Good News from Iraq ... there's got to be some
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<font size="4">Anbar a bright spot in turbulent Iraq</font size>
By Leila Fadel
McClatchy Newspapers
Fri, May. 11, 2007
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Ali Hatam Ali al Suleiman sat in a high-backed leather chair in his Baghdad office, proud of what the Anbar Salvation Council has done. The council, a group of leaders from the Dulaim tribe, Iraq's largest, is driving the al-Qaida in Iraq group from what had been sanctuary in Anbar province.
For four years, the province has been a battleground between the extremist group and U.S. forces. Innocent people from the tribes have been killed, mostly by al-Qaida but also by American troops, he said.
"The service we are providing is fighting al-Qaida and militias with no mercy," he said. "They corrupted our religion; they misinterpreted our values. We are Iraqis - not Sunnis and Shiites. We don't threaten to bomb and to kill; all we wanted was our dignity and to live."
Two hours with Suleiman, a Sunni Muslim, provided an insight into why - after so many years without progress - Anbar is now a bright spot in the frustration that is Iraq. They also gave a warning that the problems of American policy won't end when the last al-Qaida fighter is gone. Suleiman said the American bid to remake Iraq had failed, and warned that the United States must rebuild Anbar or suffer the consequences.
He said it was about four months ago that tribal leaders had had enough. A leading tribal sheik had been killed and al-Qaida members had dragged another leader's daughter through the streets by her hair. Dishonoring a woman this way was unacceptable, and the battle began.
"The Americans were not truly working in Anbar," he said. "We asked them to clean their hands of al-Qaida and we will drive them out."
The effort has been largely successful, said Suleiman, an elegant young sheik of 34. Life in Ramadi, the provincial capital, is reviving. Residents have cell phone service. Schools and hospitals are opening.
"We did in three months what they couldn't do in four years," he said, referring to U.S. troops. "We are not fighting al-Qaida for the sake of the Americans. We are fighting them to rid ourselves of this shame."
But the area has been destroyed, he said. Merchants have returned to their shops, but only a few can open in the ruins. The city is an expanse of wrecked buildings punctuated by the vehicle carcasses of car bombs.
Suleiman said he'd seen none of the billions of dollars in aid that have come to Iraq.
"We were the burning room for the dirty projects of the politicians," he said.
He's quietly angry at what he deems the U.S. occupation and a pro-Shiite-Muslim government. But the solution isn't as simple as kicking out U.S. troops, he said.
"If we Dulaim want to fight the Americans, they will not stay more than 10 days," he said. But fighting Americans right now "is not in our best interest, because the American tank, which was part of the problem, is now part of the solution."
The Iraqi government would collapse without the U.S. presence, and the tribes would have to fight what he called "turbaned men," the Sunni and Shiite clerics whom he said would vie for power.
During the interview Thursday, Suleiman wore a long white dishdasha and a traditional checkered headdress. He also sported the trappings of modernity. A brown sport coat covered the dishdasha and a gold watch was wrapped around his wrist, despite a Muslim prohibition against men wearing gold. Reminders of his noble ancestry graced the room: black and white photos of his uncle, grandfather and father standing between kings and princes of Arab countries.
Dignity, he said, is why his tribe moved decisively against al-Qaida.
"Our religion doesn't allow us to harm a human or even a plant," he said. "We won't let anyone step on us."
For now, he said, the only common goal he has with what he calls the legitimate resistance groups that battle U.S. troops is the fight against al-Qaida. But he's frustrated with what he characterized as Iranian influence over the Iraqi government, the flourishing Shiite militias and the possible division of Iraq. He blames the United States for that.
"Iraq became a house with no fence, and anyone who wants to can come in," he said.
He can imagine conditions under which his tribe might turn on the Americans - if they stay and their policies don't change or if they try to leave without fixing the mistakes they made.
"I will send Bush a message," he said. "He failed; let him confess that frankly. He put the American Army and the people in a game that is a loser's game."
But before American troops go, the U.S. must rebuild Anbar.
"If they leave in such an embarrassing time, we will fight them everywhere and sue them for every mistake," he said.
