US - Iran: WWIII or Regime Collapse?
The U.S. & Iran: 4 Decades of Conflict
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History of US-Iran Conflict Explained
Four decades of conflict with Iran, explained
The Week Staff
AP Photo/Campion, File
January 19, 2020
Iran and the U.S. have been enemies since 1979. Why? Here's everything you need to know:
What is the state of relations?
For four decades, the U.S. and Iran have been locked into what is essentially an ongoing, low-grade war. Since its inception in 1979, the Shiite theocracy, now run by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a council of top clerics, has considered the U.S. the "Great Satan" — an intruder in the Middle East and a primary obstacle to the mullahs' goal of sustaining and spreading their Shiite Islamic revolution.
Speeches and sermons often end with the chant "Death to America!" Iran sponsors a network of Shiite militias and parties in countries across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Badr Organization in Iraq, and it is sworn to the destruction of key U.S. ally Israel. Over the years, Iranian-backed terrorists have attacked U.S. troops and killed hundreds of Americans. From Iran's point of view, the U.S. has sought to destroy its regime almost from its inception, surrounding it with military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the Gulf states and crippling its economy through punishing sanctions.
When did problems begin?
It all started in 1953, under President Eisenhower, when the CIA and British intelligence led a coup against elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
The shah, modern reformer Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was installed as head of state and restored British and U.S. access to oil.
The shah created a secret police force, SAVAK, to keep various leftist and religious opposition groups in check, but its authoritarian abuses further embittered Iranians who considered the shah a puppet of the West.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist cleric who had been banished to France, inspired massive protests that forced the shah to flee, enabling the ayatollah to return and set up a theocratic government.
When President Jimmy Carter allowed the ailing shah to come to America for medical treatment, enraged Iranian students broke into the U.S. Embassy, taking 52 American diplomats hostage for a gut-wrenching 444 days.
What happened under Reagan?
The U.S. and the Iranian theocracy struggled, often violently, for influence in the region. In 1983, a Hezbollah truck bomb killed 241 Americans, mostly Marines, who were on a peacekeeping mission in Lebanon to support the Christian-led government. President Reagan then withdrew U.S. soldiers from Lebanon.
Iraq's Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, launched a war against Iran that cost 500,000 lives, with the U.S. providing support to Iraq as the lesser of two evils.
Amid heightened tensions, the U.S. Navy mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger jet in the Persian Gulf in 1988, killing all 290 people on board. It was during this period that Iran decided to develop nuclear weapons.
How did the nuclear program start?
Iran began working with Pakistan, China, and Russia to develop nuclear technology, insisting it would be used only for electrical generation.
But in 2002, Iranian dissidents revealed that Iran had built a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz that could be used to help build a bomb. Over the ensuing years, Iran repeatedly evaded United Nations inspectors and lied about the extent of its activities.
After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, largely to establish a pro-Western democracy in the region, Iran began supporting Iraq's Shiite militias, who killed hundreds of U.S. soldiers with improvised bombs.
When President Barack Obama took office, he sought to broker a deal with Iran; in 2015, U.S. negotiators and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani — a relative moderate — reached an agreement to curtail Iran's nuclear program.
What was in the nuclear deal?
Iran agreed to slash the number of its uranium centrifuges — machines that can spin that element into a highly enriched form usable in nuclear bombs — and submit to intrusive inspections, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the release of some $50 billion in frozen Iranian assets held abroad.
The deal — backed by the EU, Russia, and China — would have prevented Iran from enriching significant amounts of uranium until at least 2031. For three years, the U.N. and EU said that Iran was complying fully with the treaty. But many Republicans, including presidential candidate Donald Trump, objected that the restrictions on enrichment would expire after 15 years, and complained that it did nothing to restrict Iran's support for terrorism abroad.
What did President Trump do?
Trump pulled the U.S. out of the pact in May 2018 and reimposed devastating sanctions on Iran, including an embargo on Iranian oil. This policy of "maximum pressure," the administration says, is intended to force Iran to negotiate a more comprehensive deal and agree to end all aggressive actions in the region. But with its economy deeply damaged, the Iranian regime became even more aggressive.
, through its Houthi proxy in Yemen, Iran bombed two key oil installations in Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias tried to storm the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Trump responded by authorizing a drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the powerful leader of the Quds Force who oversaw Iran's network of allied militias. The killing of Soleimani, said Ali Vaez, director of the Iran program for the International Crisis Group, is "the death knell of the Iran nuclear deal and any prospect of diplomacy between Iran and the U.S."
