One heartbeat away and she doesn't even know about the Bush doctrine

MASTERBAKER · Sep 11, 2008

Sarah Palin - Charles Gibson Interview Excerpts

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Sarah Palin will be interviewed in a 3 part series starting tonight by ABC News anchor, Charles Gibson. :hmm:

MASTERBAKER · Sep 12, 2008

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This is the html version of the file http://www.wilsoncenter.org/about/director/docs/Hamilton_Bush_Doctrine.doc.
Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.
The Bush Doctrine – An Evaluation

The Middle East Institute

The Hon. Lee H. Hamilton

October 11, 2002

What is the Bush Doctrine?

The Bush doctrine provides a new definition for the use of American power. It uses the overwhelming military, economic, and political tools of the United States to establish a balance of power that favors human freedom and security.

The Bush Doctrine has three primary objectives:

1) The first objective is to combat and defeat terrorism. The threat of terrorist organizations, hostile states, and technology is defined as interrelated. Thus, states that harbor terrorists or rogue states who might supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction are targets for U.S. action.

2) The second objective is to construct good relations with other great powers. Russia and China are no longer identified as “strategic adversaries.” Instead, the Bush administration focuses on potential areas of cooperation – the war on terrorism, economic development, and energy.

3) The third objective is encouraging free and open societies around the world. The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “there is a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” The Bush administration will encourage this model through targeted aid, the encouragement of free markets and sound fiscal governance, public diplomacy, and – if necessary – force.

There are three core elements to the strategy:

1) The first is prevention. The U.S. will use an aggressive strategy of diplomacy, law enforcement, arms-control and export controls to prevent the threats of terrorism, destabilizing regional conflicts and weapons proliferation.

2) The second is preemption. At the core of the Bush doctrine is preemption – the preemptive use of force to counter the threats of terrorism and potentially dangerous rogue states. The old standard that states can order preemptive strikes when faced with an imminent threat is out. The new doctrine is that the U.S. must insist on anticipatory action to defend itself against new threats – even if there is uncertainty as to the enemy’s intentions, timetable, or target of aggression.

3) The third is defense. Despite the attention that preemption has received, the Bush administration also focuses on deterrence and defense. To deter potential adversaries, the U.S. must maintain a military capability that is so overwhelming that no country will attempt to challenge it. The U.S. will improve its defense capability by deploying a missile defense system to protect the homeland and our friends and allies.

General Evaluation

It is difficult to evaluate the specific impact of any doctrine – no doctrine can anticipate every circumstance, and there will always be a reactionary element to foreign policy. For example, the Bush doctrine would probably not exist without the shocking and unfathomable events of September 11.

There is something for everybody in the National Security Strategy. For multilateralists there is an emphasis on the importance of allies; for unilateralists there is the determination that the U.S. reserves the right to act alone to defend its interests. For hawks there is the notion of preemptive strikes and intervention to counter new threats. For doves, there is an emphasis on increased foreign aid, development, and support for democratic institutions.

The strategy is at times vague or contradictory. It proclaims freedom as a controlling mission, but fails to criticize key nations who suppress freedoms – China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc. Instead, it trumpets closer relations with some of these nations. There is a gap between the words (“freedom”) and deeds (cooperation with repressive regimes) that opens the U.S. to criticism.

The strategy is at times short-sighted. Emphasis on preemptive strikes, ad hoc coalitions, U.S. military supremacy, and converging interests with great powers fails to address some long-term concerns. There is less attention to nation building in the aftermath of preemptive strikes, the ability of broad alliances and international institutions to further U.S. interests over the long-term, and key points of contention with great powers (eg. Russian lack of democracy and “axis of evil” relations, Taiwan and Chinese human rights abuses).

Preemption

Preemption can be effective if it has a narrow role in U.S. policy. The new threat of terrorism demands a new response, and this doctrine is a response – no president would let an attack come to America when it could be prevented.

Stated in conjunction with terrorism, preemption is not that controversial and not a huge departure from previous U.S. policy. Intelligence and law enforcement have always acted to preempt terrorist attacks and these practices are established in international law.

Pre-empting rogue states is a dramatic change in U.S. policy that could have far-reaching implications. There are key questions raised by this notion:

1) Why abandon the tenets of containment and deterrence? The Bush administration argues that, “deterrence based upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks.” This is a questionable assertion. Throughout the Cold War, we deterred dangerous adversaries like Stalin and Mao who took risks. Since the Cold War ended, we have successfully deterred the very “axis of evil” states that represent the world’s most dangerous regimes. Iraq’s capability and aggression has been significantly curtailed since 1991. North Korea has frozen its weapons program and indicated a desire for further talks. Iran has begun a process of political liberalization. The Bush doctrine is based on an expectation that these regimes will dramatically alter their reaction to containment.

