U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls

QueEx

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U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls​



The New York Times
By CHARLIE SAVAGE
and EDWARD WYATT
June 5, 2013


WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is secretly carrying out a domestic surveillance program under which it is collecting business communications records involving Americans under a hotly debated section of the Patriot Act, according to a highly classified court order disclosed on Wednesday night.

The order, signed by Judge Roger Vinson of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in April, directs a Verizon Communications subsidiary, Verizon Business Network Services, to turn over “on an ongoing daily basis” to the National Security Agency all call logs “between the United States and abroad” or “wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”

The order does not apply to the content of the communications.

Verizon Business Network Services is one of the nation’s largest telecommunications and Internet providers for corporations. It is not clear whether similar orders have gone to other parts of Verizon, like its residential or cellphone services, or to other telecommunications carriers. The order prohibits its recipient from discussing its existence, and representatives of both Verizon and AT&T declined to comment Wednesday evening.

The four-page order was disclosed Wednesday evening by the newspaper The Guardian. Obama administration officials at the F.B.I. and the White House also declined to comment on it Wednesday evening, but did not deny the report, and a person familiar with the order confirmed its authenticity. “We will respond as soon as we can,” said Marci Green Miller, a National Security Agency spokeswoman, in an e-mail.

The order was sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under a section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the 1978 law that regulates domestic surveillance for national security purposes, that allows the government to secretly obtain “tangible things” like a business’s customer records. The provision was expanded by Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which Congress enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The order was marked “TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN,” referring to communications-related intelligence information that may not be released to noncitizens. That would make it among the most closely held secrets in the federal government, and its disclosure comes amid a furor over the Obama administration’s aggressive tactics in its investigations of leaks.

The collection of call logs is set to expire in July unless the court extends it.

The collection of communications logs — or calling “metadata” — is believed to be a major component of the Bush administration’s program of surveillance that took place without court orders. The newly disclosed order raised the question of whether the government continued that type of information collection by bringing it under the Patriot Act.

The disclosure late Wednesday seemed likely to inspire further controversy over the scope of government surveillance. Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies, a civil liberties advocacy group, said that “absent some explanation I haven’t thought of, this looks like the largest assault on privacy since the N.S.A. wiretapped Americans in clear violation of the law” under the Bush administration. “On what possible basis has the government refused to tell us that it believes that the law authorizes this kind of request?” she said.

For several years, two Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon and Senator Mark Udall of Colorado, have been cryptically warning that the government was interpreting its surveillance powers under that section of the Patriot Act in a way that would be alarming to the public if it knew about it.

“We believe most Americans would be stunned to learn the details of how these secret court opinions have interpreted Section 215 of the Patriot Act,” they wrote last year in a letter to Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.

They added: “As we see it, there is now a significant gap between what most Americans think the law allows and what the government secretly claims the law allows. This is a problem, because it is impossible to have an informed public debate about what the law should say when the public doesn’t know what its government thinks the law says.”

A spokesman for Senator Wyden did not respond Wednesday to a request for comment on the Verizon order.

The senators were angry because the Obama administration described Section 215 orders as being similar to a grand jury subpoena for obtaining business records, like a suspect’s hotel or credit card records, in the course of an ordinary criminal investigation. The senators said the secret interpretation of the law was nothing like that.

Section 215 of the Patriot Act made it easier to get an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain business records so long as they were merely deemed “relevant” to a national-security investigation.

The Justice Department has denied being misleading about the Patriot Act. Department officials have acknowledged since 2009 that a secret, sensitive intelligence program is based on the law and have insisted that their statements about the matter have been accurate.

The New York Times filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit in 2011 for a report describing the government’s interpretation of its surveillance powers under the Patriot Act. But the Obama administration withheld the report, and a judge dismissed the case.