Iran's thwarted democracy movement
Several times over the past two decades, Iran's long-suffering people have risen up against their repressive regime, only to meet with brutality. In 2009, Iranian voters who believed the re-election of hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president was rigged poured into the streets by the millions, chanting "Where is my vote?" After months of protest, the Iranian Green Movement was squelched by mass arrests, with the regime jailing and torturing the ringleaders. Some made false confessions that they were working for the U.S. Smaller protests followed in 2018, and then, last November, new mass protests broke out over a rise in gas prices, and the regime responded by firing on unarmed protesters, killing hundreds and arresting some 7,000. Once Soleimani was killed, though, pro-regime Iranians poured into the streets to mourn him. They've now been supplanted by democracy protesters enraged by Iran's shooting down of a Ukrainian commercial jet.
This article was first published in the latest issue of The Week magazine. If you want to read more like it, try the magazine for a month here.
.
The Week Staff
AP Photo/Campion, File
January 19, 2020
Iran and the U.S. have been enemies since 1979. Why? Here's everything you need to know:
What is the state of relations?
For four decades, the U.S. and Iran have been locked into what is essentially an ongoing, low-grade war. Since its inception in 1979, the Shiite theocracy, now run by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a council of top clerics, has considered the U.S. the "Great Satan" — an intruder in the Middle East and a primary obstacle to the mullahs' goal of sustaining and spreading their Shiite Islamic revolution.
Speeches and sermons often end with the chant "Death to America!" Iran sponsors a network of Shiite militias and parties in countries across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Badr Organization in Iraq, and it is sworn to the destruction of key U.S. ally Israel. Over the years, Iranian-backed terrorists have attacked U.S. troops and killed hundreds of Americans. From Iran's point of view, the U.S. has sought to destroy its regime almost from its inception, surrounding it with military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the Gulf states and crippling its economy through punishing sanctions.
When did problems begin?
It all started in 1953, under President Eisenhower, when the CIA and British intelligence led a coup against elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
The shah, modern reformer Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was installed as head of state and restored British and U.S. access to oil.
The shah created a secret police force, SAVAK, to keep various leftist and religious opposition groups in check, but its authoritarian abuses further embittered Iranians who considered the shah a puppet of the West.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist cleric who had been banished to France, inspired massive protests that forced the shah to flee, enabling the ayatollah to return and set up a theocratic government.
When President Jimmy Carter allowed the ailing shah to come to America for medical treatment, enraged Iranian students broke into the U.S. Embassy, taking 52 American diplomats hostage for a gut-wrenching 444 days.
What happened under Reagan?
The U.S. and the Iranian theocracy struggled, often violently, for influence in the region. In 1983, a Hezbollah truck bomb killed 241 Americans, mostly Marines, who were on a peacekeeping mission in Lebanon to support the Christian-led government. President Reagan then withdrew U.S. soldiers from Lebanon.
Iraq's Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, launched a war against Iran that cost 500,000 lives, with the U.S. providing support to Iraq as the lesser of two evils.
Amid heightened tensions, the U.S. Navy mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger jet in the Persian Gulf in 1988, killing all 290 people on board. It was during this period that Iran decided to develop nuclear weapons.
How did the nuclear program start?
Iran began working with Pakistan, China, and Russia to develop nuclear technology, insisting it would be used only for electrical generation.
But in 2002, Iranian dissidents revealed that Iran had built a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz that could be used to help build a bomb. Over the ensuing years, Iran repeatedly evaded United Nations inspectors and lied about the extent of its activities.
After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, largely to establish a pro-Western democracy in the region, Iran began supporting Iraq's Shiite militias, who killed hundreds of U.S. soldiers with improvised bombs.
When President Barack Obama took office, he sought to broker a deal with Iran; in 2015, U.S. negotiators and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani — a relative moderate — reached an agreement to curtail Iran's nuclear program.
What was in the nuclear deal?
Iran agreed to slash the number of its uranium centrifuges — machines that can spin that element into a highly enriched form usable in nuclear bombs — and submit to intrusive inspections, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the release of some $50 billion in frozen Iranian assets held abroad.
The deal — backed by the EU, Russia, and China — would have prevented Iran from enriching significant amounts of uranium until at least 2031. For three years, the U.N. and EU said that Iran was complying fully with the treaty. But many Republicans, including presidential candidate Donald Trump, objected that the restrictions on enrichment would expire after 15 years, and complained that it did nothing to restrict Iran's support for terrorism abroad.
