Everything you need to know about Tuesday's hearing on the Jan. 6 insurrection...9:30am
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Questions the January 6 Select Committee Should Ask Its Witnesses
The House select committee established to investigate the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol will hold its first public hearing on July 27. Like the 9-11 Commission before it, the select committee is investigating how our nation’s defenses failed and how we can prevent similar attacks from occurring again. In an era when alternative facts have all too often substituted for the truth, it is important for Americans to have a definitive, reliable understanding of what happened. That will be a difficult challenge in today’s hyper-politicized environment, so it is critical that the committee function as a neutral collector of the evidence, acquiring relevant information and following it wherever it leads, without any predetermined outcome.
At the outset it is important to distinguish the mission of the select committee from that of the criminal investigations being conducted by the Department of Justice, which has charged more than 500 defendants with crimes. Whereas DOJ’s role is to bring criminal charges, the select committee must instead examine and chronicle what happened leading up to, on the day of, and in the wake of the attack, including the failure by government agencies and officials to properly assess the threat, collect intelligence, share information, act on that information, and provide adequate security for the Capitol and the people who were there that day. By necessity, the inquiry must study the threat of domestic terrorism in America, particularly groups that are motivated by anti-government sentiment and white supremacy. The committee should review the ways these extremists use social media and other communications platforms to recruit members and coordinate activities, and the role of disinformation in fueling violent extremism.
The committee should consider the acts and omissions of executive and legislative branch entities and individuals, up to and including former President Donald J. Trump, his associates, and others involved in the runup to the events of Jan. 6, and the use of disinformation to incite violence. Suggesting collection of this evidence is not to presuppose liability; but the country needs an accurate record, collected as contemporaneously to events as possible. Only by understanding all of the factors that did or did not contribute to the attack can we hope to prevent similar attacks in the future.
Listed below are some of the topics, witnesses, and documents the committee should seek to obtain voluntarily, or by subpoena where necessary, as well as some of the key questions to be asked. Witnesses, in fulfilling their civic responsibilities, should proactively address some of these questions in their prepared remarks without having to be asked by a member of the committee. Journalists and the general public may also want to keep an eye on these questions as a guide to key areas that should be covered in the hearings and in the select committee’s final report. Finally, the lists below may serve another, indirect purpose. They show current and former U.S. officials who may want to communicate with the committee — including potential whistleblowers — questions of importance to Congress and the American public in uncovering the truth.
One issue the select committee will have to consider is whether they will call President Trump to testify. He played a key role in the day’s events and, at a minimum, is a material fact witness. Committee members will have to weigh whether there is unique value in his potential testimony and if so, whether it is worth the spectacle Trump would undoubtedly create if he testified. If he is called, the questions posed to him would be best drafted after the committee develops the record. (We do not include questions for Trump in the list below.) Ultimately, the committee must take the path that best permits it to create a durable record of Jan. 6 that will serve as a history and a basis for preventing a recurrence of an unprecedented attack on our democracy.
Table of Contents
A. Intelligence Collection, Threat Assessment and Information Sharing
1. Christopher Wray, Director, FBI
2. Chad Wolf, former Acting DHS Secretary
B. On-Site Response
1. Stephen Sund, former Chief, Capitol Police
2. Robert J. Contee, III, Acting Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia
3. Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police Officers on duty at Capitol on Jan. 6
4. Maj. Gen. William Walker, former Commander, D.C. National Guard
5. Christopher Miller, former Acting Secretary of Defense
6. Kash Patel, Chief of Staff, Acting Secretary of Defense
7. Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
8. Ryan McCarthy, former Secretary of Army
9. Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, U.S. Army
10 .Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn, U.S. Army
11. Jeffrey Rosen, former Acting Attorney General
C. White House Role and Response
1. Katrina Pierson, Trump campaign official
2. Mark Meadows, White House Chief of Staff
3. Stephen Miller, White House Adviser
4. Ivanka Trump, White House Senior Adviser
5. Kayleigh McEnany, White House Press Secretary
6 .Keith Kellogg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President
7. Eric Herschmann, White House Senior Adviser
8. Dan Scavino, White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Director of Social Media
9. Chris Christie, former Governor of New Jersey
10. Kellyanne Conway, former White House Adviser
11. Alyssa Farah, White House Director of Strategic Communications
12. Vice President Mike Pence
13. Marc Short, Vice President’s Chief of Staff
D. Organizers, Funders, and Supporters
1. Roger Stone, Trump campaign adviser
2. Rudolph Giuliani, Trump personal attorney
3. Ashley Trenzeluk, former Finance Director, Republican Attorneys General Association
4. Pete Bisbee, former Executive Director, Rule of Law Defense Fund
E. Response from Congress
1. Kevin McCarthy, House Minority Leader
2. Sen. Ben Sasse
3. Sen. Lindsey Graham
4. Sen. Tommy Tuberville
5. Rep. Mo Brooks
F. Expert Witnesses
1. Domestic Terrorism Threat
2. Social Media Platforms
3. Disinformation
A. Intelligence Collection, Threat Assessment and Information Sharing
Christopher Wray, Director, FBI
1. Although you have previously testified that you cannot monitor social media under FBI guidelines, isn’t it true that under the Attorney General Guidelines (pp. 17-18), if you open a threat assessment, you are permitted to review social media that is available to the public?