2) What if preemption brings about the scenarios we aim to prevent? Saddam Hussein did not use his weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf War after we indicated that we would respond in kind. If he is faced with the threat of a preemptive strike, why wouldn’t he use the weapons of mass destruction before he loses them, or give them to others who could use them?

3) What are the guidelines for preemption? The U.S. is yet to set out clear guidelines for when preemptive strikes are legitimate – how imminent must the threat be, and where do international law and the UN Security Council come in? Does the U.S. alone make these judgments?

4) What if preemption becomes a “hunting license” for other countries? Russia has already indicated its right to use preemption in Georgia. What if China preempts Taiwanese independence? What if India strikes preemptively against Pakistan? The global system could become one of violent anarchy. We do not want to give every nation the unfettered right of preemption.

Preemption requires good intelligence. We cannot go to war on instincts or guesses. Good intelligence can ensure a quick and overwhelming victory, and allows us to immediately justify our actions.

If tightly applied and monitored, preemption has a rightful place in American national security strategy. But it must be applied carefully. We should establish clear guidelines for taking action, and make an effort to work with our friends and allies.

Cooperation with Allies

Bush states a preference for working with allies but always reserves the right to act unilaterally (“…we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.”)

Bush asserts the importance of working with allies – “no nation can build a safer, better world alone.” But multilateralism and coalition building are dismissed when U.S. will or capacity for action is frustrated.

The Bush administration puts an emphasis on coalitions of the willing and able, making the point that the mission should determine the coalition, not the other way around. There are three problems with this strategy:

1) Acting with the broadest international support simplifies things – it grants legitimacy and erodes opposition.

2) We need allies for a number of practical reasons, including: basing and over-flight rights, peacekeeping and rebuilding, and helping with expenses.

3) Ad hoc coalitions do little to help American interests beyond the short-term. Key long-term interests such as weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, international crime and drug trafficking demand cooperation. Those left on the outside may prove dangerously uncooperative on some of these key issues, and may be less willing to offer support in the future (eg. Europeans may grow increasingly lukewarm).

The Bush administration has presented a strategy for strengthening NATO by expanding membership to incorporate new European democracies, encouraging higher defense spending by allies, and updating capabilities for the new demands of rapid-response and coalition warfare. These reforms are necessary to maintain NATO’s relevance as a military alliance – the risk is that it becomes merely political.

Relations with great powers

One of the most striking aspects of the national security strategy is the new nature of U.S. relations with China, Russia and India. No longer are these powers defined as “strategic adversaries”.

Russia: the strategy says “we are building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the 21st century: the United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries.”

Cooperation with Russia is emphasized in regard to the war on terrorism, the NATO-Russia Council, and U.S. support for Russian accession into the WTO. The Bush administration is also forging a new energy relationship that presents Russia as a stabilizing alternative to shocks in the Middle East and OPEC.

Lingering tensions are noted (Russia’s relations with the “axis of evil countries” and questionable commitment to free-market democracy), but opportunities are stressed over divergences. Despite improved relations, questions about Russia’s commitment to democracy, free-market economics, and human rights (eg. Chechnya) remain.

China: the strategy says “we welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China.” It focuses on the overlapping interests of the war on terrorism, trade, stability on the Korean peninsula, the future of Afghanistan, and environmental and health threats (HIV/AIDS).

Tensions such as the future of Taiwan, non-proliferation and China’s nuclear capability, and human rights violations are not detailed at length.

India: the strategy says, “U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India.” The common interests of the war on terror, representative democracy, Asian stability and free-flowing commerce in the Indian Ocean are stressed.

Bush emphasizes the opportunities for enhanced relations with other great powers in the wake of 9/11. The common threat of terrorism is repeatedly stressed as common ground, and continued differences are downplayed in relation to increased cooperation.

The emphasis on maintaining American military supremacy complicates a great-power strategy based on mutual interests. The strategy says U.S. military capability will, “dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in the hopes of surpassing or equaling the power of the U.S.” This raises several questions and concerns:

1) Who is this statement intended for? The U.S. advocates greater European capabilities, and Russia is dismantling much of its capability. China and to a lesser extent India must be the likely competitors.

2) How will we dissuade other powers from a military build-up? It is difficult to tell other nations not to develop a military capability – particularly when the Bush administration has been hostile to most international arms agreements (Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, CTBT). Will we act preemptively if China continues to expand its arsenal? To what extent will an attempt to expand weapons capabilities undermine bilateral relations with the U.S.?

3) The statement is impolitic – it asserts perpetual U.S. global military domination. This should make other powers uneasy and threatened.

Practically, the effect of this military goal may be very modest. The U.S. can only do so much to constrain the potential defense spending of other nations, and is unlikely to risk war with another greater power over that nation’s defense budget.

