BREAKING: INVASION HAS BEGUN..... Putin's "3-day war"... NOW... 1 YEAR 338 DAYS ...WAGNER HEAD SAYS GROUP STANDING DOWN AFTER CLAIMS OF DEAL
- Thread starter lightbright
- Start date
The whole point of troll accounts like that is to muddy the water and blur the line between what is real and what is bullshit. I would suggest that if Girkin et al. describe the situation in the same way as ISW, that is probably an accurate assessment of what is going on. As far as I know, Girkin etc. are not Western imperialists.
That same account was attempting to discredit Bellingcat as well. I wonder why? It couldnt be that they debunked the Amstor mall attack "story" just as russophile idiot twitter was getting started with the false flags, biolabs, NATO bullshit...
Russia’s Kremenchuk Claims Versus the Evidence - bellingcat
Russian claims about the missile strike that hit a factory and mall in Kremenchuk appear to be contradicted by open source evidence.
www.bellingcat.com
Man the more I’ve been researching things and look at videos of the civilians… this conflict is nothing more than a civil war both sides getting outside help.
Ukraine /NATO vs Donbas(LPR/DPR)/Russia
How NATO got so invested into Ukraine, that’s a different point.
But when everything is scaled back to the core…. This is totally a civil war in Ukraine.
no matter how we slice it
Ukraine /NATO vs Donbas(LPR/DPR)/Russia
How NATO got so invested into Ukraine, that’s a different point.
But when everything is scaled back to the core…. This is totally a civil war in Ukraine.
no matter how we slice it
Damn you called ISW a troll accountThe whole point of troll accounts like that is to muddy the water and blur the line between what is real and what is bullshit. I would suggest that if Girkin et al. describe the situation in the same way as ISW, that is probably an accurate assessment of what is going on. As far as I know, Girkin etc. are not Western imperialists.
That same account was attempting to discredit Bellingcat as well. I wonder why? It couldnt be that they debunked the Amstor mall attack "story" just as russophile idiot twitter was getting started with the false flags, biolabs, NATO bullshit...
Russia’s Kremenchuk Claims Versus the Evidence - bellingcat
Russian claims about the missile strike that hit a factory and mall in Kremenchuk appear to be contradicted by open source evidence.
yes Lawd
who debunked false flags operations like the mall attack, that b word
man u know that b word is as serious as a heart attack
All of the Russian nationalists, Wagner nazi mercenaries and LNR/DNR nationalists all have been calling for mobilization for a while now. Kadyrov has called for it and Girkin, mouthpiece for the FSB, has been one of the loudest proponents of it. I think there are three main reasons he can't do it and is using a stealth or shadow mobilization instead:
1. It would be a formal admission that things in Ukraine are not going to plan. The idea of losing all of the VDV and other elite troops in Kyiv as part of a tactical feint only makes sense to idiots on twitter.
Mobilizing after being forced to drastically reduce the aims of the special operation would be a humiliation.2. Mobilization would bring the war to "ethnic" russians in the major cities and not just poor, rural ethnic minorities. The reports of soldiers being shocked by indoor plumbing etc. are because these are troops from remote villages desperate for work/money etc.
Young, poor and from minorities: the Russian troops killed in Ukraine
The bulk of the thousands of Russian soldiers killed in Moscow's onslaught against Ukraine are very young, have poor backgrounds and many are from ethnic minority groups, observers say.
www.france24.com
Indoor Plumbing Still a Pipe Dream for 20% of Russian Households, Reports Say - The Moscow Times
More than one-fifth of Russian households do not have access to indoor plumbing, according to official statistics obtained by the RBC news website on Tuesday.
These are ads that are appearing in Russia but, conveniently, not in Moscow, St. Petersburg etc.
Russia is conducting covert mobilisation campaign, Ukraine spy chief says
Russia is using its reserve forces in a covert mobilisation to replenish its ranks in eastern Ukraine and there is no point in simply waiting for its offensive potential to fizzle out, the head of Ukraine's military intelligence agency said on Saturday.
