North Korean missile is challenge to Obama

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
<font size="5"><center>
North Korean missile is challenge to Obama </font size>
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As Kim Jong-il prepares to challenge US authority,
a tense region waits for Washington’s reaction</font size></center>


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Kim appears to be indulging in brinkmanship, knowing the US
and its allies have limited options



The Sunday Times (London)
By Michael Sheridan
March 29, 2009


WARSHIPS patrolled the Sea of Japan and Patriot batteries were set up around Tokyo yesterday as North Korea counted down to a missile launch intended to challenge President Barack Obama as he attends the G20 summit in London.Two Japanese guided-missile destroyers set sail under orders to intercept the Taepodong-2 if the launch goes wrong and it threatens to come down in Japan, a key US ally. North Korea has said any interception would amount to an act of war.

Kim Jong-il, the North Korean dictator, has hinted that if the missile is destroyed, his country will strike back violently, conduct a second nuclear weapons test and ruin years of American disarmament diplomacy.

North Korea, which conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, maintains that the Taepodong-2 is to launch a satellite into space for peaceful purposes. The US and Japan think it is a long-range missile designed for atomic warheads. Experts say the missile could be fired any time from today, although the North Koreans have set a date between April 4 and 8.

<SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">The launch has become a test of American power, according to one of the most senior foreign policy advisers in China. The US and Japan “will be bankrupt in reputation and dignity” if the missile violates Japanese sovereignty and is not destroyed, said Professor Zhang Lian-gui, of the Central Party school. </span>

His comments, in an official journal, showed how keenly Chinese leaders were watching Obama’s performance under pressure. Obama will have his first summit with President Hu Jintao in London this week.

American and Chinese ships recently clashed in the South China Sea and the two nations exchanged angry words about a Pentagon report on China’s military build-up. The Chinese have refused to persuade their North Korean ally to call off the launch and are standing back to see how America and its allies deal with it.



The Potential For Error

The potential for error on both sides is high. The missile’s planned trajectory takes it soaring into space on an arc that leads across Japan. Previous North Korean missiles have exploded in flight or veered off course, and the US antimissile technology has not been perfected. Tokyo’s sophisticated Aegis vessels, the Kongo and the Chokai, which carry SM-3 interceptor missiles, were sent into the seas between the Koreas and Japan yesterday morning.

They will be joined tomorrow by two US Aegis destroyers, the USS John S McCain, skippered by a Korean-American naval officer, and the USS Chaffee. South Korea has sent its own Aegis destroyer, the King Sejong the Great.

On land, Japanese units deployed the latest Pac3 Patriot missile batteries to protect political and financial districts in Tokyo yesterday. The public was asked to stay calm. The Americans are also ready for the risk of a North Korean revenge strike across the border with South Korea.



North Korea Prepares for War

On February 11, Kim demoted his chief of staff, General Kim Kyok-sik, to command the Fourth Army Corps in a move that may have been a strategic deception.

The corps guards the western coast, a tangle of islands and inlets where the border is disputed and where bloody naval battles between north and south claimed many lives in 1999 and 2002.

The state media announced that the outgoing chief of staff had also lost his seat in “elections” to North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament. In retrospect, that seemed too simple. North Korea jealously guards its internal secrets and rarely discloses such a fall from favour. It may have been intended to deceive.

Analysts now suspect the “Dear Leader” may have deliberately placed the trusted man he wanted to command the west coast in preparation for another fight. The posting came less than two weeks after North Korea warned that it was scrapping all its accords with the south and would not respect the maritime borderline.

The former chief of staff will be perfectly versed in the north’s repertoire of fighting tactics. “Suicide operations, mini-submarines, teams of saboteurs, stealth, surprise and deception are all integral to their thinking,” said a US military source in Seoul.

As extra insurance, the North Koreans are holding captive two American video-journalists caught filming along the sensitive border with China. The two women, both of Asian origin, were working for a cable TV channel founded by the former vice-president Al Gore.



Limited U.S. Options

Diplomats said Kim was engaging in classic brinkmanship. Both China and Russia would almost certainly veto any United Nations security council resolution imposing new sanctions on North Korea, leaving the US and its allies with limited options. And Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, revealed in an interview with Fox News that Kim had refused even to let her new special envoy into the country.

For all the billions of dollars of multinational military hardware deployed around North Korea, its adversaries lack any hard facts about what Kim and his generals are planning. However, there have been reassuring words from a Russian expert on the North Korean leadership, Andrei Lankov. “They are not about to start a war,” he said. “Their major strategic goal is to die in their beds.”

Additional reporting: Sarah Baxter in Washington

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5992936.ece
 
China's holding a serious advantage with their poker face... This is getting very interesting. Thanks.
 
The man is getting it from all sides.

Isn't this what Biden is for, taking care of military situations & scenarios?
 
The man is getting it from all sides.

Isn't this what Biden is for, taking care of military situations & scenarios?

Buck stops with the president Bro. He asked for it; he has to deal with it.

QueEx
 
The man is getting it from all sides.

We cannot police the world. Let the Asians figure this crap out, it's none of our business! North Korea does not pose a threat to us. Besides, we can't afford the "Contingency Operations Overseas" we're in right now, We're broke!
 
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Korea's Obama Test </font size>
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Pyongyang's blast and White House 'engagement';
Dictator Kim Jong Il is testing President Obama
and his vow to "engage" the world's rogues </font size></center>


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South Koreans react to news that Pyongyang tested
another nuclear device.



