<font size="5"><center>Haiti: Elections and Continued Dependence</font size></center>
STRATFOR
Intelligence Summary
August 9. 2005
The U.S. government and the United Nations are determined to hold new elections in Haiti before the end of 2005, while gunmen loyal to former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide are escalating political violence in an effort to force a postponement of the elections. Even if elections are held on schedule, however, Haiti's new government will remain politically weak and dependent on a large international security presence and on long-term international aid totaling billions of dollars.
Analysis
Haiti is scheduled to hold nationwide municipal elections Oct. 9, 2005, and legislative and presidential elections Nov. 13, 2005. If necessary, a runoff election will take place Dec. 18, 2005.
The U.S. government and United Nations are determined the elections will not be postponed, arguing that a legitimate democratic government represents the first vital step toward lifting Haiti out of its extreme social misery, economic chaos and political instability. However, armed groups loyal to ousted former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide are determined to derail the elections, or else to strip the new government of its legitimacy by boycotting the elections if they are not postponed.
Some groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) already are calling for the elections' postponement because Haiti is not prepared to hold transparent elections yet. According to the ICG report, rampant political violence is only one reason for this problem. The report also notes that voter registration is running far behind schedule, and that not a single political party has registered officially to field candidates in the elections. To address the last two issues, the interim government of Prime Minister Gerard Latortue has extended the deadlines for registering voters and political parties.
As to the issue of political violence, U.N. and U.S. government officials claim political violence is being contained in Haiti and say elections will be held on schedule. To make certain this happens, the U.N. peacekeeping force likely will be reinforced before elections. Also, the U.S. government will shortly send 3,000 handguns, hundreds of rifles and anti-riot equipment to Haiti to reinforce the country's police ahead of an anticipated surge in politically motivated violence in coming months. But reinforcing international and local security forces will not stabilize Haiti before -- or after -- the elections.
Eighteen months after the U.S. government compelled Aristide to flee Haiti in February 2004 following a brief rebellion led by former army soldiers and supported by Haitian exiles in Miami and the neighboring Dominican Republic, the country's interim government has failed to contain criminal and political violence. Spokesmen for the U.N. peacekeeping force claim the 7,600-member force has suppressed political violence across the country. Senior U.N. officials also claim the political climate is improving as violence declines, particularly in acutely poor neighborhoods such as Bel Air and Cite Soleil in Port-au-Prince. This official optimism is mostly rhetoric, however.
Since Aristide's flight, more than 1,000 Haitians have died in political violence. And many Haitians view Lartortue's government as incompetent and corrupt.
Many also feel that the post-February 2004 arrests of three major figures associated with Aristide's Family Lavalas (FL) party were politically motivated. Former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune and former Interior Minister Jocelerme Privert have been jailed for months. And radical populist Roman Catholic priest Gerard Jean-Juste recently was arrested in connection with the murder of one of Haiti's best-known journalists, though his supporters say the charges against the priest are false.
It is possible these prominent pro-Aristide figures were detained with cause, as the government claims. However, it is likely not a coincidence that Neptune, Privert and Jean-Juste are FL radicals advocating a boycott of the elections unless Aristide is allowed to return to Haiti from his South African exile. The U.S. government and the United Nations are pressuring moderate FL leaders to participate in the elections, since a boycott by Aristide's party would severely undermine U.S. and U.N. claims that elections have restored a legitimate, democratic government in Haiti.
The elections could still be postponed, however, given the many obstacles that must be overcome. For example, enough voters must register and participate in the ballot to give the new government political legitimacy. If less than half of the eligible population registers and votes, Haiti's next democratic government would be off to a weak start. Also, it is not clear which political parties besides LF could obtain the required 5,000 registered voter signatures to field candidates. And if LF boycotts the elections, many Haitians may not accept the elections as legitimate. On the other hand, should an LF split produce a moderate faction fielding a slate of candidates, many Haitian voters would still probably reject the results if Aristide publicly calls the elections undemocratic because he and his followers were excluded.
Aristide is not running in these elections, but he remains Haiti's dominant political figure. U.S. government and U.N. support for Latortue means little to Haitians. And no alternative to Aristide stands out, or can match his charisma and appeal among the country's most dispossessed people. Moreover, between 2001 and 2004, Aristide and his closest supporters are believed to have amassed a war chest totaling more than $50 million. This is a great deal of money in the Western Hemisphere's most impoverished country; these resources imply Aristide will remain one of the most influential forces in Haitian politics during his life, even from exile.
Even if elections are not postponed, Haiti's new government will need massive, long-term international economic and security assistance to remain in power. Senior U.N. envoys to Haiti recently admitted that a U.N. security presence will be needed for at least a decade, combined with more than $1.5 billion in international financial aid. And that sum probably constitutes an overly optimistic assessment.
Haiti is a failed state, meaning its people and institutions are too poor, uneducated, underdeveloped and corrupt to organize the country either politically or economically. But the U.S. government, the United Nations and other foreign countries refuse to acknowledge this since admitting it would raise an impossible question. For if Haiti -- with more than 8 million impoverished citizens -- is ungovernable, who will accept the financial and political responsibility for subsidizing it indefinitely?
The U.S. government clearly wants to disengage from Haiti quickly. Washington's game plan is first, to elect a new government; second, to cobble together an international aid program for Haiti after elections that will not cut into the U.S. federal budget; and third, to let the new, democratically elected Haitian government fix the country's problems --which have persisted for 200 years. The United Nations also wants out, since its peacekeeping effort is expensive, and since the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council do not see permanent U.N. stewardship of failed states such as Haiti in a favorable light. Even Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is not keen on Haiti, considering he has offered his country's oil wealth to much of the region without signaling any willingness to share the wealth with Haiti.