SOURCE



 

The BGOL - Politics Board Background:


Supreme Court lets stand immunity for telecom companies in US wiretap program
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=695452&highlight=FISA


Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts

http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=76887&highlight=FISA


New Law To Make It Illegal To Report NSA Action In The News
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=93783&highlight=FISA


FBI Patriot Act Plan Concerns Lawmakers
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=75400&highlight=NSA


The Truth About George W. Bush & Co.
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=89409&highlight=NSA


Bush Lets NSA Spy on Callers Without Courtshttp://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=76887&highlight=NSA


The Secret Sentry
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=395849&highlight=NSA


NSA Domestic Surveillance Began 7 Months Before 9/11, Convicted Qwest CEO Claims
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=202381&highlight=NSA


At&t tech says AT&T has special NSA room to intercept ALL communications they process
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=98431&highlight=NSA



Halliburton Build's Concentration Camps & ISP's Spy On You
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=104932&highlight=NSA


Secret U.S. Program Tracks Global Bank Transfers
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=110717&highlight=NSA


Bush Subpoenas Google - Your Records
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=83980&highlight=NSA


Covert CIA program withstands new furor
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=79626&highlight=NSA


Has Bush Out Manuevered the Senate ???
http://www.bgol.us/board/showthread.php?t=53147&highlight=NSA


 
I knew the government was monitoring phone metadata, I have been posting about this type of activity on BGOL based on my experience.

Unfortunately, there is much more surveillance being done by the government and private sector in the United States. I had somebody from the government contact me regarding an official matter and asked me a question that was similar to the Internet activity on my phone. This was to inform and intimidate me that I was being watched. Therefore, much more data is being collected, and being used to shut down any dissent or release of information.

I had persons that would approach after writing a long email just before I was going to hit the send button, this was to inform me that I was being monitored in real time. There is also criminal mob gangs connected to corporations that follow people around using Stassi type tactics to shut down any dissent.

If these people want to continue this practice than I would want the same level of surveillance powers to inflict the same type pestering on them.

The basis for the surveillance of being terrorism related is just a ruse.
 
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Government Phone Surveillance for Dummies

Surprise: Your leaders are monitoring the calls you make! Some frequently asked questions, answered.


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First things first: What's all the fuss about?

The discovery and publication of a top-secret court order, issued this April, compelling Verizon to turn over the telephone records of millions of its U.S. customers to the National Security Agency.


So, whoa, the government has been eavesdropping on our phone conversations?

Not quite (or not that we know of). The order calls for the turnover of metadata, the external information about the telephone calls. It specifically excludes the content of the call. As the order puts it, "telephony metadata does not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C. 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer."


Then what kind of metadata was actually sought through the order?

The order compelled Verizon to provides the NSA with "all call detail records or 'telephony metadata' created by Verizon for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls."

Which includes, per the order:

- originating and terminating telephone number
- International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number
- International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number
- trunk identifier
- telephone calling card numbers
- time of call
- duration of call​

As the New Yorker's Amy Davidson summed it up: "The government seems to have a list of all the people that Verizon customers called and who called them; how long they spoke; and, perhaps -- depending on how precise the cell-phone-tower information in the metadata is, where they were on a given day."


So how do we know about all this?

Glenn Greenwald, a columnist at The Guardian, seems to have received a leaked copy of the order. He posted the document, and an article about it, last night.


The order, now that I look at it, is dated April 25 -- which is just 10 days after the Boston bombings. Could there be any connection there?

Unlikely. In fact, very unlikely. The order is one piece of evidence for a surveillance program that seems to have been ongoing since 2006. It's a program that, from what we know so far, is renewed every 90 days. As Senator Diane Feinstein said of the document, "As far as I know, this is the exact three-month renewal of what has been in place for the past seven years."


Who in the government might have access to the metadata being gathered?

The order itself directs that the records be provided to the NSA. Then again, there seems to be nothing in the document that would explicitly prohibit the NSA from sharing the data with other agencies. There's also nothing in the order specifying limitations on who can access the data within the NSA itself.


What has the government, as far as we know, been doing with the metadata it's gathered?

Very generally, it seems that the information is being put to use in the name of counter-terrorism. (As Feinstein put it: "It's called protecting America.")

In terms of the specifics, though, we don't precisely know how the metadata is being employed. At least in theory, that kind of information is mostly useful for identitying associations and networks of people who may be engaged in criminal activities.


How is the Obama Administration explaining and trying to justify all this?

This way, according to talking points sent to Marc Ambinder:

* On its face, the order reprinted in the article does not allow the Government to listen in on anyone's telephone calls. The information acquired does not include the content of any communications or the name of any subscriber. It relates exclusively to metadata, such as a telephone number or the length of a call.