Wall Street Journal
May 26, 2009


North Korea's test of a second nuclear device Monday didn't surprise readers who saw John Bolton's recent prediction on these pages. But it does once again put in sharp relief the world's failure to counter dictator Kim Jong Il's challenge to global security. If history is any guide, Kim's strategy is to keep escalating until he extorts more money, aid and global recognition. This time in particular he's testing President Obama and his vow to "engage" the world's rogues.

By early accounts, yesterday's underground test outside the northeastern city of Kilju was successful. If the initial reports of a 10 to 20 kiloton blast are true, then North Korea's scientists have come a long way since their first test in October 2006. That blast registered less than a kiloton and was widely considered a failure abroad, if not in the North, where Kim used it to bolster his prestige.

In response to that test, the Bush Administration and China at first increased sanctions and diplomatic pressure. But they quickly turned to strike a deal offering Pyongyang aid and recognition in return for the North's promise to dismantle its nuclear programs. The North and the U.S. later made a public-relations show of blowing up the cooling towers at the Yongbyon reactor, but the deal foundered over the North's refusal to allow adequate inspections, turn over its plutonium or acknowledge its clandestine uranium program. President Bush nonetheless removed North Korea from the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring nations.

Kim is returning to this playbook now that Mr. Obama is in the White House, and Kim can't be displeased with the reaction so far. After the North launched a long-range ballistic missile in April, Mr. Obama declared that "Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons. Now is the time for a strong international response." But the U.S. couldn't even get a Security Council resolution at the U.N. and had to settle for a nonbinding "presidential statement" of rebuke.

After Pyongyang said it would put two American journalists on trial in June, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said there was an "open door" to talks. And when the North refused to return to the six-party nuclear talks, Presidential envoy Stephen Bosworth said the U.S. is "committed to dialogue." Monday's test brought more global tut-tutting, with the White House saying that "such provocations will only serve to deepen North Korea's isolation." But Kim Jong Il can be forgiven for concluding that his multiple violations will sooner be rewarded than punished.

We can already hear the response in world capitals that there is "no alternative" to this kind of policy accommodation. That's what senior Bush State Department officials like Philip Zelikow, Christopher Hill and Condoleezza Rice asserted to win over Mr. Bush. But a concerted effort to squeeze North Korea economically was making a difference before Mr. Bush pulled the plug in 2007.

In 2005, the U.S. Treasury took action against a bank in Macau that did business with North Korea, and Japan cracked down on illegal businesses sending cash to the North. Those financial sanctions could be resumed, and if backed by energy sanctions from China would get the North's attention in a way that U.N. resolutions never will. The U.S. also has a reliable South Korean ally in President Lee Myung-bak, who has cut off aid to the North amid its recent provocations.

The stakes here go beyond the ambitions of one nasty regime. North Korea has shown in the past it is willing to sell its missile and other technology around the world, not least to Iran and Syria. The mullahs in Tehran and other rogues are carefully watching the response of the new American President as they contemplate the costs of their own WMD ambitions.

Mr. Obama won the White House while promising that his brand of kinder, gentler diplomacy would better rally the world against bad actors. Now would be a good time, and North Korea the right place, to prove it.


http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124329265169452457.html
 
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Why did North Korea rush to a nuclear test?</font size></center>



Reuters
By Jack Kim
May 26, 2009


SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea's nuclear test on Monday sparked international condemnation. Following are some questions and answers about why the North went ahead with the test and why it came sooner than analysts had expected.

<font size="3">WHY DID NORTH KOREA CHOOSE TO TEST NOW?</font size>


North Korea likely concluded that no concessions would flow from U.S. President Barack Obama, especially after his strongly worded response to Pyongyang's rocket launch last month that regional powers say was a long-range missile test. To North Korea, this probably signaled Washington was in no mood for direct negotiations, something long sought by Pyongyang.

The North may have also felt it needed to boost its leverage by conducting a follow-up nuclear test after its only other test nearly three years ago was considered just a partial success.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, perhaps pressured by an ailing economy and questions about succession, may be trying to lure Washington into making a quick deal that would boost his standing at home.

Monday was the Memorial Day holiday in the United States, and the test follows a pattern of Pyongyang's provocations timed for U.S. national holidays. The 2006 test of North Korea's long-range Taepodong-2 missile came on the U.S. Independence Day holiday.​

<font size="3">ARE THERE DOMESTIC FACTORS AT PLAY?</font size>


Kim is returning to the center stage in Pyongyang after a long absence from the public view following a suspected stroke last August. His illness has focused attention on who might take over in Asia's only communist dynasty.

Analysts said the recent demonstrations of military strength might make it easier for Kim to introduce one of his three sons as a successor when most of the North Korean public is unaware he even has children. The recent saber rattling could also divert attention from the country's economic malaise.

North Korea says it has been on a 150-day "battle" leading up to the October 10 anniversary of the ruling Workers' Party, and the nuclear test has been a major part of the propaganda campaign.

There is a possibility the North will follow up with an additional nuclear test before the 150-day campaign is over, although this would risk depleting its meager stockpile of fissile material.