2. Couldn’t you open a threat assessment here? And did you? Isn’t it true that the FBI can open a threat assessment for a “special event” under the Attorney General Guidelines (pp. 17-18), and that the certification of the presidential election at the Capitol would qualify as such an event?
3. Did the FBI conduct a threat assessment of the certification vote at the Capitol in advance of Jan. 6? If not, why not?
4. Don’t you open such assessments for inaugurations, Super Bowls, and the like? Did you not think the entire legislative branch and the Vice President and Vice President-Elect being in one spot merited this attention? Did you not have any intelligence that would have provided the necessary low threshold for an assessment?
5. If you knew before Jan. 6 what the FBI knows now about militia group members’ conspiring to attack the Capitol, would the government have been able to thwart the attack? Why did the FBI not know this beforehand?
6. What precisely did the FBI — not just you — know before Jan. 6?
7. In prior testimony, you lauded the fact that the FBI’s Norfolk office broke with normal protocol to send other federal agencies raw intelligence indicating a possible attack and conveyed the information in three different formats.
Given its importance, why did the bulletin generated in the FBI’s Norfolk office, warning that extremists were planning to engage in “war” at the Capitol, fail to make its way to you and other leaders at FBI until “days after” Jan. 6 (see testimony by Assistant Director, FBI Counterterrorism Division Jill Sanborn)?
8. Do you consider it an intelligence failure that the Norfolk bulletin did not make its way to you and other leaders at the FBI before Jan. 6, and have you taken any administrative actions against FBI officials responsible for that failure? Have you made any procedural changes at the FBI to prevent this lapse from occurring again?
9. You acknowledged that the social media company Parler sent several referrals to the FBI warning of threats of violence in Washington, D.C., and to the Capitol on Jan. 6. Why did these referrals fail to make their way to you until after Jan. 6?
10. Do you consider it an intelligence failure that the Parler warnings did not make their way to you before Jan. 6, and have you taken any administrative actions against FBI officials responsible for that failure? Have you made any procedural changes at the FBI to prevent this lapse from occurring again?
11. Did the FBI share the warnings from Parler with other law enforcement agencies including the U.S. Secret Service? If it did not, why not?
12. On Nov, 19, 2020, an FBI official apparently sent a Parler representative an email to “establish a working relationship” with the company. Who at the FBI was involved in the decision to establish the relationship? Were you aware of it at the time? What information did the FBI anticipate Parler might be able to provide the FBI as part of this relationship?
13. Did the FBI receive any similar warnings from other social media companies about threats of violence in Washington, D.C. — or, more specifically, threats to the Capitol — in advance of Jan. 6?
14. In her congressional testimony, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, Melissa Smislova stated the following:
What precisely are the successes and failures of the FBI in connection with Jan. 6? For each failure, what is being done to minimize the risk of repetition?