More on it:
Russia's 'Shadow Mobilization' Accelerates With New Ethnic Units From The North Caucasus
Faced with a deepening personnel crisis for its war in Ukraine, Russian authorities are recruiting from republics in the North Caucasus and looking to form extra units along ethnic lines.
www.rferl.org
3. Think of the rivalry that exists between the FSB and GRU and realize that the military is fractured/warring with itself in a similar manner. It is by design to keep certain elements from being too powerful to control. Recall, the FSB helped kill elite Chechen units at the beginning of the of the "special operation": https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...-russia-ukraine-assassination-attempt-foiled/ The theory being these elite forces could be used against anyone Putin wanted so they were a threat to the FSB.
You see the same different type of thinking within the military. Widespread reports of forced prostitution etc. going back decades now well before even 2014:
Were Russian soldiers forced into prostitution?
In the latest claim of rampant abuse in the nation’s armed forces, Russian military prosecutors pledged Monday to investigate claims that young conscripts were forced into prostitution by fellow soldiers.
www.nbcnews.com
Russian military gigolo ring
DENIS SINYAKOV/AFP Russian prosecutors are investigating claims that young conscripts are being forced into prostitution by senior officers for a "network of clients" in St. Petersburg.…
foreignpolicy.com
It is all by design to prevent a coup but it also means that any full mobilization would mean that portions of the military would become too strong. Think about the strength/respect the military in places like Turkey or Egypt has and compare that with Russia:
Not at all. I was talking about the troll accounted you posted that posts and amplifies russian bullshit in addition to random right wing bullshit. How this makes any sense to some on here I will never know...
It retweeted this from Cernovich
and this from Gonzalo Lira
Not at all. I was talking about the troll accounted you posted that posts and amplifies russian bullshit in addition to random right wing bullshit. How this makes any sense to some on here I will never know...
It retweeted this from Cernovich
and this from Gonzalo Lira
Fa sho bro,
I understand how things work …
can’t even talk about Ukraine
German Tokyo Rose is no different than the other "covid truthers" turned russophiles on social media. Uncle vlad and the FSB offer steady pay and there are millions of "covid truthers" ready to be made marks again...
Less than three years ago, Alina Lipp was still a committed member of the Green Party in Lower Saxony, was an advisory member of the environmental committee of the city of Hanover and then became involved with the party in Lüneburg. By 2022, that's long gone, and the 28-year-old has discovered a new role for herself: she's one of the most important propaganda figures for Vladimir Putin in Germany.On her Telegram channel "News from Russia," Lipp now has more than 120,000 followers and spreads pro-Russian propaganda there; for a few days now, she has also been reporting from the separatist region in the Donbass.
The former Green shares Russian propaganda videos that have already been exposed as false, considers the horrific images from Butcha and other Ukrainian cities a staging.Alina Lipp spreads pro-Russian propaganda on TelegramOfficially, Lipp calls herself a "peace journalist," but she spreads unfiltered Russian propaganda that could also be broadcast that way on state television there. Thus, the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine is a "special operation", Ukraine is kept under control by a "regime". The 28-year-old was born in Hamburg to a German mother and a Russian father.
Lipp is something of Putin's wartime influencer - and she carries her propaganda to Germany via Telegram and Facebook. At the end of March, she spread a rumor of an attack by Ukrainian refugees on a man for allegedly speaking Russian. They allegedly beat him to death. Lipp stated that the crime took place in Euskirchen. There is no evidence for this, the police also vehemently contradicts. Simply because there is no murder victim.According to a report in "Der Spiegel,"
Lipp's transformation comes as quite a surprise, if one asks former companions. Local politicians from Hanover described her as completely inconspicuous, the magazine article says. The traces for the radical change lead to a research project of the Moscow Lomonosov University in the Crimea.Back in Germany, Lipp no longer sympathized with the Greens but with the lateral thinkers, demonstrated against the Corona measures and founded the YouTube channel "Druzhba FM" with Sergei Filbert, who is also of Russian origin. Druzhba is the Russian word for friendship.