What did President Trump do?
Trump pulled the U.S. out of the pact in May 2018 and reimposed devastating sanctions on Iran, including an embargo on Iranian oil. This policy of "maximum pressure," the administration says, is intended to force Iran to negotiate a more comprehensive deal and agree to end all aggressive actions in the region. But with its economy deeply damaged, the Iranian regime became even more aggressive.
, through its Houthi proxy in Yemen, Iran bombed two key oil installations in Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias tried to storm the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Trump responded by authorizing a drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the powerful leader of the Quds Force who oversaw Iran's network of allied militias. The killing of Soleimani, said Ali Vaez, director of the Iran program for the International Crisis Group, is "the death knell of the Iran nuclear deal and any prospect of diplomacy between Iran and the U.S."
Iran's thwarted democracy movement
Several times over the past two decades, Iran's long-suffering people have risen up against their repressive regime, only to meet with brutality. In 2009, Iranian voters who believed the re-election of hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president was rigged poured into the streets by the millions, chanting "Where is my vote?" After months of protest, the Iranian Green Movement was squelched by mass arrests, with the regime jailing and torturing the ringleaders. Some made false confessions that they were working for the U.S. Smaller protests followed in 2018, and then, last November, new mass protests broke out over a rise in gas prices, and the regime responded by firing on unarmed protesters, killing hundreds and arresting some 7,000. Once Soleimani was killed, though, pro-regime Iranians poured into the streets to mourn him. They've now been supplanted by democracy protesters enraged by Iran's shooting down of a Ukrainian commercial jet.
This article was first published in the latest issue of The Week magazine. If you want to read more like it, try the magazine for a month here.
.
The killing of Qassem Soleimani: Iran at a crossroads
In the past, Tehran has failed to take advantage of opportunities to change the regional status quo. Will it do so again?
www.middleeasteye.net
The killing of Qassem Soleimani: Iran at a crossroads
Taha Ozhan
9 January 2020 14:05 UTC | Last update: 1 week 4 days ago
In the past, Tehran has failed to take advantage of opportunities to change the regional status quo. Will it do so again?
Last October, Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi died during a US raid in northwestern Syria. Two months later, a US drone strike killed Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad.
In some sense, Baghdadi and Soleimani were byproducts of the US presence in the Middle East. Without Washington’s occupations and disastrous policies in the region, neither would have risen to their recent prominence.
Mutualistic relationship
If Baghdadi was created by the US occupation, then his rise in the years that followed was enabled by the Soleimani-sponsored purge in Iraq. Likewise, without the IS phenomenon, Soleimani’s impact throughout the region could have been significantly more confined. This strange, mutualistic relationship ended consecutively, almost proving its cause-and-effect nature.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who clashed with Soleimani just months earlier, said after the military leader’s death that he was “the most effective force” fighting IS, Nusra and al-Qaeda.
Zarif is well aware of the value of being an anti-IS warrior. Tehran, like many others in the region, is well aware of the simple and primitive strategy of the past decade. Whatever they do, it is all about “fighting IS”. This is a useful leverage to help advance tactical goals in the eyes of the international community.
As Baghdadi started to emerge on the scene, Iran’s sectarian purge in post-Saddam Iraq was a catalyst for him and for IS. It was also Iran’s first al-Qaeda moment.
After 9/11, as the US rushed to occupy Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran noticed a golden opportunity. Soleimani’s first crucial mission as leader of the Quds Force was in Afghanistan and involved “implicit coordination” with the US against Washington and Tehran’s mutual enemy: the Taliban. The US removed Iran’s two enemies, Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, in less than two years.
Historic juncture
The temporary and consensual marriage was similar to the symbiosis between Baghdadi and Soleimani. Neither ever acknowledged their co-dependency, but instead kept clashing on many fronts, threatening each other and even crossing the lines with physical attacks.
The US occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq marked a historic juncture, one where Iran could have set itself on the path of domestic normalisation, supporting the people’s demand for change in the region. Instead, Iran interpreted the 9/11 attacks as the US finding a new enemy: al-Qaeda.
Iraqi protesters shout anti-US slogans as they surround military vehicles in 2003 in Baghdad (AFP)
A decade later, a second opportunity arrived with the Arab uprisings. Popular movements were growing, and the masses were asking for change - but Tehran chose to back the regional status quo, supporting governments in Iraq and Syria. Had it not done so, there could have been important opportunities for the reconciliation of ethnic and sectarian factions in both countries.