15. When asked about the failure of the FBI to issue a specific intelligence bulletin for Jan. 6, you have repeatedly referred to “approximately 12 intelligence products” the FBI sent to law enforcement agencies around the country about domestic violent extremism over the course of 2020. How many of those products were related to violence around Black Lives Matter protests? How many were about threats posed by white supremacist groups? By QAnon? By militia groups? Did FBI intelligence products circulated in advance of the inauguration include threats from those groups?
In late June, following your testimony, NBC News reported:
16. Did you or other FBI officials communicate within the Bureau — or with DHS or anyone else outside the FBI — about whether to issue a specific intelligence warning for Jan. 6? Was an affirmative decision taken not to issue such a warning or Intelligence Bulletin? If so, what was the reason for that decision?
17. Did you or any other senior FBI officials communicate with DHS or any other person outside the FBI (including anyone at main Justice or the WH) in advance of Jan. 6 about the decision whether to designate the Jan. 6 certification at the Capitol as a National Special Security Event?
18. On Friday, Jan. 8, the head of the FBI’s Washington field office, Steven D’Antuono, said:
Do you acknowledge that Mr. D’Antuono’s statement was not accurate? What did you do to correct it? How was that statement vetted before it was made?
What actions do you take in your responsibilities as Director when a senior official makes a false statement on an issue of such public importance?
19. Did the FBI have open investigations into threats of violence against election officials following the 2020 elections? How many? Was there an increase in such threats compared to previous years? Were those threats and information from those investigations effectively included in the FBI’s assessment of the risk of violence and threats to the Capitol on Jan. 6?
20. Did the FBI fail to take seriously the nature of the threat? If so, why? Did the race and politics of the attackers cause the FBI to underestimate the seriousness of the threat?
21. Can you compare the FBI’s proactive role in advance of Black Lives Matter protests with its role in connection with Jan. 6?
a) Was the FBI at the scene or nearby for any Black Lives Matter protests?
b) Were arrests made at the scene of any Black Lives Matter protest?
c) Why were no arrests made at the scene on Jan. 6?
d) Why did the FBI need to seek public help in identifying people after Jan. 6, when those people could have been arrested at the scene?
22. Does the FBI today focus on the threat of violent extremists who are motivated by the belief that the 2020 presidential election was stolen? Will you commit to a robust interagency process, like the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee, that shares information about different groups with a goal of providing better threat assessment?
23. Can you say with any confidence that race did not play any role in how U.S. intelligence agencies prepared for Jan. 6 and how law enforcement agencies treated some of the rioters that day? What is the basis for your confidence?
One counterterrorism expert (who served in a prior administration) commented that officials and analysts may have failed to identify the threats leading up to the Jan. 6 events because of an “invisible bias” – the idea that “it was very hard for [them] to realize that people who look just like them could want to commit this kind of unconstitutional violence and could literally try to and want to kill them.” Do you think he is wrong? What assessment or investigation have you conducted involving the Jan. 6 preparation and its aftermath to confirm such a bias does not exist within the FBI?
24. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?
Chad Wolf, former Acting DHS Secretary
1. Not only the General Services Administration, but DHS also has a statutory role in ascertaining the President-Elect, which implicates the statutory provision for Secret Service protection.
When did DHS ascertain that Joe Biden was the President-Elect? Did you or other officials ever discuss whether a failure or delay in making such an ascertainment implicated Biden’s or Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris’ Secret Service protection during the transition?
2. Why was the Jan. 6 vote certification not designated as a National Special Security Event, the way certain sporting events, like the Super Bowl, are?
3. Did you or any other senior DHS officials communicate with the FBI in advance of Jan. 6 about the decision whether to designate the Jan. 6 certification at the Capitol as a National Special Security Event?
4. What criteria are used to decide whether to designate an event as a National Special Security Event?
5. In retrospect, do you believe DHS should have issued an intelligence bulletin specifically about the threat of violence on Jan. 6?
6. In her congressional testimony, DHS, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary Melissa Smislova stated the following:
CONTINUED:
Questions the January 6 Select Committee Should Ask Its Witnesses (justsecurity.org)
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The House select committee established to investigate the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol will hold its first public hearing on July 27. Like the 9-11 Commission before it, the select committee is investigating how our nation’s defenses failed and how we can prevent similar attacks from occurring again. In an era when alternative facts have all too often substituted for the truth, it is important for Americans to have a definitive, reliable understanding of what happened. That will be a difficult challenge in today’s hyper-politicized environment, so it is critical that the committee function as a neutral collector of the evidence, acquiring relevant information and following it wherever it leads, without any predetermined outcome.
