Judges in Dispute Over Mutual Fund Fees

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Judges in Dispute Over Mutual Funds
By FLOYD NORRIS
Published: August 15, 2008

THEY are both known as conservatives and were pioneers in the economic analysis of the law. Each is a past president of the American Law and Economics Association. They have written papers together and teach at the University of Chicago law school while serving as judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to which each was appointed by President Ronald Reagan.

One academic study found the two judges, Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook, were the circuit court judges most often quoted by other judges. A 2001 poll of Legal Affairs Magazine readers listed them among the 20 most influential legal thinkers in the country. Only one other circuit court judge made the list.

But now they have parted ways on a dispute involving what the courts should do about high pay for the investment managers of mutual funds.

In a vigorous dissent, Judge Posner criticized the “one-sided character of the panel’s analysis” in a major decision by Judge Easterbrook, which said fund directors, also called trustees, should have the final say on pay for managers.

“The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth,” Judge Easterbrook wrote.

To Judge Posner, that analysis was naïve.

“Competition in product and capital markets can’t be counted on to solve the problem because the same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations and similar entities, including mutual funds,” he said. “Mutual funds are a component of the financial services industry, where abuses have been rampant.”

Judge Posner issued his comments last week in a futile effort to get the entire Seventh Circuit to consider the case, rather than allow the decision by Judge Easterbrook and two colleagues to stand. One of the 11 judges recused himself, and the others split 5 to 5 on the question. Without a majority vote, the original opinion stood.

At issue is a section of the law passed by Congress in 1970, which provides that fund managers have a “fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for services,” and gives shareholders the right to go to court and argue that fees are excessive.

Until now, the dominant precedent on that issue was a 1982 ruling by the Second Circuit in a case known by the name of the plaintiff, Irving L. Gartenberg. That ruling stated that a fee could be deemed excessive if it was “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”

Judge Posner complained that although the Easterbrook opinion did not precisely say it was rejecting the Gartenberg precedent, that was what it did, and that Judge Easterbrook had violated a Seventh Circuit rule requiring that such an opinion be sent to all circuit judges before its release.

The Easterbrook opinion relied in part on what it called a “a recent, careful study” study written by two academics, John C. Coates, a Harvard professor of law and economics, and R. Glenn Hubbard, the dean of Columbia Business School and a former chairman of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers.

That study, which was financed in part by the Investment Company Institute, a mutual fund trade group, concluded, Judge Easterbrook wrote, “that thousands of mutual funds are plenty, that investors can and do protect their interests by shopping, and that regulating advisory fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good than harm.”

Judge Posner, in his dissent, said that even the Coates and Hubbard study “explicitly approves Gartenberg.” But he also said there was more evidence of abusive behavior on Wall Street than there was when their article was written in August 2007. He pointed to a May 2008 study by Camelia M. Kuhnen, an assistant professor of finance at Northwestern, which found evidence that connections between fund directors and managers “foster favoritism, to the detriment of investors.”

Judge Posner added, “The panel bases its rejection of Gartenberg mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for re-examination on the basis of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly traded firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation.”

In the case decided by the appellate court, against Harris Associates, the managers of the Oakmark family of funds, the plaintiff, Jerry N. Jones, argued that the courts should consider evidence that Oakmont charges much more to the mutual funds than it charges to manage similar portfolios for institutional investors.

Judge Easterbrook rejected that comparison, saying that the courts should rely on competition to keep fees reasonable and that there were many possible reasons for the difference, like differing demands on managers’ time.

Judge Posner was unimpressed, quoting a study that concluded the difference existed because there was real competition in the institutional market but that mutual funds were captives of their managers, who normally start the funds and sell them to investors.

“The panel opinion throws out some suggestions on why this difference may be justified,” Judge Posner wrote, “but the suggestions are offered purely as speculation, rather than anything having an evidentiary or empirical basis. And there is no doubt that the captive funds are indeed captive.”

James C. Bradley, a lawyer in South Carolina who brought the suit, said he would ask the Supreme Court to review the case. The dissent by Judge Posner, with his emphasis that there is now a split between circuit courts, reads almost like an appellate brief, and could help to get this issue before the Supreme Court.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/business/16place.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin
 

QueEx

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Re: Judges in Dispute Over Mutual Funds

I think Judge Posner is right. The Easterbrook court proposes virtually no regulation at all in a area where time is likely to tell of abuse. The Gartenberg Rule doesn't exactly impose regulation of fees because it places a huge burden on the plaintiff (as it probably should to cut down on review abuse) -- but at least it might cause some to pause. But, allowing fund directors to have the final say on pay for managers without the possibility of review (whether shareholder or judicial), is, in my opinion, inviting abuse.

QueEx
 

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What is abuse? Very vague term.

Generally, shareholders can always review their relationship with fund managers and deny the fund manager the use of their capital if they don't think he is worth the fees the shareholder is paying. No victimology needed.

If a less fluid contractual relationship exist and one party think the other isn't being faithful to the terms, then sue the other party. That's a disagreement that the court system exist to resolve.

However, just being regretful that you entered into a relationship with someone who you think is overpaid for an unexpectedly shitty job is a waste of time.

I disagree with both judges because unless a contract dispute or outright fraud is involved the court/government should stay out of the equation.
 

nittie

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Re: Judges in Dispute Over Mutual Funds

If the government can save fannie mae it can save shareholders from shitty fund managers. There should be caps on what these people make.
 

Greed

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The government should not have created Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, but since it did, the mess they created needs to be cleaned up.

I just wish the cleanup included gradually shutting both of them down.
 