An Iran that defended change in the region would have helped to actualise the process of democratisation in neighbouring countries - and more importantly, at home - without external scare tactics. It would have softened the sectarian tensions antagonising the region, clearing the path for an entirely different discourse on the Middle East. Instead, Tehran thought it more prudent to extend its power through its allies.
Demise of the proxy strategy
In the early days of 2020, as over the past two decades, Iran finds itself once again at a crossroads. Although Iran is quite experienced with US aggression in the region and against Tehran, the current state of tension is different than that of the past.
Iran was able to withstand the longest conventional war of the 20th century (1980-88), during which the US supported Iraq. Iran has managed to withstand devastating economic sanctions. And while there have been many incidents over the last four decades, this is the first time that the US and Iran are having a direct confrontation at this level.
Soleimani’s killing represents the demise of the comfortable proxy strategy used by Iran for years. It also represents US recklessness and the nonexistence of Washington’s geopolitical perspective. The temporary marriage of the last two decades between the US and Iran is over.
The moment the Iraqis attacked the US embassy, things radically changed. It was not difficult to predict what Washington would think about the raid. The 1979 Tehran embassy crisis, when thousands of young people who proclaimed themselves as followers of Imam Khomeini took 52 US diplomats and citizens hostage, was also recalled by the Libyan embassy attack several years ago.
Iran's retaliation
In the wake of Soleimani’s assassination, questions began to fly over how Iran would retaliate. On Wednesday, Iran fired more than a dozen ballistic missiles towards two Iraqi military bases hosting US-led coalition personnel, with no reported casualties. Zarif said the strikes “concluded” Iran’s response, and US President Donald Trump subsequently noted that “Iran appears to be standing down, which is a good thing for all”.
Any further retaliation could easily ignite a war, the magnitude of which no one can possibly predict. As the US is the largest global military power - with almost zero geopolitical vision and no sound policy in the Middle East under Trump’s leadership - eschatological, end-of-times speculation is not off the table.
Over the last decade, especially after the Arab uprisings broke out, Iran has sought to compensate for centuries of geopolitical hunger with messianic sectarianism. After missing the last two decades of opportunities, Tehran should avoid another lost decade.
Had Iran chosen to support change in the region and domestically, we could have been witnessing a radically different political atmosphere today - one that could not have been stopped or destroyed by a drone missile.
See also: Ronald Reagan’s “October Surprise” Plot Was Real After All
Ronald Reagan’s “October Surprise” Plot Was Real After All
source: Jacobin Ronald and Nancy Reagan on the day of his first inauguration as president in 1981. A batch of quietly released documents confirms what many have long suspected: Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign worked behind the scenes to delay the release of US hostages in Iran, for...
www.bgol.us
EXCLUSIVE: Iran tasked Nasrallah with uniting Iraqi proxies after Soleimani's death
www.middleeasteye.net
Hezbollah leader sponsors 'truce' talks, with Iraqi paramilitaries endorsing Hadi al-Amiri as PMF leader and Tehran courting Moqtada al-Sadr in bid to form 'united resistance'
Paramilitary groups in Iraq have agreed to accept Hadi al-Amiri, right, as the new leader of the PMF, including those loyal to anti-Iran cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, left (Reuters)
The leaders of Iranian-backed paramilitary groups in Iraq have agreed to put their differences aside and back Hadi al-Amiri as the new chairman of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) as part of a wider plan brokered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to quell tensions between the groups and create a “united resistance” to US troops in the country.
The informal agreement was forged at a meeting convened in Beirut on Thursday after Nasrallah was asked by Iran to organise its Iraqi factions following the assassinations of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the de facto leader of the PMF, in a US drone strike in Baghdad on 3 January.
Most of the leaders then flew to Tehran on Sunday, before moving onto the Iranian city of Qom on Monday where they also met with influential Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in a significant display of Shia unity.
While the stated purpose of these meetings was to rally groups commonly opposed to the US presence in Iraq, sources told Middle East Eye that they were also convened to address the leadership vacuum and quell in-fighting over long-simmering feuds between rival Iran-backed militias in the wake of the killings of Soleimani and Muhandis.
“All these meetings were attempting to gather the factions after they have been devastated in an unprecedented way,” a prominent Shia politician familiar with these meetings told Middle East Eye.
“Even the meeting with Sadr was heading in this direction, and it is part of the attempts to break the ice with him and drag him to the camp [of the pro-Iranian factions].”