* Information of the sort described in the Guardian article has been a critical tool in protecting the nation from terrorist threats to the United States, as it allows counterterrorism personnel to discover whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in terrorist activities, particularly people located inside the United States.

* As we have publicly stated before, all three branches of government are involved in reviewing and authorizing intelligence collection under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Congress passed that act and is regularly and fully briefed on how it is used, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorizes such collection.


So this would seem to be a continuation of Bush-era surveillance policies.

Yes. And it might well be an extension of those policies.


Okay, but ... seriously, how is this not a violation of the Fourth Amendment?

So the Fourth Amendment generally requires that the government obtain a warrant when it's seeking private information about individual citizens. And the warrant, in turn, should be granted based on probable cause. There's a slight exception to that broad approach, though. Many Supreme Court rulings have held that you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes, specifically, to information you share with a third party.

And the courts have now applied that standard to other areas. Which generally makes sense, except for one substantial tension. As David Cole, a Georgetown law professor who focuses on national security and constitutional law, told me: "Basically, everything you do now shares information with a third party." The numbers you dial on the phone, the amount of time you spend on the phone, the location from which you make a phone call -- all of that, because of how our technologies and businesses are structured, is de facto shared with the third party that is your phone company.

And the rub, as Cole explains it, is that the Fourth Amendment doesn't limit the government's ability to obtain any of that third-party information. Bank records, credit card records, Internet searches: none of that, on its own, has protection under the Constitution.


How is it that a FISA court -- a court established under the auspices of the "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act" -- is authorizing the government to monitor metadata from domestic calls?

This is where things get dicier. FISA, which was adopted in 1978 and has been amended several times since then, permits the U.S. government to obtain records that are related to a target of a foreign intelligence investigation. While "foreign" can be defined fairly broadly, it's notable -- and legally questionable -- that the FISA court order, in this case, includes purely domestic surveillance.

Furthermore, FISA, as it's been widely understood, has allowed governments to gather third-party information in response to investigations into individuals' actions. It's unclear in this case how that translates, legally, to the kind of collective surveillance the NSA seems to be engaged in.


I keep reading about the PATRIOT Act. How does that fit into all this?

A section of the PATRIOT Act -- section 215, to be precise -- is what's ultimately guiding the legal affordances here, at least as the Administration is interpreting them. (You may know the section as the "library records" provision, named that way because of the breadth of personal information that can be investigated under its auspices.) Section 215, following the terror attacks of September 11, expanded the powers of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the court that, in this case, issued the Verizon order). It established a process, through that court, for compelling businesses to turn over records that may be relevant to the gathering of foreign intelligence or the prevention of international terrorism.

Here's the section language as it currently reads:

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. ``(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall-- ``(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor order); and ``(B) not be conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

`(b) Each application under this section-- ``(1) shall be made to-- ``(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a); or ``(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to hear applications and grant orders for the production of tangible things under this section on behalf of a judge of that court; and (2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.


So am I reading right that it's basically one judge who makes the ultimate decision about the legality of proposed surveillance?

Yes.


And that judge's decision, in turn, would come down to how he or she defines "relevance"?

Sort of. Though we're not (yet?) privy to the original argument the government made to this particular judge, in this particular case, it seems that the logic here is based on the idea that the "tangible evidence" from Verizon is directly relevant to an ongoing investigation -- ostensibly, an investigation into terror threats.

But if that's the argument the government is making, David Cole notes, that's a very, very broad interpretation of the law as it stands. Particularly given the fact that the order involves records of wholly domestic calls.

In other words: it would seem to violate, pretty much any way you look at it, the spirit of the law, if not the letter. As Amy Davidson puts it, "The sophistry lies in pretending that 'metadata' is just about the transaction with Verizon -- the business -- rather than about the privacy of the callers."


But wait -- the transaction with Verizon. Does this mean that Verizon customers were singled out here? If I'm a T-Mobile customer, I haven't been surveilled?

Probably not. Again, the court order Greenwald obtained is only one document of what would seem to be many; it's highly likely that AT&T and other carriers have been on the receiving end of similar orders. "Which means," Cole says, "that they are sweeping up this phone data on all of us, all the time."


Do we know for sure that Verizon did, in fact, comply with the order?