QueEx

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What is abuse? Very vague term.
Not vague. Abuse is a very real thing when those at the top use their position to siphon off cash that should have gone to the investor participants.

Generally, shareholders can always review their relationship with fund managers and deny the fund manager the use of their capital if they don't think he is worth the fees the shareholder is paying. No victimology needed.

When does your shareholder review take place? - BEFORE or AFTER the award of compensation?
  • If shareholders get to review the award of compensation BEFORE it is made that could be a good thing if they also get to vote. If they can't vote, the review is meaningless.

  • If the shareholder review comes AFTER the award, obviously, that would be even less meaningless than a review, without a vote -- since in both cases the excessive fee award can't be put back where it belongs - in the pockets of the investors.

If a less fluid contractual relationship exist and one party think the other isn't being faithful to the terms, then sue the other party. That's a disagreement that the court system exist to resolve.
Well, isn't that what the article is really about ??? If I correctly understand the article and the article has correctly characterized the issue -- then we have a debate over judicial review or no judicial review:

  • Under the Easterbrook analysis, there would be no judicial review -- no right to sue. Easterbrook proposes that, “[t]he trustees . . . rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth.” Under this analysis, if a shareholder filed suit, he would be shit out of luck because, absent fraud, the court would be compelled to dismiss the case since the trustees (and not the courts) are the final arbiters of just compensation.

  • Under the Posner analysis, judicial review occurs but only to a limited degree. The court's review would be limited to determining whether the fee awarded is, “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Mind you, that is a very significant burden of proof for the plaintiff-shareholder -- and a reversal of a fee award would not come easy.

  • NOTE: Under Easterbrook, trustees would probably <u>not</u> seek insurance coverage for their fee decisions because the shareholders would not have a cause of action against them for an excessive award, hence, shareholders would never see a dime of any excess. Under the Posner analysis, trustees would have to have coverage for excessive award decisions and the insurance policy is there to take care of the shareholders if the trustees and/or manager(s) have absconded with the money.


I disagree with both judges because unless a contract dispute or outright fraud is involved the court/government should stay out of the equation.
I think you misunderstand the debate. The court is not involved <u>unless</u> there is a dispute. There is no prior judicial review. In fact, I can't off the top of my head think of a matter where a court has jurisdiction to review -- BEFORE an action (lawsuit) is filed. That would be contrary to the whole notion of separation of powers -- such that the judiciary would have the right to substitute its judgment for that of the executive and legislative branches. Thats just not the law in this country.


QueEx
 

Greed

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Re: Judges in Dispute Over Mutual Funds

Not vague. Abuse is a very real thing when those at the top use their position to siphon off cash that should have gone to the investor participants.
It should only be considered abuse (you call it abuse and I call that scenario theft) if that money was already agreed upon to go to investors. If the terms of the contract or the formula for compensation is ambiguous, then it seems an honest dispute has arisen and the courts is the place to go. Once again, if the terms of the contract have been honored and the investor just thinks he is paying too much for the services rendered, then tough. The investor should stop whining, especially with an argument like, “he charges us more than he charges them.” Is he allowed to price discriminate under the terms of the contract? Then oh well.



When does your shareholder review take place? - BEFORE or AFTER the award of compensation?
  • If shareholders get to review the award of compensation BEFORE it is made that could be a good thing if they also get to vote. If they can't vote, the review is meaningless.

  • If the shareholder review comes AFTER the award, obviously, that would be even less meaningless than a review, without a vote -- since in both cases the excessive fee award can't be put back where it belongs - in the pockets of the investors.
The shareholder’s vote is in the form of their agreement to the compensation terms before the investment manager manages one cent of their money. The only thing that matters after that is whether the terms have been honored.

Well, isn't that what the article is really about ??? If I correctly understand the article and the article has correctly characterized the issue -- then we have a debate over judicial review or no judicial review:

  • Under the Easterbrook analysis, there would be no judicial review -- no right to sue. Easterbrook proposes that, “[t]he trustees . . . rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth.” Under this analysis, if a shareholder filed suit, he would be shit out of luck because, absent fraud, the court would be compelled to dismiss the case since the trustees (and not the courts) are the final arbiters of just compensation.

  • Under the Posner analysis, judicial review occurs but only to a limited degree. The court's review would be limited to determining whether the fee awarded is, “so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Mind you, that is a very significant burden of proof for the plaintiff-shareholder -- and a reversal of a fee award would not come easy.

  • NOTE: Under Easterbrook, trustees would probably <u>not</u> seek insurance coverage for their fee decisions because the shareholders would not have a cause of action against them for an excessive award, hence, shareholders would never see a dime of any excess. Under the Posner analysis, trustees would have to have coverage for excessive award decisions and the insurance policy is there to take care of the shareholders if the trustees and/or manager(s) have absconded with the money.
Maybe our disagreement is Posner and you are thinking in terms of theft and a larger worse case scenario than this particular case. Using words like abuse and absconded for this case doesn’t seem necessary. There is no malice here and no fraud. Just people unhappy with what they paid, in relation to what they got, after the fact. Also, technically hasn’t judicial review happened and will continue to happen? People can always bring suit. Do you think that ability is being threatened here?

I don’t think the courts should be considering whether a compensation is subjectively large, just whether the compensation are within the terms the parties agreed to abide by. And I definitely don't want lawyers and judges trying to decided what is "enough competition" and whether there is enough of it.