Nuclear experts say at least as many as half a dozen nuclear tests are needed to accomplish the technology for a stable and workable nuclear device and it may take years for the North to build a weapon it could mount on a ballistic missile.​

<font size="3">DOES NORTH KOREA WANT TO BE A NUCLEAR STATE?</font size>


It appears so. For a country with a battered economy and food shortages that make it reliant on outside aid to feed its people, a nuclear arms program is the ultimate bargaining chip to win concessions from the United States and regional powers.

The more nuclear advances it makes, the greater the payoff it expects in negotiations with countries willing to pay for the North's eventual disarmament, if that ever happens.

South Korea, Japan and the United States say they will never recognize the North as a nuclear state and consider its moves to achieve such a status a grave threat to regional security.​

<font size="3">SO WILL NORTH KOREA RETURN TO DISARMAMENT TALKS?</font size>


This is unlikely at the moment. North Korea has said six-way disarmament talks are over because U.N. sanctions against its April rocket launch infringed its sovereignty and nullified all deals reached under the multilateral talks, which began in 2003.

Officials in Seoul and analysts have expressed concern that the six-way talks among the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, Russia and China may indeed be over in their current form.​

(Editing by Jon Herskovitz and Dean Yates)

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE54P0SR20090526
 
North Korean Nuclear Test - Geopolitical Reality

<font size="5"><center>
The North Korean Nuclear Test
and Geopolitical Reality</font size></center>



Stragetic Forecasting Inc. (STRATFOR)
Geopolitical Weekly
By: Nathan Hughes
May 26, 2009


North Korea tested a nuclear device for the second time in two and a half years May 25. Although North Korea’s nuclear weapons program continues to be a work in progress, the event is inherently significant. North Korea has carried out the only two nuclear detonations the world has seen in the 21st century. (The most recent tests prior to that were the spate of tests by India and Pakistan in 1998.)

Details continue to emerge through the analysis of seismographic and other data, and speculation about the precise nature of the atomic device that Pyongyang may now posses carries on, making this a good moment to examine the underlying reality of nuclear weapons. Examining their history, and the lessons that can be drawn from that history, will help us understand what it will really mean if North Korea does indeed join the nuclear club.


<font size="3">Nuclear Weapons in the 20th Century</font size>

Even before an atomic bomb was first detonated on July 16, 1945, both the scientists and engineers of the Manhattan Project and the U.S. military struggled with the implications of the science that they pursued. But ultimately, they were driven by a profound sense of urgency to complete the program in time to affect the outcome of the war, meaning understanding the implications of the atomic bomb was largely a luxury that would have to wait. Even after World War II ended, the frantic pace of the Cold War kept pushing weapons development forward at a break-neck pace. This meant that in their early days, atomic weapons were probably more advanced than the understanding of their moral and practical utility.

But the promise of nuclear weapons was immense. If appropriate delivery systems could be designed and built, and armed with more powerful nuclear warheads, a nation could continually threaten another country’s very means of existence: its people, industry, military installations and governmental institutions. Battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons would make the massing of military formations suicidal — or so military planners once thought. What seemed clear early on was that nuclear weapons had fundamentally changed everything. War was thought to have been made obsolete, simply too dangerous and too destructive to contemplate. Some of the most brilliant minds of the Manhattan Project talked of how atomic weapons made world government necessary.

But perhaps the most surprising aspect of the advent of the nuclear age is how little actually changed. Great power competition continued apace (despite a new, bilateral dynamic). The Soviets blockaded Berlin for nearly a year starting in 1948, in defiance of what was then the world’s sole nuclear power: the United States. Likewise, the United States refused to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War (despite the pleas of Gen. Douglas MacArthur) even as Chinese divisions surged across the Yalu River, overwhelming U.S., South Korean and allied forces and driving them back south, reversing the rapid gains of late 1950.

Again and again, the situations nuclear weapons were supposed to deter occurred. The military realities they would supposedly shift simply persisted. Thus, the United States lost in Vietnam. The Syrians and the Egyptians invaded Israel in 1973 (despite knowing that the Israelis had acquired nuclear weapons by that point). The Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan went to war in 1999 — and nearly went to war twice after that. In none of these cases was it judged appropriate to risk employing nuclear weapons — nor was it clear what utility they might have.


<font size="3">Enduring Geopolitical Stability</font size>

Wars of immense risk are born of desperation. In World War II, both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan took immense geostrategic gambles — and lost — but knowingly took the risk because of untenable geopolitical circumstances. By comparison, the postwar United States and Soviet Union were geopolitically secure. Washington had come into its own as a global power secured by the buffer of two oceans, while Moscow enjoyed the greatest strategic depth it had ever known.

The U.S.-Soviet competition was, of course, intense, from the nuclear arms race to the space race to countless proxy wars. Yet underlying it was a fear that the other side would engage in a war that was on its face irrational. Western Europe promised the Soviet Union immense material wealth but would likely have been impossible to subdue. (Why should a Soviet leader expect to succeed where Napoleon and Hitler had failed?) Even without nuclear weapons in the calculus, the cost to the Soviets was too great, and fears of the Soviet invasion of Europe along the North European Plain were overblown. The desperation that caused Germany to seek control over Europe twice in the first half of the 20th century simply did not characterize either the Soviet or U.S. geopolitical position even without nuclear weapons in play. It was within this context that the concept of mutually assured destruction emerged — the idea that each side would possess sufficient retaliatory capability to inflict a devastating “second strike” in the event of even a surprise nuclear attack.