No, not for sure. We haven't seen specific evidence that it fought the order; then again, though, we've seen very little evidence at all when it comes to the surveillance.


Let's say Verizon didn't comply. What recourse would it have had, in that case? Would it realistically be able to refuse the order?

It could challenge the order in court, before the same judge who ordered it. It could have engaged in what Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, has called "adversarial proceedings."


So should we be outraged by all this?

That's your choice, fellow citizen! There is certainly a national security argument to be made for this kind of ongoing tracking of telephonic metadata. And it's significant that the order, as written, doesn't allow for the surveillance of calls' content.

Then again, there's the fact that it took an unauthorized leak for us to know about our call information being monitored in the first place. You could see the situation the way David Cole does: "This is one order, but it authorizes data taken from millions of customers." You could also focus on the idea that, as Cole puts it, "Every time an American picks up the phone, they're sharing that fact with the National Security Agency."


And what about the person or people who gave the order to The Guardian in the first place?

According to NBC's Pete Williams, "It seems highly likely this will trigger a leak investigation."




SOURCE


 

Could This Be How PRISM Technically Works?​

A plausible account of the technical and institutional
details from a long-time national security reporter


National security reporter Marc Ambinder, who has long been known for his contacts within the intelligence community (he used to work here at The Atlantic), just tweeted what seems like a plausible explanation for how PRISM might function.

His account resolves what has been a remarkably strange situation: Namely, that the government has basically acknowledged the program, yet the capabilities ascribed to PRISM seem incompatible with the full-throated denials of the technology companies who are supposedly working with the government.

The key sticking point was whether or not the government had "direct access" or, as the Washington Post put it, whether the government was "tapping directly" into servers at Google, Facebook, etc.

Here's Ambinder's reporting:

On the "no direct access"--[content providers]* push to a separate server the subset of accounts that the FISC order covers; NSA monitors them in real time.

Let's say court order says "all Yahoo accounts in Pakistan" Yahoo would push those accounts to the server; NSA could watch them in real time. They'd try & figure who & where the incoming emails were coming from. US persons data minimized automatically if possible (often it's not).

If they're up on a Pak bad guy email and someone in Denver sends that account an email saying "I need more explosives," NSA notifies FBI via a Guardian tip. Then FBI opens prelim investigation to determine if the Denver person is a bad guy & takes over. Of course, to ID the person sending the email to Pakistan, analysis of US persons email might be required. Incidental targeting happens now. And that's how it works. Basically.

* Ambinder originally tweeted that it was ISPs pushed to a separate server, but corrected himself in this tweet. He has also noted that he assumes the court orders are narrower than "all Yahoo accounts in Pakistan."



SOURCE



 
they playing chess..

they been doing that shit, the nypd has always worked closely with verizon...

they monitor everything including your bill payments.

trust me, for them to let this out now, they are distracting us from something they are trying to push past us.. or hope we overlook....


its like a pickpocket team.. they work in groups, cause a distraction, in one location, while the pickpocketers go to work while they are distracted..

we are being distracted so these parasitic elitist banking mafia or their minions can run game..

Keep your eyes open and read the the shit that scrolls on the bottom of the screen while watching news like cnn or msnbc, bloomberg etc.., thats the news they want to get by you..


the talking heads and moving images are mind fuck distractions to keep you in a hypnotic state..
 

PRISM's Legal Basis: How We Got Here,
and What We Can Do to Get Back​


A privacy scholar explains the recent news about government surveillance.


legalexplainersecuritystate.png

The National Security Administration building and a copy of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court order to Verizon (AP/Patrick Semansky and AP)​



Margot Kaminski
JunE 7 2013
The Atlantic

In the past two days, the press has provided unprecedented revelations of how pervasive the secret surveillance state has become. Leaks reveal that the FBI and NSA have received all Verizon Business Services telephone call records, including geolocation data; and the NSA uses a program called PRISM to access user content held by Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple. How can a country that constitutionally protects privacy permit its government to spy on such a scale?

The Fourth Amendment prevents dragnet surveillance by requiring law enforcement to go to courts and show probable cause. These dual requirements of court oversight and a legitimate, targeted investigation ensure that people will not be subject to general searches by an abusive government. But intelligence-gathering that involves "the activities of foreign powers" is treated differently, whether it occurs inside or outside of the United States.