Alina Lipp turns away from the Greens in early 2020
According to "Der Spiegel," Lipp turned away from the Greens as early as the beginning of 2020; since then, her contributions have become increasingly radical, and her reporting reflects almost unfiltered information released by the Kremlin.Most recently, a video by the now 28-year-old surfaced in which she posits that there is no longer any freedom of expression, only "controlled media." Lipp is not referring to the situation in Russia, but in Germany. The video is not current, but two years old. Since then, Lipp has gained even more reach - and intensified her ties to Russia.
She even made it to the hall of fame of grifts, InfoWars...
An independent German journalist is being targeted by her government for documenting the ongoing atrocities by the Ukrainian government in the Donbas region.
Alina Lipp claims the German government has opened a criminal case against her and frozen her and her father’s bank accounts pending a trial that she is forbidden to appear at over her reporting of Russia’s military operation in the Donbas region over the last several months.
Please don't try to turn this into another "ivermectin" thread with infowars level disinformation. The reality on this is interesting enough that we don't need the additional insights of the "anti vaccine" crowd
It is still insane to me that we not only get insights from the more hawkish elements of the FSB through their mouthpiece Girkin but that anglophone russophiles are less sober and realistic in their assessments than literally the FSB.
Short review of the frontline situation. With predictions.
1. “Border” front (from borders with Belarus and Kharkiv Oblast):
No substantial changes. The situation is gradually but steadily heating up. Artillery skirmishes, sabotage actions. The enemy is stepping up shelling and UAV attacks deeper into the Russian territory. The aim is to force RF AF to manoeuvre the available air defence units to cover the cities, weakening the cover of forces on the frontline and near rears, in addition to “increasing the prestige of the Russian authorities and the President personally among the population of shelled settlements”. Both sides are gradually bringing forces to the border. I predict that at the end of summer (if not earlier) this frontline will become quite active, which, considering the absence of mobilisation in RF, will only be beneficial to the enemy, who is able to put up a much larger number of “line” detachments and units, even if just light infantry, thanks to their own mobilisation.
2. Kharkiv frontline – no major changes.
Artillery skirmishes, aviation activities, fights of local significance. Prediction – potentially can become the main place for the upcoming “battle for the initiative”. How it will really turn out – we shall see. In any case, the extended configuration of the frontline will inevitably lead to attempts of one or the other side (or both) to conduct offensive operations with decisive or partial goals.
3. Izyum-Sloviansk direction.
The transfer of almost all combat-ready artillery and infantry forces of RF AF and LDPR AF to Lysychansk led to a local superiority of UAF over our forces, as a result of which a series of attacks on Krasnopolye and this general direction were unsuccessful. The enemy, by reinforcing their frontline (despite the battle for Lysychansk) with fresh reserves managed in several places to return lost tactical positions.
Prediction: the group of RF AF and LDPR AF in this direction will be definitely strengthened due to release of forces after the victory at Lysychansk, however I am not expecting an advance on the Sloviansk-Barvenkovo line (at least a successful one), since the enemy forces have entrenched well in the terrain, are quite numerous and active. The UAF command (and their military-political authorities) are paying special significance to holding the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
4. Donetsk frontline. Seversk-Uhledar-Bakhmut section.
At the moment, advancing forces of RF AF and LDPR AF are attempting to move forward in the Seversk area “on the shoulders of the retreating enemy”. However the enemy prepared here in advance and occupied the new defensive lines with fresh forces, and continues entrenching. Prediction: unfortunately, I am not expecting substantial successes and the breakthrough of the UAF frontline in this area. A gradual fading of the fighting here is probable.
5. Donetsk frontline. Avdeevka-Maryinka section.
Positional fights with superiority of UAF (the superiority is achieved with good artillery support and the activity of UAVs, both reconnaissance and light strike UAVs). There may be attempts of RF AF command to develop the previously achieved success north of Avdeevka, which will now be much more difficult than during the initial breakthrough of the frontline (which was sacrificed to transfer forces to Severodonetsk-Lysychansk).
6. Donetsk frontline. South section.
Not changes. Pretty much the same situation as in the north. I predict only positional fights in the nearest future.