---
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17213164.htm
By Leila Fadel
McClatchy Newspapers
Fri, May. 11, 2007
BAGHDAD, Iraq - Ali Hatam Ali al Suleiman sat in a high-backed leather chair in his Baghdad office, proud of what the Anbar Salvation Council has done. The council, a group of leaders from the Dulaim tribe, Iraq's largest, is driving the al-Qaida in Iraq group from what had been sanctuary in Anbar province.
For four years, the province has been a battleground between the extremist group and U.S. forces. Innocent people from the tribes have been killed, mostly by al-Qaida but also by American troops, he said.
"The service we are providing is fighting al-Qaida and militias with no mercy," he said. "They corrupted our religion; they misinterpreted our values. We are Iraqis - not Sunnis and Shiites. We don't threaten to bomb and to kill; all we wanted was our dignity and to live."
Two hours with Suleiman, a Sunni Muslim, provided an insight into why - after so many years without progress - Anbar is now a bright spot in the frustration that is Iraq. They also gave a warning that the problems of American policy won't end when the last al-Qaida fighter is gone. Suleiman said the American bid to remake Iraq had failed, and warned that the United States must rebuild Anbar or suffer the consequences.
He said it was about four months ago that tribal leaders had had enough. A leading tribal sheik had been killed and al-Qaida members had dragged another leader's daughter through the streets by her hair. Dishonoring a woman this way was unacceptable, and the battle began.
"The Americans were not truly working in Anbar," he said. "We asked them to clean their hands of al-Qaida and we will drive them out."
The effort has been largely successful, said Suleiman, an elegant young sheik of 34. Life in Ramadi, the provincial capital, is reviving. Residents have cell phone service. Schools and hospitals are opening.
"We did in three months what they couldn't do in four years," he said, referring to U.S. troops. "We are not fighting al-Qaida for the sake of the Americans. We are fighting them to rid ourselves of this shame."
But the area has been destroyed, he said. Merchants have returned to their shops, but only a few can open in the ruins. The city is an expanse of wrecked buildings punctuated by the vehicle carcasses of car bombs.
Suleiman said he'd seen none of the billions of dollars in aid that have come to Iraq.
"We were the burning room for the dirty projects of the politicians," he said.
He's quietly angry at what he deems the U.S. occupation and a pro-Shiite-Muslim government. But the solution isn't as simple as kicking out U.S. troops, he said.
"If we Dulaim want to fight the Americans, they will not stay more than 10 days," he said. But fighting Americans right now "is not in our best interest, because the American tank, which was part of the problem, is now part of the solution."
The Iraqi government would collapse without the U.S. presence, and the tribes would have to fight what he called "turbaned men," the Sunni and Shiite clerics whom he said would vie for power.
During the interview Thursday, Suleiman wore a long white dishdasha and a traditional checkered headdress. He also sported the trappings of modernity. A brown sport coat covered the dishdasha and a gold watch was wrapped around his wrist, despite a Muslim prohibition against men wearing gold. Reminders of his noble ancestry graced the room: black and white photos of his uncle, grandfather and father standing between kings and princes of Arab countries.
Dignity, he said, is why his tribe moved decisively against al-Qaida.
"Our religion doesn't allow us to harm a human or even a plant," he said. "We won't let anyone step on us."
For now, he said, the only common goal he has with what he calls the legitimate resistance groups that battle U.S. troops is the fight against al-Qaida. But he's frustrated with what he characterized as Iranian influence over the Iraqi government, the flourishing Shiite militias and the possible division of Iraq. He blames the United States for that.
"Iraq became a house with no fence, and anyone who wants to can come in," he said.
He can imagine conditions under which his tribe might turn on the Americans - if they stay and their policies don't change or if they try to leave without fixing the mistakes they made.
"I will send Bush a message," he said. "He failed; let him confess that frankly. He put the American Army and the people in a game that is a loser's game."
But before American troops go, the U.S. must rebuild Anbar.
"If they leave in such an embarrassing time, we will fight them everywhere and sue them for every mistake," he said.
---
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17213164.htm
<font size="5"><center>In Iraq, role of tribes is divisive</font size>
<font size="4">U.S. has turned to Sunni clans to battle Al Qaeda,
a tactic they hope to repeat elsewhere.
But some warn that it may backfire.</font size></center>
Los Angeles Times
By Alexandra Zavis, Times Staff Writer
June 23, 2007
BAGHDAD — When the Sunni Muslim sheik sent his representatives into the heaving Baghdad slum where a Shiite Muslim militia holds sway, many thought he was courting disaster. Sunnis mutter darkly that the only members of their sect who enter Sadr City are the ones stuffed into the trunk of a car.