I think you misunderstand the debate. The court is not involved <u>unless</u> there is a dispute. There is no prior judicial review. In fact, I can't off the top of my head think of a matter where a court has jurisdiction to review -- BEFORE an action (lawsuit) is filed. That would be contrary to the whole notion of separation of powers -- such that the judiciary would have the right to substitute its judgment for that of the executive and legislative branches. Thats just not the law in this country.
Sorry, I was speaking outside the context of the article and the overall debate with maximum wage laws. Both judges are fine with that concept, which I wish they would strike down whenever they are enacted but they won’t.
 
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BigUnc

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If I'm reading this correctly then Judge Easterbrook is correct. It seems the plaintiff is asking the courts to renegotiate the present contract in his favor and regulate the compensation structure for all future services instead of the free market, in other words, to save them from their own stupidity past, present and future. For Judge Posner to cite studies that have not undergone judicial processes, such as, cross examination of the evidence is somewhat perplexing. While abuse is clearly indicated the judiciary is probably not the place to set what would be regulatory control over a business. That is clearly a legislative area but since Congress has not acted to exert any control that leaves the field wide open for the court to step in.
 

Greed

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If I'm reading this correctly then Judge Easterbrook is correct. It seems the plaintiff is asking the courts to renegotiate the present contract in his favor and regulate the compensation structure for all future services instead of the free market, in other words, to save them from their own stupidity past, present and future. For Judge Posner to cite studies that have not undergone judicial processes, such as, cross examination of the evidence is somewhat perplexing. While abuse is clearly indicated the judiciary is probably not the place to set what would be regulatory control over a business. That is clearly a legislative area but since Congress has not acted to exert any control that leaves the field wide open for the court to step in.
I really did want to mention the outrageousness of both judges mentioning academic studies as some justification for their opinions. Thanks for bringing that up.

However, people keep mentioning abuse. Where? An investment manager taking all that the terms of agreement allows him to take is not abuse. It's either bad negotiating skills on the part of the investor or good negotiating skills on the part of the fund manager.

Abuse implies a victim, please specify a victim in this agreement entered freely by two parties?
 

QueEx

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You know, I intended to come back to this thread after thinking about the various scenarious and the different outcomes given the three (3) approaches: Easterbrooks, Posners and yours (Greed's). Your last statement "Abuse implies a victim, please specify a victim in this agreement entered freely by two parties? sets up an interesting question that you may or may not agree with. If the word "victim" somehow causes you problems, drop it. There has been long recognized in the law the notion of unequal bargaining position which we won't call victim but, nevertheless, results in an inequity.

You assume that all contracting parties stand on equal footing, quite the contrary. There are many contracts where one party may have little choice but to accept one sided terms; there are parties who, because of their relative station in life, lack savvy, etc., who are simply out witted by the unsavory for every day needs; and there are situations where one party is just simply out to take another honest person though his game may not be so obvious -- etc, ad nausem.
My point, all parties are not equal.

In your free market approach, or levianthan - strongest survives, the little man often loses. Now, if the little man is in some places where his wants outstrip his ability, it can be argued that he asked for it. On the other hand, when it comes to the things the little man needs and when it comes to the little man investing his money, he stands in an unequal bargaining position to the Wall Street sharks. Hence, he may often be forced to into take it or leave it contractual terms and conditions.

Do we let the sharks consume the little fish; or

Do we build in protections, not against the sharks profit, but against the sharks insatiable appetite ???

QueEx

(I'd like to develop this more -- but I gotta get to bed)
 

Greed

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I will gladly address this subject. There is no such thing as a victim when it comes to free choice by both/multiple parties to enter upon an ultimately honored agreement.

What makes you think the Wall Street types are any smarter than the Average Joe? This last episode in Sub-Prime Madness should show how many big dummies work on Wall Street. The only thing Wall Street has shown to be efficient at is lobbying government to save their asses after their stupidity overwhelms them. Now some people may come to the conclusion that if Bear Sterns and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac can be save then provide some relief for the "little man." My response to that is save no one. Pretty simple with no qualifications.

To address your post's specifics, there is no need that makes "little choice" equivalent to no choice. If your little man enters into some kind of agreement based on some self-perceived desperation, then he took a risk that things will work out to his net benefit. Things may not work for him, but since I don’t equate little choice with no choice, the government should not step in purely on the basis that society thinks he should have come out ahead on the deal.

Overall, legally recognized parties are always equal to me if no fraud or threat of physical violence is involved forcing someone to make a deal they think is bad for them. As long as both entities made an assessment (gamble) that they are working in their own best interest, then let the chips fall where they may. If someone looks at a contract and can only see a bad outcome for himself or herself, then they are better off leaving it. Taking it or leaving it in any circumstance presupposes thought, judgment, and choice.

Isn’t that last sentence what the pursuit of happiness all about?
 

nittie

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Wall Street Winners Get Billion-Dollar Paydays
By JENNY ANDERSON
Published: April 16, 2008


Hedge fund managers, those masters of a secretive, sometimes volatile financial universe, are making money on a scale that once seemed unimaginable, even in Wall Street’s rarefied realms.
One manager, John Paulson, made $3.7 billion last year. He reaped that bounty, probably the richest in Wall Street history, by betting against certain mortgages and complex financial products that held them.

Mr. Paulson, the founder of Paulson & Company, was not the only big winner. The hedge fund managers James H. Simons and George Soros each earned almost $3 billion last year, according to an annual ranking of top hedge fund earners by Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine, which comes out Wednesday.

Hedge fund managers have redefined notions of wealth in recent years. And the richest among them are redefining those notions once again.

Their unprecedented and growing affluence underscores the gaping inequality between the millions of Americans facing stagnating wages and rising home foreclosures and an agile financial elite that seems to thrive in good times and bad. Such profits may also prompt more calls for regulation of the industry.