Meetings in Beirut, Tehran and Qom
Commanders and senior officials within most of the most prominent pro-Iran armed factions, including Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah, Kataib Jund al-Imam, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Kataib al-Imam Ali, arrived in Beirut on Thursday in response to Nasrallah's call for them to “set aside differences” and promote calm in the aftermath of the US strikes.
At the same time, many of Iraq's top politicians and the leaders of other armed factions, including Amiri, the leader of the Iran-backed Badr Organisation who was nominated as Muhandis' successor less than 24 hours after his death, went to Tehran to offer their condolences to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei over the killing of Soleimani.
Supporters of the Hezbollah movement watch as the movement's leader Hasan Nasrallah delivers a speech on a screen in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatieh on 12 January (AFP)
As most returned to Baghdad, Amiri and Akram al-Kaabi, the commander of the Huzballah al-Najaba Brigades, remained there, where they were joined on Sunday by most of the leaders who had met Nasrallah in Beirut.
Less than 24 hours later, the group travelled to Qom where they were photographed meeting Sadr, who has been pursuing religious studies there for months, and two of his top military aides, Abu Doaa al-Issawi and Abu Yasser al-Kaabi.
One of the attendees who participated in the meeting said in a press statement: “The aim of the meeting with Sadr was to prepare the ground for the creation of a united resistance front to dislodge the American forces and all foreign forces from Iraq and coordinate to unify the positions.”
But several Shia commanders and politicians familiar with what was discussed have told MEE that the series of meetings was mostly directed at resolving internal tensions and disputes between the different groups that make up the PMF, a government-organised umbrella group of Shia militia factions also known as Hashd al-Shaabi which was created in 2014 to fight alongside Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces against the Islamic State group.
The PMF's factions divide into three main groups. The first is linked to the supreme religious authority in Najaf represented by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; the second is associated with Sadr; while the last group, which represents the most numerous and best armed, is associated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC).
The Iranian-backed armed factions have been one of the biggest challenges to the authority of the Iraqi government ever since the 2003 US-led invasion that deposed Saddam Hussein and pitched the country into turmoil and political instability.
Although they became a part of the Iraqi security establishment and have been funded and equipped mainly from the budget of the Iraqi government since 2016, they do not fall under the command of the leader of the Iraqi armed forces.
Many have also been accused of involvement in illegal activities, including killings, drug trafficking, oil smuggling and racketeering.
Disputes over smuggling and political influence
From outside, these factions appear to be a united front, acting violently towards their critics and threatening both government and non-government parties who challenge their activities. Yet internally, they compete fiercely for financial gains and control of influential government positions.
For example, competition over oil and scrap metal smuggling from southern Mosul in recent years was one of the main reasons for the differences that broke out between most of the the faction leaders who attended the Beirut meetings, one of whom had sought to obtain the largest share of the illicit trade at the expense of the others.
Another dispute erupted in recent months between leaders of two of the most prominent factions who attended meetings in Beirut over the political gains and government positions that one of them received, while the other was deprived of such gains because of his defiance of Muhandis' orders.
A third dispute erupted several weeks ago between two groups within Kataeb Hezbollah itself about some of the gains obtained by one of the leaders close to Muhandis which ended with the defection of the aggrieved leader and his announcement of the creation of a separate faction.
The meetings in Beirut sponsored by Nasrallah “were aimed at achieving a truce between these factions,” a commander who attended told MEE.
“Iran asked Nasrallah to play the same role that Soleimani was playing in Iraq until some decisions are made,” the commander said.
“Iran needs at least three months to decide how to manage the factions known as the resistance axis, who will be in charge and which mechanisms should be followed. So it [Iran] needs to ensure that the situation between the factions remains the same as it is now.”
MEE has contacted Hezbollah's media office in Lebanon for comment but had not received a response at the time of publication.
Supreme leader vs Sistani
Iran is facing unprecedented tension in its relationship with the United States after it bombed Iraqi military bases hosting US forces last week, in retaliation for the killings of Soleimani and Muhandis.
In addition, the relationship between Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Shia community in Iraq, and Khamenei has deteriorated significantly because of the Iranian supreme leader's insistence on using Iraq as a proxy battleground for the confrontation with the US, and over the role of Iranian-backed armed groups in the killing and intimidation of Iraqi anti-government protesters.