At the outset it is important to distinguish the mission of the select committee from that of the criminal investigations being conducted by the Department of Justice, which has charged more than 500 defendants with crimes. Whereas DOJ’s role is to bring criminal charges, the select committee must instead examine and chronicle what happened leading up to, on the day of, and in the wake of the attack, including the failure by government agencies and officials to properly assess the threat, collect intelligence, share information, act on that information, and provide adequate security for the Capitol and the people who were there that day. By necessity, the inquiry must study the threat of domestic terrorism in America, particularly groups that are motivated by anti-government sentiment and white supremacy. The committee should review the ways these extremists use social media and other communications platforms to recruit members and coordinate activities, and the role of disinformation in fueling violent extremism.
The committee should consider the acts and omissions of executive and legislative branch entities and individuals, up to and including former President Donald J. Trump, his associates, and others involved in the runup to the events of Jan. 6, and the use of disinformation to incite violence. Suggesting collection of this evidence is not to presuppose liability; but the country needs an accurate record, collected as contemporaneously to events as possible. Only by understanding all of the factors that did or did not contribute to the attack can we hope to prevent similar attacks in the future.
Listed below are some of the topics, witnesses, and documents the committee should seek to obtain voluntarily, or by subpoena where necessary, as well as some of the key questions to be asked. Witnesses, in fulfilling their civic responsibilities, should proactively address some of these questions in their prepared remarks without having to be asked by a member of the committee. Journalists and the general public may also want to keep an eye on these questions as a guide to key areas that should be covered in the hearings and in the select committee’s final report. Finally, the lists below may serve another, indirect purpose. They show current and former U.S. officials who may want to communicate with the committee — including potential whistleblowers — questions of importance to Congress and the American public in uncovering the truth.
One issue the select committee will have to consider is whether they will call President Trump to testify. He played a key role in the day’s events and, at a minimum, is a material fact witness. Committee members will have to weigh whether there is unique value in his potential testimony and if so, whether it is worth the spectacle Trump would undoubtedly create if he testified. If he is called, the questions posed to him would be best drafted after the committee develops the record. (We do not include questions for Trump in the list below.) Ultimately, the committee must take the path that best permits it to create a durable record of Jan. 6 that will serve as a history and a basis for preventing a recurrence of an unprecedented attack on our democracy.
Table of Contents
A. Intelligence Collection, Threat Assessment and Information Sharing
1. Christopher Wray, Director, FBI
2. Chad Wolf, former Acting DHS Secretary
B. On-Site Response
1. Stephen Sund, former Chief, Capitol Police
2. Robert J. Contee, III, Acting Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia
3. Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police Officers on duty at Capitol on Jan. 6
4. Maj. Gen. William Walker, former Commander, D.C. National Guard
5. Christopher Miller, former Acting Secretary of Defense
6. Kash Patel, Chief of Staff, Acting Secretary of Defense
7. Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
8. Ryan McCarthy, former Secretary of Army
9. Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, U.S. Army
10 .Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn, U.S. Army
11. Jeffrey Rosen, former Acting Attorney General
C. White House Role and Response
1. Katrina Pierson, Trump campaign official
2. Mark Meadows, White House Chief of Staff
3. Stephen Miller, White House Adviser
4. Ivanka Trump, White House Senior Adviser
5. Kayleigh McEnany, White House Press Secretary
6 .Keith Kellogg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President
7. Eric Herschmann, White House Senior Adviser
8. Dan Scavino, White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Director of Social Media
9. Chris Christie, former Governor of New Jersey
10. Kellyanne Conway, former White House Adviser
11. Alyssa Farah, White House Director of Strategic Communications
12. Vice President Mike Pence
13. Marc Short, Vice President’s Chief of Staff
D. Organizers, Funders, and Supporters
1. Roger Stone, Trump campaign adviser
2. Rudolph Giuliani, Trump personal attorney
3. Ashley Trenzeluk, former Finance Director, Republican Attorneys General Association
4. Pete Bisbee, former Executive Director, Rule of Law Defense Fund
E. Response from Congress
1. Kevin McCarthy, House Minority Leader
2. Sen. Ben Sasse
3. Sen. Lindsey Graham
4. Sen. Tommy Tuberville
5. Rep. Mo Brooks
F. Expert Witnesses
1. Domestic Terrorism Threat
2. Social Media Platforms
3. Disinformation
A. Intelligence Collection, Threat Assessment and Information Sharing
Christopher Wray, Director, FBI
1. Although you have previously testified that you cannot monitor social media under FBI guidelines, isn’t it true that under the Attorney General Guidelines (pp. 17-18), if you open a threat assessment, you are permitted to review social media that is available to the public?
