"they put the fuel way too close to the front of the plane causing it to tip slightly when in the air
and its heavier than the other 737s .
so by this tipping actyion these safety mechanisms work against the own plane itself."
"The engines were too big to fit under the wing so they pushed them forward.. then used software to counter balance the plane. The engines should have never been installed on the Max 8 or 9 to begin with, but it saved Boeing the cost of designing a new plane."
"I currently fly the B737NG (BBJ), which is a little different than the MAX, and have a lot of friends that fly it. I can tell you that the entire Boeing pilot community hasn't been this concerned since the rudder hard-over problems of the 90s. "
"Reading a pilot forum, it seems like the crash had similar features to the recent Lion Air crash of 737-MAX
What seems to have happened there is that the wrong input of airspeed (possibly related to a faulty sensor) caused the MCAS system to point the plane straight into the ground.
Boeing Co. is advising airlines on procedures to deal with false readings from an plane sensor that authorities say malfunctioned on a 737 Max jet that crashed off the Indonesian coast over a week ago.
The operations-manual bulletin was issued Tuesday, Boeing said in a statement posted to Twitter, and tells crew to use existing guidelines when dealing with erroneous inputs from the so-called angle of attack sensor. That sensor is intended to maintain air flow over a plane’s wings but if it malfunctions can lead to an aerodynamic stall — which can cause aircraft to abruptly dive."
"Here is the caveman explanation for the MCAS system:
1)Big engines on wing changed stall characteristics during certification tests
2) At high AoA, flaps up, full down elevator insufficient
3) MCAS automatically trims nose down at high AoA, flaps up, autopilot off
4) 1 Faulty AoA indication is all it takes to begin nose down trim
5) full aft control yoke does not automatically cut off MCAS nose down trim"
"Boeing executives sat down last November with pilots at the Allied Pilots Association’s low-slung brick headquarters in Fort Worth.
Tensions were running high. One of Boeing’s new jets — hailed by the company as an even more reliable version of Boeing’s stalwart 737 — had crashed into the ocean off Indonesia shortly after takeoff, killing all 189 people on board the flight operated by Lion Air.
After the crash, Boeing issued a bulletin disclosing that this line of planes, known as the 737 Max 8, was equipped with a new type of software as part of the plane’s automated functions. Some pilots were furious that they were not told about the new software when the plane was unveiled.
Dennis Tajer, a 737 captain who attended the meeting with Boeing executives, recalled, “They said, ‘Look, we didn’t include it because we have a lot of people flying on this and we didn’t want to inundate you with information.’ ”