Through it all, the metrics of nuclear warfare became more intricate. Throw weights and penetration rates were calculated and recalculated. Targets were assigned and reassigned. A single city would begin to have multiple target points, each with multiple strategic warheads allocated to its destruction. Theorists and strategists would talk of successful scenarios for first strikes. But only in the Cuban Missile Crisis did the two sides really threaten one another’s fundamental national interests. There were certainly other moments when the world inched toward the nuclear brink. But each time, the global system found its balance, and there was little cause or incentive for political leaders on either side of the Iron Curtain to so fundamentally alter the status quo as to risk direct military confrontation — much less nuclear war.

So through it all, the world carried on, its fundamental dynamics unchanged by the ever-present threat of nuclear war. Indeed, history has shown that once a country has acquired nuclear weapons, the weapons fail to have any real impact on the country’s regional standing or pursuit of power in the international system.

Thus, not only were nuclear weapons never used in even desperate combat situations, their acquisition failed to entail any meaningful shift in geopolitical position. Even as the United Kingdom acquired nuclear weapons in the 1950s, its colonial empire crumbled. The Soviet Union was behaving aggressively all along its periphery before it acquired nuclear weapons. And the Soviet Union had the largest nuclear arsenal in the world when it collapsed — not only despite its arsenal, but in part because the economic burden of creating and maintaining it was unsustainable. Today, nuclear-armed France and non-nuclear armed Germany vie for dominance on the Continent with no regard for France’s small nuclear arsenal.


<font size="3">The Intersection of Weapons, Strategy and Politics</font size>

This August will mark 64 years since any nation used a nuclear weapon in combat. What was supposed to be the ultimate weapon has proved too risky and too inappropriate as a weapon ever to see the light of day again. Though nuclear weapons certainly played a role in the strategic calculus of the Cold War, they had no relation to a military strategy that anyone could seriously contemplate. Militaries, of course, had war plans and scenarios and target sets. But outside this world of role-play Armageddon, neither side was about to precipitate a global nuclear war.

Clausewitz long ago detailed the inescapable connection between national political objectives and military force and strategy. Under this thinking, if nuclear weapons had no relation to practical military strategy, then they were necessarily disconnected (at least in the Clausewitzian sense) from — and could not be integrated with — national and political objectives in a coherent fashion. True to the theory, despite ebbs and flows in the nuclear arms race, for 64 years, no one has found a good reason to detonate a nuclear bomb.

By this line of reasoning, STRATFOR is not suggesting that complete nuclear disarmament — or “getting to zero” — is either possible or likely. The nuclear genie can never be put back in the bottle. The idea that the world could ever remain nuclear-free is untenable. The potential for clandestine and crash nuclear programs will remain a reality of the international system, and the world’s nuclear powers are unlikely ever to trust the rest of the system enough to completely surrender their own strategic deterrents.


<font size="3">Legacy, Peer and Bargaining Programs</font size>

The countries in the world today with nuclear weapons programs can be divided into three main categories.

  • Legacy Programs: This category comprises countries like the United Kingdom and France that maintain small arsenals even after the end of the threat they acquired them for; in this case, to stave off a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In the last few years, both London and Paris have decided to sustain their small arsenals in some form for the foreseeable future. This category is also important for highlighting the unlikelihood that a country will surrender its weapons after it has acquired them (the only exceptions being South Africa and several Soviet Republics that repatriated their weapons back to Russia after the Soviet collapse).

  • Peer Programs: The original peer program belonged to the Soviet Union, which aggressively and ruthlessly pursued a nuclear weapons capacity following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 because its peer competitor, the United States, had them. The Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs also can be understood as peer programs.

  • Bargaining Programs: These programs are about the threat of developing nuclear weapons, a strategy that involves quite a bit of tightrope walking to make the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons appear real and credible while at the same time not making it appear so urgent as to require military intervention. Pyongyang pioneered this strategy, and has wielded it deftly over the years. As North Korea continues to progress with its efforts, however, it will shift from a bargaining chip to an actual program — one it will be unlikely to surrender once it acquires weapons, like London and Paris. Iran also falls into this category, though it could also progress to a more substantial program if it gets far enough along. Though parts of its program are indeed clandestine, other parts are actually highly publicized and celebrated as milestones, both to continue to highlight progress internationally and for purposes of domestic consumption. Indeed, manipulating the international community with a nuclear weapon — or even a civilian nuclear program — has proved to be a rare instance of the utility of nuclear weapons beyond simple deterrence.


<font size="3">The Challenges of a Nuclear Weapons Program</font size>

Pursuing a nuclear weapons program is not without its risks. Another important distinction is that between a crude nuclear device and an actual weapon. The former requires only that a country demonstrate the capability to initiate an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction, creating a rather large hole in the ground. That device may be crude, fragile or otherwise temperamental. But this does not automatically imply the capability to mount a rugged and reliable nuclear warhead on a delivery vehicle and send it flying to the other side of the earth. In other words, it does not immediately translate into a meaningful deterrent.

For that, a ruggedized, reliable nuclear weapon must be mated with some manner of reliable delivery vehicle to have real military meaning. After the end of World War II, the B-29’s limited range and the few nuclear weapons the United States had on hand meant that its vaunted nuclear arsenal was initially extremely difficult to bring to bear against the Soviet heartland. The United States would spend untold resources to overcome this obstacle in the decade that followed.