2. Couldn’t you open a threat assessment here? And did you? Isn’t it true that the FBI can open a threat assessment for a “special event” under the Attorney General Guidelines (pp. 17-18), and that the certification of the presidential election at the Capitol would qualify as such an event?
3. Did the FBI conduct a threat assessment of the certification vote at the Capitol in advance of Jan. 6? If not, why not?
4. Don’t you open such assessments for inaugurations, Super Bowls, and the like? Did you not think the entire legislative branch and the Vice President and Vice President-Elect being in one spot merited this attention? Did you not have any intelligence that would have provided the necessary low threshold for an assessment?
5. If you knew before Jan. 6 what the FBI knows now about militia group members’ conspiring to attack the Capitol, would the government have been able to thwart the attack? Why did the FBI not know this beforehand?
6. What precisely did the FBI — not just you — know before Jan. 6?
7. In prior testimony, you lauded the fact that the FBI’s Norfolk office broke with normal protocol to send other federal agencies raw intelligence indicating a possible attack and conveyed the information in three different formats.
Given its importance, why did the bulletin generated in the FBI’s Norfolk office, warning that extremists were planning to engage in “war” at the Capitol, fail to make its way to you and other leaders at FBI until “days after” Jan. 6 (see testimony by Assistant Director, FBI Counterterrorism Division Jill Sanborn)?
8. Do you consider it an intelligence failure that the Norfolk bulletin did not make its way to you and other leaders at the FBI before Jan. 6, and have you taken any administrative actions against FBI officials responsible for that failure? Have you made any procedural changes at the FBI to prevent this lapse from occurring again?
9. You acknowledged that the social media company Parler sent several referrals to the FBI warning of threats of violence in Washington, D.C., and to the Capitol on Jan. 6. Why did these referrals fail to make their way to you until after Jan. 6?
10. Do you consider it an intelligence failure that the Parler warnings did not make their way to you before Jan. 6, and have you taken any administrative actions against FBI officials responsible for that failure? Have you made any procedural changes at the FBI to prevent this lapse from occurring again?
11. Did the FBI share the warnings from Parler with other law enforcement agencies including the U.S. Secret Service? If it did not, why not?
12. On Nov, 19, 2020, an FBI official apparently sent a Parler representative an email to “establish a working relationship” with the company. Who at the FBI was involved in the decision to establish the relationship? Were you aware of it at the time? What information did the FBI anticipate Parler might be able to provide the FBI as part of this relationship?
13. Did the FBI receive any similar warnings from other social media companies about threats of violence in Washington, D.C. — or, more specifically, threats to the Capitol — in advance of Jan. 6?
14. In her congressional testimony, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, Melissa Smislova stated the following:
Do you agree with those statements as they pertain to the FBI? In other words, do you acknowledge in hindsight, the FBI should have issued a separate intelligence report for Jan. 6 and would have been better off doing so?
What precisely are the successes and failures of the FBI in connection with Jan. 6? For each failure, what is being done to minimize the risk of repetition?
15. When asked about the failure of the FBI to issue a specific intelligence bulletin for Jan. 6, you have repeatedly referred to “approximately 12 intelligence products” the FBI sent to law enforcement agencies around the country about domestic violent extremism over the course of 2020. How many of those products were related to violence around Black Lives Matter protests? How many were about threats posed by white supremacist groups? By QAnon? By militia groups? Did FBI intelligence products circulated in advance of the inauguration include threats from those groups?