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STRATFOR
Intelligence Summary
August 9. 2005
The U.S. government and the United Nations are determined to hold new elections in Haiti before the end of 2005, while gunmen loyal to former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide are escalating political violence in an effort to force a postponement of the elections. Even if elections are held on schedule, however, Haiti's new government will remain politically weak and dependent on a large international security presence and on long-term international aid totaling billions of dollars.
Analysis
Haiti is scheduled to hold nationwide municipal elections Oct. 9, 2005, and legislative and presidential elections Nov. 13, 2005. If necessary, a runoff election will take place Dec. 18, 2005.
The U.S. government and United Nations are determined the elections will not be postponed, arguing that a legitimate democratic government represents the first vital step toward lifting Haiti out of its extreme social misery, economic chaos and political instability. However, armed groups loyal to ousted former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide are determined to derail the elections, or else to strip the new government of its legitimacy by boycotting the elections if they are not postponed.
Some groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) already are calling for the elections' postponement because Haiti is not prepared to hold transparent elections yet. According to the ICG report, rampant political violence is only one reason for this problem. The report also notes that voter registration is running far behind schedule, and that not a single political party has registered officially to field candidates in the elections. To address the last two issues, the interim government of Prime Minister Gerard Latortue has extended the deadlines for registering voters and political parties.
As to the issue of political violence, U.N. and U.S. government officials claim political violence is being contained in Haiti and say elections will be held on schedule. To make certain this happens, the U.N. peacekeeping force likely will be reinforced before elections. Also, the U.S. government will shortly send 3,000 handguns, hundreds of rifles and anti-riot equipment to Haiti to reinforce the country's police ahead of an anticipated surge in politically motivated violence in coming months. But reinforcing international and local security forces will not stabilize Haiti before -- or after -- the elections.
Eighteen months after the U.S. government compelled Aristide to flee Haiti in February 2004 following a brief rebellion led by former army soldiers and supported by Haitian exiles in Miami and the neighboring Dominican Republic, the country's interim government has failed to contain criminal and political violence. Spokesmen for the U.N. peacekeeping force claim the 7,600-member force has suppressed political violence across the country. Senior U.N. officials also claim the political climate is improving as violence declines, particularly in acutely poor neighborhoods such as Bel Air and Cite Soleil in Port-au-Prince. This official optimism is mostly rhetoric, however.
Since Aristide's flight, more than 1,000 Haitians have died in political violence. And many Haitians view Lartortue's government as incompetent and corrupt.
Many also feel that the post-February 2004 arrests of three major figures associated with Aristide's Family Lavalas (FL) party were politically motivated. Former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune and former Interior Minister Jocelerme Privert have been jailed for months. And radical populist Roman Catholic priest Gerard Jean-Juste recently was arrested in connection with the murder of one of Haiti's best-known journalists, though his supporters say the charges against the priest are false.
It is possible these prominent pro-Aristide figures were detained with cause, as the government claims. However, it is likely not a coincidence that Neptune, Privert and Jean-Juste are FL radicals advocating a boycott of the elections unless Aristide is allowed to return to Haiti from his South African exile. The U.S. government and the United Nations are pressuring moderate FL leaders to participate in the elections, since a boycott by Aristide's party would severely undermine U.S. and U.N. claims that elections have restored a legitimate, democratic government in Haiti.
The elections could still be postponed, however, given the many obstacles that must be overcome. For example, enough voters must register and participate in the ballot to give the new government political legitimacy. If less than half of the eligible population registers and votes, Haiti's next democratic government would be off to a weak start. Also, it is not clear which political parties besides LF could obtain the required 5,000 registered voter signatures to field candidates. And if LF boycotts the elections, many Haitians may not accept the elections as legitimate. On the other hand, should an LF split produce a moderate faction fielding a slate of candidates, many Haitian voters would still probably reject the results if Aristide publicly calls the elections undemocratic because he and his followers were excluded.
Aristide is not running in these elections, but he remains Haiti's dominant political figure. U.S. government and U.N. support for Latortue means little to Haitians. And no alternative to Aristide stands out, or can match his charisma and appeal among the country's most dispossessed people. Moreover, between 2001 and 2004, Aristide and his closest supporters are believed to have amassed a war chest totaling more than $50 million. This is a great deal of money in the Western Hemisphere's most impoverished country; these resources imply Aristide will remain one of the most influential forces in Haitian politics during his life, even from exile.
Even if elections are not postponed, Haiti's new government will need massive, long-term international economic and security assistance to remain in power. Senior U.N. envoys to Haiti recently admitted that a U.N. security presence will be needed for at least a decade, combined with more than $1.5 billion in international financial aid. And that sum probably constitutes an overly optimistic assessment.
Haiti is a failed state, meaning its people and institutions are too poor, uneducated, underdeveloped and corrupt to organize the country either politically or economically. But the U.S. government, the United Nations and other foreign countries refuse to acknowledge this since admitting it would raise an impossible question. For if Haiti -- with more than 8 million impoverished citizens -- is ungovernable, who will accept the financial and political responsibility for subsidizing it indefinitely?
The U.S. government clearly wants to disengage from Haiti quickly. Washington's game plan is first, to elect a new government; second, to cobble together an international aid program for Haiti after elections that will not cut into the U.S. federal budget; and third, to let the new, democratically elected Haitian government fix the country's problems --which have persisted for 200 years. The United Nations also wants out, since its peacekeeping effort is expensive, and since the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council do not see permanent U.N. stewardship of failed states such as Haiti in a favorable light. Even Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is not keen on Haiti, considering he has offered his country's oil wealth to much of the region without signaling any willingness to share the wealth with Haiti.
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