Integrating Russia and China into the West is at the center of Bush’s plans for creating a new balance of power in the world. Great power relations based on common interests reduce threat of significant great power conflict, and grant the U.S. greater freedom of action in pursuing its interests. But key questions remain in each of these bilateral relationships.

Aid and Global Economic Development

Bush advocates the forceful use of economic policy and public diplomacy to affect the future – and future attitudes – of the developing world. Economic engagement and the encouragement of free markets and free trade are presented as a key element of the Bush strategy.

Half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day. The Bush strategy identifies that as “neither just nor stable”. It sets the goal of doubling the size of the world’s poorest economies within a decade. The key strategies for doing this are:

1) A 50% increase in core development assistance.

2) Tying aid to good governance. Transparency, the rule of law, and economic freedom will become conditions of receiving aid.

3) Improving the effectiveness of international financial institutions. The strategy breaks from the Clinton policy of bail-outs, declaring that the best strategy for financial crises is preventing their occurrence. It advocates a movement from loans to development grants.

The core of the administration’s development policy is tough love: those who embrace market reforms and sound fiscal policy will receive generous assistance.

The Bush strategy could help those who are least in need of help, and ignore those who need it the most. Failed states have the most difficult time enforcing the rule of law, transparency, sound fiscal policy and economic development strategy. The risk of a tough love strategy is that it may permit states incapable of meeting standards for reform to slip into poverty, lawlessness and, potentially, violence. International terrorism, crime and drug trafficking tends to arise in these situations (Colombia, Somalia, Myanmar, etc).

Nation Building (Afghanistan)

Right now, the administration’s efforts in Afghanistan are insufficient. Bush sets two goals: preventing internal abuse of Afghanistan, and preventing Afghanistan from remaining a safe harbor for terrorists. This does not go far enough.

I am much more concerned about the Afghan situation than is the Bush administration. Violence, political conflict, and warlord-rule are widespread and are threatening reconstruction. Poverty is rampant, and the infrastructure devastated.

We need to guarantee security in Afghanistan. The peacekeeping force needs to be expanded beyond Kabul, and efforts to create an Afghan national army should be strengthened.

We need to help rebuild Afghanistan. This will require emergency relief aid, international help in rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools, power sources, etc), and supporting the fragile central government. Only by creating an environment for stability and growth can we finish the job in Afghanistan.

We cannot afford to reinforce the perception that we are indifferent to the suffering of Muslim peoples. Most countries suspect the U.S. will do the minimum necessary to resuscitate Afghanistan once its war aims have been fulfilled. The fear is that the U.S. will commit neither the resources nor the time to hold Afghanistan together until it can fend for itself.

Much of the world – particularly the Islamic world – is watching what develops in Afghanistan. It is a test of American commitment to following through on pledges of freedom, security and prosperity. If we continue to permit lawlessness and poverty, the rest of the world will be less willing to back preemptive action in other countries. If we made a concerted effort to rebuild Afghanistan, we would be more trusted to take action elsewhere (eg. Iraq).

Public Diplomacy

The strategy emphasizes the importance of public diplomacy in winning “a battle for the future of the Muslim world.”

The U.S. is expanding its efforts at public diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East – there is greater American broadcasting, more resources, and an attempt to present the American message of freedom and prosperity.

Public diplomacy should be a key part of American foreign policy. Our message should be sharpened, and our messengers must be given the best technology.

We should engage the audience in the Middle East and elsewhere – not simply push or force-down our message. We must not try to impose our views, but we should make the case for religious tolerance and liberal democracy -- not as luxuries -- but as universal values that should be welcomed by all people.

The government should use NGO’s, the private sector and academia to help explain the American position and the benefit of American values.

We must also understand the grievances against us – why do they hate us? It is not simply because they “hate our freedoms” – often they hate our policies.

Conclusion – Benevolent America?

There is much in the NSS that the world will find bellicose and challenging – the assertion of military supremacy, the right to act preemptively and unilaterally, hostility to international treaties and agreements, and the small attention given to international institutions.

Protecting America against new threats and preserving the relative strength of our military are certainly the right goals, and we must retain the right to act preemptively if we are faced with a grave and imminent threat. But we must also demonstrate to the world that we are a benign superpower – that we want to spread our values and prosperity, that we prefer to work with friends and allies, and that we will use our vast power to protect our national interest and the common interests of those who share our values.

The NSS lays out an ambitious and aggressive strategy that raises many questions. When will we act preemptively? To what lengths will we go to maintain our military superiority? When will we work with friends and allies, and when will we go it alone? Will we continue to give the bulk of our aid to repressive governments, or will we really make aid contingent upon openness and good governance?

