Public health response
1. Leadership and coordination:
- Coordination has been strengthened at the national, provincial, and community levels. On 30 November 2024, the first Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) meeting was held with all partners to address the alert, after which a rapid response team (RRT) from Kwango Province was deployed to Panzi. On 3 December 2024, a second PHEOC meeting was convened with partners, leading to the decision to deploy a national-level RRT to Panzi with support from WHO.
- Daily coordination meetings are being held at the national level, with provincial teams actively participating in ongoing planning and response.
2. Surveillance:
- A case definition has been developed based on clinical symptoms observed, which is guiding surveillance and reporting efforts.
- Active case search is being conducted in health facilities, including reviews of hospital registers to identify additional cases. Investigations and active case search are also being organized in the community.
- Data collection is ongoing, focusing on the preparation of a line list and detailed epidemiological analysis.
- Community deaths are being investigated to better understand transmission dynamics and the scope of the outbreak.
3. Case Management:
- A provincial RRT was deployed to Panzi on 30 November, and a multidisciplinary RRT from the national level, including WHO experts, was deployed on 7 December to investigate the outbreak, and reinforce the response.
- The teams are carrying medication to support case management and prevent more deaths.
- Efforts are underway to strengthen capacity of healthcare providers to ensure the best possible care for patients.
4. Laboratory:
- Laboratory equipment was transported to collect samples from cases and send for testing at INRB in Kinshasa. Additionally, RDTs for malaria and COVID-19 have been provided to assist in diagnosis.
5. Risk communication and community engagement:
- Key messages have been developed to enhance public awareness and encourage general preventive behaviors. These messages are being disseminated through community engagement, with sensitization campaigns underway.
6. Infection prevention and control:
- Infection prevention and control measures are being reinforced. Health and care workers have been briefed on key practices, including the proper use of masks, hand washing, and gloves, to reduce the risk of further transmission.
7. Logistics
- Logistical support is being provided for effective case management, including the transportation of samples to INRB Kinshasa for laboratory testing. Health facilities and hospitals in the most affected health areas are being supplied with appropriate medications and sampling kits to support the response.
WHO risk assessment
There are ongoing efforts to address the outbreak in Panzi health zone, however significant challenges in the clinical and epidemiological response remain, that increase the public health risk for the affected population. Severe cases with anaemia, respiratory distress, and malnutrition have been reported. The affected area is remote, complicating the assessment and response. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for acute food insecurity levels in Kwango province increased from IPC 1 (acceptable) in April 2024 to IPC 3 (Crisis Level) in September 2024. This suggests a significant phase of increase in food insecurity and risk of severe acute malnutrition.
Symptoms such as fever, cough, headache, and body ache have been observed since 24 October, primarily through health worker reports, yet Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) data on baseline respiratory illness rates are not available for affected health zone to establish trends. Cases have been reported in family clusters, suggesting potential transmission dynamics within households, though additional investigation is needed. Furthermore, there is no information available on specific vaccination coverage, including childhood vaccination, in the affected health zone, leading to uncertainties about vaccine-deprived population immunity.
Gaps in case management have also been identified. Stock-outs of medications for treating common diseases frequently occur, and care is not provided free of charge, which could limit access to treatment for vulnerable populations.
The affected area’s remoteness and logistical barriers, including a two-day road journey from Kinshasa due to the rainy season affecting the roads and limited mobile phone and internet network coverage across the health areas, have hampered the rapid deployment of response teams and resources. Furthermore, there is no functional laboratory in the health zone or province, requiring the collection and shipment of samples to Kinshasa for analysis. This has delayed diagnosis and response efforts. The lack of sample collection supplies has further limited diagnostic capacity, leaving significant gaps in understanding the outbreak’s aetiology.
Insecurity in the region adds another layer of complexity to the response. The potential for attacks by armed groups poses a direct risk to response teams and communities, which could further disrupt the response.
Based on the above rationale, the overall risk level to the affected communities is assessed as high.
At the national level, the risk is considered moderate due to the localized nature of the outbreak within the Panzi health zone in Kwango province. However, the potential for spread to neighboring areas, coupled with gaps in surveillance and response systems, this assessment underscores the need for heightened preparedness.
At the regional and global levels, the risk remains low at this time. However, the proximity of the affected area to the border with Angola raises concerns about potential cross-border transmission, and continued monitoring and cross-border coordination will be essential to mitigate this risk.
The current confidence in the available information remains moderate, as significant gaps in clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory data persist.