The modern nuclear weapon is not just a product of physics, but of decades of design work and full-scale nuclear testing. It combines expertise not just in nuclear physics, but materials science, rocketry, missile guidance and the like. A nuclear device does not come easy. A nuclear weapon is one of the most advanced syntheses of complex technologies ever achieved by man.

Many dangers exist for an aspiring nuclear power. Many of the facilities associated with a clandestine nuclear weapons program are large, fixed and complex. They are vulnerable to airstrikes — as Syria found in 2007. (And though history shows that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be employed, it is still in the interests of other powers to deny that capability to a potential adversary.)

The history of proliferation shows that few countries actually ever decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Obtaining them requires immense investment (and the more clandestine the attempt, the more costly the program becomes), and the ability to focus and coordinate a major national undertaking over time. It is not something a leader like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez could decide to pursue on a whim. A national government must have cohesion over the long span of time necessary to go from the foundations of a weapons program to a meaningful deterrent capability.


<font size="3">The Exceptions</font size>

In addition to this sustained commitment must be the willingness to be suspected by the international community and endure pariah status and isolation — in and of themselves significant risks for even moderately integrated economies. One must also have reasonable means of deterring a pre-emptive strike by a competing power. A Venezuelan weapons program is therefore unlikely because the United States would act decisively the moment one was discovered, and there is little Venezuela could do to deter such action.

North Korea, on the other hand, has held downtown Seoul (just across the demilitarized zone) at risk for generations with one of the highest concentrations of deployed artillery, artillery rockets and short-range ballistic missiles on the planet. From the outside, Pyongyang is perceived as unpredictable enough that any potential pre-emptive strike on its nuclear facilities is too risky not because of some newfound nuclear capability, but because of Pyongyang’s capability to turn the South Korean capital city into a proverbial “sea of fire” via conventional means. A nuclear North Korea, the world has now seen, is not sufficient alone to risk renewed war on the Korean Peninsula.

Iran is similarly defended. It can threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz, to launch a barrage of medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, and to use its proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere to respond with a new campaign of artillery rocket fire, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. But the biggest deterrent to a strike on Iran is Tehran’s ability to seriously interfere in ongoing U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan — efforts already tenuous enough without direct Iranian opposition.

In other words, some other deterrent (be it conventional or unconventional) against attack is a prerequisite for a nuclear program, since powerful potential adversaries can otherwise move to halt such efforts. North Korea and Iran have such deterrents. Most other countries widely considered major proliferation dangers — Iraq before 2003, Syria or Venezuela, for example — do not. And that fundamental deterrent remains in place after the country acquires nuclear weapons.

In short, no one was going to invade North Korea — or even launch limited military strikes against it — before its first nuclear test in 2006. And no one will do so now, nor will they do so after its next test. So North Korea – with or without nuclear weapons – remains secure from invasion. With or without nuclear weapons, North Korea remains a pariah state, isolated from the international community. And with or without them, the world will go on.


<font size="3">The Global Nuclear Dynamic</font size>

Despite how frantic the pace of nuclear proliferation may seem at the moment, the true pace of the global nuclear dynamic is slowing profoundly. With the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty already effectively in place (though it has not been ratified), the pace of nuclear weapons development has already slowed and stabilized dramatically. The world’s current nuclear powers are reliant to some degree on the generation of weapons that were validated and certified before testing was banned. They are currently working toward weapons and force structures that will provide them with a stable, sustainable deterrent for the foreseeable future rooted largely in this pre-existing weapons architecture.

New additions to the nuclear club are always cause for concern. But though North Korea’s nuclear program continues apace, it hardly threatens to shift underlying geopolitical realities. It may encourage the United States to retain a slightly larger arsenal to reassure Japan and South Korea about the credibility of its nuclear umbrella. It also could encourage Tokyo and Seoul to pursue their own weapons. But none of these shifts, though significant, is likely to alter the defining military, economic and political dynamics of the region fundamentally.

Nuclear arms are better understood as an insurance policy, one that no potential aggressor has any intention of steering afoul of. Without practical military or political use, they remain held in reserve — where in all likelihood they will remain for the foreseeable future.

Tell Stratfor what you think.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090526_north_korean_nuclear_test_and_geopolitical_reality

stratfor.com
 
Obama labels nuclear-armed NKorea 'grave threat'

WASHINGTON — Declaring North Korea a "grave threat" to the world, President Barack Obama on Tuesday pledged the U.S. and its allies will aggressively enforce fresh international penalties against the nuclear-armed nation and stop rewarding its leaders for repeated provocations.

In a display of unity with South Korea's leader, Obama said the world must break a pattern in which North Korea puts the globe on edge, only to put itself in line for concessions if it holds out long enough.

"We are more than willing to engage in negotiations to get North Korea on a path of peaceful coexistence with its neighbors, and we want to encourage their prosperity," Obama said in the Rose Garden alongside South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. "But belligerent, provocative behavior that threatens neighbors will be met with significant and serious enforcement of sanctions that are in place."

Obama's comments came at a time of intensifying concern, with the North stepping up its bomb-making activities and threatening war against any country that blockades its ships. Pentagon officials warned on Tuesday that North Korea's missiles could strike the U.S. within three years if its weapons growth goes unchecked.