In late June, following your testimony, NBC News reported:
How can the American people rely on your description of these products if the FBI will not provide them to the public? What legitimate reasons prevent their disclosure? Will you provide them to Congress?
16. Did you or other FBI officials communicate within the Bureau — or with DHS or anyone else outside the FBI — about whether to issue a specific intelligence warning for Jan. 6? Was an affirmative decision taken not to issue such a warning or Intelligence Bulletin? If so, what was the reason for that decision?
17. Did you or any other senior FBI officials communicate with DHS or any other person outside the FBI (including anyone at main Justice or the WH) in advance of Jan. 6 about the decision whether to designate the Jan. 6 certification at the Capitol as a National Special Security Event?
18. On Friday, Jan. 8, the head of the FBI’s Washington field office, Steven D’Antuono, said:
He made that statement before the public knew of the Norfolk report, the NYPD warnings sent to the FBI, Parler warnings sent to the FBI, and other FBI actions such as the Bureau’s disrupting the travel of specific people with intention to cause violence from coming to Washington, D.C., that day.
Do you acknowledge that Mr. D’Antuono’s statement was not accurate? What did you do to correct it? How was that statement vetted before it was made?
What actions do you take in your responsibilities as Director when a senior official makes a false statement on an issue of such public importance?
19. Did the FBI have open investigations into threats of violence against election officials following the 2020 elections? How many? Was there an increase in such threats compared to previous years? Were those threats and information from those investigations effectively included in the FBI’s assessment of the risk of violence and threats to the Capitol on Jan. 6?
20. Did the FBI fail to take seriously the nature of the threat? If so, why? Did the race and politics of the attackers cause the FBI to underestimate the seriousness of the threat?
21. Can you compare the FBI’s proactive role in advance of Black Lives Matter protests with its role in connection with Jan. 6?
a) Was the FBI at the scene or nearby for any Black Lives Matter protests?
b) Were arrests made at the scene of any Black Lives Matter protest?
c) Why were no arrests made at the scene on Jan. 6?
d) Why did the FBI need to seek public help in identifying people after Jan. 6, when those people could have been arrested at the scene?
22. Does the FBI today focus on the threat of violent extremists who are motivated by the belief that the 2020 presidential election was stolen? Will you commit to a robust interagency process, like the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee, that shares information about different groups with a goal of providing better threat assessment?
23. Can you say with any confidence that race did not play any role in how U.S. intelligence agencies prepared for Jan. 6 and how law enforcement agencies treated some of the rioters that day? What is the basis for your confidence?
One counterterrorism expert (who served in a prior administration) commented that officials and analysts may have failed to identify the threats leading up to the Jan. 6 events because of an “invisible bias” – the idea that “it was very hard for [them] to realize that people who look just like them could want to commit this kind of unconstitutional violence and could literally try to and want to kill them.” Do you think he is wrong? What assessment or investigation have you conducted involving the Jan. 6 preparation and its aftermath to confirm such a bias does not exist within the FBI?
24. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?
- President Trump
- Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
- Members or associates of the Trump campaign
- Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
- Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
- White House or other officials
- Members of Congress or their staff
Chad Wolf, former Acting DHS Secretary
1. Not only the General Services Administration, but DHS also has a statutory role in ascertaining the President-Elect, which implicates the statutory provision for Secret Service protection.
When did DHS ascertain that Joe Biden was the President-Elect? Did you or other officials ever discuss whether a failure or delay in making such an ascertainment implicated Biden’s or Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris’ Secret Service protection during the transition?
2. Why was the Jan. 6 vote certification not designated as a National Special Security Event, the way certain sporting events, like the Super Bowl, are?
3. Did you or any other senior DHS officials communicate with the FBI in advance of Jan. 6 about the decision whether to designate the Jan. 6 certification at the Capitol as a National Special Security Event?
4. What criteria are used to decide whether to designate an event as a National Special Security Event?
5. In retrospect, do you believe DHS should have issued an intelligence bulletin specifically about the threat of violence on Jan. 6?
