British Officer: U.S. Soldiers Racist in Iraq

[QueEx]

<font size="5"><center>Senior British officer
brands US soldiers 'racist' in Iraq</font size></center>

The Scotsman
RACHEL WILLIAMS
January 12, 2006

A SENIOR British officer has launched a scathing attack on the United States army and its operations in Iraq.

Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster accused the Americans of "cultural insensitivity" that amounted to institutional racism and "moral righteousness" which led in extreme cases to distorted military judgments.

Writing in the US army-published Military Review magazine, Brigadier Aylwin-Foster, who was the deputy commander of a programme training the Iraqi military, said the failings may have spurred the growth of the insurgency.

The Washington Post, which reported the article, said his comments had already provoked an intense reaction among US officers.

Brigadier Aylwin-Foster said of his US colleagues: "While they were almost unfailingly courteous and considerate, at times their cultural insensitivity, almost certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional racism."

The US army's approach during the early occupation "exacerbated the task it now faces by alienating significant sections of the population", he said.

While the US army had an "unparalleled sense of patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and determination" US forces seemed "weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a pre- disposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on".

Military Review has run previous articles criticising US military operations in Iraq but none had been as blunt, the Washington Post said.

Brigadier Aylwin-Foster said he aimed to promote constructive discussion that would improve the coalition's chance of success in Iraq.

He stressed his views did not reflect those of the British government or military, the US army, or Military Review.

Lieutenant-General David Petraeus, who oversees the journal, said he did not agree with many of the assertions of the brigadier, whom he commanded in Iraq.

But he added: "He is a very good officer, and therefore his viewpoint has some importance, as we do not think it is his alone."

However, Colonel Kevin Benson, the commander of the US army's elite School of Advanced Military Studies, said: "I think he's an insufferable British snob."

Brigadier Aylwin-Foster, who is at present serving in Bosnia, commented in an e-mail to the Washington Post: "The Brits approve, those that have read it."

http://news.scotsman.com/uk.cfm?id=53212006

 

[QueEx]

<font size="5"><center>US army in Iraq institutionally racist,
claims British officer</font size></center>

Richard Norton-Taylor and Jamie Wilson in Washington
Thursday January 12, 2006
The Guardian


A senior British officer has criticised the US army for its conduct in Iraq, accusing it of institutional racism, moral righteousness, misplaced optimism, and of being ill-suited to engage in counter-insurgency operations.
The blistering critique, by Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who was the second most senior officer responsible for training Iraqi security forces, reflects criticism and frustration voiced by British commanders of American military tactics.

What is startling is the severity of his comments - and the decision by Military Review, a US army magazine, to publish them.

American soldiers, says Brig Aylwin-Foster, were "almost unfailingly courteous and considerate". But he says "at times their cultural insensitivity, almost certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional racism".
The US army, he says, is imbued with an unparalleled sense of patriotism, duty, passion and talent. "Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on."

Brig Aylwin-Foster says the American army's laudable "can-do" approach paradoxically led to another trait, namely "damaging optimism". Such an ethos, he says, "is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command".

But his central theme is that US military commanders have failed to train and educate their soldiers in the art of counter-insurgency operations and the need to cultivate the "hearts and minds" of the local population.

While US officers in Iraq criticised their allies for being too reluctant to use force, their strategy was "to kill or capture all terrorists and insurgents: they saw military destruction of the enemy as a strategic goal in its own right". In short, the brigadier says, "the US army has developed over time a singular focus on conventional warfare, of a particularly swift and violent kind".

Such an unsophisticated approach, ingrained in American military doctrine, is counter-productive, exacerbating the task the US faced by alienating significant sections of the population, argues Brig Aylwin-Foster.

What he calls a sense of "moral righteousness" contributed to the US response to the killing of four American contractors in Falluja in the spring of 2004. As a "come-on" tactic by insurgents, designed to provoke a disproportionate response, it succeeded, says the brigadier, as US commanders were "set on the total destruction of the enemy".

He notes that the firing on one night of more than 40 155mm artillery rounds on a small part of the city was considered by the local US commander as a "minor application of combat power". Such tactics are not the answer, he says, to remove Iraq from the grip of what he calls a "vicious and tenacious insurgency".

Brig Aylwin-Foster's criticisms have been echoed by other senior British officers, though not in such a devastating way. General Sir Mike Jackson, the head of the army, told MPs in April 2004 as US forces attacked Falluja: "We must be able to fight with the Americans. That does not mean we must be able to fight as the Americans."

Yesterday Colonel William Darley, the editor of Military Review, told the Guardian: "This [Brig Aylwin-Foster] is a highly regarded expert in this area who is providing a candid critique. It is certainly not uninformed ... It is a professional discussion and a professional critique among professionals about what needs to be done. What he says is authoritative and a useful point of perspective whether you agree with it or not." In a disclaimer he says the article does not reflect the views of the UK or the US army.

