100 Turkish (and other Nato) drones downed; countless UAVs and missiles stopped in their
flights. Repeated missile and drone attacks rebuffed at the Khmeimim Russian airbase in Lathakia
Syria foiled and rebuffed.
The Times. It was then reportedly moved to a base hosting Turkish forcesbefore being sent for pickup at Zuwarah. Bahroun has reported connections to arms smugglers and Islamist militant groups in Libya.
VIA ALMARSAD.CO
Mohamed Bahroun, in the white shirt, seen taunting an LNA pilot, in the green flight suit, who was captured after bailing out of a MiG-23 combat jet near Tripoli in 2019.
At the same time, there would have been other ways to mitigate these concerns that would not have required recovering the Pantsir-S1, including destroying it, either on the ground or from the air. The potential intelligence value is more likely to have been the major driving factor for the U.S. military.
"A Russian official said Moscow was aware the U.S. had removed the Pantsir system but suggested its capture would be of limited intelligence value, since the US would have the opportunity to study the same system in the UAE," The Times added. "Export versions, such as the one captured in Libya, are supposedly stripped of a carefully guarded identification friend or foe database with the transponder codes for all Russian air force jets."
However, whatever the system's capabilities, the UAE is unlikely to have ever allowed elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community that specialize in what is known as "foreign materiel exploitation," or FME, to completely tear down any of its Pantsir-S1s. A full and meticulous examination of the system could still yield a wide array of valuable intelligence information. Even just examining the materials used to make certain components and the quality of their manufacture can provide useful insights into current Russian industrial capabilities. It's not clear if the U.S. government has acquired any other Pantsir-S1s, which have been in service since 2012, from any other sources in the past.
Having a largely complete and potentially functional Pantsir-S1 would also give the U.S. military a valuable example of a real-world threat system for use during testing, including when it comes to developing countermeasures. It could also help with the development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures and would be a prized asset for use by the "opposing force," or OPFOR, during major exercises, such as Red Flag and Black Flag.
It's true that the Pantsir has, at best, a mixed record, suffering particularly notable losses in Libya, as well as Syria, to Turkish, Turkish-backed, and Israeli forces. While some of this can be attributed to poor quality operators, major deficiencies with the first-generation Pantsir-S1s have also reportedly been discovered over the years, which has now led to the development of the improved Pantsir-SM and new surface-to-air missiles to go with it.
Some of the system's negative reputation is also based on superficial videos of them being struck by drones and other weapons. Without more complex anti-air tactics, any system is vulnerable to attack when it is left out in the open and offline for repairs, rearming and refueling, or due to personnel issues. Still, the Pantsir-S1 continues to enjoy significant success on the export market and presents a potential threat that U.S. forces are increasingly likely to encounter in future conflicts.
With all this in mind, the U.S. government, among others, has long worked to acquire foreign threat representative systems, especially aircraft and air defense systems, on the open market and via other means for FME, testing, and training purposes. In one particularly famous example, U.S. special operations forces, including elements of the U.S. Army's elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, snatched a Libyan Mi-25 Hind helicopter gunship from neighboring Chad in 1988. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force also set up an entire top-secret squadron, known as the Red Eagles, equipped with foreign jets that had been smuggled out of various countries or otherwise recovered, including some that had been partially destroyed, to test and train against.
All told, no matter what might have ultimately happened to the Pantsir-S1 that the U.S. military reportedly picked up in Libya, it's certain that intelligence analysts took all available opportunities to glean any additional information they could from it.
Contact the author: joe@thedr
flights. Repeated missile and drone attacks rebuffed at the Khmeimim Russian airbase in Lathakia
Syria foiled and rebuffed.
The Times. It was then reportedly moved to a base hosting Turkish forcesbefore being sent for pickup at Zuwarah. Bahroun has reported connections to arms smugglers and Islamist militant groups in Libya.
VIA ALMARSAD.CO
Mohamed Bahroun, in the white shirt, seen taunting an LNA pilot, in the green flight suit, who was captured after bailing out of a MiG-23 combat jet near Tripoli in 2019.
At the same time, there would have been other ways to mitigate these concerns that would not have required recovering the Pantsir-S1, including destroying it, either on the ground or from the air. The potential intelligence value is more likely to have been the major driving factor for the U.S. military.
"A Russian official said Moscow was aware the U.S. had removed the Pantsir system but suggested its capture would be of limited intelligence value, since the US would have the opportunity to study the same system in the UAE," The Times added. "Export versions, such as the one captured in Libya, are supposedly stripped of a carefully guarded identification friend or foe database with the transponder codes for all Russian air force jets."
However, whatever the system's capabilities, the UAE is unlikely to have ever allowed elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community that specialize in what is known as "foreign materiel exploitation," or FME, to completely tear down any of its Pantsir-S1s. A full and meticulous examination of the system could still yield a wide array of valuable intelligence information. Even just examining the materials used to make certain components and the quality of their manufacture can provide useful insights into current Russian industrial capabilities. It's not clear if the U.S. government has acquired any other Pantsir-S1s, which have been in service since 2012, from any other sources in the past.
Having a largely complete and potentially functional Pantsir-S1 would also give the U.S. military a valuable example of a real-world threat system for use during testing, including when it comes to developing countermeasures. It could also help with the development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures and would be a prized asset for use by the "opposing force," or OPFOR, during major exercises, such as Red Flag and Black Flag.
It's true that the Pantsir has, at best, a mixed record, suffering particularly notable losses in Libya, as well as Syria, to Turkish, Turkish-backed, and Israeli forces. While some of this can be attributed to poor quality operators, major deficiencies with the first-generation Pantsir-S1s have also reportedly been discovered over the years, which has now led to the development of the improved Pantsir-SM and new surface-to-air missiles to go with it.
Some of the system's negative reputation is also based on superficial videos of them being struck by drones and other weapons. Without more complex anti-air tactics, any system is vulnerable to attack when it is left out in the open and offline for repairs, rearming and refueling, or due to personnel issues. Still, the Pantsir-S1 continues to enjoy significant success on the export market and presents a potential threat that U.S. forces are increasingly likely to encounter in future conflicts.
With all this in mind, the U.S. government, among others, has long worked to acquire foreign threat representative systems, especially aircraft and air defense systems, on the open market and via other means for FME, testing, and training purposes. In one particularly famous example, U.S. special operations forces, including elements of the U.S. Army's elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, snatched a Libyan Mi-25 Hind helicopter gunship from neighboring Chad in 1988. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force also set up an entire top-secret squadron, known as the Red Eagles, equipped with foreign jets that had been smuggled out of various countries or otherwise recovered, including some that had been partially destroyed, to test and train against.
All told, no matter what might have ultimately happened to the Pantsir-S1 that the U.S. military reportedly picked up in Libya, it's certain that intelligence analysts took all available opportunities to glean any additional information they could from it.
Contact the author: joe@thedr
So if warding off these has you that impressed about Russia's defense system, we should stop now....