Even on Wall Street, where money is the ultimate measure of success, the size of the winnings makes some uneasy. “There is nothing wrong with it — it’s not illegal,” said William H. Gross, the chief investment officer of the bond fund Pimco. “But it’s ugly.”

The richest hedge fund managers keep getting richer — fast. To make it into the top 25 of Alpha’s list, the industry standard for hedge fund pay, a manager needed to earn at least $360 million last year, more than 18 times the amount in 2002. The median American family, by contrast, earned $60,500 last year.

Combined, the top 50 hedge fund managers last year earned $29 billion. That figure represents the managers’ own pay and excludes the compensation of their employees. Five of the top 10, including Mr. Simons and Mr. Soros, were also at the top of the list for 2006. To compile its ranking, Alpha examined the funds’ returns and the fees that they charge investors, and then calculated the managers’ pay.


There's nothing illegal about the salaries, the problem is it's just wrong. The whole premise for this arguement is wrong. It's not a legal issue [hopefully it will be soon] it's a moral issue. You cannot have a handful of people making this kind of money while the average person home loses value. These business pratices are a recipe for disaster.
 

QueEx

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I will gladly address this subject. There is no such thing as a victim when it comes to free choice by both/multiple parties to enter upon an ultimately honored agreement.
Right away, this is the point of our divergence. Your free market concepts notwithstanding, its just theory -- practiced in few places in the real world. Yours is pure Leviathan. All of your business deals exist in a state of nature. you recognize no differences in position as you artificially place each party in the same position relative to the other. Hence, its dog eat and strongest survive. In the end, your system only last until it consumes itself. Please name a place where this system today continues to thrive.


What makes you think the Wall Street types are any smarter than the Average Joe? This last episode in Sub-Prime Madness should show how many big dummies work on Wall Street. The only thing Wall Street has shown to be efficient at is lobbying government to save their asses after their stupidity overwhelms them. Now some people may come to the conclusion that if Bear Sterns and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac can be save then provide some relief for the "little man." My response to that is save no one. Pretty simple with no qualifications.
Again, where does this hellish system exist ???

To address your post's specifics, there is no need that makes "little choice" equivalent to no choice. If your little man enters into some kind of agreement based on some self-perceived desperation, then he took a risk that things will work out to his net benefit. Things may not work for him, but since I don’t equate little choice with no choice, the government should not step in purely on the basis that society thinks he should have come out ahead on the deal.

I wonder why there is the legal theory called "Unconscionability" in the United States and in different forms and degrees, elsewhere ???

Overall, legally recognized parties are always equal to me if no fraud or threat of physical violence is involved forcing someone to make a deal they think is bad for them. As long as both entities made an assessment (gamble) that they are working in their own best interest, then let the chips fall where they may. If someone looks at a contract and can only see a bad outcome for himself or herself, then they are better off leaving it. Taking it or leaving it in any circumstance presupposes thought, judgment, and choice.
Overall, you're just dead wrong. See, unconscionability and similar theories.

Isn’t that last sentence what the pursuit of happiness all about?
LOL. Where is this "sucessfully" practiced ???

QueEx

(and now, I must catch a flight); later.
 

Greed

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I am very much aware of the reality of life versus the optimality of life. I know there is not a free person on this earth. However, since I hold no respect for the concept of majority rule, I see the issue differently. The rarity of freedom in this world isn’t an indictment of the concept of freedom, but instead of the elements of humanity that has, throughout unwritten and written history, fought against it. The timeframe where the concept of freedom is defined and pursued by humanity en masse is really just a blip on the radar of human history, the last few hundred years at most. Being in the minority on this issue does not reduce the validity or merit of the ideal.

You mentioned an immediate divergence of our positions in your post, and I’ll return the favor. Your response assumes when two parties enter into a contract one is taking advantage of the other, and I’ll cite your consistent reference to dog-eat-dog. However, appealing to your own experience of entering into these agreements, if no one forced the parties involved to agree to the terms, then there must be another motivation for them. Without fraud or force the only motivation left is a perceived future benefit associated with the agreement. In addition, the perceived benefit is all that needs to be present, and not actual benefit. You and I can look at an agreement between two other people and judge that one came out too far ahead in benefit. In our present society, the standard is to use government to limit the difference in actual benefit between the two parties. In the meanwhile completely ignoring that until the government butt-in the “little man” did receive some benefit (likely the exact benefit he agreed to beforehand), and the “little man” was content with his choice. Of course, once you tell the little man (no quotations on purpose) that you are going to limit, by force of law, his cost to an arbitrarily low level and keep his claim to benefits intact he will be all for it. So overall, citing that most people have rejected the freedom I talk about is irrelevant in deciding if it’s right or wrong, since most people are being bribed with promises of higher net benefits at the expense of the minority “big guy,” your shark if you will.

Also regarding your point of unconscionabilty, I do not reject the concept, but I do reject the way it is applied now. If I understand the concept correctly it has to be issues with the substance and process. Like cruel and unusual punishment has to go together. I already stated that government should defend people who entered into one-sided contracts as victims of force or fraud. Substance and process.
 

BigUnc

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Isn't there a middle ground somewhere in here?

I agree that a purely free market system is unworkable. That kind of system immediately brings up the bogus concept of libertarianism. On the other hand the prospect of choking regulation by the judicial or legislative branches also sends shivers down my spine.As far as whether there have been victims I would say that by the large number of complaints and the anecdotal evidence that there is something underhanded going on industry wide.