6. In her congressional testimony, DHS, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary Melissa Smislova stated the following:
CONTINUED:
Questions the January 6 Select Committee Should Ask Its Witnesses (justsecurity.org)
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Lizard lip liar got caught in a corner... Raskin boxed his cracker ass in
Jan. 6 committee looks to subpoena witnesses after emotional day of testimony
The first hearing of the congressional committee investigating the Jan. 6 insurrection did not go well for those who continue to downplay what happened that day.
The select committee heard three hours of detailed and emotional testimony from four police officers who battled rioters at the Capitol, in a meeting that set the tone for the rest of the body’s work over the next year or more.
Committee Chairman Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., said after the hearing that he would issue subpoenas immediately to those the committee wants to testify, rather than sending requests. Subpoenas are enforceable through the courts, though it has been over a century since Congress used its authority to arrest and detain someone for defying a subpoena. Thompson made clear he did not want to give aides to former President Donald Trump time to stall and delay, anticipating that they would try to drag out the process.
Chairman Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., after Tuesday's House select committee hearing on the Jan. 6 Capitol attack.
Thompson also made clear that the select committee will be focused not just on what happened in the past, but also on the ongoing threat to democracy posed by Trump and his continued campaign of lies about the 2020 election.
During his opening statement, Thompson played a video clip of insurrectionists vowing to return to Washington with 30,000 guns. “That man's warning reminds us that this threat hasn't gone away. It looms over a democracy like a dark cloud,” Thompson said.
“While our institutions endured ... a peaceful transfer of power didn't happen this year. It did not happen. Let that sink in,” he said.
The insurrection came after Trump spent months repeating false and unsupported claims of a rigged and stolen election. He deceived millions of supporters into believing this alternative reality. Thousands of them then attempted to stop the certification of the 2020 election on Jan. 6.
And now, after an initial period following the insurrection in which GOP leaders recognized the reality and gravity of what had happened, Trump’s lies have been picked up and promoted again by many Republicans. These attempts to downplay, distract from or even defend what happened were a theme of the testimony by the four police officers who testified Tuesday.
“Truly nothing has prepared me to address those elected members of our government who continue to deny the events of that day and in doing so betray their oath of office," said Michael Fanone, a Washington, D.C., police officer who was dragged down the steps of the Capitol by rioters, beaten with fists and flagpoles, and electrocuted at the base of his neck multiple times, and who heard those assaulting him yell, “Kill him with his own gun.”
D.C. Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone, center, listens while Capitol Police Sgt. Aquilino Gonell speaks at Tuesday's hearing.
It was impossible to deny the horror of Jan. 6 during the hearing Tuesday. Fanone and the three other officers each recounted their experiences that day in excruciating detail, and the committee also played video footage from each officer’s body camera to supplement their testimony. Fanone’s body camera showed other officers standing over him and carrying him into the Capitol as he lay unconscious for about four minutes, he said.
“I was electrocuted again and again and again with a Taser,” he said. “I'm sure I was screaming, but I don't think I could even hear my own voice. ... I thought of my four daughters who might lose their dad.”
The gripping video clips displayed a grinding crush of bodies battling inch by inch to gain control of entrances to the Capitol. It was a “contest of wills,” said D.C. Police Officer Daniel Hodges.
Thompson told the officers that their heroism during these battles bought precious time until reinforcements could arrive. It took hours for the National Guard and other law enforcement to show up, and the reasons for that delay are part of the committee’s probe.
A Senate panel has investigated the details of those delays in the law enforcement response, as well as the weaknesses in law enforcement’s preparation for Jan. 6. But much remains unknown about why the Capitol was so badly defended and unprepared for violence that day.
“Our chain of command had not told us to prepare for any of these levels of violence,” said Harry Dunn, an officer with the Capitol Police.
CONTINUED:
Jan. 6 committee looks to subpoena witnesses after emotional day of testimony (yahoo.com)
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The first hearing of the congressional committee investigating the Jan. 6 insurrection did not go well for those who continue to downplay what happened that day.
The select committee heard three hours of detailed and emotional testimony from four police officers who battled rioters at the Capitol, in a meeting that set the tone for the rest of the body’s work over the next year or more.
