Peter Schiff On the Stimulus & Minimum Wage!

The Minimum Wage Ain’t What It Used to Be

I posted three economist all critical of the minimum wage even though they all vote differently.

Minimum wage is a political construct that economists would rather replace.

But politicians and their lemmings keep endorsing it because it's easy to understand.
The Minimum Wage Ain’t What It Used to Be
By DAVID NEUMARK
December 9, 2013, 11:00 am

Proponents of raising the minimum wage often point out that the real minimum wage is lower now than it was decades ago. But the federal policy aimed at low-wage work and low-income families has shifted — wisely — away from reliance on the minimum wage and toward a generous earned-income tax credit, which is better focused on poor families. There is nothing wrong with reducing our reliance on a less effective policy when we have adopted a more effective one. In fact, we should hope that research on public policy leads to exactly this kind of outcome.

The decline in the real value of the minimum wage is indisputable. As shown in the chart below, the real value of the federal minimum declined sharply over the 1980s, and then further in the mid-2000s, before partly recovering with the fairly steep increases in the minimum wage in 2007-9. But despite those increases and low inflation in recent years, it still remains well below its real value in the 1970s.

There has been a significant policy shift, however, in how to guarantee a minimally acceptable income to families with low-wage workers. In particular, the earned-income tax credit was instituted in 1976, and its generosity has since been expanded considerably.

Through the tax system, the earned-income tax credit pays benefits to families with low income and employed workers. For example, in 2013 a low-income family with two children could receive a refundable tax credit of 40 percent of its income up to a maximum credit of $5,372. This maximum applied to families with income of $13,430, and it is phased out as their income rises. In addition, many states supplement this with their own earned-income tax credits. The benefits are a little higher for three-child families, a little lower for one-child families, and negligible for families with no children (a maximum of $487, or a subsidy of only 7.6 percent). So like the minimum wage, the earned-income tax credit provides an income floor for working people that exceeds what they would earn in the absence of either policy.

Reflecting this change in how we support low-income families, federal government spending on the earned-income tax credit rose to $55 billion in 2011, about twice the spending on welfare. The figure below shows the real minimum wage (as above), and the maximum credit for a household with two children. The policy shift is obvious. And indexing of the earned-income tax credit ensures that, unlike the minimum wage, it is not eroded by inflation.

So suggesting that federal policy addressing low-wage work and low-income families has somehow failed because the minimum wage has not kept pace with inflation ignores the fact that we have moved away from a focus on the minimum wage — a policy with many flaws — and toward the earned-income tax credit. We shouldn’t be asking simply how much the real minimum wage has changed, but rather how much the combined income floor generated by the two policies has changed.

To provide an example, the blue line in the figure below shows the wages received by a single adult worker earning the minimum wage and working full time throughout the year. This can be interpreted as the income floor established by the minimum wage. The red line shows the level of family income when the earned-income tax credit for a family with two children is added (all in 2012 dollars). The lower line illustrates the income consequences of the real decline in the minimum wage. But the upper line shows that, because of the sharp increase in the generosity of the earned-income tax credit, the combined effect of the two policies is that the real income of this family is as high or higher than it was in past decades — when the real minimum wage was relatively high — and much higher than it was in most of the intervening years.

Nonetheless, there are important differences between the earned-income tax credit and the minimum wage. The fundamental difference is that the earned-income tax credit aims benefits at low-income families with children, rather than simply low-wage workers. This is in large part its virtue, and it makes a lot more sense than the minimum wage’s focus on low-wage workers. Do we really care if a low-wage teenager in a middle-class family makes an extra dollar an hour? Economists of all persuasions in the minimum-wage debate agree that mandated wage floors do a bad job of directing benefits to low-income families. This is confirmed in recent research by my graduate student Sam Lundstrom, calculating who would be affected by increasing the current federal minimum to $8.25 from $7.25. He finds that only 21.3 percent of the affected workers would be in poor families, while 30.9 percent would be in families with incomes more than three times the poverty line.

