50 Years Ago: The Cuban Missile Crisis

QueEx

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50 Years Ago:
The Cuban Missile Crisis



On October 15, 1962, a group of CIA analysts assigned to review aerial photographs of Cuba identified several newly established Soviet medium-range ballistic missile installations -- bases within 100 miles of the United States. The State Department was notified that night, and President John F. Kennedy was briefed the next morning, setting in motion a crisis that brought the world frighteningly close to nuclear war.

The U.S. considered options, deployed troops and weapons to Florida, confronted the Soviets at the UN, and shortly set up a naval blockade of Cuba. For 13 tense days, the crisis deepened and people around the world feared the very real possibility of a new, horrific worldwide conflict. On October 27, the U.S. and Soviets reached a secret agreement, where Kennedy would order the removal of missiles in southern Italy and Turkey, and Khrushchev would remove all missiles in Cuba. Over the following weeks, U.S. forces monitored the departure of 42 missiles aboard eight Soviet ships, and the crisis was averted.

Gathered here are a few glimpses from those tense Cold War days, as the world approached, then retreated from, the brink of destruction.



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President John F. Kennedy tells the American people that the U.S. is setting up a naval blockade against Cuba, during a
television and radio address, on October 22, 1962, from the White House. The president also said the U.S. would wreak
"a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union" if any nuclear missile is fired on any nation in this hemisphere."
(AP Photo/Bill Allen)



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U.S. President John F. Kennedy speaks before reporters during a televised speech to the nation about the strategic
blockade of Cuba, and his warning to the Soviet Union about missile sanctions, during the Cuban missile crisis, on
October 24, 1962 in Washington, DC. (Getty Images)

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A spy photo of a medium range ballistic missile base in San Cristobal, Cuba, with labels detailing various parts of the base, displayed October of 1962. (Getty Images)


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Evidence presented by the U.S. Department of Defense, of Soviet missiles in Cuba. This low level photo, made October 23, 1962, of the medium range ballistic missile site under construction at Cuba's San Cristobal area. A line of oxidizer trailers is at center. Added since October 14, the site was earlier photographed, are fuel trailers, a missile shelter tent, and equipment. The missile erector now lies under canvas cover. Evident also are extensive vehicle tracks and the construction of cable lines to control areas. (AP Photo/DOD)


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A map of Cuba annotated by former U.S. President John F. Kennedy, displayed for the first time at the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 13, 2005. Former President Kennedy wrote "Missile Sites" on the map and marked them with an X when he was first briefed by the CIA on the Cuban Missile Crisis on October 16, 1962. (Reuters/Brian Snyder)


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A photograph of a ballistic missile base in Cuba, used as evidence with which U.S. President John F. Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis, on October 24, 1962. (Getty Images)
 
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President John F. Kennedy meets with Air Force Maj. Richard Heyser, left, and Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis LeMay, center, at the White House in Washington to discuss U-2 spy plane flights over Cuba. (AP Photo/Richard Heyser private collection)


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A composite image of three photograph taken on October 23, 1962, during a United Nations Security Council meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis. From left, Soviet foreign deputy minister Valerian A. Zorin; Cuba's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mario Garcia-Inchaustegui; and U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. (Library of Congress)


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Cuban President Fidel Castro replies to President Kennedy's naval blockade via Cuban radio and television, on October 23, 1962. (AP Photo/file)




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President John F. Kennedy signs a proclamation enacting the U.S. arms quarantine against Cuba, on October 23, 1962. (Library of Congress)




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Picketers representing an organization known as Women Strike for Peace carry placards outside the United Nations headquarters in New York City, where the U.N. Security Council considers the Cuban missile crisis in a special meeting, on October 23, 1962. (AP Photo)



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New Yorkers eager for news of the Cuban missile crisis line up to buy newspapers in October of 1962. (Library of Congress)

 
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U.S. Navy surveillance of the first Soviet F-class submarine to surface near the Cuban quarantine line on October 25, 1962. (U.S. Navy)




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U.S. Army anti-aircraft rockets, mounted on launchers and pointed out over the Florida Straits in Key West, Florida, on October 27, 1962. (AP photo




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Soviet personnel and six missile transporters loaded onto a Soviet ship in Cuba's Casilda port, on November 6, 1962. Note shadow at lower right of the RF-101 reconnaissance jet taking the photograph. (Department of Defense)




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An RF-101 - as seen in the "shadow" in the photograph above




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A P2V Neptune U.S. patrol plane flies over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. (Getty Images)





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The Soviet ship Kasimov removes 15 Soviet I1-28 aircraft from Cuba after the U.S. asked for their withdrawal. (Getty Images)