7. Zaporizhye frontline.
Positional fights, artillery skirmishes. Increasing activity of UAF sabotage groups in the near and far rears of our troops. Potentially one of the possible directions of the enemy offensive.
8. Kherson frontline.
No changes. At the forefront – gradually increasing shelling by UAF artillery. The line of contact has not been formed everywhere, in some sections the defence of both sides has local nature (inside localities). One of the most likely directions of the “battle for the initiative”.
General points:
1. The enemy.
Conclusion: UAF is concluding preparation for their own active operations in one or more directions. Will the enemy first wait for the new attack of RF AF or carry out their actions in a proactive manner – I will not be predicting this.
2. Our troops.
General conclusion for May-June:
The “Second Stage of the SMO” ended without the complete achievement of the set goals. The group of UAF in Donbas is not defeated and not completely driven out of its territory. Only managed to defeat and push out a part of the enemy group from the “bulge” along the Siverskyi Donets, liberating fully the LPR territory and Popasna, Krasyni Lyman, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and a number of smaller settlements.
The operation demonstrated that the RF “peace time army”, even significantly strengthened by LDPR AF and “surrogates” that are various PMCs is not able to complete the objective of the complete defeat of UAF and the victorious conclusion of the so-called SMO.
Delay in mobilisation in the Russian Federation may in the coming months lead to a crisis in certain areas of the “Ukrainian frontline”, while further ignoring of the aforementioned inability will negatively impact the situation on a strategic scale.
Short review of the frontline situation. With predictions.
1. “Border” front (from borders with Belarus and Kharkiv Oblast):
No substantial changes. The situation is gradually but steadily heating up. Artillery skirmishes, sabotage actions. The enemy is stepping up shelling and UAV attacks deeper into the Russian territory. The aim is to force RF AF to manoeuvre the available air defence units to cover the cities, weakening the cover of forces on the frontline and near rears, in addition to “increasing the prestige of the Russian authorities and the President personally among the population of shelled settlements”. Both sides are gradually bringing forces to the border. I predict that at the end of summer (if not earlier) this frontline will become quite active, which, considering the absence of mobilisation in RF, will only be beneficial to the enemy, who is able to put up a much larger number of “line” detachments and units, even if just light infantry, thanks to their own mobilisation.
2. Kharkiv frontline – no major changes.
Artillery skirmishes, aviation activities, fights of local significance. Prediction – potentially can become the main place for the upcoming “battle for the initiative”. How it will really turn out – we shall see. In any case, the extended configuration of the frontline will inevitably lead to attempts of one or the other side (or both) to conduct offensive operations with decisive or partial goals.
3. Izyum-Sloviansk direction.
The transfer of almost all combat-ready artillery and infantry forces of RF AF and LDPR AF to Lysychansk led to a local superiority of UAF over our forces, as a result of which a series of attacks on Krasnopolye and this general direction were unsuccessful. The enemy, by reinforcing their frontline (despite the battle for Lysychansk) with fresh reserves managed in several places to return lost tactical positions.
Prediction: the group of RF AF and LDPR AF in this direction will be definitely strengthened due to release of forces after the victory at Lysychansk, however I am not expecting an advance on the Sloviansk-Barvenkovo line (at least a successful one), since the enemy forces have entrenched well in the terrain, are quite numerous and active. The UAF command (and their military-political authorities) are paying special significance to holding the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
4. Donetsk frontline. Seversk-Uhledar-Bakhmut section.
At the moment, advancing forces of RF AF and LDPR AF are attempting to move forward in the Seversk area “on the shoulders of the retreating enemy”. However the enemy prepared here in advance and occupied the new defensive lines with fresh forces, and continues entrenching. Prediction: unfortunately, I am not expecting substantial successes and the breakthrough of the UAF frontline in this area. A gradual fading of the fighting here is probable.
5. Donetsk frontline. Avdeevka-Maryinka section.
Positional fights with superiority of UAF (the superiority is achieved with good artillery support and the activity of UAVs, both reconnaissance and light strike UAVs). There may be attempts of RF AF command to develop the previously achieved success north of Avdeevka, which will now be much more difficult than during the initial breakthrough of the frontline (which was sacrificed to transfer forces to Severodonetsk-Lysychansk).