In this particular lawsuit it would appear IMHO that the plaintiff over reached by trying to get the courts to essentially write the terms of all future contracts including the compensation amount. The plaintiff should have stuck to the terms of the contract in dispute and used that as a basis to petition Congress to amend the law or write new ones.

Being that petitioning Congress is a slow and laborious process and people need relief now is perhaps the reason Judge Posner is determined to have the court intervene. I believe the plaintiffs case is severely weakened by the ruling of the lower court(the fact finder) and the lower court ruling has withstood appellate review. On what basis the Supreme Court is gong to take this case is beyond me.
 

QueEx

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Re: U.S. Stock Market

In this particular lawsuit it would appear IMHO that the plaintiff over reached by trying to get the courts to essentially write the terms of all future contracts including the compensation amount. The plaintiff should have stuck to the terms of the contract in dispute and used that as a basis to petition Congress to amend the law or write new ones.

But what are the facts of this case BigUnc ???


QueEx
 

QueEx

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Re: U.S. Stock Market

I am very much aware of the reality of life versus the optimality of life. I know there is not a free person on this earth. However, since I hold no respect for the concept of majority rule, I see the issue differently. The rarity of freedom in this world isn’t an indictment of the concept of freedom, but instead of the elements of humanity that has, throughout unwritten and written history, fought against it. The timeframe where the concept of freedom is defined and pursued by humanity en masse is really just a blip on the radar of human history, the last few hundred years at most. Being in the minority on this issue does not reduce the validity or merit of the ideal.
And I agree with the quest for freedom while I subscribe to the notion of Locke's social contract whereby we all have to agree to give up aspects of absolute freedom in exchange for relative peaceful coexistence, one with another.


Greed said:
You mentioned an immediate divergence of our positions in your post, and I’ll return the favor. Your response assumes when two parties enter into a contract one is taking advantage of the other, and I’ll cite your consistent reference to dog-eat-dog.
On the contrary, I do not assume unequal bargaining -- but that it occurs, naturally, is no anomaly. My point is that because it does occur with relative frequency the law recognizes the same and imposes restraints. Our difference, in all due respects, is that you don't believe in those restraints, absent fraud (though I think that you do; but its inconsistent with your market based approach). With respect to dog eat dog, you too agree with that concept since it is the very basis of absolute freedom of contract without govermental intervention or protections. I simply do not believe that man can be left to his own devices without control (restraining laws) because dog will eat dog and everything else until there is virtually nothing else, to eat -- which is at the heart of the concept of self preservation.


However, appealing to your own experience of entering into these agreements, if no one forced the parties involved to agree to the terms, then there must be another motivation for them. Without fraud or force the only motivation left is a perceived future benefit associated with the agreement. In addition, the perceived benefit is all that needs to be present, and not actual benefit.
Again, I have to disagree with you (with the intent not to be disagreeable). There is a kind of force that is not physical or domineering - though as real as them both - - and that is human need for those things that are possessed by others more powerful or blessed. For example, they guy with a lil family needs to purchase a refrigerator to help sustain his family. Because of his relative station in life (he is poor with poor credit) he is forced to accept the credit terms of the Umma Rip You Off Company. Of course, he could go without the refrigerator, but that will cause his family even more grief that the high-ass interest rate he has to pay for the frig.

Did anybody force him to make the purchase? Hi-Ass-Frig Company didn't force him, but life did.

Bottom line, the law recognizes that Hi-Ass-Frig will (as human nature is inclined to do) fuck over Family Guy because, that is what humans tend to do. Hence, laws are put into place to deal with the this rip-off and the out-take is bite out of the ass of the Hi-Ass-Frig of the world.


Also regarding your point of unconscionabilty, I do not reject the concept, but I do reject the way it is applied now. If I understand the concept correctly it has to be issues with the substance and process. Like cruel and unusual punishment has to go together. I already stated that government should defend people who entered into one-sided contracts as victims of force or fraud. Substance and process.
You just have to take the next step to the realization that there are wrongs more egregious than brute force or fraud which, nevertheless, cause as much or more harm and are due to be protected agains.



QueEx
 

BigUnc

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But what are the facts of this case BigUnc ???


QueEx


I haven't found the lower court files on this case yet.The plaintiffs are Jerry and Mary Jones from South Carolina,I believe. I did find the 7th Circuit case but not a transcript of oral arguments just the audio.

here's the oral arguments

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/G10NCPEO.mp3


The opinion of Judge Easterbrook

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/G10NDVYS.pdf


The opinion of Judge Posner(per curiam)

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/G10NGF5C.pdf
 

QueEx

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Re: U.S. Stock Market

BigUnc,

I get the following from each of the three links: "The page you are looking for might have been removed, had its name changed, or is temporarily unavailable. "

QueEx
 

QueEx

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Re: U.S. Stock Market

Big Unc,

Thanks for the link.

When I read the article (second from the top of this thread) that started this little exchange, I noted that the author did not mention a "contract." Nevertheless, reading Greed's arguments its obvious that much of his comments are predicated upon the existence of a contract. Then, reading your comments at post No. 17 above, you stated:
In this particular lawsuit it would appear IMHO that the plaintiff over reached by trying to get the courts to essentially write the terms of all future contracts including the compensation amount. The plaintiff should have stuck to the terms of the contract in dispute and used that as a basis to petition Congress to amend the law or write new ones.​
I admit that I scanned the Jones case pretty fast and I might be missing something, however, I just don't see the contract that you guys have mentioned that the court was asked to depart. As I see it understand the facts,
Oakmark Fund paid Harris Associates 1% (per year) of the first $2 billion of the fund’s assets, 0.9% of the next $1 billion, 0.8% of the next $2 billion, and 0.75% of anything over $5 billion.​

And the Court pointed out that "the fees for the other funds . . . are similar . . . [and that] it is undisputed that these fees are roughly the same (in both level and breakpoints) as those that other funds of similar
size and investment goals pay their advisers." (the Jones case at page 6).