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A Soviet submarine near the Cuban coast controlling the operations of withdrawal of the Russian Missiles from Cuba in accordance with the US-Soviet agreement, on November 10, 1962. American planes and helicopters flew at a low level to keep close check on the dismantling and loading operations, while US warships watched over Soviet freighters carrying missiles back to Soviet Union. (AFP/Getty Images)




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Buildup of troops and military equipment, rushed to south Florida to launch an invasion of Cuba if it had been ordered, remained on the keys, between Miami and Key West. This unit, showing no sign of dismantling, was manned and ready with its anti-aircraft missiles in Key West on November 21, 1962. (AP Photo)





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The U.S. Navy guided missile ship Dahlgren trails the Soviet Leninsky Komsomol as the Russian vessel departed Casilda, Cuba, on November 10, 1962. (AP Photo/Henry Burroughs)



 
i know everything there is to know about the cuban missile crisis.how it started,who started it and how it ended.but the one thing we all can thank the leaders of that time for, is how cooler heads prevailed in the end.
 
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KENNEDY'S SECRET APPROACH
TO CASTRO


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But i mos def know a lot of people in the US military at that time remember this,and remember this incident........Curtis Lemay was boiled in rage when the news got back to him that Major Rudolph Anderson was killed during a mission flight over cuba by a Soviet made anti-aircraft battery.this and other incidents like this during the crisis could have lead to thermonuclear war.real talk.:smh:
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But i mos def know a lot of people in the US military at that time remember this,and remember this incident........Curtis Lemay was boiled in rage when the news got back to him that Major Rudolph Anderson was killed during a mission flight over cuba by a Soviet made anti-aircraft battery.this and other incidents like this during the crisis could have lead to thermonuclear war.real talk.:smh:
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btw Major Rudolph Anderson was the only military casaulty during the 1962 crisis
 
Hawks vs. Doves

when doves fly


Attorney General Robert Kennedy, in his own handwriting, tallied the initial positions of those around the table ("Blockade" or "Strike") on a possible U.S. response to the missiles in Cuba. The "hawks" supported an airstrike; the "doves" supported a naval quarantine. In the tally below, the Doves prevailed 11 - 7 and quite possibly averted war.



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A 1962 Newsreel Reporting the
Cuban Missile Crisis in Progress


50 years ago this week, the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war.
On October 14, 1962, a U.S. reconnaissance mission discovered medium-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba. The 13 days of brinkmanship that followed have been called <SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">the most dangerous episode in recorded history</span>.



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Castro's Nuclear Epiphany — and What
It Reveals About the Minds of Dictators


Did the Cuban leader's change of heart on nuking the
United States come from a realization about his own death?



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Exactly 50 years ago today, October 27, 1962, on "Black Saturday," the climax of the Cuban Missile Crisis, <SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">Fidel Castro sent a cable to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev calling on him to fire nuclear missiles on Washington, D.C., New York, and other American cities with a warhead 60 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.</span>

But half a century later, he has changed his view. "After I've seen what I've seen," he told a journalist, "and knowing what I know now, it wasn't worth it all."

Why this change of heart? What has Castro, the last major revolutionary of the twentieth century, "seen" these past decades that altered his stance? In October 1962, Castro was engaged in his own mythic battle to save and continue his revolution, which he extolled as a heroic struggle against injustice, poverty and imperialist exploitation. But now says it was not worth obliterating U.S. cities, letting his island country be annihilated, and triggering a full-scale war killing over 150 million people.

Did Castro have some revelation of fundamental truth or was this recent admission borne of a sense of his own mortality after his 2006 intestinal surgery, his own internal bleeding? How did he reach this humbled state that led him to admit he was wrong to call to destroy humanity for the sake of his island bunker and his revolution?


Other veterans of the crisis had come to a chastened and humbled position rather more quickly. I had the opportunity to sit with the key living veterans of the 1962 crisis -- with former U.S. Defense Secretary Bob McNamara, former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Castro himself and others in their historic first face-to-face meetings in Moscow in 1989 and in Havana in 1992. Most focused on lessons of how to avoid ever again coming to the edge of nuclear Armageddon. And we were shocked to receive the previously secret uncensored memoirs of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, showing his utter horror at receiving Castro's doomsday cable. "This is insane," he wrote, "not only is he preparing to die himself, he wants to drag us with him. Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this."

For most at the table, the climax of the legendary "13 days" was a sobering near-death experience, personal and collective. McNamara said that, as he left the White House on 27 October fifty years ago, "I wondered whether I would live to see another Saturday night." Yet, when we sat with Castro in 1992, and I asked him about the events of that Saturday, he defended his position, saying that the Cubans were ready for annihilation if the U.S. attacked the missile sites and that Khrushchev should be the first to fire nuclear weapons.