6. Donetsk frontline. South section.
Not changes. Pretty much the same situation as in the north. I predict only positional fights in the nearest future.
7. Zaporizhye frontline.
Positional fights, artillery skirmishes. Increasing activity of UAF sabotage groups in the near and far rears of our troops. Potentially one of the possible directions of the enemy offensive.
8. Kherson frontline.
No changes. At the forefront – gradually increasing shelling by UAF artillery. The line of contact has not been formed everywhere, in some sections the defence of both sides has local nature (inside localities). One of the most likely directions of the “battle for the initiative”.
General points:
1. The enemy.
- Throughout the past month, UAF have been continuously increasing the number of troops and equipment in all directions, both active and “sleeping”, thus creating a steady superiority in manpower, artillery and armoured vehicles at many of those. At the same time, the enemy continued forming strategic reserves, limiting their deployment into battle even at the peak of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk battle.
- As a new element of the UAF tactic, special attention is paid to destruction by rocket artillery and unmanned aviation of important rear facitilies and RF AF and LDPR AF, primarily of large ammunition stockpiles that were not sufficiently or not at all covered by air defence forces.
- The local superiority in manpower allowed the enemy to take up previously abandoned territories in many sections without a fight, complicating the tactical situation of our units and formations active in those areas.
- Apparently, the emphasised defensive nature of the battle for Severodonetsk-Lysychansk from the UAF side was deliberate. Battles were simply dragged out with an aim to win as much time as possible and inflict maximum losses on the Russian strike group. After the loss of the main positions was a foregone conclusion, the command of UAF managed to withdraw the core of the defending forces and avoid encirclement of even the smallest part of them – both in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and Zolotoye-Gorskoye. At the same time, however, the majority of the defender’s equipment was irreversibly lost.
Conclusion: UAF is concluding preparation for their own active operations in one or more directions. Will the enemy first wait for the new attack of RF AF or carry out their actions in a proactive manner – I will not be predicting this.
2. Our troops.
- The offensive potential of the strike group that took Lysychansk is almost fully exhausted. Continuing the advance without a sufficient operational pause necessary for replenishment and rest of the troops may lead to additional large losses without significant results. Regrouping and determining of the next offensive targets is necessary, as well as taking measures to repel probable enemy attacks.
- Russian troops are experiencing growing difficulties in confrontation with UAF on a tactical level due to increasing enemy superiority in manpower and the increase in modern combat equipment available to them.
- A lack of replenishment and the impossibility of rotation (especially for the mobilised units of LDPR AF who have been on the frontline for 3-4 months without rotation) leads to a slow but constant decrease in the actual combat readiness and morale of our units and formations currently on defence (while the morale of those who suffered heavy losses but still advancing assault formations remains high).
- The military-political authority of RF cannot allow itself to gain foothold in positions and give the initiative fully into the hands of the enemy, since dragging out the hostilities in these conditions will only lead to an increase in the enemy strength and weakening of our strength. Therefore I’m expecting deployment into combat of prepared reserves in a new offensive operation as part of the “battle for the initiative” immediately after some short operational pause.
General conclusion for May-June:
The “Second Stage of the SMO” ended without the complete achievement of the set goals. The group of UAF in Donbas is not defeated and not completely driven out of its territory. Only managed to defeat and push out a part of the enemy group from the “bulge” along the Siverskyi Donets, liberating fully the LPR territory and Popasna, Krasyni Lyman, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and a number of smaller settlements.
The operation demonstrated that the RF “peace time army”, even significantly strengthened by LDPR AF and “surrogates” that are various PMCs is not able to complete the objective of the complete defeat of UAF and the victorious conclusion of the so-called SMO.
Delay in mobilisation in the Russian Federation may in the coming months lead to a crisis in certain areas of the “Ukrainian frontline”, while further ignoring of the aforementioned inability will negatively impact the situation on a strategic scale.