Foreign intelligence is the exception that has swallowed the Fourth Amendment whole. As my colleague Anjali Dalal points out, people probably believe that foreign intelligence law is " supposed to be going after foreign intelligence," but its impact on Americans is surprisingly broad. In 1978, Congress set up a system governing foreign intelligence surveillance. The surveillance programs leaked in the past two days are the results of the post-9/11 version of this system. The Verizon call records, which include phone numbers, location data, and timestamps, were authorized as the collection of "business records" under the PATRIOT Act. And the PRISM program--which allows the NSA to access content such as emails, search histories, and audio chats-- is authorized as part of "foreign intelligence" gathering under the 2008 Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

It is crucial to understand that the foreign intelligence system as it currently exists fails to require both adequate targeting and adequate oversight. The system allows intelligence agencies to gather an enormous amount of information "incidental" to any investigations. And it does so with minimal court and Congressional oversight. If the revelations of the past two days have taught us anything, it is that revision of our foreign intelligence surveillance system is a constitutional necessity. If the Fourth Amendment is to have any meaning, Congress must untangle the current web of broad authorizations and broad secrecy that allows the government to escape judicial accountability for its acts.

First, there is the question of whom the surveillance targets. PRISM spies on Americans. The Director of National Intelligence emphasized yesterday that PRISM targets only " non-U.S. persons located outside the United States." But the press release also acknowledges that "information about U.S. persons" may be "incidentally acquired" in such pursuits. Targeting is not the same as collecting; the program may "target" foreign persons, but "acquire" information on Americans.

The current scope of this "incidental" surveillance will shock most Americans. Before 2008, the law limited "incidental" surveillance by limiting primary surveillance. The government had to show probable cause that its surveillance target was the agent of a foreign power, and that the facility being watched was about to be used by that target. You could be incidentally observed if you communicated with a targeted foreign agent, but otherwise foreign communications were likely to be unmonitored.

But in 2008, the FISA Amendments Act (FISAAA) changed this. The government now does not need to show probable cause that the target is a foreign agent. It need only have a "reasonable belief" that the target is located outside of the United States. The new version of FISA does not require the government to identify its targets; it does not require the government to identify the monitored facilities; and the purpose of foreign intelligence gathering attaches to the whole surveillance program, not the individual investigation. That is to say: the FISA Amendments Act permits the government to obtain a single court order through which it can monitor thousands, or even millions, of people. The scope of "incidental" surveillance thus vastly expanded as Congress lowered the requirements for spying on the primary target.

Such a system will inevitably sweep in untold numbers of Americans who communicate with foreigners. And because the government need have only a "reasonable belief" that the target is outside the United States--which it is interpreting according to the Washington Post as a 51% chance that the target is outside the U.S.--this system will undoubtedly sweep in purely domestic communications as well.

This brings us to the issue of oversight: who is watching the watchers? The Director of National Intelligence assures us that PRISM is "subject to oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Executive Branch, and Congress." It is true that in December 2012 Congress renewed the law that allows PRISM to exist. But what kind of oversight did Congress actually provide? When Senators Ron Wyden and Mark Udall asked whether communications by Americans had been gathered under the law, the Director of National Intelligence responded that it was not possible to identify the number of people in the United States whose communications were reviewed. How effective can Congressional oversight be if Congress does not understand the scope and nature of the programs it has authorized?

At the core of the problem is that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), which meets in secret and does not publish its opinions, itself does not provide adequate oversight. When Congress changed the standard for targeting foreign individuals in 2008 , it abolished the ability of the FISA Court to evaluate whether the government had any real cause to target an individual or group of individuals. The Supreme Court itself disputes whether the FISA Court enforces the Fourth Amendment. The "minimization procedures" touted by the Director of National Intelligence as adequate privacy safeguards are established by the government, evaluated by the government, and are subject to review by a secret court--if review occurs at all. And as a general practice, FISA "minimization" has not been true minimization: it occurs after information is already acquired.

The existence of PRISM and the Verizon metadata program, both authorized by the FISA Court, confirms that a secret court broadly authorized by an uninformed Congress will not adequately protect the Fourth and First Amendment rights of American citizens on American soil.

So what can we do?