But on this occasion, the head of a Shiite family stood up and recited a poem calling Abdul Sattar Rishawi "the honest, the decent, the good sheik, who would not bow his head in humiliation." The sheik's representatives were so pleased, they asked him to read it again.
This kind of bold move has persuaded the U.S. command to champion tribal leaders such as Rishawi as a way around the government stalemate in Baghdad. Rishawi has formed an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that are fighting Al Qaeda-linked insurgents in Al Anbar province. Military leaders, who have provided weapons and other material to some tribal groups there, hope that Rishawi's effort can be replicated in other provinces.
But some Western officials question the wisdom of encouraging tribalism in Iraq, when such loyalties have helped to cripple development and stir conflict in other parts of the world. Iraq's Shiite-led government also is uneasy over the alliances, which Prime Minister Nouri Maliki warns could end up creating even more militias if weapons fall into the wrong hands.
On Friday, Maliki said intelligence officials had information that "enemies are attempting to infiltrate this process in order to serve their own interests." In a statement, he announced that he had formed a committee to oversee the arming of tribes, saying, "All such activity should be overseen by the government."
Although tribes can offer effective leadership at the grass-roots level, their shifting loyalties and frequent clashes among them present risks on a national stage.
"You've always got to be careful when using tribal leaders — they're available to the highest bidder," said one diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Although the tribes have proved a potent force against Al Qaeda in Iraq, others worry that any power and weapons given to them now will not be easily taken away when that threat is gone. If too much authority devolves to them, some in government fear, the country may begin to look uncomfortably like Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan.
"Tribes mean informal laws, which are against the principles of … the state," said an Iraqi Cabinet aide. "When you go toward tribes, it means you are in a very weak, weak position."
--
An alternative to Baghdad
But frustration is building in Washington with Maliki's government, which has failed to push through the legislative reforms that U.S. officials believe will help win over the disaffected Sunni minority that has felt powerless since Saddam Hussein's ouster and is now driving the insurgency. They include jobs for former members of Hussein's Baath Party, and a fair distribution of Iraq's oil wealth.
The No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, told reporters recently that he was encouraging commanders to strike deals with tribes, religious leaders and local insurgent groups that could help build reconciliation from the bottom up.
"Engaging with the tribal entities and others has made a huge difference," he said. With their encouragement, recruitment into the Al Anbar security forces has shot up to more than 12,000 so far this year, compared with 1,000 in all of 2006, he said. And attacks in what was once the most dangerous region outside Baghdad have dropped to just over 400 last month, from 811 in May 2006.
Odierno acknowledged that the success in Al Anbar, which is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab, may not be easily replicable in other regions where there are volatile mixes of Sunnis, Shiites and ethnic Kurds. But U.S. officers say tribal leaders possess unrivaled knowledge of what goes on in their areas, and can be an effective force to secure them. They can also be an initial conduit for development aid.
Maliki's plan to put the government in charge of the arming process could, in effect, stall the grass-roots deals that the military is pursuing and that tribal leaders say should have been made long ago.
"In all countries, you can't do anything without the people, and the people of Iraq are tribal," said Faleh Dulaimi, media advisor to Rishawi, who heads the Abu Risha tribe.
Analysts estimate that at least three-quarters of the Iraqi people are members of one of the country's roughly 30 tribal confederations that group hundreds of tribes, clans and extended families. Through the centuries, this complex network has provided the basis on which Iraq's largely feudal society was organized.
Hussein's Baath Party officially rejected the system as backward, banning the use of tribal names on official documents, and promoting Arab nationalism. But key positions were filled by members of Hussein's clan, which dominated the elite. Later, Hussein openly encouraged tribalism during his disastrous 1980s war with Iran and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
When U.S. authorities banned the Baath Party and dismantled the Iraqi military in 2003, they wiped out some of the few unifying groups that existed in Iraq. The political formations that make up the current government are mostly based on ethnicity and religion.
Rishawi is dismissive of Iraq's politicians, many of whom spent years in exile, and who, he alleges, continue to do the bidding of their foreign backers.