Emboldened by fresh assurances of protection by the United States, Lee went even further in warning that North Korea's tactics will not be tolerated. Asked if he felt his country was under the threat of attack from the North, Lee said his country's alliance with the U.S. will "prevent anything from happening."

He said of the North Koreans, "They will think twice about taking any measures that they will regret."

Defiantly pursuing its nuclear ambitions, North Korea has posed a major foreign policy challenge for Obama. However, the new president has found support from the international community, including a swift resolution of sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council just last week.

The new punishments toughen an arms embargo against North Korea and authorize ship searches in an attempt to thwart the Koreans' nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The U.N., however, did not authorize military force to enforce the measures.

North Korea provoked that rebuke by conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, following recent missile launches that had already alarmed the world.

Beyond enforcement of the new U.N. penalties, Lee said he and Obama agreed on something more — a push for other new policies that will "effectively persuade North Korea to irrevocably dismantle all their nuclear weapons programs." The South Korean leader said those measures will be discussed among the five nations that had been working with North Korea on disarmament until talks stalled: the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Russia and China.

He did not elaborate, and the White House had no comment on the matter.

North Korea has bargained with other countries for more than a decade about giving up its nuclear program, gaining such concessions as energy and economic aid, and then reneging.

The North is thought to have enough weaponized plutonium for at least half a dozen atomic bombs and is believed to be preparing for another nuclear test. Deepening the crisis, it responded to the new sanctions by promising to "weaponize" all its plutonium and step up its nuclear bomb-making by enriching uranium — the first time it had acknowledged it had such a program. Both plutonium and uranium can be used to make atomic bombs.

With all that as a backdrop, Lee's treatment at the White House was meant to underscore solidarity at a perilous time.

The South Korean president was the first foreign leader in Obama's nearly five-month-old presidency to get the honor of a joint appearance in the Rose Garden. He spoke repeatedly of his nation's firm partnership with the United States and thanked the American people "for their selfless sacrifice in defending my country and its people." Obama said the friendship was anchored in democratic values, and then he turned his words on the country's northern neighbor.

"North Korea has abandoned its own commitments and violated international law," Obama said. "Its nuclear and ballistic missile programs post a grave threat to peace and security of Asia and to the world."

Obama said that North Korea's record of threatening other countries and spreading nuclear technology around the world means it should not be recognized as a legitimate nuclear power.

At a missile defense hearing on Capitol Hill, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn pointed to North Korea's recent steps to speed up its long-range weapons program and agreed with Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., that the U.S. should be prepared for a "worst-case scenario."

"We think it ultimately could — if taken to its conclusion — it could present a threat to the homeland," Lynn said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

The House Appropriations Committee Tuesday approved spending $9.3 billion on missile defense for the 2010 fiscal year that begins Oct. 1. That's as much as the Pentagon had requested but marked what Republicans called a $1.6 billion cut from what had been budgeted for missile defense during the Bush administration.

The panel's chairman, Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., said the new spending plans trim some fat from missile defense budgets while still protecting the U.S. against foreign threats.

But Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., said the Obama administration's cut to missile defense was too steep at a time when North Korea and Iran are ramping up their long-range nuclear weapons programs.

At the Defense Department press secretary Geoff Morrell declined to say when interdiction operations might begin under the new U.N. sanctions, but he said the U.S. already has enough ships and other resources in the region to do the job. Morrell was asked what the point of the activity would be — and whether it was only a half-measure — as long as there was no authority to forcibly board Korean ships.

"I think if the world is in agreement that we are all going to monitor and then attempt to compliantly board and attempt to then direct those ships into a port where they can then be inspected, that is real progress," he said. "That is more than what we were doing before."

http://www.comcast.net/articles/news-general/20090616/US.US.SKorea/

Associated Press writers Robert Burns, Pauline Jelinek, Lara Jakes and Jennifer Loven contributed to this report.
 
N.Korea Accuses Obama of Nuclear War Plot

<font size="5"><center>N.Korea accuses Obama
of nuclear war plot</font size></center>



AFP
June 21, 2009


SEOUL (AFP) — <SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">North Korea has accused US President Barack Obama of plotting a nuclear war on the communist nation</span> by reaffirming a US assurance of security for South Korea, the North's state media said.

In a first official response to last week's US-South Korean summit, the state-run weekly Tongil Sinbo said in its Saturday edition Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak "are trying to ignite a nuclear war".

<SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">"The US-touted provision of 'extended deterrence, including a nuclear umbrella' (for South Korea) is nothing but 'a nuclear war plan,'" </span>Tongil Sinbo said.

<SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">It said it wasn't a coincidence that the United States has brought "nuclear equipment into South Korea and its surroundings and staged massive war drills every day to look for a chance to invade North Korea."</span>

Pyongyang has created weeks of tension by conducting a second nuclear test and test-firing missiles.

At a summit with Lee in Washington Wednesday, Obama warned that North Korea is a "grave threat" and vowed to defend South Korea.

A Seoul presidential official told Yonhap news agency Lee would seek a written US commitment to provide a nuclear "umbrella" for Seoul as part of "extended deterrence" against Pyongyang.

North Korea detonated its second nuclear device on May 25, following the first one in 2006. It also went ahead with what Washington said was a disguised test of a long-range missile in April.

The United Nations Security Council in response agreed to tighter cargo inspections, a stricter arms embargo and new targeted financial curbs to choke off revenue for the North's nuclear and missile sectors.