Making children a target of benefits is also very sensible. There are different views across the political spectrum as to why adults are poor and whether providing poor adults with assistance reduces work effort and encourages dependence on government support. But no one views children as actively taking part in decisions that make them poor, and we know that living in poverty is associated with adverse outcomes for children. Hence, many components of the safety net in the United States aim benefits at children, and this approach is not controversial. The earned-income tax credit does the same. It is a fair question, however, whether we are providing a sufficient income floor for childless low-wage adults, who have to a large extent been left out in the cold by our income-support and safety net programs.

Research also supports the notion that the earned-income tax credit provides greater support to low-income families than does the minimum wage. Most studies of the effects of the minimum wage on the income distribution in the United States suggest that a higher minimum wage does little to reduce poverty. How is this possible? When the minimum wage goes up, there are winners, to be sure — those whose wages increase and who retain their jobs and don’t have their hours reduced. But some low-skilled workers lose their jobs and others fail to find work because of the higher wage floor. (This point is contested by some, but the evidence that William Wascher and I have compiled is fairly overwhelming.) Research by Richard Burkhauser and Joseph Sabia shows that the balance between winners and losers, coupled with the distribution of these winners and losers across low-income and higher-income families, results in no net change in poverty from a higher minimum wage.

In contrast, research shows that the earned-income tax credit has beneficial effects. There is overwhelming evidence of the credit’s positive employment effects for female-headed households with children, which have a very high incidence of poverty. And my work with Mr. Wascher shows that the earned-income tax credit helps families to escape poverty — and not simply through the payment of the credit, but also through the incentives that the credit creates to work more. That is, even before we account for the credit payment, the pro-work incentives of the earned-income tax credit lead to more families earning their way out of poverty.

There is a more subtle argument — that the combination of an earned-income tax credit with a higher minimum wage can lead to better outcomes than the earned-income tax credit alone. The basic mechanism is twofold. On the one hand, a higher minimum wage, coupled with an earned-income tax credit, can induce more of those eligible for the credit to enter the labor market. On the other hand, those not eligible for the credit face greater competition from the increase in labor supply, which can amplify the disemployment effects for them.

My work with Mr. Wascher has explored the interactions of higher minimum wages and a more generous earned-income tax credit. We indeed find that a combination of these two policies leads to higher employment and income among single women with children who are eligible are for the credit. At the same time, the combined policies lead to more adverse employment effects on specific groups — like teenagers and less-skilled minority men — who are not eligible for the earned-income tax credit and have to compete with the new labor market entrants who are eligible for it.

Thus, on distributional grounds there may be an argument for coupling the earned-income tax credit with a higher minimum wage. But to be clear, the higher minimum wage entails some job loss. We may simply be willing to accept this job loss in return for better distributional outcomes.

This doesn’t change the fact that the earned-income tax credit’s generosity has increased significantly and plays a predominant role in our efforts to help low-income families.

These factors are some of the reasons the earned-income tax credit has attracted widespread political support, and — as shown above — has to some extent supplanted the minimum wage as a means of helping low-income families. That the minimum wage has declined in real value is not necessarily an indication that we, as a society, have abandoned our obligations to low-income families. It may be more of an indication that we have found a better way to meet these obligations.

David Neumark is professor of economics and director of the Center for Economics and Public Policy at the University of California, Irvine.

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/the-minimum-wage-aint-what-it-used-to-be/?_r=2
 
Help the Working Poor, but Share the Burden

Help the Working Poor, but Share the Burden
By N. GREGORY MANKIW
January 4, 2014

In a speech last month, President Obama brought renewed attention to economic disparities in the United States. The gap between rich and poor is indeed substantial — much larger than in most developed nations and much larger than it was 40 years ago. So what is the best way to help those struggling at the bottom of the economic ladder?

If we could figure out a way to do it, the most effective solution would be to increase the skills of those low-wage workers. Many studies have shown that the financial return of education is now high by historical standards. Reforming the education system so that more students graduate from high school and college is thus crucial to a more egalitarian prosperity. But upgrading the skills of the labor force is a decades-long project, not a quick fix. And educational reform is easier said than done.