A member of Hashd al-Shaabi holds a picture of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani during the funeral procession of fellow comrades killed by US strikes in Baghdad on 31 December (AFP)
In a sermon at Friday prayers last week, Sistani described both Iran and America as “strangers” who should not interfere in Iraqi affairs.
But at the same time, the row sparked a lot of discussion in official Iranian circles over the success of the policies pursued by Khamenei and Soleimani in Iraq, Iraqi leaders close to Iran told MEE.
“Iran is in a very critical position. The policy that Khamenei previously pursued in managing the Iraqi file and the region is no longer successful. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard had contributed to creating problems in Iraq that turned into a burden for Iran and became an obstacle in the way of its negotiations with the United States,” a prominent Shia politician told MEE.
“Therefore, discussions are currently taking place in Iran about which Iranian authorities will receive the file [of Iraq] - intelligence, the foreign affairs ministry, or keep it in the hands of the Guards?
“Also they need to decide who will replace Soleimani. General Esmail Ghaani [Soleimani's successor] was responsible for the Afghanistan file and had no experience in managing the Middle East.”
Ghaani was appointed as head of the IRGC's elite Quds Force following Soleimani's death, having served as his deputy since 2007. But Ghaani does not speak fluent Arabic.
Ali Larijani, the head of the Iranian Shura Council, or parliament, is one of the suggested names to take over Soleimani's responsibilities in the region, the politician said.
Larijani is a successful politician who tends to favour diplomacy over military solutions. He also enjoys good relations with Najaf, which means that “Iran is seeking to calm the situation in Iraq at all levels”, according to the politician.
Courting Moqtada al-Sadr
Resolving the longstanding rift with Sadr, who does not hide his hostility to the factions associated with Iran, is also considered a priority in Tehran after the death of Muhandis for fear that Sadr could challenge Iran's control of the PMF.
Sadr holds Assaib Ahl al-Haq and Huzballah al-Najaba in particular disdain because he considers their leaders, Qais al-Khazali and Akram al-Kaabi, to be archrivals who defected from him in 2005.
Supporters of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr take part in Friday prayers in the Sadr City suburb of the capital Baghdad, on 3 January, 2020 (AFP)
Amiri's Badr Organisation, the oldest and one of the most powerful paramilitary Shia armed groups, was formed in Iran in 1982 to fight Saddam Hussein's former Baathist regime.
At 66, Amiri is also the oldest among the leaders of the factions associated with Iran. He is a follower of Khamenei and his loyalty to Iran is beyond doubt.
All indications suggest that the leaders of the PMF factions consider Amiri to be an acceptable leader “thanks to his personality, which tends towards flexibility, simplicity and directness,” a PMF commander close to Sistani told MEE.
While Nasrallah’s endeavours have, in principle, resulted in a truce, there are no guarantees that this arrangement will hold, especially if the current collective anger of the paramilitary groups is not channelled towards US forces in Iraq.
With tensions seemingly easing between Washington and Tehran following Iran's non-lethal attacks on US bases in Iraq last week, Iranian-backed Iraqi forces “have received explicit orders not to target any American interests or people until further notice,” one PMF commander told MEE.
But with Tehran apparently happy for now for the Iraqi government to pursue a US withdrawal through legal and diplomatic channels, he warned that the paramilitary groups could return to their old feuds unless they are given something to do.
“Iran will find a way to keep these factions busy. It may allow them to practice their hobbies from time to time by striking a blow here or there against the American forces,” he predicted.
“But there will not be a painful strike. All the warring parties [Iran, its proxies and the US] will adopt a policy of exchanging slaps for the next two or three months.”
EXCLUSIVE: Iran tasked Nasrallah with uniting Iraqi proxies after Soleimani's death
Hezbollah leader sponsors 'truce' talks, with Iraqi paramilitaries endorsing Hadi al-Amiri as PMF leader and Tehran courting Moqtada al-Sadr in bid to form 'united resistance'
www.middleeasteye.net
Hezbollah leader sponsors 'truce' talks, with Iraqi paramilitaries endorsing Hadi al-Amiri as PMF leader and Tehran courting Moqtada al-Sadr in bid to form 'united resistance'
Paramilitary groups in Iraq have agreed to accept Hadi al-Amiri, right, as the new leader of the PMF, including those loyal to anti-Iran cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, left (Reuters)
The leaders of Iranian-backed paramilitary groups in Iraq have agreed to put their differences aside and back Hadi al-Amiri as the new chairman of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) as part of a wider plan brokered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to quell tensions between the groups and create a “united resistance” to US troops in the country.