In response Pyongyang has vowed to build more nuclear bombs and start enriching uranium for a new atomic weapons program.

Some analysts say the sabre-rattling is part of an attempt by 67-year-old ailing North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il, to bolster a succession plan involving his youngest son, Kim Jong-Un.

Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved



http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j8XaBgDxfRpc7DtpfttKYAPqF-2g
 
N. Korea: "Wipe Out U.S."

<font size="5"><center>

North Korea threatens to 'wipe out' U.S.</font size>
<font size="4">
Kim Jong-il close to naming son as successor</font size></center>


northkorea-cp-6926131.jpg

In this undated photo released earlier this week
by Korean Central News Agency, North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il, right, inspects the command
of the 7th Infantry Division of the Korean People's
Army at an undisclosed location in North Korea.
(Korean Central News Agency/Korea News
Service/Associated Press)


CBC News
Wednesday, June 24, 2009



North Korea threatened on Wednesday to "wipe out" the United States in the event of a new war on the Korean Peninsula, as international observers watched for signs the regime would perform new missile tests in the coming days.

The warning came as a U.S. navy destroyer was tracking a North Korean ship suspected of attempting to transport illicit weapons to Burma. The pursuit is seen as the first test of sanctions passed by the UN Security Council as a response to Pyongyang's underground nuclear test in late May.

North Korea has said it would consider an interception to be a declaration of war. On Wednesday, it accused the U.S. of seeking to provoke another Korean War.

"If the U.S. imperialists start another war, the army and people of Korea will … wipe out the aggressors on the globe once and for all," the official Korean Central News Agency said.

The Korean War ended in a truce in 1953, not a peace treaty, leaving the peninsula in state of war.

In recent months, Pyongyang has sparked the fury of the international community by shunning six-party negotiations and resuming its nuclear program in defiance of the UN Security Council.

Meanwhile, reports emerged in South Korea that the North's leader, Kim Jong-il, appointed his son, Kim Jong-un, to head the country's spy agency to prepare him to inherit the leadership.

Seoul's Dong-a Ilbo newspaper reported that Kim ordered senior officials at the State Security Department in March to "uphold" his youngest son as head of the agency, while doling out foreign-made luxury cars to the officials as gifts.

The 67-year-old Kim reportedly suffered a stroke last year and has appeared gaunt in recently released photos, prompting further speculation about his health and the stability of the regime.

With files from The Associated Press

http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/06/24/north-korea-nuclear-standoff062409.html
 
Re: N. Korea: "Wipe Out U.S."

I am sincerely getting irritated with these dickheads in N. Korea, seriously...
 
Re: N. Korea: "Wipe Out U.S."

<font size="5"><center>
With US-South Korea war games,
a signal to North Korea </font size>
<font size="4">

US naval exercises Sunday off the Korean peninsula take on added
significance, after North Korean attack on a South Korean island.
Pyongyang rails against the US-South Korea war games.</font size></center>


1126_WarGames_full_600.jpg

The Nimitz-class USS George Washington at the Busan port in Busan, on July 25. On the heels
of North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong island the Obama administration has sent the aircraft
carrier to take part in war games set for Sunday. Lee Jin-man/AP/File



csmlogo_179x46.gif

By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer
November 26, 2010



Washington - The joint military exercises the US will conduct with South Korea's navy on Sunday, off the Korean peninsula in the Yellow Sea, are taking on added significance as a message-bearer to North Korea, following Pyongyang's shelling of the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong on Tuesday.

The Pentagon is quick to point out that the naval exercises are “defensive in nature” and that similar events have been held frequently. But US commanders also acknowledge that this joint exercise is a pointed reminder to the North of US military strength and America's allegiance with South Korea. The US announced the exercises after the artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong, home to South Korean military bases and a small civilian population.

“While planned well before [Tuesday’s] unprovoked artillery attack, [the joint exercise] demonstrates the strength” of the US-South Korean alliance, according to a statement released Wednesday by the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet.

The exercise, in the wake of what is widely considered the region's most dramatic flare-up since the Korean War ended in a cease-fire, “is meant to send a very strong signal of deterrence,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen told CNN this week.

That said, he added, “We’re very focused on restraint – not letting this thing get out of control. The South Koreans have so far responded that way. Nobody wants this thing to turn into a conflict.”

An aircraft carrrier, the USS George Washington, and four other US Navy ships are currently making their way toward the Yellow Sea to take part in the training exercises. They will include air defense and also surface warfare readiness training, according to the US military, which “maintains a robust forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region,” the Seventh Fleet release further noted. These exercises will last until Dec. 1 and may involve air defense and submarine drills, as well as test-firing the ships' weapons, including dummy torpedos, according to US Navy officials.

The attack on Yeonpyeong has certainly become an international incident. Just after US Gen. Walter Sharp, commander of the 28,000 US troops stationed in South Korea, toured the island Friday morning to inspect the result of the barrage that left homes in flames and four South Koreans dead, North Korea fired menacing artillery rounds that landed off Yeonpyeong's coast.

The artillery exchange Tuesday has produced domestic political fallout in South Korea, prompting the defense minister to resign. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak on Friday named one of the country’s chairman of the joint chiefs to replace him.