As a result, those who are worried about inequality look for more immediate ways to help workers with limited skills. Before turning to President Obama’s proposal, let’s consider two other possibilities. For lack of better terms, call them Plan A and Plan B:

PLAN A The government subsidizes the incomes of low-wage workers. These subsidies are financed by increasing taxes on middle- and upper-income Americans.

PLAN B The government again subsidizes the incomes of low-wage workers. But under this plan, the subsidies are financed by taxing those companies that hire low-wage workers.

Stop reading for a moment and consider: Which of these plans would you prefer, and why? If you have a pen or pencil handy, jot down your reasons.

O.K. — and now, here are my answers:

To me, Plan A is distinctly better than Plan B, which suffers from two problems — one involving fairness, and one involving efficacy.

First, fairness: If we decide as a nation that we want to augment the income of low-wage workers, it seems only right that we all share that responsibility. Plan A does that. By contrast, Plan B concentrates the cost of the wage subsidy on a small subset of businesses and their customers. There is no good reason this group has a special obligation to help those in need.

Indeed, one might argue that this group is already doing more than its share. After all, it is providing jobs to the unskilled. Asking it to do even more, while letting everyone else off the hook, seems particularly churlish.

But even putting fairness aside, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of Plan B. Taxing businesses that hire unskilled workers would alter their behavior in ways that would hurt those we are trying to help.

To avoid the tax, businesses would have an incentive to hire fewer of these workers. For example, they would have greater incentive to replace workers with labor-saving machines.

In addition, some of the tax would be passed on to customers in the form of higher prices. These customers, in turn, would have an incentive to spend more of their income elsewhere. Over time, these businesses would shrink, reducing the job opportunities for the unskilled.

All in all, the Plan B tax-and-subsidy plan sounds like a pretty bad idea. Why, you might wonder, did I bring it up? Because it is the one favored by President Obama. He calls it an increase in the minimum wage.

To be sure, the minimum wage isn’t exactly a system of taxes and subsidies. But its effects are much the same as those of Plan B. Unskilled workers earn more, and the businesses that hire them pay more. The main difference between the minimum wage and Plan B is that, under a minimum wage, the extra compensation is paid directly from the business to the worker, rather than indirectly via the government.

When proposing to increase the minimum wage, President Obama said that “there’s no solid evidence that a higher minimum wage costs jobs.” In fact, many studies suggest that it does precisely that. Mr. Obama is like a physician who prescribes a medicine based on a few studies that find no side effects while ignoring others that report debilitating effects.

What is most disappointing about the president’s proposal is that the federal government has the option of using the much better Plan A. It is called the earned-income tax credit. Originally passed into law in 1975 and expanded substantially in the 1990s, the credit is a subsidy to low-wage workers paid by the rest of us, not just by the businesses who hire those workers.

Advocates of a higher minimum wage like to note that the current minimum wage, adjusted for inflation, is low by historical standards. That is true but beside the point. Because the earned-income tax credit has grown over time, the minimum wage is increasingly less relevant. As a nation we have switched from Plan B to the better Plan A. And a good case can be made for eliminating Plan B entirely by repealing the minimum wage.

Because “tax” is a dirty word in Washington, politicians generally prefer regulations like the minimum wage to accomplish their goals. But many regulations work like hidden taxes. Sometimes, in the process of hiding taxes, lawmakers opt for more damaging alternatives.

If, as a nation, we decide we want to do more to supplement the incomes of low-wage workers, that’s fine. But let’s do it openly, without artifice, and with broad participation.

N. GREGORY MANKIW is a professor of economics at Harvard.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/b...-poor-but-share-the-burden.html?smid=pl-share
 
Most of the Benefits of a Minimum Wage Increase Would Not Go to Poor Households

Most of the Benefits of a Minimum Wage Increase Would Not Go to Poor Households
by David R. Henderson
Monday, January 13, 2014

Most people who earn the minimum wage or slightly more are the only earners in their households and, therefore, are poor, right? And so, if the federal government or state governments raise the minimum wage, that will be a nicely targeted way of helping poor people, right?

Well, no. Wrong on both counts. Most workers earning at or close to the minimum wage are not the sole earners in a household and most of them are not in poor households. For those two reasons, raising the minimum wage is not a targeted way to help poor people.

