against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, but it has also been accused of harboring funders who have given aid to ISIS as recently as the summer of 2014. And the kingdom's history of exporting its Wahhabist strain of Sunni Islam has had worldwide implications. Writing in Foreign Policy, Daniel Benjamin, a former State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, has called Wahhabism "a devastating invasive species in Islam's enormous ecosystem—it's the zebra mussel, the Asian Tiger mosquito, and the emerald ash borer wrapped into one." He continues: "The consequences have been fateful: A solid line of causation from the slaughter in Islamic State-controlled Iraq and the tragedy of 9/11 traces back directly to Saudi evangelization and the many radical mosques and extremist NGOs it spawned."
The Saudis problematic relationship with extremism isn't news. In US embassy cables leaked by Wikileaks, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote in 2009, "Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide." She said that the United States needed to keep encouraging the Saudi government to do more to stop "the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists and extremists worldwide." The cables also list Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates as major sources of money for militants. These three nations are part of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen, and each has bought weapons from the United States, including guided missiles and Apache helicopters (to Qatar), Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods for their F/A-18s (to Kuwait), and guided bombs—a lot of them (to the UAE).
In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, Charlie Pierce of Esquire called for the United States to change its stance on its "Middle Eastern 'allies'—the states and bankers and political elites—who persist in funding mass murder." He argues that this means cutting off not just the money trail, but also arms. "It goes without saying, but we'll say it anyway—not another bullet will be sold to you, let alone advanced warplanes, until this act gets cleaned up to our satisfaction. If that endangers your political position back home, that's your problem, not ours. You are no longer trusted allies."
The Saudis have been staunch US allies since World War II. Should the renewed push to defeat ISIS force a reassessment of that relationship?
MeasureMeasure