moderator's note: the case is
mary berghuis, warden vs. Van chester
thompkins. The united states filed an amicus (friend of the court) brief
in this case. I have excerpted from that brief the facts, etc., below. To
make it simper to read, i have replaced the word "respondent" with the
word "defendant." if you would like to read the brief in its entirety, you
can find it
here in pdf format.
<font size="4">the facts</font size>
on january 10, 2000, a shooting occurred outside a strip mall in southfield, michigan. The two victims, frederick france and samuel morris, were driving around the mall when several men on foot, including the defendant, van chester thompkins, stopped in front of their car and began staring them down.
France and morris had words with defendant, then drove away. A few minutes later, defendant and his crew pulled up in a van next to france and morris, so that the passenger side of the van (where respondent sat) was aligned with the driver’s side of the car (where morris sat).
Defendant said to france and morris, “what you say, big dog?,” and then pulled out a gun and fired several shots at them. Morris died from multiple gunshot wounds; france was injured but eventually recovered.
<font size="4">the arrest:</font size>
the defendant fled and was apprehended about a year later in ohio. Two southfield michigan police officers traveled to ohio to interview respondent while he was being held pending extradition.
<font size="4">the police interview:</font size>
the interview began at approximately 1:30 p.m. And lasted between two and one-half and three hours. Defendant was not sick, injured, or intoxicated during the interview, and
the police never threatened him.
<u>miranda warnings</u>
detective christopher helgert began the interview by presenting respondent with an advice of rights form. The form stated the miranda warnings, followed by the question, “do you understand each of these rights that i have explained to you? Detective helgert asked defendant to read one of the warnings out loud in order to ensure that defendant understood english; respondent did. J
detective helgert then read all of the warnings to defendant and asked him to sign the form to evidence his understanding of his rights; defendant declined to do so. detective helgert “asked [respondent] if he understood the rights,” and defendant answered “yes.”
<u>the confession</u>
during the interview, defendant never said that he did not want to talk with the police or that he wanted an attorney. he mostly listened as the two officers talked to him. although detective helgert described the interview as “very, very one-sided,” he stated that defendant occasionally shared “limited verbal responses” with the officers—such as “yes,” “no,” or “i don’t know”—and communicated nonverbally by making eye contact and nodding his head. The officers told respondent that they had information about the murder and that they wanted to hear his side of the story, because there are two sides to every story. Detective helgert also suggested that respondent provide information to help himself. Respondent listened but did not have “any significant response” to those suggestions.
<center>finally, detective helgert tried “a spiritual tac[k].”
<span style="background-color: #ffff00">he asked defendant whether he believed in god.
Defendant made eye contact with detective helgert, said “yes,”
and his eyes “well[ed] up with tears.”</span> detective helgert
<span style="background-color: #ffff00">asked defendant whether he prayed to god, and defendant said, “yes.”</span> detective
<span style="background-color: #ffff00">helgert then asked defendant, <span style="background-color: #ffff00">“do you pray to god to forgive you for shooting that boy down?”
defendant answered “yes” and looked down.</span> </center>
defendant declined to write anything down, and the interview ended shortly thereafter.
defendant was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms-related offenses.
moderator's note: at the trial, defendant moved to suppress (keep
the statement from being admitted into evidence against him). The trial
court denied that motion. The statement was admitted and defendant
was convicted.
As you now know, the u.s. Supreme court upheld the conviction in this
case and upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress allowing
the "confession" to be sued against thompson.
voting in favor: justice anthony m. Kennedy (who wrote the opinion)
justices scalia, alito, and thomas and chief justice roberts.
dissenting: justices stevens, ginsburg, sotomayor, and breyer.
<font size="4">but, why did i post all of this ???</font size>
- <font size="3">to give you more than the media probably ever would;</font size>
- <font size="3">to demonstrate that one doesn't have to wait to be informed, by the media; and</font size>
- <font size="3">to make an interesting point that will become quite clear, in the next segment below - - keep reading</font size></font size>
<font size="3">as i indicated above, the united states was not involved in this lawsuit; it was a matter between the state of michigan and the defendant. But, the united states involved itself through, non-other than its then solicitor general -- now
<span style="background-color: #ffff00">
supreme court nominee, elena kagan</span>.</font size>
elena kagan presented the government's case as solicitor general of the u.s. Kagan supported kennedy's ruling in her arguments that pointed out that the ruling spelled out for prosecutors and defendants just how the right against self-incrimination applies in such cases. Of course, those who opposed it stated that the requirement that the defendant must speak to indicate his intention to remain silent further erodes the ability of the defendant to stay completely silent about the case.