Bush argues that the core of his policy is that the U.S. will wield its strength to spread liberty throughout the world. Others say that the U.S. is saying we will do what we want when we feel like it – that we will go to war against anyone if we think that they may be preparing to go to war with us. In any view, though, it is a very ambitious strategy.

The real nature of our national security strategy will be revealed in deeds, not in policy statements. But the NSS suggests an aggressive approach to threat-assessment and the U.S. role in the world.

Zmaniac723 · Sep 13, 2008

yawn, not many people know what the Bush Doctrine is because it is called the Preemptive Doctrine by the mainstream media and the majority of politicians. I had never even heard of the Bush doctrine and I follow politics pretty well. Maybe she would have answered correctly if Gibson would have elaborated on the term by saying the name more familar to people. I love how so many Obama lovers are jumping on this. It's actually hilarious because Obama completely blundered on an important international agreement that the media has never brought up.
I think Palin did pretty well at the questions she had fired at her. She only hit a slight bump on the Doctrine question.

Greed · Sep 13, 2008

Charlie Gibson's Gaffe

September 13, 2008
Charlie Gibson's Gaffe
By Charles Krauthammer

"Ms. Palin most visibly stumbled when she was asked by Mr. Gibson if she agreed with the Bush doctrine. Ms. Palin did not seem to know what he was talking about. Mr. Gibson, sounding like an impatient teacher, informed her that it meant the right of `anticipatory self-defense.'" -- New York Times, Sept. 12

WASHINGTON -- Informed her? Rubbish.

The Times got it wrong. And Charlie Gibson got it wrong.

There is no single meaning of the Bush doctrine. In fact, there have been four distinct meanings, each one succeeding another over the eight years of this administration -- and the one Charlie Gibson cited is not the one in common usage today.

He asked Palin, "Do you agree with the Bush doctrine?"

She responded, quite sensibly to a question that is ambiguous, "In what respect, Charlie?"

Sensing his "gotcha" moment, Gibson refused to tell her. After making her fish for the answer, he grudgingly explained to the moose-hunting rube that the Bush doctrine "is that we have the right of anticipatory self-defense."

Wrong.

I know something about the subject because, as the Wikipedia entry on the Bush doctrine notes, I was the first to use the term. In the cover essay of the June 4, 2001, issue of The Weekly Standard titled, "The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism," I suggested that the Bush administration policies of unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto protocol, together with others, amounted to a radical change in foreign policy that should be called the Bush doctrine.

Then came 9/11, and that notion was immediately superseded by the advent of the war on terror. In his address to Congress nine days later, Bush declared: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." This "with us or against us" policy regarding terror -- first deployed against Pakistan when Secretary of State Colin Powell gave President Musharraf that seven-point ultimatum to end support for the Taliban and support our attack on Afghanistan -- became the essence of the Bush Doctrine.

Until Iraq. A year later, when the Iraq War was looming, Bush offered his major justification by enunciating a doctrine of pre-emptive war. This is the one Charlie Gibson thinks is the Bush doctrine.

It's not. It's the third in a series and was superseded by the fourth and current definition of the Bush doctrine, the most sweeping formulation of Bush foreign policy and the one that most distinctively defines it: the idea that the fundamental mission of American foreign policy is to spread democracy throughout the world. It was most dramatically enunciated in Bush's second inaugural address: "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world."

This declaration of a sweeping, universal American freedom agenda was consciously meant to echo John Kennedy's pledge that the United States "shall pay any price, bear any burden ... to assure the survival and the success of liberty." It draws also from the Truman doctrine of March 1947 and from Wilson's 14 points.

If I were in any public foreign policy debate today, and my adversary were to raise the Bush doctrine, both I and the audience would assume -- unless my interlocutor annotated the reference otherwise -- that he was speaking about Bush's grandly proclaimed (and widely attacked) freedom agenda.

Not the Gibson doctrine of pre-emption.

Not the "with us or against us" no-neutrality-is-permitted policy of the immediate post-9/11 days.

Not the unilateralism that characterized the pre-9/11 first year of the Bush administration.

Presidential doctrines are inherently malleable and difficult to define. The only fixed "doctrines" in American history are the Monroe and the Truman doctrines, which came out of single presidential statements during administrations where there were few conflicting foreign policy crosscurrents.

Such is not the case with the Bush doctrine.

Yes, Palin didn't know what it is. But neither does Gibson. And at least she didn't pretend to know -- while he looked down his nose and over his glasses with weary disdain, "sounding like an impatient teacher," as the Times noted. In doing so, he captured perfectly the establishment snobbery and intellectual condescension that has characterized the chattering classes' reaction to the phenom who presumes to play on their stage.

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/09/charlie_gibsons_gaffe.html

Sanity · Sep 14, 2008