Committee Chairman Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., said after the hearing that he would issue subpoenas immediately to those the committee wants to testify, rather than sending requests. Subpoenas are enforceable through the courts, though it has been over a century since Congress used its authority to arrest and detain someone for defying a subpoena. Thompson made clear he did not want to give aides to former President Donald Trump time to stall and delay, anticipating that they would try to drag out the process.
Thompson also made clear that the select committee will be focused not just on what happened in the past, but also on the ongoing threat to democracy posed by Trump and his continued campaign of lies about the 2020 election.
During his opening statement, Thompson played a video clip of insurrectionists vowing to return to Washington with 30,000 guns. “That man's warning reminds us that this threat hasn't gone away. It looms over a democracy like a dark cloud,” Thompson said.
“While our institutions endured ... a peaceful transfer of power didn't happen this year. It did not happen. Let that sink in,” he said.
The insurrection came after Trump spent months repeating false and unsupported claims of a rigged and stolen election. He deceived millions of supporters into believing this alternative reality. Thousands of them then attempted to stop the certification of the 2020 election on Jan. 6.
And now, after an initial period following the insurrection in which GOP leaders recognized the reality and gravity of what had happened, Trump’s lies have been picked up and promoted again by many Republicans. These attempts to downplay, distract from or even defend what happened were a theme of the testimony by the four police officers who testified Tuesday.
“Truly nothing has prepared me to address those elected members of our government who continue to deny the events of that day and in doing so betray their oath of office," said Michael Fanone, a Washington, D.C., police officer who was dragged down the steps of the Capitol by rioters, beaten with fists and flagpoles, and electrocuted at the base of his neck multiple times, and who heard those assaulting him yell, “Kill him with his own gun.”
It was impossible to deny the horror of Jan. 6 during the hearing Tuesday. Fanone and the three other officers each recounted their experiences that day in excruciating detail, and the committee also played video footage from each officer’s body camera to supplement their testimony. Fanone’s body camera showed other officers standing over him and carrying him into the Capitol as he lay unconscious for about four minutes, he said.
“I was electrocuted again and again and again with a Taser,” he said. “I'm sure I was screaming, but I don't think I could even hear my own voice. ... I thought of my four daughters who might lose their dad.”
The gripping video clips displayed a grinding crush of bodies battling inch by inch to gain control of entrances to the Capitol. It was a “contest of wills,” said D.C. Police Officer Daniel Hodges.
Thompson told the officers that their heroism during these battles bought precious time until reinforcements could arrive. It took hours for the National Guard and other law enforcement to show up, and the reasons for that delay are part of the committee’s probe.
A Senate panel has investigated the details of those delays in the law enforcement response, as well as the weaknesses in law enforcement’s preparation for Jan. 6. But much remains unknown about why the Capitol was so badly defended and unprepared for violence that day.
“Our chain of command had not told us to prepare for any of these levels of violence,” said Harry Dunn, an officer with the Capitol Police.
CONTINUED:
Jan. 6 committee looks to subpoena witnesses after emotional day of testimony (yahoo.com)
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I am so happy the Democrats is staying on the Republicans ass with this because they really really dropped the ball on that day.
I was skeptical at first but from what I've seen, I think I'm going to like this shit 
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I was skeptical at first but from what I think I'm going to like this shit
There's going to be some entertainment with this one... trust me.... Nancy Pelosi has outplayed McCarthy.... she even told a report that he was "such a moron"...
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There's going to be some entertainment with this one... trust me.... Nancy Pelosi has outplayed McCarthy.... she even told a report that he was "such a moron"...
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The dick dribbler strikes again.......
HIGH CALIBER YOU NEED A VERIFICATION FOR ALL YOUR RACIST POSTING.
Explain your bullshit ass thread title. Until you prove otherwise you a cracka . http://www.bgol.us/forum/index.php?threads/i-always-knew-they-liked-n-word.979568/
www.bgol.us
HIGH CALIBER YOU NEED A VERIFICATION FOR ALL YOUR RACIST POSTING.
Explain your bullshit ass thread title. Until you prove otherwise you a cracka . http://www.bgol.us/forum/index.php?threads/i-always-knew-they-liked-n-word.979568/
www.bgol.us
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