Was Castro's penitent statement -- made in August 2010, two years after his intestinal surgery -- effectively a deathbed admission? This week we again read the latest Western press reports of Castro's demise -- that he was in a "neurovegetative state" after suffering a stroke. But official Cuban media responded with photos and Fidel's protest: "I'm not dead yet." After 47 years of absolute rule, Castro did give up power to his brother Raul. Was it because Castro is now "an elder statesman" that he made his admission? Was he no longer constrained by his political office and official duties and could now take a larger, more global viewpoint? Or was it because he could not deny that his physical strength is finally leaving him, making him less cocky?

Let us keep it in perspective. Castro did not say it was not worth killing hundreds. Fidel did not renounce revolution. He just said it was not worth killing millions.

Castro's revelation offers an opportunity to explore the minds of revolutionaries and the justification they give for mass violence in the name of social engineering for a new just society. There is nothing more revealing on this topic than the candid words spoken privately by Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin to his friend, the writer Maxim Gorky:


"Our generation has succeeded in doing a job of astounding historical importance. The cruelty of our life, forced upon us by conditions, will be understood and justified. It will all be understood, all of it!"

...Listening to Beethoven's sonatas in Moscow one evening, Lenin remarked: "I know of nothing better than the 'Appassionata' and could listen to it every day. What astonishing, superhuman music! It always makes me proud, perhaps naively so, to think that people can work such miracles!"

Wrinkling up his eyes, he smiled rather sadly, adding: "But I can't listen to music very often, it affects my nerves. I want to say sweet, silly things and pat the heads of people who, living in a filthy hell, can create such beauty. One can't pat anyone on the head nowadays, they might bite your hand off. They ought to be beaten on the head, beaten mercilessly, <SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">although ideally we are against doing any violence to people.</span> Hmm -- what a hellishly difficult job!"

<SPAN style="BACKGROUND-COLOR: #ffff00">Lenin's unguarded statement stands as perhaps the greatest revelation of the inner thoughts of the political revolutionary, of the kind not found in their published writings. "...Although ideally we are against doing any violence to people" -- this is perhaps the most terrifying independent clause added to any sentence in the history of political thought.</span>

Lenin never saw the hell created by Stalin. He did not live to see the tens of millions killed in his name. Lenin died of a brain hemorrhage at age 54. Had he lived longer, might he have regretted his choice to support revolutionary violence -- and not listen to more music? Mao's rule killed over 40 million and he lived to be 84; I do not know if he had any regrets.

But what was it that moved Castro to his admission that "it wasn't worth it all?

Did his revolutionary zeal finally wane and he finally realized with horror the implications of his own call for a nuclear launch? Or perhaps he came to terms with the failure of using state coercion to advance his social experiment? Fidel has seen his brand of socialism rejected around the world. He lived through the complete collapse of Soviet socialism. He cannot help but see young people wanting openness, iPads, a chance to participate in the free market of goods and ideas.

As a proponent of nonviolent social change, I would like to think that maybe Castro let his true inner thoughts be expressed in an unguarded moment -- like Lenin when he acknowledged his love for Beethoven's "Appassionata" and expressed his desire "ideally" to avoid violence. Lenin immediately sought to discipline himself to ensure he did not succumb to the beauty of this world rather than fight for his imagined future socialist utopia.

How do we explain Castro's final revelation? The great Russian writer Lev Tolstoy may help us here. Few realize today that it was Tolstoy, the very author of War and Peace, who, in his latter years, became one of the world's greatest proponents of nonviolence. I believe that it is fair to say that there would have been no Mahatma Gandhi had he not exchanged letters and writings with Lev Tolstoy, who wrote:

"You who may die any instant, you sign sentences of death, you declare war, you take part in it, you judge, you punish...and yet it may happen at the moment when you are acting thus that a bacterium or a bull may attack you and you will fall and die, losing forever the chance of repairing the harm you have done to others, and above all to yourself, in uselessly wasting a life which has been given you only once in eternity."

Maybe Castro become more conscious of the inescapable reality of his own death and found a new appreciation for life -- and had second thoughts about mass killing of others? Confronting our own death, our own personal end of the world, our own personal Armageddon, can, Tolstoy says, help us be thankful for and embrace the beauty of life here and now. I like to imagine that the decisive moment came when Fidel was listening to Beethoven.





SOURCE: The Atlantichttp://www.theatlantic.com/internat...-reveals-about-the-minds-of-dictators/264169/



 
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