"They have an outside agenda and they do not understand the people," he said in a recent interview. "When I talk to them, they just give me a long speech about Islam — as if they are actors."
--
National aspirations
Rishawi's ambitions extend far beyond his base in Ramadi, capital of Al Anbar. He has launched a national political party called the Iraqi Awakening Conference, which he says will encourage reconciliation among all sects and ethnicities. The sheiks are reaching out to other groups through meetings such as the one in Sadr City and want to field candidates in provincial elections that are supposed to be held by year's end.
"Sectarianism brought us nothing but destruction," he said. "What does it matter if a person prays this way or that way? We are all praying to God."
As if to underscore the point, a battle rages at a market across the river from the once-grand Baghdad hotel where Rishawi is holding court recently, receiving a parade of visitors. Police, soldiers and gunmen in civilian clothes surge across the bridge to the fight. The streets are sealed off, helicopters buzz overhead, and occasional bursts of gunfire pop in the distance.
But inside the hotel, calm prevails. A waiter arrives to take the order for the next round of tea. A guard approaches, fiddling absent-mindedly with his assault rife, and accidentally shoots a hole in the marble floor. The gunshot reverberates through the high-ceilinged lobby, sending up a cloud of dust that briefly shrouds the scene.
Rishawi, regal in a crisp white dishdasha, gold-rimmed cloak and diamond-studded ring, does not stop talking or look up as the hapless guard is unceremoniously escorted away.
Asked about his political aims, Rishawi does not answer directly.
"Now, my main goal is to reunify the society and defeat terrorism," he said. But, interjects Dulaimi, "after achieving all these aims, the masses will definitely turn to the new leaders who did something."
Rishawi nods approvingly.
Analysts believe Rishawi is trying to position himself as the legitimate representative of Sunni Arabs and a credible negotiating partner.
On the Kurdish and Shiite sides, there are leaders such as radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr who have influence in parliament and also command powerful militias, said Vali Nasr, a Middle East expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. But there are no Sunni politicians who control the insurgency, he said.
"That's why these tribal leaders, everyone views them as such a promise," he said. "The assumption is that they represent a chunk of territory, a chunk of people, and they potentially can deliver."
Shiite tribal leaders have noted Rishawi's sudden rise and see in him a potential ally in the fight against Sunni militants. Rishawi's success in leveraging funding and weapons for his Anbar Salvation Council from U.S. and Iraqi sources has not gone unnoticed, either.
For the U.S., however, working through the tribes has risks.
Iraq's tribal system is complex, with a different leader, or sheik, at every level.
"Because there are so many sheiks, finding one with a significant degree of authority can be a challenge for U.S. occupiers," Sharon Otterman wrote in a 2003 paper for the Council on Foreign Relations.
Although tribal leaders have traditionally been able to come together in a crisis, relations are fluid and frequently testy.
"Tribal leadership is extremely cautious about appearing to surrender prerogative or authority to another tribe," said Marine Brig. Gen. John Allen, the No. 2 commander in Al Anbar.
Already, tensions are emerging. Rishawi heads one of the smaller branches of the powerful Dulaimi tribal confederation. Other families in the group recently launched the rival Al Anbar Tribal Sheiks Council.
The new alliance's public face is Ali Hathem Suleiman, whose late father was one of the province's most influential leaders, though he has yet to prove himself. Suleiman says he supported the Anbar Salvation Council when its purpose was to fight Al Qaeda, but says it has become a political vehicle for Rishawi.
"Abu Risha wants to be the sheik of all Al Anbar," he complained, using Rishawi's nickname.
Suleiman accused members of the Anbar Salvation Council of corruption and other abuses.
He also warned that the United States' policy of equipping tribesmen who join the police and auxiliary units was in effect arming tribal militias that could one day turn their guns against their benefactors, Shiite rivals or one another.
"We will get rid of the Al Qaeda problem," he said. "But then there will be militias, and Al Anbar will be sitting on a powder keg."
--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
zavis@latimes.com
Times staff writers Tina Susman, Ned Parker, Raheem Salman and Wail Alhafith contributed to this report.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationw...23,0,6148132.story?page=1&coll=la-home-center
<font size="4">U.S. has turned to Sunni clans to battle Al Qaeda,
a tactic they hope to repeat elsewhere.