The fees for the fund manager is set by the trustees of the fund. In this case, the fee paid to Harris Associates, the manager, was set by the trustees of the Oakmark Fund. Hence, it does not appear that this is really a "contract" case but one where there is a challenge to the discretion of the trustee acting in their fiduciary capacity. (Again, I read it really quick and I could have missed something, if so, I trust someone will point it out).

I will finish reading over the case later; - its travel time again, gotta go.


QueEx
 

BigUnc

Potential Star
Registered
Re: U.S. Stock Market

I would say brother QueX is that you can't have a fee for services arrangement without a contract. Here's a couple snippets from Judge Posners opinion:


These findings support recent calls for more disclosure regarding
the negotiation of advisory contracts by fund
boards.

“[T]he chief reason for substantial advisory fee level differences between equity pension fund portfolio managers and
equity mutual fund portfolio managers is that advisory
fees in the pension field are subject to a marketplace
where arm’s-length bargaining occurs. As a rule, [mutual] fund shareholders neither benefit from arm’s-length
bargaining nor from prices that approximate those that
arm’s-length bargaining would yield were it the norm.”

John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, “Mutual Fund
Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest,” 26 J.
Corp. L. 609, 634 (2001).


From Judge Easterbrook:

To get anywhere, even with a private right of action, plaintiffs would have to show the sort of violation that knocks out any valid contract between Harris Associates and the funds.

During the time covered by the suit, the funds had
nine or ten trustees, at least seven of whom are independent
even if we count Morgenstern as interested. That’s
comfortably over the statutory requirement that 40% of
trustees be disinterested. And as the disinterested trustees unanimously approved the contracts with Harris Associates,
it makes no difference how Morgenstern is classified.



Now for the main event: plaintiffs’ contention that the
adviser’s fees are excessive. They rely on §36(b), which
provides:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment
adviser of a registered investment company shall
be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect
to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered
investment company, or by the security
holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any
affiliated person of such investment adviser. An
action may be brought under this subsection by
the Commission, or by a security holder of such
registered investment company on behalf of such
company, against such investment adviser . . . .
With respect to any such action the following
provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or
prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of
fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the
board of directors of such investment
company of such compensation or payments,
or of contracts or other arrangements
providing for such compensation or
payments, and ratification or approval of
such compensation or payments, or of
contracts or other arrangements providing
for such compensation or payments,
by
the shareholders of such investment company,
shall be given such consideration by
the court as is deemed appropriate under
all the circumstances. . . .


I'm pretty sure there's a contract
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Re: U.S. Stock Market

Big Unc,

As always, thank you for your comments and insight.

I should have been more precise earlier than my hurried comments permitted. Brother Greed raised the issue above regarding shareholder/plaintiff contracts, at Post No. 4, as follows:
Greed said:
Generally, shareholders can always review their relationship with fund managers and deny the fund manager the use of their capital if they don't think he is worth the fees the shareholder is paying. No victimology needed.

If a less fluid contractual relationship exist and one party think the other isn't being faithful to the terms, then sue the other party. That's a disagreement that the court system exist to resolve.

However, just being regretful that you entered into a relationship with someone who you think is overpaid for an unexpectedly shitty job is a waste of time.

I disagree with both judges because unless a contract dispute or outright fraud is involved the court/government should stay out of the equation.
That comment, I believe, assumed that the shareholders were suing upon a contract that THEY contend had been breached. What I keep saying is, thats not true. The signficance of this contract theory is that the managers fee was set in a contract; but that contract was neither (1) one that the shareholder/investors were a part, or (2) one in which the managers fee was approved by the Shareholders.

You are right, however, there is a contract -- but it is one that exist between the Fund Managers (Harris Associates) and the Fund (Oakmark) through its Trustees, that is, the Trustees set the fee with Harris Associates through that contract. The Shareholders, however, have NO DIRECT AGREEMENT with Harris Associates, hence, there is NO FEE CONTRACT between the Shareholders and Fund Managers and, therefore, there is no issue of breach of contract with Harris Associates. In other words, it would be wrong to argue that the Shareholders/Investors agreed to the fee arrangment and, therefore, need to shut the fuck up and stop the pity party. (Maybe they need to STFU, but not for that reason).

So, the Shareholders sued, not on the breach of a contract with Harris, Oakmark or anyone else -- but <U>under the statute</U> that provides that the Trustees have a Fiduciary Duty to the shareholders in setting the fees with the fund managers. The Shareholders argued, among other things, that the Trustees breached their fiduciary duty by setting the fee, too high.

The trial court upheld the fee awarded to Harris Associates because it was 'ordinary' under the Gartenberg Test.

On appeal to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld the fee, but rejected the Gartenberg Test as the appropriate standard of review. Under Gartgenberg, in order to determine whether a fee is excessive, the inquiry is "whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances." To violate that standard, "the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining." In other words, disproportionately large is synonymous with extra-ordinary. A fee that falls within the standard is 'ordinary" and one that is excessive is "extraordinary.'

In order to determine what is an ordinary fee or a fee that is not disproportionately large -- Gartenberg supposedly looks to see what fees are charged in the market place. The Shareholders argued that the market place approach is faulty because, among other things, the market is not necessarily "arms-length" (bargaining between unrelated and uninterested parties) because there are, in many cases, incestous relationships -- where investment advisers create mutual funds where they end up being most of the Trustees and, hence, dominate decision making, they argue, to the detriment of the shareholder/investors.