The first instinct might be to look to federal courts to protect our constitutional rights. But in February of this year, the Supreme Court effectively closed that avenue of recourse at least with respect to PRISM in Clapper v. Amnesty International. The majority of the Court found that the group of lawyers, journalists, and human rights advocates who challenged the constitutionality of the law that authorizes PRISM could not show that they had been injured by it. The Court explained that the alleged surveillance was too speculative; the group could not get into court unless it showed that surveillance of its members was "certainly impending."

One might think that a new lawsuit could show that surveillance is "certainly impending," because we now know that the PRISM program exists. But this is not clear. Any plaintiffs would probably still face the significant hurdle of showing that the government has spied on them in particular, or their foreign correspondents. And while the existence of a similarly pervasive spying program led the Ninth Circuit to find that a similar lawsuit could proceed, that case came down before the recent Supreme Court opinion.

The best solution, then, is Congress. Congress must repeal the FISA Amendments Act, which it regrettably reauthorized in 2012. Otherwise the revelation that the government can and does spy on Americans through Internet companies will chill expression, chill free association, and threaten our society's growing reliance on cloud computing for everything from intimate communications to business transactions. And Congress should reevaluate the secrecy surrounding our entire foreign intelligence-gathering system, because if the past two days have shown anything, it is that lack of oversight leads to extraordinary abuses.



SOURCE


 
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I can vouch that this information that was being collected was not used to go after terrorist. It is being used to harass American citizens, disrupt their activities, and terrorize them!!!MSM is trying to downplay what was being done.

Why don't these cloud services allow you to encrypt your files with your own password? If Mega can create API to do this type of encryption, I am pretty sure a $400 billion dollar company can establish this service.

Why doesn't Google allow you to encrypt all emails that you receive or send with your own password? Why don't they provide logs whenever anybody accesses your emails, whether a Google employee, government without a court order, or hacker?


How much in government contracts do these companies get, that could encourage companies not to fight these court orders?
 
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I can vouch that this information that was being collected was not used to go after terrorist. It is being used to harass American citizens, disrupt their activities, and terrorize them!!!MSM is trying to downplay what was being done.


Evidence . . .
 
trust me, for them to let this out now, they are distracting us from something they are trying to push past us.. or hope we overlook....


its like a pickpocket team.. they work in groups, cause a distraction, in one location, while the pickpocketers go to work while they are distracted..

we are being distracted so these parasitic elitist banking mafia or their minions can run game..

Keep your eyes open and read the the shit that scrolls on the bottom of the screen while watching news like cnn or msnbc, bloomberg etc.., thats the news they want to get by you..


the talking heads and moving images are mind fuck distractions to keep you in a hypnotic state..

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[SIZE=+1]Biometric Database tucked inside Gang of Eight immigration bill[/SIZE]
<small style="font-family: 'Times New Roman';">Conservative Action Alerts ^ | May 31, 2013 | Conservative Action Alerts </small>
<small>Posted on 6/7/2013 7:44:05 AM by KeyLargo</small>
<small>
</small>

Biometric Database tucked inside Gang of Eight immigration bill
by Conservative Action Alerts on May 31, 2013


ALERT: The Gang of Eight’s comprehensive immigration plan will destroy individual privacy via biometric database.




Last Tuesday, the Senate Judiciary Committee passed their markup of the Gang of Eight’s “immigration reform” bill – a version that not only preserves most of the bill’s original problems, but also contains 233 additional pages of rules.


Senator Ted Cruz says that the bill only makes our current immigration problems “worse.” Sadly, he holds the minority opinion as he was one of only five Senate Judiciary Members who opposed S. 744′s exit from committee.


Page 1,318 of the markup bill details the establishment of a “photo tool” – a giant federal database managed by the Department of Homeland Security, supplied with individuals’ biometric information from all of the fifty states.


If established, the database would house a file for every person carrying a driver’s license or equivalent state-issued photo I.D., and contain their name, age, Social Security number, along with their photograph.


This database would also determine whether or not one is permitted to find employment. In other words, without becoming an entry in a federal database, Americans will be unable to secure a job or freely work where and as they choose!


“The Secretary shall develop and maintain a photo tool that enables employers to match the photo on a covered identity document provided to the employer to a photo maintained by a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database.” (S. 744, page 1,319.)



(Excerpt) Read more at conservativeactionalerts.com ...


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