The joint exercises set for Sunday have provoked a predictably confrontational response from North Korea. Its state news agency promised that North Korea’s Army is “getting ready to give a shower of dreadful fire and blow up the bulwark of the enemies.”

The agency further warned, according to The New York Times, that the “situation on the Korean Peninsula is inching closer to the brink of war due to the reckless plan of those trigger-happy elements to stage war exercises” – exercises, the agency emphasized, that are targeted against the North.

It is an assessment that the US military continues to dispute. The announcement by the Seventh Naval Fleet emphasized that the “US Navy routinely operates in waters off the Korean peninsula and has conducted numerous operations and exercises in this area.”

But the Pentagon is not opposed to conducting these routine exercises to send a message in the wake of less-than-routine events. Two dozen US Apache gunships fired Hellfire missiles in exercises off South Korea in early June, for example, after North Korea sank the South Korean warship Cheonan in March, killing 46 South Korean sailors.

“We always point out that these are not offensive in nature,” Pentagon spokesman Col. Dave Lapan told reporters Wednesday on the heels of the announcement of the maneuvers after President Obama held a phone conversation with South Korean President Lee late Tuesday evening.

The exercises, Lapan said, “should not be seen as directed in an offensive nature against anyone.”


http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Milita...South-Korea-war-games-a-signal-to-North-Korea
 
Re: N. Korea: "Wipe Out U.S."

<font size="5"><center>
Why are U.S.-South Korea drills so sensitive?</font size></center>




53848-q-a-why-are-u-s-south-korea-drills-so-sensitive.jpg

U.S. servicemen walk at the upper deck of a USS George Washington
aircraft carrier during a media tour at the South China Sea, 170 nau-
tical miles from Manila September 3, 2010.


Reuters
By Jeremy Laurence
Sat Nov 27, 2010




(SEOUL) - The U.S. and South Korean militaries have started a large-scale exercise off the west coast of the peninsula on Sunday, just days after North Korea fired a barrage of missiles at a South Korean island.

The nuclear-powered USS George Washington is participating in the exercise from Sunday to Wednesday.

Here are some questions and answers about the exercise:


WHY CONDUCT JOINT EXERCISES?

The exercises are held primarily to send a message to North Korea that the U.S. military stands by South Korea. These combined drills are also an overt show of force.

Washington says large-scale drills, which started after the sinking of the Cheonan warship in March, are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop.

The U.S. and South Korean militaries are vastly better equipped than the North's, and experts say they would quickly win any war. The North's force of over a million troops easily outnumbers the U.S.-South Korean contingent, but its equipment is old and it barely has enough fuel to fly its fighter jets. The exercises also serve to underline the gap in technology.​


HOW OFTEN AND WHERE ARE THEY HELD?

South Korea and the United States regularly hold combined exercises each year, but after the sinking of the Cheonan they agreed to stage a series of large-scale military drills. This weekend's exercise will be their third of these extra combined maneuvres, and the second to take place off the west coast where the Cheonan was torpedoed in the Yellow Sea. North Korea denies responsibility for the attack.

A joint drill in July involving the aircraft carrier the USS George Washington was initially planned for the Yellow Sea off the peninsula's west coast, but after criticism from China it was moved to areas off the east coast.

This weekend's drill had initially been scheduled for late last month, just before the G20 summit in Seoul, but was postponed due to scheduling problems.​


WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SENDING AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER?

The participation of 97,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier from the U.S. 7th Fleet is the ultimate show of strength. Carriers have a become a symbol of the United States' position as a superpower.

The carrier strike group includes 75 aircraft and 6,000 sailors. These massive vessels, essentially mini cities at sea, have found an important role as the "forward military presence" of the United States.​


WHY DOES THIS UPSET NORTH KOREA SO MUCH?

Pyongyang regards military exercises by South Korea and the United States with genuine unease, fearing the maneuvers could be a smokescreen for a real attack.

The North customarily responds to such exercises with bellicose remarks. In July, it threatened "a sacred war" if the allies went ahead with joint exercises. On Saturday the North said if the U.S. carrier participated in the exercise "no one can predict the ensuing consequences."

The North says the exercises also violate its sovereignty and pose a major danger for the security of the region.​


WHY HAS CHINA REACTED SO ANGRILY TO THE EXERCISES THIS YEAR?

China has this year voiced its serious objection to exercises in the Yellow Sea, and has expressed concern about this week's joint drill.

Firstly, it says they add to tensions in the region, which have been running high since the sinking of the Cheonan. Tuesday's shelling of a remote island village raised tension levels another notch. Secondly, China says the exercises threaten its own security, happening too close to home shores for comfort.

Beijing has also been irked by U.S. Navy ships engaging in surveillance in waters close to its coast.

Washington, which wants China to rein in its ally North Korea, said the exercises were planned long before Tuesday's attack. The U.S. says they are aimed at deterring North Korea and not at China.

More broadly, China fears being encircled by hostile forces, whether Russia to the north, India to the southwest or U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea.​

(Editing by Nick Macfie and Sanjeev Miglani)


http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AR07E20101128
 
Re: N. Korea: "Wipe Out U.S."



Problems to solve . . .

<s>Bin Laden</s>

<s>Libya</s>

<s>North Korea</s>

Iran (if Santorum, McCain, Romney & Israel would STFU)


 


China says it will work with the US to persuade North Korea to give up
its nuclear programme and to settle regional tensions through dialogue



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