Long day. More later on: Easterbrook v. Posner, the Standard of Review; Plainitff-Shareholders; the Real Issue in the Jones case; and, why there must be protections against the Free Market Economy.



QueEx
 
Last edited:

BigUnc

Potential Star
Registered
Re: U.S. Stock Market

The strength of the plaintiffs case is with the relationships at the top. There is hat person, whose name I cant recall,that was instrumental in setting this up but whose clear conflict of interest was arranged in a way on paper to appear that he was disinterested when he clearly had a future monetary interest with the fee structure as it stood. That to me should have been the main argument but somehow he got just a passing mention. Maybe that was the plaintiffs strategy but somehow this case got twisted into dueling scholarly studies and other B.S. which blurred everything. Maybe the Supreme Court needs to step in to put some clarity on this case. With 2 appellate courts making different rulings in regard to Gartenberg strengthens the plaintiffs case for Supreme Court review. But with the current make up of the court I don't know if it would be a good idea to proceed.

I agree we need protection, or another way to put it a level playing field with clear boundaries and let everyone who dares to step on it have at each other.
 

Greed

Star
Registered
Re: U.S. Stock Market

Looking back, I think I consistently used the words contract and agreement interchangably in regards to the overall principle. In regards to the specific case, I can't believe hundreds of thouands of dollars were paid out in performance related fees with no written contract.
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Re: U.S. Stock Market

In regards to the specific case, I can't believe hundreds of thouands of dollars were paid out in performance related fees with no written contract.
Who said there was no contract ?

QueEx
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Re: U.S. Stock Market

Greed said:
You mentioned an immediate divergence of our positions in your post, and I’ll return the favor. Your response assumes when two parties enter into a contract one is taking advantage of the other, and I’ll cite your consistent reference to dog-eat-dog.

QueEx said:
On the contrary, I do not assume unequal bargaining -- but that it occurs, naturally, is no anomaly. My point is that because it does occur with relative frequency the law recognizes the same and imposes restraints. Our difference, in all due respects, is that you don't believe in those restraints, absent fraud (though I think that you do; but its inconsistent with your market based approach). With respect to dog eat dog, you too agree with that concept since it is the very basis of absolute freedom of contract without govermental intervention or protections. I simply do not believe that man can be left to his own devices without control (restraining laws) because dog will eat dog and everything else until there is virtually nothing else, to eat -- which is at the heart of the concept of self preservation.

Greed said:
However, appealing to your own experience of entering into these agreements, if no one forced the parties involved to agree to the terms, then there must be another motivation for them. Without fraud or force the only motivation left is a perceived future benefit associated with the agreement. In addition, the perceived benefit is all that needs to be present, and not actual benefit.

QueEx said:
Again, I have to disagree with you (with the intent not to be disagreeable). There is a kind of force that is not physical or domineering - though as real as them both - - and that is human need for those things that are possessed by others more powerful or blessed. For example, they guy with a lil family needs to purchase a refrigerator to help sustain his family. Because of his relative station in life (he is poor with poor credit) he is forced to accept the credit terms of the Umma Rip You Off Company. Of course, he could go without the refrigerator, but that will cause his family even more grief that the high-ass interest rate he has to pay for the frig.

Did anybody force him to make the purchase? Hi-Ass-Frig Company didn't force him, but life did.

Bottom line, the law recognizes that Hi-Ass-Frig will (as human nature is inclined to do) fuck over Family Guy because, that is what humans tend to do. Hence, laws are put into place to deal with the this rip-off and the out-take is bite out of the ass of the Hi-Ass-Frig of the world.

Greed said:
Also regarding your point of unconscionabilty, I do not reject the concept, but I do reject the way it is applied now. If I understand the concept correctly it has to be issues with the substance and process. Like cruel and unusual punishment has to go together. I already stated that government should defend people who entered into one-sided contracts as victims of force or fraud. Substance and process.

QueEx said:
You just have to take the next step to the realization that there are wrongs more egregious than brute force or fraud which, nevertheless, cause as much or more harm and are due to be protected agains.


As I reflected over the recent course of events with the markets, the financial houses and bailouts, I thought again about our exchange above. It occurred to me that the heart of our discussion involved one of the central themes under discussion today: REGULATION.

I am a firm believer in that old adage, "if you spare the rod, you'll ruin the child". Too little discipline, in most cases, will lend to a bad result; conversely, too much discipline is likely to end in a bad, though perhaps different, result. And, so it is with regulation.


QueEx
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Re: U.S. Stock Market

<font size="5"><center>
Beyond a bailout, Wall Street needs new rules</font size>
<font size="4">
Pay plans that pushed CEOs to 'roll the dice' must go.</font size></center>

Christian Science Monitor
By Andy Zelleke
September 23, 2008


Cambridge, Mass. - The financial calamity that has befallen the United States quite obviously reflects Wall Street failures in leadership and risk management. But we couldn't have arrived at this crisis point without a fundamental failure of government. That failure must be owned up to and rectified in the weeks ahead, or even the planned $700 billion bailout will end up being just a band-aid.

Capitalism relies on markets to make the world go round. But as Nobel Prize-winning economist Douglass North has articulated, it's the government's responsibility to ensure a legal and institutional context that is conducive to well-functioning markets. "Rules of the game" distinguish a healthy free market from a destructively chaotic one.

The inadequacy of Wall Street's rules has now been revealed beyond argument. The full magnitude of this calamity has yet to sink in. The financial services industry was supposed to be one of the remaining sectors of US competitive advantage in a globalized economy. Instead, its malfunctioning has further jeopardized the economic security of the American people.