Colonel Kevin Benson, director of the US army's school of advanced military studies, who told the Washington Post the brigadier was an "insufferable British snob", said his remark had been made in the heat of the moment. "I applaud the brigadier for starting the debate," he said. "It is a debate that must go on and I myself am writing a response."

The brigadier was deputy commander of the office of security transition for training and organising Iraq's armed forces in 2004. Last year he took up the post of deputy commander of the Eufor, the European peacekeeping force in Bosnia. He could not be contacted last night.


http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,16518,1684564,00.html

 

[QueEx]

<font size="5"><center>Army's Iraq Work Assailed by Briton</font size>
<font size="5">Senior Officer Points to Cultural Ignorance
In an Essay Published by the U.S. Military</font size></center>

Washington Post
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, January 11, 2006; Page A17

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. -- A senior British officer has written a scathing critique of the U.S. Army and its performance in Iraq, accusing it of cultural ignorance, moralistic self-righteousness, unproductive micromanagement and unwarranted optimism there.

His publisher: the U.S. Army.

In an article published this week in the Army magazine Military Review, British Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who was deputy commander of a program to train the Iraqi military, said American officers in Iraq displayed such "cultural insensitivity" that it "arguably amounted to institutional racism" and may have spurred the growth of the insurgency. The Army has been slow to adapt its tactics, he argues, and its approach during the early stages of the occupation "exacerbated the task it now faces by alienating significant sections of the population."

The decision by the Army magazine to publish the essay -- which already has provoked an intense reaction among American officers -- is part of a broader self-examination occurring in many parts of the Army as it approaches the end of its third year of fighting in Iraq.

Military Review, which is based here along with many of the Army's educational institutions, has been part of that examination, becoming increasingly influential and pointed under the editorship of Col. William M. Darley. In the past two years, his magazine has run articles that have sharply criticized U.S. military operations in Iraq. A piece last summer by then-Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli about how to better counter the insurgency has become required reading for officers deploying to Iraq -- especially since Chiarelli was recently selected to become the No. 2 American officer there.

But none of the earlier articles has been as bluntly critical of the Army as the essay by Aylwin-Foster, whose assessment is also unusual because it comes from a senior military commander with the closest ally the U.S. government has in Iraq.

The Army is full of soldiers showing qualities such as patriotism, duty, passion and talent, writes Aylwin-Foster, whose rank is equivalent to a U.S. one-star general. "Yet," he continues, "it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on."

Those traits reflect the Army's traditional focus on conventional state-on-state wars and are seen by some experts as less appropriate for counterinsurgency, which they say requires patience, cultural understanding and a willingness to use innovative and counterintuitive approaches, such as employing only the minimal amount of force necessary. In counterinsurgency campaigns, Aylwin-Foster argues, "the quick solution is often the wrong one."

He said he found that an intense pressure to conform and overcentralized decision making slowed the Army's operations in Iraq, giving the enemy time to understand and respond to U.S. moves. And the Army's can-do spirit, he wrote, encouraged a "damaging optimism" that interfered with realistic assessments of the situation in Iraq.

"Such an ethos is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command," Aylwin-Foster says. A pervasive sense of righteousness or moral outrage, he adds, further distorted military judgments, especially in the handling of fighting in Fallujah.

Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who runs much of the Army's educational establishment, and also oversees Military Review, said he does not agree with many of Aylwin-Foster's assertions. But Petraeus, who commanded Aylwin-Foster in Iraq, said "he is a very good officer, and therefore his viewpoint has some importance, as we do not think it is his alone."

Reflecting that ambivalence, the article was published with two disclaimers -- one in the form of an introduction, the other as a footnote -- which make clear that the views expressed do not reflect those of the British government, the British military, the U.S. Army, its Combined Arms Center or Military Review.

"I think he's an insufferable British snob," said Col. Kevin Benson, commander of the Army's elite School of Advanced Military Studies, referring to Aylwin-Foster. Benson said he plans a rebuttal.

"I think he's overstating the case," said another military intellectual here, retired Col. Gregory Fontenot, who led U.S. forces into Bosnia in 1995. But he added, "whether he's right or wrong, what's important is that the Army understands it has a problem, which it does."

Aylwin-Foster, now on assignment in Bosnia, said he has heard favorable early reaction to the article. "The Brits approve, those that have read it," he said by e-mail yesterday.

Darley, the review's editor, is holding his ground. "We've had some very strong reaction as to why the Military Review would even consider publishing this," he said as he strolled across the grounds of Fort Leavenworth last week. He said he did so because he wants "to win the war" in Iraq.

A link to the article by Aylwin-Foster can be found at www.washingtonpost.com/world.



http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011001456.html