The informal agreement was forged at a meeting convened in Beirut on Thursday after Nasrallah was asked by Iran to organise its Iraqi factions following the assassinations of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the de facto leader of the PMF, in a US drone strike in Baghdad on 3 January.
Most of the leaders then flew to Tehran on Sunday, before moving onto the Iranian city of Qom on Monday where they also met with influential Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in a significant display of Shia unity.
While the stated purpose of these meetings was to rally groups commonly opposed to the US presence in Iraq, sources told Middle East Eye that they were also convened to address the leadership vacuum and quell in-fighting over long-simmering feuds between rival Iran-backed militias in the wake of the killings of Soleimani and Muhandis.
“All these meetings were attempting to gather the factions after they have been devastated in an unprecedented way,” a prominent Shia politician familiar with these meetings told Middle East Eye.
“Even the meeting with Sadr was heading in this direction, and it is part of the attempts to break the ice with him and drag him to the camp [of the pro-Iranian factions].”
Meetings in Beirut, Tehran and Qom
Commanders and senior officials within most of the most prominent pro-Iran armed factions, including Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah, Kataib Jund al-Imam, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Kataib al-Imam Ali, arrived in Beirut on Thursday in response to Nasrallah's call for them to “set aside differences” and promote calm in the aftermath of the US strikes.
At the same time, many of Iraq's top politicians and the leaders of other armed factions, including Amiri, the leader of the Iran-backed Badr Organisation who was nominated as Muhandis' successor less than 24 hours after his death, went to Tehran to offer their condolences to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei over the killing of Soleimani.
Supporters of the Hezbollah movement watch as the movement's leader Hasan Nasrallah delivers a speech on a screen in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatieh on 12 January (AFP)
As most returned to Baghdad, Amiri and Akram al-Kaabi, the commander of the Huzballah al-Najaba Brigades, remained there, where they were joined on Sunday by most of the leaders who had met Nasrallah in Beirut.
Less than 24 hours later, the group travelled to Qom where they were photographed meeting Sadr, who has been pursuing religious studies there for months, and two of his top military aides, Abu Doaa al-Issawi and Abu Yasser al-Kaabi.
One of the attendees who participated in the meeting said in a press statement: “The aim of the meeting with Sadr was to prepare the ground for the creation of a united resistance front to dislodge the American forces and all foreign forces from Iraq and coordinate to unify the positions.”
But several Shia commanders and politicians familiar with what was discussed have told MEE that the series of meetings was mostly directed at resolving internal tensions and disputes between the different groups that make up the PMF, a government-organised umbrella group of Shia militia factions also known as Hashd al-Shaabi which was created in 2014 to fight alongside Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces against the Islamic State group.
The PMF's factions divide into three main groups. The first is linked to the supreme religious authority in Najaf represented by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; the second is associated with Sadr; while the last group, which represents the most numerous and best armed, is associated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC).
The Iranian-backed armed factions have been one of the biggest challenges to the authority of the Iraqi government ever since the 2003 US-led invasion that deposed Saddam Hussein and pitched the country into turmoil and political instability.
Although they became a part of the Iraqi security establishment and have been funded and equipped mainly from the budget of the Iraqi government since 2016, they do not fall under the command of the leader of the Iraqi armed forces.
Many have also been accused of involvement in illegal activities, including killings, drug trafficking, oil smuggling and racketeering.
Disputes over smuggling and political influence
From outside, these factions appear to be a united front, acting violently towards their critics and threatening both government and non-government parties who challenge their activities. Yet internally, they compete fiercely for financial gains and control of influential government positions.
For example, competition over oil and scrap metal smuggling from southern Mosul in recent years was one of the main reasons for the differences that broke out between most of the the faction leaders who attended the Beirut meetings, one of whom had sought to obtain the largest share of the illicit trade at the expense of the others.
Another dispute erupted in recent months between leaders of two of the most prominent factions who attended meetings in Beirut over the political gains and government positions that one of them received, while the other was deprived of such gains because of his defiance of Muhandis' orders.
A third dispute erupted several weeks ago between two groups within Kataeb Hezbollah itself about some of the gains obtained by one of the leaders close to Muhandis which ended with the defection of the aggrieved leader and his announcement of the creation of a separate faction.
The meetings in Beirut sponsored by Nasrallah “were aimed at achieving a truce between these factions,” a commander who attended told MEE.
“Iran asked Nasrallah to play the same role that Soleimani was playing in Iraq until some decisions are made,” the commander said.