But some warn that it may backfire.</font size></center>
Los Angeles Times
By Alexandra Zavis, Times Staff Writer
June 23, 2007
BAGHDAD — When the Sunni Muslim sheik sent his representatives into the heaving Baghdad slum where a Shiite Muslim militia holds sway, many thought he was courting disaster. Sunnis mutter darkly that the only members of their sect who enter Sadr City are the ones stuffed into the trunk of a car.
But on this occasion, the head of a Shiite family stood up and recited a poem calling Abdul Sattar Rishawi "the honest, the decent, the good sheik, who would not bow his head in humiliation." The sheik's representatives were so pleased, they asked him to read it again.
This kind of bold move has persuaded the U.S. command to champion tribal leaders such as Rishawi as a way around the government stalemate in Baghdad. Rishawi has formed an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that are fighting Al Qaeda-linked insurgents in Al Anbar province. Military leaders, who have provided weapons and other material to some tribal groups there, hope that Rishawi's effort can be replicated in other provinces.
But some Western officials question the wisdom of encouraging tribalism in Iraq, when such loyalties have helped to cripple development and stir conflict in other parts of the world. Iraq's Shiite-led government also is uneasy over the alliances, which Prime Minister Nouri Maliki warns could end up creating even more militias if weapons fall into the wrong hands.
On Friday, Maliki said intelligence officials had information that "enemies are attempting to infiltrate this process in order to serve their own interests." In a statement, he announced that he had formed a committee to oversee the arming of tribes, saying, "All such activity should be overseen by the government."
Although tribes can offer effective leadership at the grass-roots level, their shifting loyalties and frequent clashes among them present risks on a national stage.
"You've always got to be careful when using tribal leaders — they're available to the highest bidder," said one diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Although the tribes have proved a potent force against Al Qaeda in Iraq, others worry that any power and weapons given to them now will not be easily taken away when that threat is gone. If too much authority devolves to them, some in government fear, the country may begin to look uncomfortably like Afghanistan or northwest Pakistan.
"Tribes mean informal laws, which are against the principles of … the state," said an Iraqi Cabinet aide. "When you go toward tribes, it means you are in a very weak, weak position."
--
An alternative to Baghdad
But frustration is building in Washington with Maliki's government, which has failed to push through the legislative reforms that U.S. officials believe will help win over the disaffected Sunni minority that has felt powerless since Saddam Hussein's ouster and is now driving the insurgency. They include jobs for former members of Hussein's Baath Party, and a fair distribution of Iraq's oil wealth.
The No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, told reporters recently that he was encouraging commanders to strike deals with tribes, religious leaders and local insurgent groups that could help build reconciliation from the bottom up.
"Engaging with the tribal entities and others has made a huge difference," he said. With their encouragement, recruitment into the Al Anbar security forces has shot up to more than 12,000 so far this year, compared with 1,000 in all of 2006, he said. And attacks in what was once the most dangerous region outside Baghdad have dropped to just over 400 last month, from 811 in May 2006.
Odierno acknowledged that the success in Al Anbar, which is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab, may not be easily replicable in other regions where there are volatile mixes of Sunnis, Shiites and ethnic Kurds. But U.S. officers say tribal leaders possess unrivaled knowledge of what goes on in their areas, and can be an effective force to secure them. They can also be an initial conduit for development aid.
Maliki's plan to put the government in charge of the arming process could, in effect, stall the grass-roots deals that the military is pursuing and that tribal leaders say should have been made long ago.
"In all countries, you can't do anything without the people, and the people of Iraq are tribal," said Faleh Dulaimi, media advisor to Rishawi, who heads the Abu Risha tribe.
Analysts estimate that at least three-quarters of the Iraqi people are members of one of the country's roughly 30 tribal confederations that group hundreds of tribes, clans and extended families. Through the centuries, this complex network has provided the basis on which Iraq's largely feudal society was organized.
Hussein's Baath Party officially rejected the system as backward, banning the use of tribal names on official documents, and promoting Arab nationalism. But key positions were filled by members of Hussein's clan, which dominated the elite. Later, Hussein openly encouraged tribalism during his disastrous 1980s war with Iran and the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
When U.S. authorities banned the Baath Party and dismantled the Iraqi military in 2003, they wiped out some of the few unifying groups that existed in Iraq. The political formations that make up the current government are mostly based on ethnicity and religion.