So as Congress considers a massive bailout intended to relieve firms of the toxic securities on their balance sheet, it must also pledge to rewrite the rules of the game. It's unacceptable to put Wall Street's recklessness on the taxpayers' tab without an ironclad guarantee that business as usual is over. But what should the new rules look like? A comprehensive answer – including the contours of the new regulatory regime that's needed – is beyond the scope and deadline of the immediate bailout. Still, a few of its essential elements are clear.

Wall Street badly needs a culture change at the top. Its leaders must come to view themselves as stewards of institutions for the long term, not as temporary operators of vehicles proficient at finding new ways to throw off wealth, with everything else – including impact on the public interest – a mere detail. Institutional stewardship will mean, in practice, forgoing some opportunities for making a killing when the downside of a bet gone bad may be to jeopardize a franchise.

America must also come to terms with the infirmities of our system of corporate governance. This is especially true in the financial sector, which combines outsized rewards for apparent success. The emphasis is on "apparent," since byzantine balance sheets make it nearly impossible to know whether a CEO is really succeeding.

It's unlikely that most boards of directors of Wall Street firms – charged with oversight of management, with the interests of shareholders and of the institution uppermost in mind – understood the magnitude of the existential risks being undertaken by management in the pursuit of profit. But without industry-appropriate and company-specific understanding of risk, meaningful oversight is impossible.

The exorbitant CEO pay on Wall Street could only be justified on the premise that the firms they led were creating reasonably durable financial value while running only reasonable risk; and that the process of creating that financial value – though perhaps not the work of angels – was at the very least not destructive to the real economy. Its further premise was that the boards of directors hiring CEOs could distinguish the superior from the inferior talents, and that the better talents demanded to be paid extravagantly. These premises – except perhaps the last – have been undermined by this crisis.

The most objectionable aspect of CEO compensation isn't primarily the unfairness of the few at the top taking more than their appropriate share, nor that CEOs could cash in their personal gains based on ephemeral financial value, nor even the absurdity of massive "golden parachutes" paid out in cases of failure. The worst affront to the national interest is that these compensation arrangements created incentives for CEOs to "roll the dice" in search of the biggest possible scores for the company (and, not coincidentally, themselves), with too little regard for the downside risk if they bet wrong. And with no appreciation for the potentially dangerous consequences of such gambles, in the aggregate, for the economic security of the American people.

In now bailing out the financial sector, the government must do more than cut a deal on the toxic securities. The bargain must include a fundamental reform of the rules of the game on Wall Street to better align its activities with the public interest. Policymakers can't possibly work out the contours of these new rules in a few days. That's why this week's agreement must be understood to be merely Act 1, with much more to follow.

But Act 2 must be truly systemic. Having belatedly recognized that business as usual on Wall Street is capable of mortally wounding our economy, it would be the height of irresponsibility for Washington to simply restore the status quo ante – minus a player or two. The price for this bailout must include an explicit embrace by Wall Street of responsibilities to the public interest.

• Andy Zelleke is a lecturer in public policy at Harvard Kennedy School and codirector of its Center for Public Leadership.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0923/p09s02-coop.html
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Re: U.S. Stock Market

The comments in this thread have suddenly become relevant, today.

QueEx
 

QueEx

Rising Star
Super Moderator
Re: U.S. Stock Market

<font size="5"><center>Obama's salary cap could mean huge
pay cut for top executives</font size>
<font size="4">

Executives at the biggest companies stand to lose
the most with the president's move to limit compensation
to $500,000. Compensation for CEOs at large businesses
averaged $11 million in 2007.</font size></center>


Los Angeles Times
By Michael Muskal
12:37 PM PST, February 4, 2009


Today's move by the Obama administration to put a $500,000 cap on the pay of senior executives at companies hoping for federal bailout money could force some big firms to rethink their pay packages.

The bigger the company, the bigger the effect is likely to be, according to an analysis prepared by Equilar Inc., of Redwood Shores, Calif., an information services firm specializing in executive compensation.

The company looked at chief executive compensation at public banks that already have received funds from the Troubled Assets Relief Program. More than half of the $700 billion in TARP funds approved last year have been distributed or earmarked.


Chief executives of companies with more than $10 billion in assets had an average compensation in 2007 of more than $11 million. Of that money, the average base pay was $844,229, well above the $500,000 figure announced today.

In addition to salary, chief executives also received an average cash bonus of more than $2.5 million, benefits and perquisites of $292,000 and average equity awards of almost $7.5 million, Equilar said.

At mid-sized institutions, those with assets between $1 billion and $9.9 billion, chief executives had an average base pay of $397,162 in 2007. But other compensation brought them to $858,754, still over today's limit. An average cash bonus added $134,717, benefits and perquisites added $115,201, and stock awards added $211,674.

Of the smallest group, those with assets of less than $1 billion, the average compensation was $384,000 in 2007. The average base pay was $247,135, cash bonus was $76,339, benefits and add-ons were $38,514, and stock was $22,023.

Today's cap does not apply to any of the companies that already have received federal money and would have no effect on the recently announced bonuses of more than $18 billion paid last year to Wall Street firms during the sharp economic downturn. Reports of those bonuses sparked the political outrage that led to the call in Congress to limit executive pay.

But the issue of executive compensation has been a flash point for years. Studies by an advocacy group showed that, in 2007, CEOs earned an average of $10.5 million, about 344 times an average worker's pay.

michael.muskal@latimes.com

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pay-impact-2009feb05,0,4979583.story
 
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