“Iran needs at least three months to decide how to manage the factions known as the resistance axis, who will be in charge and which mechanisms should be followed. So it [Iran] needs to ensure that the situation between the factions remains the same as it is now.”
MEE has contacted Hezbollah's media office in Lebanon for comment but had not received a response at the time of publication.
Supreme leader vs Sistani
Iran is facing unprecedented tension in its relationship with the United States after it bombed Iraqi military bases hosting US forces last week, in retaliation for the killings of Soleimani and Muhandis.
In addition, the relationship between Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Shia community in Iraq, and Khamenei has deteriorated significantly because of the Iranian supreme leader's insistence on using Iraq as a proxy battleground for the confrontation with the US, and over the role of Iranian-backed armed groups in the killing and intimidation of Iraqi anti-government protesters.
A member of Hashd al-Shaabi holds a picture of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani during the funeral procession of fellow comrades killed by US strikes in Baghdad on 31 December (AFP)
In a sermon at Friday prayers last week, Sistani described both Iran and America as “strangers” who should not interfere in Iraqi affairs.
But at the same time, the row sparked a lot of discussion in official Iranian circles over the success of the policies pursued by Khamenei and Soleimani in Iraq, Iraqi leaders close to Iran told MEE.
“Iran is in a very critical position. The policy that Khamenei previously pursued in managing the Iraqi file and the region is no longer successful. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard had contributed to creating problems in Iraq that turned into a burden for Iran and became an obstacle in the way of its negotiations with the United States,” a prominent Shia politician told MEE.
“Therefore, discussions are currently taking place in Iran about which Iranian authorities will receive the file [of Iraq] - intelligence, the foreign affairs ministry, or keep it in the hands of the Guards?
“Also they need to decide who will replace Soleimani. General Esmail Ghaani [Soleimani's successor] was responsible for the Afghanistan file and had no experience in managing the Middle East.”
Ghaani was appointed as head of the IRGC's elite Quds Force following Soleimani's death, having served as his deputy since 2007. But Ghaani does not speak fluent Arabic.
Ali Larijani, the head of the Iranian Shura Council, or parliament, is one of the suggested names to take over Soleimani's responsibilities in the region, the politician said.
Larijani is a successful politician who tends to favour diplomacy over military solutions. He also enjoys good relations with Najaf, which means that “Iran is seeking to calm the situation in Iraq at all levels”, according to the politician.
Courting Moqtada al-Sadr
Resolving the longstanding rift with Sadr, who does not hide his hostility to the factions associated with Iran, is also considered a priority in Tehran after the death of Muhandis for fear that Sadr could challenge Iran's control of the PMF.
Sadr holds Assaib Ahl al-Haq and Huzballah al-Najaba in particular disdain because he considers their leaders, Qais al-Khazali and Akram al-Kaabi, to be archrivals who defected from him in 2005.
Supporters of Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr take part in Friday prayers in the Sadr City suburb of the capital Baghdad, on 3 January, 2020 (AFP)
Amiri's Badr Organisation, the oldest and one of the most powerful paramilitary Shia armed groups, was formed in Iran in 1982 to fight Saddam Hussein's former Baathist regime.
At 66, Amiri is also the oldest among the leaders of the factions associated with Iran. He is a follower of Khamenei and his loyalty to Iran is beyond doubt.
All indications suggest that the leaders of the PMF factions consider Amiri to be an acceptable leader “thanks to his personality, which tends towards flexibility, simplicity and directness,” a PMF commander close to Sistani told MEE.
While Nasrallah’s endeavours have, in principle, resulted in a truce, there are no guarantees that this arrangement will hold, especially if the current collective anger of the paramilitary groups is not channelled towards US forces in Iraq.
With tensions seemingly easing between Washington and Tehran following Iran's non-lethal attacks on US bases in Iraq last week, Iranian-backed Iraqi forces “have received explicit orders not to target any American interests or people until further notice,” one PMF commander told MEE.
But with Tehran apparently happy for now for the Iraqi government to pursue a US withdrawal through legal and diplomatic channels, he warned that the paramilitary groups could return to their old feuds unless they are given something to do.
“Iran will find a way to keep these factions busy. It may allow them to practice their hobbies from time to time by striking a blow here or there against the American forces,” he predicted.
“But there will not be a painful strike. All the warring parties [Iran, its proxies and the US] will adopt a policy of exchanging slaps for the next two or three months.”
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