Rishawi is dismissive of Iraq's politicians, many of whom spent years in exile, and who, he alleges, continue to do the bidding of their foreign backers.
"They have an outside agenda and they do not understand the people," he said in a recent interview. "When I talk to them, they just give me a long speech about Islam — as if they are actors."
--
National aspirations
Rishawi's ambitions extend far beyond his base in Ramadi, capital of Al Anbar. He has launched a national political party called the Iraqi Awakening Conference, which he says will encourage reconciliation among all sects and ethnicities. The sheiks are reaching out to other groups through meetings such as the one in Sadr City and want to field candidates in provincial elections that are supposed to be held by year's end.
"Sectarianism brought us nothing but destruction," he said. "What does it matter if a person prays this way or that way? We are all praying to God."
As if to underscore the point, a battle rages at a market across the river from the once-grand Baghdad hotel where Rishawi is holding court recently, receiving a parade of visitors. Police, soldiers and gunmen in civilian clothes surge across the bridge to the fight. The streets are sealed off, helicopters buzz overhead, and occasional bursts of gunfire pop in the distance.
But inside the hotel, calm prevails. A waiter arrives to take the order for the next round of tea. A guard approaches, fiddling absent-mindedly with his assault rife, and accidentally shoots a hole in the marble floor. The gunshot reverberates through the high-ceilinged lobby, sending up a cloud of dust that briefly shrouds the scene.
Rishawi, regal in a crisp white dishdasha, gold-rimmed cloak and diamond-studded ring, does not stop talking or look up as the hapless guard is unceremoniously escorted away.
Asked about his political aims, Rishawi does not answer directly.
"Now, my main goal is to reunify the society and defeat terrorism," he said. But, interjects Dulaimi, "after achieving all these aims, the masses will definitely turn to the new leaders who did something."
Rishawi nods approvingly.
Analysts believe Rishawi is trying to position himself as the legitimate representative of Sunni Arabs and a credible negotiating partner.
On the Kurdish and Shiite sides, there are leaders such as radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr who have influence in parliament and also command powerful militias, said Vali Nasr, a Middle East expert at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. But there are no Sunni politicians who control the insurgency, he said.
"That's why these tribal leaders, everyone views them as such a promise," he said. "The assumption is that they represent a chunk of territory, a chunk of people, and they potentially can deliver."
Shiite tribal leaders have noted Rishawi's sudden rise and see in him a potential ally in the fight against Sunni militants. Rishawi's success in leveraging funding and weapons for his Anbar Salvation Council from U.S. and Iraqi sources has not gone unnoticed, either.
For the U.S., however, working through the tribes has risks.
Iraq's tribal system is complex, with a different leader, or sheik, at every level.
"Because there are so many sheiks, finding one with a significant degree of authority can be a challenge for U.S. occupiers," Sharon Otterman wrote in a 2003 paper for the Council on Foreign Relations.
Although tribal leaders have traditionally been able to come together in a crisis, relations are fluid and frequently testy.
"Tribal leadership is extremely cautious about appearing to surrender prerogative or authority to another tribe," said Marine Brig. Gen. John Allen, the No. 2 commander in Al Anbar.
Already, tensions are emerging. Rishawi heads one of the smaller branches of the powerful Dulaimi tribal confederation. Other families in the group recently launched the rival Al Anbar Tribal Sheiks Council.
The new alliance's public face is Ali Hathem Suleiman, whose late father was one of the province's most influential leaders, though he has yet to prove himself. Suleiman says he supported the Anbar Salvation Council when its purpose was to fight Al Qaeda, but says it has become a political vehicle for Rishawi.
"Abu Risha wants to be the sheik of all Al Anbar," he complained, using Rishawi's nickname.
Suleiman accused members of the Anbar Salvation Council of corruption and other abuses.
He also warned that the United States' policy of equipping tribesmen who join the police and auxiliary units was in effect arming tribal militias that could one day turn their guns against their benefactors, Shiite rivals or one another.
"We will get rid of the Al Qaeda problem," he said. "But then there will be militias, and Al Anbar will be sitting on a powder keg."
--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
zavis@latimes.com
Times staff writers Tina Susman, Ned Parker, Raheem Salman and Wail Alhafith contributed to this report.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationw...23,0,6148132.story?page=1&coll=la-home-center