</font size>]
<font size="4">the issue - as kagan stated it</font size>
"this case presents issues concerning the application of miranda v. Arizona, 384 u.s. 436 (1966), including:
- <font size="3">whether a suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent in order to preclude police questioning; yes</font size>
- <font size="3">whether the police may question a suspect who has been informed of his miranda rights, has stated that he understood his rights, and has not invoked or waived those rights; yes, and </font size>
- <font size="3">whether a suspect who is aware of his rights waives them when he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily responds to police questioning. Yes</font size>
although the case arises on federal habeas review of a state conviction under 28 u.s.c. 2254, the court’s view of the underlying miranda questions has substantial implications for federal criminal investigations and trials. Accordingly, the united states has a significant federal interest in the case.
<font size="4">kagan's argument, summarized</font size>
a. the defendant validly waived his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination when he answered police questions after receiving and understanding his miranda rights.
- respondent listened to police questions for a time, without either invoking or waiving his rights, but he ultimately decided to speak.
- that course of conduct [deciding to speak] evidenced a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his miranda rights, and his statements
were therefore admissible in the state’s case in chief.
b. the fifth amendment analysis in this case consists of three inquiries: (1) whether respondent invoked his fifth amendment rights after receiving the miranda warnings; (2) whether the police permissibly interrogated respondent after he stated that he understood his rights but he neither invoked nor waived them; and (3) whether respondent validly waived his rights when he made incriminating statements to the police.
- respondent did not invoke his fifth amendment rights because he did not communicate clearly that he wished to exercise his right to “cut off questioning.” michigan v. Mosley, 423 u.s. 96, 100 (1975) (quoting
miranda v. Arizona, 384 u.s. 436, 474 (1966)).
- in davis v. United states, 512 u.s. 452 (1994), this court held that, once a suspect has been informed of his right to counsel, the suspect must invoke that right unambiguously.
- the inquiry under davis is whether a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand that the suspect requested counsel. an ambiguous request does not require the police to cease questioning,
the court held, because such a rule would interfere with effective law enforcement without providing any necessary protection to fifth amendment rights.
- although davis addressed the miranda right to counsel, its requirement of an “unambiguous or unequivocal” invocation, 512 u.s. At 462, should apply to the right to silence as well.
- requiring an objectively clear assertion of a suspect’s “right to cut off questioning,” mosley, 423 u.s. At 103, respects the suspect’s rights while providing clear guidance to the police and permitting legitimate law enforcement activity.
- and, although davis applied its unequivocal-invocation standard after
an initial waiver of fifth amendment rights, the davis standard should apply to initial invocations as well. In this case, respondent did not clearly invoke his
right “to terminate questioning.” mosley, 423 u.s. At 103. Respondent never stated that he did not want to talk with the police. Nor did he attempt to end the interview.
- respondent suggests that he implicitly invoked his right to silence by remaining silent much of the time. But a suspect may silently listen to questions for some period without unambiguously invoking his right to terminate questioning.
- in any event, even during the time in which he did not answer questions seeking his account of the crime, respondent did occasionally participate in
the interview. Under the circumstances, respondent did not invoke his right to silence.
c.. If, after receiving and understanding the warnings, a suspect neither invokes nor waives his rights under miranda, officers may engage in non-coercive questioning and efforts to persuade the suspect to speak.
- miranda requires the police to provide a suspect in custody with certain warnings in order to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation. When a suspect has received the miranda warnings and has an opportunity
to exercise his rights, the suspect has received the protections envisioned in miranda, and the police may question him.
- the police are not required to obtain a waiver of a suspect’s rights before engaging in questioning. Such a rule would penalize legitimate police investigations with no concomitant fifth amendment benefit, and it would
be inconsistent with this court’s holding that a waiver may be inferred from conduct and speech during interrogation. See north carolina v. Butler, 441 u.s. 369 (1979).
- here, the police provided respondent with complete miranda warnings, respondent said he understood his rights, and respondent did not immediately either invoke or waive those rights. The police therefore could
question respondent consistent with the fifth amendment.
d. if a suspect knows and understands his miranda rights, and makes statements to the police free of coercion, that is sufficient to demonstrate a waiver of the suspect’s rights. A waiver of miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The government need not prove that the suspect expressly waived his rights; under butler, a waiver may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances. When a suspect receives the miranda warnings and evidences his understanding of his rights, then his subsequent statements are knowing and intelligent. When the government shows that
the suspect’s statements were not coerced, then the statements are voluntary.
- in holding that respondent did not waive his rights, the court of appeals incorrectly focused on respondent’s conduct before making his statements, rather than asking whether his later decision to answer questions was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
- respondent validly waived his miranda rights here. Respondent read a portion of the miranda warnings out loud, then told the officers that he understood the warnings. He controlled when he would participate in the
interview, and he ultimately decided to answer a series of questions in response to the officers’ appeal to his conscience and religious beliefs.
- nothing suggests that police coercion led him to speak. Respondent’s statements therefore were properly admitted in the state’s case in chief at trial.
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kagan's confirmation hearing will get rocky, from an unexpected source: Guess who ?
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