From 2003 to 2009, the federal hourly minimum wage rose in steps from $5.15 to $5.85, and then from $6.55 to $7.25. Between 2003 and 2007, 28 states increased their minimum wages to a level higher than the federal minimum. San Diego State University economics professor Joseph J. Sabia and Cornell University economics professor Richard V. Burkhauser examined the effects of these increases and reported their results in the prestigious Southern Economic Journal.1 They “find no evidence that minimum wage increases between 2003 and 2007 lowered state poverty rates.”

Further, they calculated the effects of a proposed increase in the federal minimum wage to $9.50 on workers then earning $5.70 (or 15 cents less than the minimum in March 2008) to $9.49. They concluded that increasing the minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.50 per hour “will be even more poorly targeted to the working poor than was the last federal increase from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour.”


Specifically, they found that if the federal minimum wage were increased to $9.50 per hour [see the table]:

  • Only 11.3 percent of workers who would gain from the increase live in households officially defined as poor.
  • A whopping 63.2 percent of workers who would gain were second or even third earners living in households with incomes equal to twice the poverty line or more.
  • Some 42.3 percent of workers who would gain were second or even third earners who live in households that have incomes equal to three times the poverty line or more.
They reached their conclusions by carefully examining U.S. Census data on household incomes and wages reported in the Current Population Survey. Thus:

  • The net increase in wage income to households containing low-wage workers would be $4.03 billion per month.
  • The net increase in wages to poor households containing low-wage workers would be only $439 million per month.
Moreover, note Sabia and Burkhauser, an estimate of gains in income to households with low-wage workers necessarily overstates those gains if it does not take account of one of the most well-documented effects of the minimum wage: it destroys low-wage jobs. For over 60 years, economists have been aware that increases in the minimum wage cause some low-wage workers to lose their jobs. The reason: at a higher wage, the value of their output per hour (productivity) is not high enough for employers to gain by hiring them.

When they take this job-loss effect into account, Sabia and Burkhauser conclude that an increase in the minimum wage will be even less effective at reducing poverty. A low-end estimate of the reduction in jobs due to an increase in the minimum wage is that a 10 percent increase would reduce the number of low-wage jobs by only one percent. Economists refer to this as an elasticity of 0.1 (1 divided by 10). But even in this best case, they found that an increase to $9.50 per hour would destroy 468,000 jobs. This means that the benefits of a higher minimum wage to households containing low-wage workers would be even lower than their original estimates. With a 468,000 job loss:

  • The net benefit to households containing low-wage workers would be $3.56 billion per month.
  • The net benefit to poor households containing low-wage workers would be only $389 million per month.
Another reasonable estimate from earlier studies is that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would destroy 3 percent of low-wage jobs, an elasticity of 0.3. If that estimate is correct, increasing the minimum wage to $9.50 per hour would destroy 1.4 million jobs. If that job destruction occurs, the net benefit to households containing low-wage workers would be only $2.63 billion per month, of which only $287 million would be a gain to households in poverty.

These estimates overstate the gains to households from increasing the minimum wage. Why? Because, to the extent they are able, employers will offset the higher minimum wage by reducing non-money components of worker compensation. Burkhauser notes that such an effect will not show up in the government data because the data do not measure these non-money parts of the compensation package.2 But that is small comfort to those who would find themselves with higher-paying but reduced-benefit jobs.

David R. Henderson is a Research Fellow with the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba792
 
Re: Help the Working Poor, but Share the Burden

The Business of the Minimum Wage
By CHRISTINA D. ROMER
Published: March 2, 2013

A Better Way to Help the Working Poor
By Edward Glaeser
Feb 19, 2013 6:23 PM CT

The Minimum Wage Ain’t What It Used to Be
By DAVID NEUMARK
December 9, 2013, 11:00 am

Help the Working Poor, but Share the Burden
By N. GREGORY MANKIW
January 4, 2014

Better Than Raising the Minimum Wage
Help Americans who need it with a major, carefully crafted expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit.
By WARREN BUFFETT
May 21, 2015 7:12 p.m. ET

...
 
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